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The Christian moralist does not live in a vaemm#
HO develops hie ethical thought in the atmosphere of the 
wrld around him, currently a world of rapid change^ volatile 
events^ expanding knowledge# and interrelated discoveries*
The relationship of his theological work to those discoveries 
and events affect his existence and the development of his 
ethics# This thesis explores one aspect of that relationship 
and examines some of the ways In which the recent studies in 
evolutionary science affect the development of Ohristian 
ethics in the last few decades of the twentieth century*
James Sellers has advised in a recent hook on Theological
The ethioist will take steps to open his investi­gations to every helpful means of studying his cultureand society* lia will necessarily he m  amateur in most realms of analysis # * * (But) he must not he reluctant to make use of the professional work of the natural and social scientists and humanists#, so far as he is able# for filling out and supplementing his own methods of getting at the facts# He will also select one or more non#theologioal disciplines # * *_in which he works at becoming a knowledgeable amateur#^
This thesis was begun in advance of Sellers* advice# but it is 
this writer *s attempt to become a "knowledgeable amateur" in 
a non#theological discipline# to the end that it will assist
^James Sellers# Theological Ethics (lew York: The Macmillan Oompany> 1966)# p*'"'88* '''
in the definition of and the solution to some current ethical 
problems facing the Christian moralist*
As it stands now# I have ended with a thesis that I 
did not Intend to write. At the start I was interested in 
the subject of how ethical decisions are made in the context 
of non-rational settings# where# by the time the agent begins 
to reflect on ethical situations# he more or less already has 
his ethical ideals as part of the reflection. That intended 
thesis involved psychological# sociological# and biological 
considerations•
At first I proposed a thesis entitled# "The Role of the 
Unconscious in Ethical Decisions# and its Implications for the 
Study of Christian Ethics," Freud figured prominently in that 
study# for his work has great importance to the moralist. His 
studies on the formation of ethical ideals in the relationship 
of parent~to~child# and the whole topic of the origin of the 
super-ego# is a critical step in understanding the inception
pof moral ideas and actions,
Others have follwed Freud in this subject# and some 
of their work is also essential to an understanding of ethical 
jud^ents*^ Jung would have been included# partly because of 
his frequently discussed idea of the collective unconscious.
^Soe esp, Biilip Rleff % Freud; The Mind, of a Moralist (London: Methuen University BaperbaoK#1565)'
^Although# as Dr, Seward Hlltner wrote to me in a personal letter# there is not a single good and comprehensive book which relates the subject matter to Christian ethics.
li
Unsuitable though I think that concept is to me# It seems 
to hint at a kind of a priori as well as the same type of 
"molecular memory"^ which is akin to the influence which 
genetically-conditioned behaviour has on the formation of 
ethical ideals and ethical acts in man#
Secondly we looked to the social-anthropological 
studies of ethical behaviour and the different cultural in* 
fluence on the formation of the "good", Sociologists and 
social anthropologists have shown that cultuz'al# or environ­
mental# pre-conditioning of etliical decisions is a most 
iit^ortant aspect in the non-rational origin and development 
of our ethical behaviour. As Dr# Ralph Linton once wrote :
The culture as a whole provides the members of any society with an indispensable guide in all the affairs of life , , # The fact that most members of the society will react to a given situation in a given way makes it possible for anyone to predict their behaviour with a high degree of probability# even though never with absolute certainty*5
There are several which deal with various aspects of the topic# and some of the following are especially helpful to the student: J, A* IWfield# psychology and..,.Morals.i Analysis of Character (LondonI Methuen^wdT''#'^ îBtSeaedlSSïxvarsity Paperbacks# 1954); Ian D# Buttle# $he Origins of Igye and Hate (Hamondsworth# Middlesex: Peregrine" Book#T%#53;' ' Mrsf 'MbliBhed in 1930) 1 Barry L# Hollin#orth# fsy.Oholpgy and Ethics (New York; The Ronald Press Company# I9W); R* B,
tM, (London; Gerald Duckworth& Owpany# Ltd* 1951); Dr# Edmund Bergler# Tbo ,5uDOfeAO: m *(New York: Grune and Stratton# 1952)# etc#
%ohn Bleibtrau# The Parable....of the.. Beast (London; Victor Gollans Ltd.# 1968)# OhapteF'lII#'pp#"#''
^Haiph linton# The. Cultural Background of Personality (London; Eagan Paul# TrencE#" )#p# 13#
In ethical matters# we do tend to follow the ethical and 
moral dictates of those around us; we do tend to shape 
our ideas of the "good#" with at least "a high degree of 
probability’ on the basis of what we are taught* This is 
made clear by different students of ethical-cultural 
studies,& And Professor Ashley Montagu wrote in a way 
directly related to many of the concerns of this thesis:
It is not surprising that Freud was unable to avoid structuring what he perceived of the dynamics of the human mind in terms of the dynamics of the human society with which he was familiar; precisely as the Darwinians were unable to avoid the competi­tive struggle for existence which prevailed in the nineteenth century England, There is nothing new in the discovery that we tend to see the world ac­cording to the Kingdom that is within us# and the Kingdom that is within us is for the most part likely to be the one in which we have been social­ized, ‘
Along with the psychological and sociological as­
pects of the "non-rational” in ethical judgments# there 
is our special interest here - the biological. It is this 
sub-division of the ethical experience to which we have 
delimited our thesis topic# and which forms the primary 
concern of this thesis. One of the reasons for this 
choice was the general problem facing any thesis writer# 
especially one covering a brOad topic - the necessity of
6See over,
7Ashley Montagu# Anthropology and Human Nature (New York; McGraw-Hill Book (jmÿahy# 1957)7
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°Hers as well there are many possibilities of avail­able works that could be listed. A complete bibliography fto 19591 is found in Values. Ethics. Estheticsi A Se- ieoted Blbliograohy. 6®Wrte-‘TiiEll%rTOert"'anr'rayde Ldckholm' ' (Illinois t The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959). Kluckhohn's own work is extensive* especially in Culture and Behaviort Collected Essays of Clyde Kluckhohn {Com- pîlia'IEyUïcBiH'’ Klïïcküolm"' ■{fomBlTrmë"îrêS“'Ifess of Glencoe)* 1962)1 ifargaret Mead (especially Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies) (tSÉSônj^ m r m o w ;  ™ r « I f r a r e m c t * j w t ^ s o fGujture (Cambridge# HaBeaohusettss The RiversIoerFeBS# Sinorsânsdltion# 1959) are both helpful In estimating the cultural and eociolOgieal influence on ethical ideals and activities* Abraham Bdal*s Anthropology and Ethics (Springfield# Illinois; CharBs C# Company^ 1959)#A# MacBeth^s Gifford Lectures in St# Andrews* >eriments in Living (Londw; The Macmillan Company# 1952)# and'" Cultural Background of Personality(London; legan# mul#"'ïrSScK#''Wrubher#''anî C o # # » 19%)#give good perspectives on the topic* showing how particular ethical attitudes belong to particular societies and cul* turesi the same act can be a "good" in one and "evil" in another# Bronislaw Malinowski * s A Scientific Theory Culture (Chapel Hill; University of'MrtB'^'BaroŒ *X9W)" Ihd Morris Ginsberg*s first volume of #says in Bociology and Social Philosophy# entitled w  YEe Diversity bf''MbraiS'' ' (L6h%0m Limited*'"1956T areTas are also the specific studies by1* Brandt* on Hopi Ethics (University of Chicago Press* 1954); J* Ladd% The 'Structure of a Moral Code (Navaho ethics) (Harvard #ii#rsity''"l§ëSS7'‘ï55T)'^  Theologian J, V*# iangmead Casserly*s Morals and Man in the Cocial Sciences is a book to whic!EiraEpePso5SI^^ andone Mich is especially useful from the viewpoint of Christian ethics and theology# A most insi#Ltful volume stressing the relativity of cultural variance was written by Florence E* Eluckhohn and Fred L# Btrodtback* Varia#. tions in Value Orientation (Evanston* Illinois; low PeteïsMi"“19637#^ '''"lim although brief* the article by Professor V# A# Damant "Sociological Factors in the Détermination of Christian RofaXs^  ^iiTUhrist.BOfejai COhtèkt^ecited by Gerald Irvine {&hdbh; *.8 ‘ST'good introduction to the problem of how one should relate a universal diristite ethic to the changing patterns of Western Society#
V
keeping the thesis to a manageable length# But then* 
what material to select was still a problem# The choice 
of evolutionary science was made for some specific reasons 
related to the relationships of science* theology* and 
Christian ethics in the middle-to-latter years of the 
twentieth century*
For one thing* the assistance which the life scien­
tist can give to Christian ethics is not as widely heralded 
in theological colleges* as is the work of the psyeholo^ 
gists* sociologists* and even the social anthropologists* 
Freud* Jung* Adler* and others are present in that familiar 
last-name-only basis* It does not seem too hazardous a 
guess to speculate that they* as well as Emile Durkheim* 
Margaret Mead* or Ruth Benedict in the social sciences* 
are far better known to and studied by theological students* 
than are Warder Clyde Allee* Petr Alekeseyevlch Kropotkin* 
Conrad Hall Waddington* or Theodosius Dobzhansky# Lectures 
and seminars in the Sociology of Religion and Psychological 
Counseling are present in most theological colleges. Courses 
in the importance of evolution in human behaviour and the 
importance of genetics to ethics* often are not#® It was
%he statement is largely based on personal observa»" tions of the various theological colleges and seminaries I am familiar with in Great Britain and the United States# There are exceptions of course# But also* in an unpublished survey conducted by Professor J# A# Whyte of all of the the­ological colleges in Great Britain for the World Oouncll of Churches* the observation was confirmed in fact*
decided early in the research that the neglect of the 
part which the life scientist plays in understanding 
ethical problems and solutions seemed reason enough to 
justify the decision#
But* also* there is a sense in which the biolog#, 
ical materials must be understood first* in chronology 
as well# Until the student can understand the genotype 
of the individual* he can hardly understand the develop­
ment in the phenotype; i,e** before there can be an actual 
behaviour which can be examined in man* there must be a 
potential for it in the genetic information encoded in 
the genes# Unless we are aware that each manifestation 
of human behaviour is affected by the genetic make*up of 
the individual human being; and that no type of emotional 
or ethical behaviour is excluded from that source* we will 
fail to understand the behavioural phenomena present in 
modem man# Professor W, H# Thorpe noted that in recent 
years it is the life sciences which are providing the 
greatest challenges "to our generally accepted ideas and 
modes of thought about man* his nature and destiny. " He 
continued#
However problematic and doubtful some of the more esoteric implications of scientific advance may seem* there is no doubt whatever about the practical appli­cations of science » *. # The ethical problems raised by the population explosion and artificial insemina­tion* by genetics and neuro-physiology* and by the social and mental sciences are at least as great as
those arising from atomic energy and the H-Bomh* ... tele- communications * computers and automtion*9
The material Itself is provocative, The life scl- 
entlst*^^ s,g,* has noted the similarity of behaviour In 
animals and men* Including much of that behaviour to which 
we attribute ethical value* In the neo-Darwlnlan evolu­
tion of the present day* some have understood that slml- 
larlty to be evidence that certain behaviour which In man 
we call "good" or "evil"* is an Inheritance from the pre­
human animal world* They have discussed biological 
instincts and the biological and physiological predlspo- 
sltlon to certain types of human behaviour* They have 
analysed genetloal transmission of personality and non­
physical traits* They have investigated the enomous 
problems which face moral man out of biological advances
of the day* a large portion of which is surveyed in cursory*1 <1style by G# Rattray Taylor in ^ he. Biological. Tlme-Bomb#
%# H* Thorpe* Science* Man and Morals (London;Methuen and Oo* Ltd** P* %
Scientist" throughout this thesis is taken In Its largest and most general meaning* to include all of the soologi^ scientists* biologists* physiologists* medical* and such related scientists who deal with the basic life stuff of man* It Is possible that one whose own field is psychology could be a "life scientist"* In­sofar as he deals with the basic mental "life" of man#
^^Oordon Rattray Taylor* The Biological. fime-Bomb (London; Thames and Hudson* 1968;
Mere these solentiste are oorreet* they will force
U0 to re-examine our tmditioml Christian, anthropology 
and ethics mà  in turn* our approach to many specific 
ethical problems* Where they are wrong then at least 
we must he able to refute them knowledgeably* The over- 
whelming popularity of some of these writers is a warning 
not to ignore their work# Many people are reading Robert 
ilrdrey mà Desmond Morris and Konrad Lor am* who popularize 
the subject. The cult of worshippers around the memory of 
Teilhard de Chardin is a notable example of the widespread 
appeal and appreciation a theologian-sclentist can obtain. 
We agree here with Professor M* B* Root* when he wrote that:
The great problem of the Church (and therefore of its theologians) is to establish or re-establish some kind Of vital contact with the enormous majority of human beings for whom the Christian faith is not so much unlikely as irrelevant and uninteresting, The greatest intellectual challenge to faith is sia#ly that thoroughly secularized intelligence which is now the rule rather than the exception* whether it expresses itself in science* or philosophy or politics or the arts #12
Part of the answer to that "great problem" is our
ooimmmication with the large group of "thoroughly secular- 
Iged" mà  intelligent people who reside outside the bound­
aries of the Christian churches* and who depend on the 
increase of scientific knowledge for their understanding
Universe and Man, So* it is literally mi apologetic
B, Root* Boundings* edited by A* U* Vldler (Gambrldge University"#6ss7 l962)* p. 6
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task which we propose as an integral part* or at least 
am inevitable adjunct* of this research* No item of 
doctrine should be changed simply because it will be­
come more attractive to those outside the Ohrietlan 
faith* But the task of seeking to work together with 
those who approach ethical discussion in a different 
way is a noble task indeed# The Christian moralist 
above all is placed in regular contact with those who work 
in ethics* and it is to him that theology can look first 
of all for this common assistance# J* B* Babgood once 
wrote;
The wise are those who. have learnt to find truth in many different places; who have enough stability not to be thrown off their balance by the latest fads and discoveries; who know the limits of their knowl­edge* but have a humble certainty about the truths by which they live*^3
In a way* we are proposing work on the frontier be­
tween biology and Christian ethics* or perhaps better* as 
Tillich once wrote* "on the boundary between them". It 
is here that the issues of the modern day and our under­
standing of the nature of man should be brought into 
focus# If* in the end* the picture proves to be a dis­
torted one* we will counter only that it will still be 
better than no picture at all* Bishop Ian f * Ramsey once 
commented that;
, # .* Frontier work between various disciplines will always appear to some unsatisfactory* and I am
13j . B* Bhbgood* Religion and Science (London;s & Boon* 1964) p* iT— -------------X
conscious as anyone of the many shortcomings which the following pages exhibit. At the same time it is essential for our academic, scientific* and in­deed political* health that despite the risks of appearing superficial or stupid* more and more of us should venture into cross-fertilized discussions* and that dialogue should occur between different disciplines .3-4
Professor Thorpe has pointed to the important posi­
tion which biology now occupies in the current expansion 
of science; for* as he says; "the King of the Sciences" 
in tomorrow*s world will be the biologist,3-5 And where 
does that leave the Queen? No doubt she Is dethroned* 
from her literal reign at least* But then theology*s 
glorious reign was ended long ago* and as H* Richard 
Niebuhr once quipped; "She never was the Queen*" for at 
her best "Theology has always been the servant of the 
s c i e n c e s *"3.6 serves as the interpreter of truth*
relating the findings of the other sciences to the unify­
ing principles of the universe* And that* they cannot do* 
Theology has its own domain* from which it does in fact 
zule* but only in that it has a theological truth which 
is outside the normal boundaries of purely scientific 
pursuits *
1 iiIan T* Ramsey* Religion and Sciences Conflict and (London;! S.P.cTk., I96A), if. vlli
15Thorpe* Science* Man and Morals* pp. 131* 133
16H, Richard Niebuhr* Journal of Religion* vol. 35* no* 1* pp. 1-5* esp, p, 3
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M  a sohool-bôy* I read Italey^s Bmva New World 
with fascinated interest-# Now #e I read it again* fascina­
tion is replaced by disquiet and fear - fear that the new 
world will bring us a controlled and manipulated man in
a controlled and impersonal world* Borne new world is 
coming* in which brave new men will have to live* The 
new biology will surely have an important place in it.
My goal* and a goal which is shared by many others whose 
work is covered in this thesis* is to insure that Christian 
ethics has one too* James Sellers wrote recently in his
Î
We live in an age in which man is demonstrating that he c m  do almost anything* This is as it should be# if he is truly created in God*s image* But it also means he needs ethics more than ever* For the m n  who can do almost anything is more hard put to decide wimt to do than the m m  who cannot do very much in any case* Twentieth-century m m  has new power and unprecendented choices; hence his new responsibility to reflect on ethics *17
The greater the possibilities# the graver are the dangers#
but the more urgent is our responsibility to act creatively
in the new and coming world*
Once we delimited the study to the life scientist#
there was finally the problem of deciding which scholars
and which biological sub**divisions we should choose# Many
scientists are involved in research which sheds light on
►3 Theological ..memlllan Oss^ aïiÿ* 196b), p, xt
the origin and functioning of human behaviour. The 
psychologist studies the behaviour of man through his 
living psyche in the individual life. The ethologist 
studies man In his relationships and behaviour in his 
distinctive characteristics. The geneticist studies man 
through his heredity. The paleontologist studies man 
through the demands of the developing species. The bio­
chemist studies man in the structure of the cells, etc. 
All of these, and more, converge In the subject matter 
of this thesis.
There are of course difficulties In separating 
the working field of any particular behavioural scientist, 
Over twenty years ago. Dr. Ralph Linton wrote of that 
new science which would be "devoted to the dynamics of 
human behaviour," and which would arise out of the col­
laboration of all the scientists who were trying to 
understand man and his problems. The pioneers in that 
science, Linton said, will be "sustained by the belief 
that somewhere in this vast territory there lies hidden
the knowledge which will arm man for his greatest victoryj
T Athe conquest of himself." Those pioneers are the set­
tlers who occupy the territory of this study.
Finally, there was the problem of which Christian 
moralists to use# From part 1 we derive a set of simple
18Linton, Cultural Background of Personality, p. 99
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criteria by which we then propose to Investigate a 
Christian ethie*^® Gnee the criteria are set, m  chose 
those witers who beet represented either an affirmative 
or a negative analyeie. we chose Karl Barth because it 
seemed that this giant of the twentieth century theology 
was a good teat case for the use of scientific material 
in Ohrietian ethical writing* Barth*» epietmology would 
Bûmx to preclude the possibility of hi# presence# but 
Barth la truer to hla responsibility than he is to the 
Barthianism which some attach to him name# Barth does 
deal with ethical issues that require a knowledge of the 
life scientist*# material*
F* R* Tennant was selected because of his early and 
impressive use of scientific material# He provides a good 
model on how a theologian should proceed* His concern was 
initially with the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin# 
in a day w h ^  those arguments demanded more attention# Be 
depended on the then current evolutionary theory as the 
starting point for his approach to the problem* m s  
importance to ethics is made clear when we realise that 
the doctrine of sin# to Tennant# was another way of 
analyzing moral imperfectionB of individual and corporate 
man*
Bishop F# R* Barry is present because he brings the 
subject d o m  to the practical interest in Christian ethical
See ahead to pages 197-207.
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problems which Is so characteristic of my own interest in 
the study* Ha has been publishing books and articles on 
ethics since the first decade of the twentieth century*
It is helpful to note his development as new materials 
became available*
"X" 'X' *K" X- # # *
The entire research has proceeded under the super­
vision of Bev* Professor James A* Whyte^ Professor of 
Practical Theology and Christian Ethics at St* Mary*s^ 
both in Scotland and later during his sabbatical visit 
to the United States* I would not want to blame him for 
any of the conclusions in this writirg; nor would X want 
to attribute my developing ideas to his assistance alone* 
But> so warmly and completely was he interested in the 
work) and so ably did he get me to the heart of the 
matter) that at any point where he might wish to claim 
this thesis as his own^ X would happily grant his right* 
Meanwhile) he will surely see himself walking through its 
pages (at times possibly even running away I ) ^ and perhaps 
he will see the both of us, still arguing a few of the 
points we hawnmered out in his third floor study in St. 
Andrews, or while he was visiting Louisville Theological 
Seminary in Kentucky* I am most grateful for that, as 
well as for the friendship which he and Mrs* Whyte offered 
to us, a friendship which we treasure still.
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Other# &t 8t# Mary*# were also helpful* I aheuld
especially mention frofeaeor 1* 1* §. iobineem, whose 
own writing on Tennant, and whose helpful comment# on my 
work, &8#l8te& me greatly# Dr* C&lder MOlr and Mr* Douglae 
Trotter took a kindly interest in my research, a# did 
ProfGBaor George Bbll who wa# at that time visiting from 
Colgate looheeter Divinity Bohool* Their help and en­
couragement were deeply appreciated.
A special word of gratitude 1# due also to Dr. E» Cecil 
M&ogregor, lecturer in zoology at the univeraity, who 
patiently read through the entire first part of the thesis, 
and offered advice on come specific aspects of the work. 
Besides, hi# warm comment# of the writing also seemed to 
make the research Infinitely worthwhile* 8ome others, in 
smaller, but important ways, directed me to book# and 
author# and periodicals and idea# that I would not have 
found without their help* A word of thanks to Dr* Adrian 
BOrridge, Director of the G&tty M&rlne Laboratory in #t* 
jkKK%]p@MN#4 iw*K> Iieljped ;BK%1;#KeiLskl3L5r iwltdki tidÜbuLjLOq&anagpüoar; ibo 
Dr# l^eston S. Outler, Executive Secretary of the Center 
for Advanced Btudy in the Behavioural Bclences, who pre^ 
pared a complete list of fellow# at the Center who over 
many year# had shown interest in. the topici to Father 
John Lt Bussell, Heythrop College, Oxford, who was espe* 
dally helpful in providing $me direction# to the back- 
(S%rcR&%%d (Odr tJhas BbSKBewa (BattdkMOldLe apoeüli&jLon <>n 1>he& (locrtjpdLne <>jp
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evoltitlon^official, and unofficial, s«nd whose correspon­
dence on current Homan Catholic ethical writings was 
enjoyable and informative#
Some others, great, warm and wonderful friends in 
the Royal Burgh of St. Andrews were not so helpful. They 
tried to take my attention away from my work, by insist­
ing that we play golf at The Old Course, or that we attend 
the festivities at the local Auction Hall, or that we walk 
along the North Sea and talk over ancient days and intrigu­
ing ghost stories in the Kingdom of Fife, or that we rush 
down to the once a decade Bon Spiel at Bilaonguhar* But 
they made Scotland seem like heme to our family - a re­
membrance deep and dear to each of us.
A final glad iford to Mr# Bugald MacArthur and his 
staff at the University Library, whose endless patience 
was excelled only by their pleasantness timt made the 
daily treks to the library a good and happy time; my thanks 
to all of them# And a further note of gratitude to Dr. 
Dikran Hhdidrian, Librarian of Pittsburgh Theological Semi­
nary and to Mrs# Amal Marks, his assistant, for all of 
their help and interest, since my return to Pittsburgh#
Near the end of a five-year project a researcher 
gets the feeling that he has been working in his own wee 
vacuum, bound in by the piles of notes and papers and 
three-by-five reference cards| bound in by the definition
and delimitation of his topic ; and bound most of all by 
the limitations of time and space to make the research 
complete#
xvii@ Against her wishes I thank my sister Alice Williams who typed the entire thesis.
So, this as other theses, must be seen as the 
opening step of the project. I take heart at the words 
which Professor John MhcMurray spoke to me in Edinburgh 
five years ago. Professor MaoMurray said that each gradu­
ate thesis should be regarded as just a beginning. It 
should indicate where the subject begins and where it heads 
next, A Ph*D, thesis, after all, is not one * s entire life*# 
work* Its purposes should be defined and a recapitulation 
given as to where we are now.
Where it has gone from the beginning is into the 
lives of those whom I teach and to whom I minister here 
in Western Pennsylvania, Seminary students have now 
shared the enthusiasm I have for this topic in my lecture 
program with them# Countless couples and individuals and 
families have forwarded the concern of this thesis out of 
theory into the practice of their lives. Why we do what 
we do is an endless search. No one really knows the answer 
to that question. But one comes the closer to it as he 
journeys to the heart of the conclusions and oonoems of 
a thesis which brings The life Sciences and Christian Ethics 
together. For these few years, at least, I know of no 
greater nor more helpful journey.
Bev. Richard M. Cromie Southmineter House Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania June, 1974
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â# General
One man's premise Is another man's problem. The 
beginning point for one is beyond the conclusion of the 
other. So that the setting of this thesis will be clear 
at the start, let me enumerate a few of the premises 
from which X commenced the study, and which were confirmed 
in the research.
Two separate convictions converged in the back­
ground of the writing of this thesis. One is my belief 
that Christian ethics begins in the study of man; in 
Christian anthropology rather than any other theological 
doctrine. This is not to say that other doctrines are 
unimportant. It is to say that we cannot speak realis­
tically about man and his ethics until we understand 
the man himself. And second, is the conviction that we 
can begin to understand man in a study of the evolutionary 
process and beyond that, in the contributions which have 
been made regarding his behaviour by the contemporary 
life scientists. The first is supported by Professor 
Norman Pittenger while commenting on a statement made 
by Dr, Georges Florowskys "You can best understand what 
is true about God and everything else, if you discover
2
What is true about man." Said Pittengers
This seems to me a very penetrating statement.It is even more true about any religious faiths if you want to know what a given religion, a given faith, believes about God, nature, history, you should first see what it believes about human na­ture ♦ , , It means simply that the way in which man is understood, and his significance determined, will give us as nothing else can, an insight into the setting, historic and cosmic, in which man makes his appearance,A
It also gives us an insight into his ethical behaviour
and its ethical significance and implications. The two
convictions converge when we move to the topic itself.
In his Essays on Human Evolution, Sir Arthur Keith
asked the serious question, "If man's chief end is to
glorify God, and to enjoy him forever, " as the Westminster
Shorter Catechism begins, "then why has man been given a
nature so incapable of fulfilling such a mode of life?"^
The question is not new with Keith, Nor is his answer
which concludes bluntly*
Ho human community could observe this injunction with any degree of strictness, nor even one day in seven, and survive on this earth as we know it. Ho: the '’chief end" cannot be as the Westminster divines formulated it.3
We need not accept the rejection of the Catechism to
agree with the intent of Keith's Inquiry. There is some
W. Horman Httenger, The Christian Understanding of Bman Nature (London: James Hisbet and "9o%, ït37i“15o4) ÿ]p, 1^-14
p"Sir Arthur Keith, Essays on Human Evolution (London; Watts and Co., 1946), p* l&'~''(MeHcan"Hîïiï EvoIuElon and Ethics) ---------- --
^ibld., p. 16
room in our inquiries for questions which have to do with 
the basic nature of man; his evolutionary origin, his 
genetic predisposition to certain types of behaviouri 
what is, or could be his "chief end"# To borrow Pro­
fessor Waddington's question and ask; "Why has man so 
often embraced systems which one might have thought he 
would intuitively recognise as avilt"^’ The answer to 
that question is complex* It plunges us deep into the 
question of why man is the way he is, and how he got that 
way* His sin and his alienation from God form the tradi­
tional Christian answer* But these, though carrying a 
theological truth which we want to reaffirm, do not define 
the details of what man is and why he is alienated. Man 
obviously does embrace systems and perform acts which 
are evil - but how did he get that way? If we reject a 
literal reading of the Garden of Eden story in Genesis, 
and accept an evolutionary origin of man, we are left 
searching for an answer which takes account both of his 
evolutionary origin, and his "spiritual nature"*
Borne would think that we profit more by examining 
man in his present circumstances, or in light of the Bible 
alone, or in the belief that Ohristian ethics should con­
demn evil and be concerned with the elimination of certain 
"bad" behaviour not with its origin and development. 
Moralists are concerned with the long detailed list of
^Conrad Ball Waddington, pie Ethical Animal (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
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modem deviations from good Ohri&timnity in the list of 
personal failings of man to individual man* That is 
critical* But-here we have a previous question* one 
which takes us hack into deeper issues* Before we can 
rightly discuss, whether man is or should be honest; 
whether war is or is not justified; whether the new 
sexual morality is Christian or can be; whether we should 
use lové as the nom for all ethical judgments, or 
some other; we must inquire whether man is capable of 
doing the very things the moralist asks; whether his 
basic nature is inclined toward them; whether it is pos­
sible for him to attain the goals; and whether he is able 
to control Wmself in his environment*
Waddington, from the viewpoint of science, reminds 
us that "philosophers have for the most part conaerned 
themselves with an issue which is actually not the most 
important*"^ What we need, he elaborates, is some 
"guidance by which we can direct our activities". By 
the time we begin to reflect, we already have what we 
call our "ethical feelings of right and wrong", Philos­
ophers have felt that their task is to "clarify the 
nature of these ethical feelings", or to distil general 
principles which would be "both guides to action and
would still remain ethical in quality" But, what is 
demanded of each generation is*
%addinston, -Ethical Animal, op* cit.*, p* 19 
%addington, ibid*, p*
A theory of ethics which is neither a mere rationalisation of prejudices, nor a philosophical discourse so abstract as to be irrelevant to the practical problems with which mankind is faced at that time.T
What we need is an ethical theory that contains both the 
truth of our existence and relevance to our behaviour* 
And, as a biological scientist, Waddington concludes 
that "the framework within which one can carry on a 
rational discussion of different systems of ethics, and 
to make comparisons of their various merits and demerits, 
is to be found in a consideration of animal and human 
evolution*
We hold here that Waddington makes a mistake when 
he bases his entire examination of ethics on evolution,^ 
but our investigation does join him in examining whether 
and how moral values are related to that source* If 
good and evil have their roots deep in the primeval past; 
if they have evolved on the basis of that which gives 
superior survival value to the tribe or the individual 
who possesses them; if by virtue of their presence in 
the past, they are present now as well; if we carry with 
us, bred into our genetic make-up, tendencies which no 
amount of psychological or spiritual juggling can remove, 
or even remake, then it is imperative that the student 
of Christian ethics determine what it means for the
p. 19 
p. S3
9Of# to the Discussion of jQwrA# Views of Evolu­tionary Ethics: Waddington, PR*
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study of our subjeot, and whether contemporary Christian 
scholars have taken it into consideration when they do 
their work#
H# Wheeler Robinson once summed it up neatly when 
he cautioned that:
The Ohrietlan must not forget that every genera­tion ha# its part to play in the unceasing evolution Of Christian doctrine, and that our part today is a somewhat stirring one* The primitive conceptions of Hebrew cosmology are replaced in the modem mind by the evolutionary view of mem; the wider horizon of nature and history involves many changes in earlier conclusions* Borne problems fall into the background, others emerge for the first time, others again reveal their depth and difficulty by their presence in the wider as in the narrower horizon * We cannot evade them, except by being false to the stewardship of a great inheritance# The Christian doctrine of man is not to be secluded from the thought of the age in timorous unbelief; it is to be employed amid the common wealth of the world, so that it may be worthily developed by us, as it was by those who went before us**v
The Christian ethic also is to be employed amid the common
wealth of the world, so that it, too, may be worthily
developed in the future# Professor Robinson's statement
was written almost sixty years ago, but it belongs to our
day as well# It is still a "stirring part" that we have
to play, for as H# l* Williams notes;
Out of all our study of science we should col­lectively by now have gained not only knowledge but also some wisdom about the meaning of things that we can apply to human relations# Clearly this wisdom must come predominently from a consideration of the evolutionary process, for that is the process , # # whereby man developed his present powers * .
Wheeler Robinson, fhe..., Christian . Doctrine of Man, p# 3 Edinburgh: T & T Clark^ '‘"3r(f ed7T!954T^lst 1911
^R# R* Williams, "Natural^ .Science and Social.. Prob-
By S* ' G* ■Simpson.ii ' The Meanihg^of Evolution (London; Oxford University Press,......... . .
-, after all, is moral goodness? 1# it good 
beoause it establishes a good sooiety, where goodness 
is defined as that which worked to survival and to the 
general accord of men? Is it good because it is a lesson 
wall learnt from the past or is it preparing thé way to a 
glorious future? Or is there, as we have believed, an 
intrinsic good, beyond all possible relation and reference 
either to origin or result? Is Christ's command to love 
based on the divine law which he received from God, or is 
it part and parcel of good humanity which he somehow 
epitomised in his brief teachings? If the command of 
an omniscient Greater is controlled by, and interpreted 
through, the natural development of human behaviour; if 
what we have called the immutable eternal laws of Ood, 
become changeable through genetic mutation or natural 
selection, then we need to adopt a new approach to our 
ethics*
"There can be no doubt", Professor (now Bishop)
Ian T* Ramsey opened one of his books;
That today the greatest tensions (between science, philosophy, and religion) arise around the concept of human personality, and generate many perplexing ques­tions* Bow far do developments in molecular biology drain human personality of any distinctiveness? How far can human beings and human behaviour be satis^ faotOrily accounted for by such developments of the theory of evolution by natural selection as are made possible by recent research in genetics? How far have developments in neurology eroded that moral responsl- bility which many believed was distinctively persoml?
Ian T# Ramsey, Biology, and Personality (Oxford: Basil, Blackwell Go#, I Un­fortunately Bishop Ramsey died an untimely death during
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Those are the questions of this thesis which force the 
moralist to lift himself up out of his everyday world, 
and to look back into the development of what man was, 
what he is, and what he can become* The desire to deal 
with man "as we have him" is commendable* But "man as 
he is" is a matter of interpretation*
This thesis deals principally with the problems 
of the present * But to get to the present it is always 
necessary to trace something of the historical movements 
of the past. This I have tried to do carefully, but in 
a minimum of space* It could appear to an historically 
minded reader that I have made short work of the long 
historical process which preceded what we have now* But 
for our purpose, just a few trends seemed mandatory* It 
seemed essential to cover some of the developments in 
bringing together a modern consensus-like view of evolu­
tionary biology* It was also important to include some 
of the historical arguments concerning the evolutionary 
ethic* In that regard, to show how Darwin introduced the 
subject of the relationship between evolution and ethics, 
and to show how others, including a few of our contem­
poraries, have misrepresented Darwin's work on the 
evolution of moral thoughts and acts.
The performance of both science and theology along 
the way is lamentably imbalanced* It was largely filled 
with bitter arguments over matters Incidental to the sub­
ject, or petty peeves on the part of the participants*
9
The "warfare" has been Intense, especially in the sub- 
jeet of the evolutiomry origin of mn* It has seemed 
so sophisticated to ennounoe that theology we# foolish, 
m  indeed it sometimes was* But soienee has not been 
guiltless either# Reinhold Niebuhr once referred to 
Brook'-s well-known comment regarding the defenders of 
the Christian faith against the advance of evolution on 
the nniweneea of man# Brook wrote; "%ey were telling 
a lot of little lies in the interest of a great truth# 
But, Niebuhr responded with the aoousation that the 
eoientista were "telling a lot of little truths about 
causes which could be fashioned into a big lie", and that 
was far worse#
Subsequent developments, after the trim#h of Darwin, proved that the religious impulse to de­fend the unique dignity of man was not as foolish as it seemed, though the^me#iOds of defense were both foolish and futile,®
That issue is still being settled# Little truths can still 
be used in the support of big lies about what man is - a 
point which we will later clarify in "the Uniqueness of
Man"
^%einhold Niebuhr# "Christianity and Darwin's Revo-j^ yaæyg'BBPBùehebam (fetttabwyghs wniveseltjr wess, 1967> third Prl#- 1967)# P» 32
1%. ,, P#
# pp. 76-92*
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But with Darwin himself we will emphasize that;
There is grandeur in this view of life with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved
These are the well-known concluding words of the Origin*
As the re-issued and complete autobiography shows,
Darwin probably later changed his mind, or at least his 
emphasis, and found courage to express his religious 
doubts about "The Creator who breathed life". But there 
can be no doubt about the grandeur#
It is the complete man we are trying to discover, 
one who is a combination of natural origin and supernatural 
destiny, Never before have we had the quantity of informa­
tion available for an adequate description of human nature 
as we have now# The problem is to use it wisely.
In an unbelievably precise manner, man is able to predict the occurrence of natural events, such as weather, crop yield, or erosion and deposition of soil* With equal assurance he can predict the be­haviour of man made things such as an atom bomb and a space satellite* But man's predictions are lament­ably uncertain in foretelling what his use shall be of this new knowledge and power, or where he may next turn* Despite elaborate precautions, it is theoret­ically possible for the human race to destroy itself accidently through misinterpretation of the motives
•'•^ G^harles Darwin, On Origin of Bpecies by Means Natural Selection, or toejEeseWailoh
' 35m  m g m ÿ ,  "3om&rie —
Autobiography of #arles Darwin 1809-1882,With OrigïnaX ^ TslioEs «eetSredT'^'^TlTo^ir^Sr^ » sgranddaughter) (London; Oollins, 19^8)
of other human beings* Man's need both to under­stand and to predict his own actions becomes a  ^g crucial condition for the survival of the species*
On a lesser, but individually more important scale, man's
need to understand and predict his own actions and those
of others, is the essential condition for the survival of
his daily life, his business success, his family, his
happiness, his Church, and his society*
The theories of the behavioural sciences are at
present tentative, and almost surely in some cases wrong*
But, as Professor Thorpe reminds s "The tentative natures
of theories is part of the very stuff of science and is
in no sense reason for failing to consider and discussIQthem from every m^gle*" We repeat, in part, from Thorpe:
All of our horizons are darkened by their menace, and at the same time lit by their promise* This is every bit as true of the applications of the biology ical sciences as of the physical sciences* The ethical problems raised by the population explosion and artificial insemination, by genetics and neuro- physiology, and by the social and mental sciences are at least as great as those arising from atomic
and automation*
There will be problems which the new biology and 
the new Christian ethics will have to face* Hew claims 
are made regularly* Sperm banks of human spermatozoa are 
not only a possibility which Mueller once advised, but 
they are actual repositories this very day which are
^%rnold Abrams, ed* Unfinished Tasks in the Be^  havioral Sciences (Baltim<
^^Thorpe, Science* Man and Morals, p* x
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constantly being used in AID and other programs of arti­
ficial insemination* Host mothers and donor fathers are 
not only possibilities, but actual events of our time#
The next generation could already be formed artificially* 
Reproductive physiologists will be increasing the possi­
bilities* Abortions have already been performed in many 
parts of the world when chromosomal tests seem to indicate 
imperfections in the foetus# Abortion reform has come in 
different parts of the world, including Great Britain and 
the United States*
There is no limit to how we can affect the future 
of the human race, either by limiting the numbers, or by 
altering the random selection of parents today# Eugenics 
and euthenics are possible today, and in the future with 
refined techniques and increasing knowledge, we could 
alter a population so completely that we cannot even 
guess the social consequences * Someone will have to de­
cide what we are going to do, what knowledge or technique 
of tampering with the human body or the human race will 
we allow? The Church, through its Christian moralists 
should be there at the time of the decisions, equipped 
with the knowledge and prepared to use it to make clear 
what the world and life are all about*
# * , biological research is in a ferment, creating and promising methods of interference with "natural processes" which could destroy or could transform every aspect of human life which we value*urgently it is necessary for men and women of every race and colour and creed, every intelligent individual of our world, to consider the present and imminent possibilities* They must be prepared to defend what they hold good for themselves and their
13
neighbours, and more importantly, to use the im­mense creative opportunities for a happier and healthier world
Ho article of belief, no expression of faith, no 
system of ethics will gain any lasting credence with the 
educated world of modern man, unless it is firmly grounded 
in the facts of human existence# Or, as Professor Whyte 
once commented in our discussions regarding this thesis :
"To embody principles one has to take account of the body. 
If you ignore the reality of man, you establish rules for 
a man who does not exist#"
If we are to preserve the Christian doctrine of mans 
man as created in the image of God for a special relation- 
eMp with the Creator| we cannot do it at the cost of 
refusing to be honest, no more than we can believe that 
the earth is flat by refusing to look at the pictures 
taken by the astronauts from outer space*
We agree with Dr* A* E* Tidier when he writes In
can best serve the cause of truth and of the Church by candidly confessing where our perplexities lie, and not by making claims which, so far as we can see, theologians are not at present in a position to justify#^
"Our task is to try to see what the questions are that we 
ought to be facing in the nineteen-sixties * " ^3 sixties
21
J.and A Gordon Wolstenholme, Man and His Future (London; Churchill, Ltd., 19631, P^ vT" %w6IsïSnholme, editor)
^%dler, Souadlme. p. Dc
23Ibid., p# xi
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have already paseeds we muet now substitute the nineteen- 
seventies, the eiêdities, and the ranalnlng years of this 
century.
B* The Theologian's Use of Science
Before proceeding farther, we should make clear 
what general principles we are applying regarding the 
theologian's use of science* We refer directly to the 
argument over whether the scientist should be involved 
in ethical discussions, and more especially to the 
matter of the "is" and its relationship to the "ought" 
and one aspect of the argument concerns the "naturalistic 
fallacy" first presented by Professor G. E# Moore#
The role of science, it is scmetimes argued, is 
and should remain a descriptive one, without any at­
titude qua science, on what value is involved# In 
opposition, we will conclude that it is erroneous to 
attempt to exclude the scientist from moral délibéra- 
tior^# To be sure, a biologist does not become an ex­
pert in morals simply because he is expert in biology.
But an absolute distinction only serves to damage the 
case of the moralist#
Some years ago Professor Kellogg complained that 
so long as the biologist limited himself to the general 
statements about "lungs, lives, skeleton and ductless 
glands," he was not questioned; but when he went further 
he was rejected as being irrelevant# Further he noted
15
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the casual way the information is judged and rejected 
ad homlnem;
When their talk is about the behaviour of human beings, about their psychology, their heredity, their responses to environment and education, and their position in Nature, then their talk is tested by the miscellaneous personal observations and prejudices and desires and hopes and beliefs of each individual, and it is accepted or not as it confirms or contradicts each one's notions derived from these things#"^ ^
Perhaps the theologian is better prepared to understand
Kellogg's complaint than aiost. In matters of Biblical
scholarship and theology also, many untrained individuals
test statements and reflection by how well it confirms
their own "miscellaneous personal observations and
prejudices*" But Kellogg notes that:
In many of the broad problems of human life arising in connection with such subjects as education, mili­tarism, eugenics, delinquency, and others usually regarded as chiefly belonging to the province of humanities, he (the biologist) can readily perceive biological aspects
The "naturalistic fallacy" argument of G. E* Moore 
dates back to 1903,^^ when Professor Moore enunciated 
a "prolegomena to any future ethics that can possibly 
pretend to be scientific." Moore's claim was pretentious, 
but there can be no denial of the enormous impact which 
his ideas have had on twentieth century philosophy and
^4yernon Kellogg, Human life: As The Biologist Sees It (New York: Henry Holt and Companÿ7^W217”™P» ï w
^5xbid., p. 48
E, Moore, Principia Ethioa (Cambridge: Uni­versity Press, 1903)
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ethics. In some ways It has become an all-inclusive 
phrase which automatically discredits the opposition.
To be accused of the "naturalistic fallacy" is normally 
an attempt to close the argument.
Yet it will help to clarify our point if we 
analyze briefly what Moore in fact meant, and how it 
relates to other concerns within the Christian ethic.
The "fallacy" with which Moore was concerned, arises out 
of a concern for the definition of goodness in itself, and 
not in the narrower setting of an anti-scientific bias#
The background question with Moore at this point is "How 
is good to be defined? The answer is that it cannot be 
defined, and that is all I have to say about It."^^ The 
"fallacy" to Moore was the attempt to define or describe 
what goodness is in terms other than the Intrinsic nature 
of goodness itself# To Moore there could be no specific 
description of goodness # The "good” is not judged by the 
scientific criteria of evolutionary study, but neither can 
it be defined by "the structures of Platonic forms," the 
"maxim of moral philosophy, " or "the detailed laws of 
Scripture." There is alone "an indescribable but in- 
tuitable non-natural quality" in the definition of the 
good* Moore quotes Bishop Butler's statement of finality, 
"Everything is what it is and not another thing." The 
fallacy applies with equal force to forms of metaphysical
27 Principia Ethica, quoted in Yervant H# Krikorian, Contemporary Philosophic Problems, edited by Abraham Edel (New York: w e  doi#mÿ^ 1959) $ PP* 469-70
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as well as naturalistic ethics* The good cannot foe re­
duced to properties of analysis of definition.
We will note that Moore is still followed foy some 
moral philosophers, font as E. J, Baton says in another 
context; "I believe it possible, however, both to hold 
that "goodness" is objective and independent of the whims 
and fancies, the impulses and desires of individual men; 
and also to hold that the goodness of a thing may vary in 
different circumstances and must stand in some necessary 
relation to a rational will." The question of whether 
Moore was correct in asserting that intrinsic good is 
undefinable has also been successfully challenged by 
Professor William Frankena in The Philosophy of Q* B#
M o o r e . We join that challenge here.
One problem, as G. J. Warnook noted, is that no 
argument is possible with Moore at this point. Moore 
alleges that it is true but "there is really nothing 
here for critical discussion to take hold o f W h a t ­
ever is known intuitively is known intuitively ad 
infinitum. With Moore's fallacy, value is a subjective 
fact, a simple quality like the color yellow, and cannot 
be explained unless one knows and agrees from the start.
Professor Burkill goes further^^ with his argument
pA.Paul A. Bchllpp, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (New York; Tudor Publishing Do*, Bicéâ^lliïion7'’'"I9B2')'', chap. 32QG. J, Warnock, Contemporary MoralMacmillan & Co., Ltd
3%. A. Burkill, God and Reality in Modern (New Jersey; Prentice-mIirT353yr'ch#T^.......
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against Moore when he explains that if you cannot define 
or analyze value, then values become purely private 
estimates and subject, as Baton said, to "the whims and 
fancies, the impulses and desires of individual men,"
That was not, of course, Moore's purpose, but without 
some criteria with which we can reflect on goodness, a 
slMQOle tautology results. If Moore's fallacy is the 
standard, then all ethical pursuits to understand, 
analyze, and define goodness are doomed to ineffective­
ness from the start,
The strength of Moore's argument is that we do 
not serve our ethical purpose well if we equate evolu­
tionary trends with goodness itself. Them is a sense, 
as Bishop Barry noted, where "ought is unique and 
irreducible * , , yet," as also Barry wrote, "we cannot 
conceive of values as existing ghostlike in a conceptual 
stratosphere*"31
But, to bring this brief discussion of the 
naturalistic fallacy to an end, we conclude that if 
Moore is used to deny the importance of scientific in­
formation to an understanding and modification of the 
moral issues involved in human goodness, we would object 
that he does not bring the final word* While we will not 
attempt to equate goodness with "that which is,” or "that 
which has evolved," we will continue the attempt to define
3%$ B. Barry, Christian Ethics k Secular Bociety(London; Holder & 8tou@itm, .51*""'” FoF'the'“s i ^of fairness, we should note that Barry goes much further and seems to support Moore's fallacy on the same page.
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and analyze what can be offered to ’goodness" in the 
evolutionary approach.
We are not arguing here for a reductionistic view 
of the moral life* Morality is not a way to adapt to the 
environment. Neither do we wish to conclude that all of 
ethics or morals are reducible to scientific investiga­
tion. There is a legitimate realm of ethical reflection, 
as there is a realm of manhood itself, which is outside 
of the verification of the research scientist. Professor 
W. H. Thorpe, himself a scientist, insists that ethical 
value must be held ultimately to be scientifically unveri- 
fiable.
But we will also show that while we do not accept 
a naturalistic view of ethics, neither do we accept what 
could be called a theological or "a moral reduotionism, " 
where the theologian-moralist can speak meaningfully and 
completely without the scientifically-acquired information 
about man* There is a sense in which the rules for human 
behaviour can be judged by how adequately they fulfill 
the values derived out of the framework of what we know 
about man in his natural setting.
Dr. Abraham Edel notes the point more exactly when 
he writes :
Even if philosophy is primarily concerned with analysis and evaluation, it cannot neglect the material or em-“" pirlcal elements in its analysis, nor the factual con­ditions which make one line of analysis more fruitful than another* And though it may be more concerned with description of fact and causal investigation, scientific work caïmbt''p'rudehtly'h^ ofconcepts nor founder among vague questions. The
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enterprise of description, analysis, causal in­vestigation and evaluation certainly have to be kept distinct, but not as separate provinces to be parcelled^out to philosophers and social scientists #3*^
Edel has a proper distinction; though science may
be "more concerned with description of fact and causal
investigation, ” it cannot neglect, nor should it avoid
the properties reserved by moral philosophers* The
distinction of duties and areas of investigation are
for the sake of convenience and organization of the
investigator, even as two members of the same football
team are assigned separate areas of the field for sake
of orderly and effective play* In the same book.
Anthropology and Ethics, Dr# Edel concludes ; "We do
not propose the merger of anthropology and philosophy,
but rather a working partnership which avoids any jostling
for primacy, or quarrels over vested rights in either
methods of problems#"33
Professor Thorpe warned that;
It is essential that we cease tottering from one crisis to the next* To do this it is needful not only to love the good and our fellow man (which is of course basic) but also to ensure that all branches of science, arts and technology are harmoniously developed in the service of man as a physical and spiritual being; for if we neglect even one of them too long we may be heading fordisaster*34
As a theme for his book, 0ciance, Man and Morals, Thorpe
32Abraham Edel and May Edel, Anthropology and Ethics(Springfield, Illinoisi Charles 0* Thomas, i959)$ p#
% b l d „  p. 5
3 4Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, p# 120
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atmounmû "the Impressive and growing understanding of 
the unitary foundation underlying all experience - 
scientific, artistic, and religious*" fhis, said Thorpe, 
is a "kind of inexorable ground-swell of man’s awareness 
of himself and the world", an awareness that was impos­
sible before Darwin, and ic^robable long after that.
This theme:
, * # finds expression in many of the most profound writers of recent times s including philosophers and theologians as far apart as #itehead, Berdayeff, (sic) Oollingwood, and some of the existentialist school throu^ Teilhard de Chardin to scientists such as Mdington, Bchrôdinger, Elnshelwood and Bolanyi.The theme is tremendous
We should also add Professor Thorpe himself to that list, 
whose expanding work is bec<ming increasingly important 
in this f i e l d , As well we could add others such as 
Professor Theodosius Dobzhansky, Sir Allister Hardy, and 
Professor Edmund Sinnott. The theme is indeed "tre­
mendous", and we want to protect the level ground which 
leads to this increasing awareness of the unitary founda­
tion which underlies all of our experience. To attempt 
to demarcate the line between science and ethics too 
sharply is to violate it.
The point can be made clearer with a detailed 
analysis of Professor William Quillian’a The Moral Theory 
of Evolutionary Naturalism» The problem with which 
Quillian deals is that of "the validity of the ethical
St* Andrews*
35ibid., p, XI
S^Thorpe was recently the Gifford Lecturer at
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theory of Evolutionary Naturalism, with particular at­
tention to the theory’s exclusion of religion and meta­
physical considerations*^'^ His hook is concerned to
show, as Moore was in a larger concern, that the evolu­
tionary naturalist goes too far when he moves out of his
"purely descriptive role as scientist" and begins to
discuss the values involved in human ethical response.
Our argument is largely one which respects the point 
which Quillian is trying to make, but also one which con­
cludes that Quillian himself goes too far in the distinc­
tion which he makes between descriptive and normative 
science. There is surely a place to stand between the 
supposed intrusion of a scientist like Julian Bixley 
into ethics, and in Quillian* s exclusion of all such 
scientists from ethical decisions.
Professor Quillian introduces some outstanding 
representatives of the evolutionary naturalistic school, 
most of them from the late nineteenth century and very 
early twentieth, including Charles Darwin, ¥. K. Clifford, 
Deslie Stephen, Herbert Spencer, & J,M.Guyau. Most of 
them are discussed later in this thesis. He notes th&\t 
while the individual writers have individual approaches 
to the subject, and while they proceed with diffe*»^ ent 
emphases, they also agree in substance on the end and 
standard of morality. "Though the standard is not phrased
^^William F. Quillian, Jr., The Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism {New mvenT Yale .
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in identically the same words by different evolutionary 
writers, the meaning is in all cases ultimately the 
same f"3®
The standard chosen by all these writers is 
the health and survival of society* "the evolutionary 
moralist seeks to discover ethical maxims or moral rules 
which prescribe the kinds of action that will further the 
end of social health and survival#"®^ As opposed to some 
other description of the "good", the naturalist posits 
human happiness and/or survival as the ultimate goal of 
a good moral code (a matter wherein he is not unique), 
and judges moral ideas or acts on the basis of whether 
they are likely to further that end*
Quillian acknowledges the worth of these theories 
when he admits without equivocation that they are valuable- 
first because they remind us that our present ideas of 
morality "have not always been what they are today, but 
are the outcome of a long period of development*"^^ Also, 
"the evidence presented by these writers gives plausi­
bility to the theory that natural selection, with its 
principle of survival value, has played an important part 
in the origin and development of primitive morality, "
And thirdly, these theories give "a more scientifically 
adequate explanation * * * of the instinctive element
3®Qullllan, Ibid., p. 58-59
3%bld., p. 60
^Ibid., p. 73
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which plays an important part in the moral life of man#"
In other words, from the historical point of view, the 
evolutionary naturalist can provide helpful comments on 
the history of morality#
We cannot fully comprehend all that is Involved In moral conduct unless we dig down to the roots of human behaviour in the effort to understand the nature of the primary Innate tendencies, whether they be regarded as definite and well-marked In­stincts, or simply as the "primary tissue of ex­perience. "^l
Quillian notes also that these modem evolutionary 
thinkers are not the first to Investigate the non-rational 
origins of human behaviour as an aid to understanding 
morality?
It has been a concern of moralists from the time of the earliest ethical speculations. All through the history of ethical theory one finds an interest in presenting the non-rational basis of morality, whether in terms of pleasure-seeking, or sympathy, , or egoism, or some other kind of "natural tendency.
The third aspect of these theories is that they have 
a commendable social emphasis, which while the applica­
tion of evolutionary theory "may not really support all 
their contentions # . . nevertheless, the social interest 
is clear" - they regard the welfare of the group as the 
summum bonum, as opposed to the atomic society of the 
utilitarians. Quillian is fair to the approach taken by 
the evolutionary moralists.
He then moves to some preliminary criticisms of the 
evolutionary ethics. The criticisms are mainly related
pp, 73-74
42Ibid., p. 74
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to the hypothetical controversy which Quillian has with 
those who attempt to deny the ultimaoy of the moral 
philosopher in ethics.
The first is the criticism that:
Throughout most discussions of evolutionary ethics, there is the assu#tion that changes which occur in the bodily organization of an individual, are passed on to the succeeding generation,
That is to say, the proponents of evolutionary ethics 
depend upon a Damarokian understanding of the inheritance 
of the characteristics which an individual acquires over 
the course of his lifei^ a doctrine which as Quillian 
surmised is almost certainly incorrect. He is not wrong 
in that conclusion. He is wrong in making the assumption. 
But then Quillian goes on to explain the problem as it 
appears in Darwin’s understanding of instinct and 
Spencer’s understanding of intuition* The negative 
criticism of these two men (at this point anyway) is also 
correct. It is not, however, a criticism of the evolu­
tionary naturalist or the evolutionary ethic per se. It 
is, rather, a specific criticism which Quillian borrows 
from his earlier argument with some individual evolu­
tionary moralists. Some evolutionary moralists did in 
fact work from a Lamarckian understanding of inheritance,
43ibid., pp. 74-75
^^Lajnaroltianlsm is discussed in much greater detail in this thesis, circa p. 62.
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probably Danvin Mmself also did. But Quillian further 
writes t
In thus thinking that environmental changes pro­duce in individuals variations which are then trans­mitted to succeeding generations, the evolutionary moralist makes an error - or really a series of errors - which preclude him from discovering, or recognizing the emergency of new characters.
In fact, the evolutionary moralist does no such thing. 
Quillian may be noting a deficiency in Daiwin. But he 
leaves the evolutionary ethic itself, and more especially 
a few of the modem versions, completely untouched.^ ^They 
do not depend on this mistake of Darwin and Spencer*
Both Sir Julian Huxley and Professor 0. H* Haddington, 
e.g., two leading exponents of the contemporary evolu­
tionary ethics, have discredited the belief in an 
inheritance of acquired characteristics* Quillian noted 
an insufficiency of some of the earlier writers alone.
Neither is there a problem for the evolutionary 
moralist as Quillian implies, in his account of the 
emergency of new characteristics * Whether he believes in 
Lamarckian inheritance or not, the naturalist could simply 
counter by saying that the emergence of the new characters 
does not depend on acquired inheritance. Bather^ now 
characteristics are a result of many other factors which 
operate genetically at the inception of the individual
^SQuillian, ibid., p. 76
^^Haddington’s Science and Ethics, e.g., is in­cluded in the bibliograp^ÇnBtttlnoï'TïSffioned in the text
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Still further, at this point, the evolutionary 
interest in ethics depends not only on the emergence of 
the new characteristic, of whatever origin, in the geno­
type itself; but also it depends on the continuance and 
the standardization of the emergent characteristic in 
the phenotype, which are assured in the entire process 
Of cultural and psycho-social evolution. Quillian*s 
first criticism is not one which is directly related to 
the facts of the evolutionary ethic Itself.
His two other preliminary criticisms are: one,
that it errs in accepting the position of the "moral 
sense school," which makes the mistake of holding that 
an individual senses immediately the rightness or wrong­
ness of an act, and two, that the evolutionary ethic 
depends for its beginning on "the hedonistic pleasurable 
state of consciousness," which assumes that the feeling 
by itself affords an adequate criterion of the good."
Either criticism could be correct in some cases* 
But it is important to note that Quilllanb two addi­
tional points, as well as the first, are largely irrele­
vant to the criticism of the evolutionary moralist him­
self. Again, Quillian is caught in his own limitation 
of the type of evolutionary ethics which he selects.
Even if those points did apply to all of the evolutionary 
writers that he has chosen to mention, it need not follow 
that they apply to other evolutionary moralities*
4-7Bee ahead to discussion of evolution and its modem theory, pp. 63-64.
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Yet, that is not the major relevance of Quillian 
to our argument here. It is far more important to move 
to his discussion of what he calls the "crucial point 
in the Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism" - that 
is, "the transition from a purely descriptive account of 
the development of moral phenomena to a normative inter­
pretation of morality. For, Quillian continues cor­
rectly, "upon the validity of this transition depends 
the success of the attempt made by this school of 
philosopliy to develop a non-religious theory of morality# "^9 
The section entitled "The Transition
Normative Morality" is the pivotal point for his entire 
argument#
Quillian sets out to show that the transition 
cannot he made legitimately, and that every such attempt 
will ultimately fail.
It will he argued that, in so far as the evolu­tionary moralist’s treatment of ethical questions is naturalistic, it is not normative; and that in so far as normative considerations age introduced, it is no longer merely naturalistic.
He then explains that the fundamental distinction betvmen 
a descriptive and a normative science is in "the two ways 
one might look at the world of man’s experience". A 
descriptive science "seeks to describe what something is - 
it is concerned with the sheer facts of existence. The
^®Quillian, p. 78
p. 78 
50ibld., p, 78
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normative a dance, on the other hand, "la concerned with 
the importance, the value, or worth of facta î ^ t 
ia and what ought to be, la the difference. Descriptive 
sciences, biology, zoology, chemistry, etc#, says 
Quillian, deal alone %dth the if^ . They deal with the 
natural or sequential causation while the normative 
deals with ante-sequential causation# Normative, or 
ante-sequential, "starts with the Idea of the possible", 
and the end helps to determine the idea and the meaning 
of the act*
In ethics the important question is; "What is 
the distinguishing character of that which we judge to 
be morally good or right?" "Here the predicate ’good* 
enters as a new notion which is super-added to, and not 
derived from, the logical or causal relations established 
by means of description#
Let us pause to note what Professor Quillian has 
aeooi#llshed to this point of his argument# In drawing 
the distinction between the descriptive and normative 
sciences, a distinction which has been made before in 
modern philosophy - certainly since 0# 1* Moore, he has 
drawn our attention to a point on which moral philosophers 
do agree* there is an Intellectual activity called Ethics 
which is the subject matter of moral philosophy. Quillian
53-lbld,, p, 79
p. 80
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begins the circle which shuts out the scientist ami 
parcels out to the evolutionary moralist the "sheer facts 
of existence", a phrase in itself somewhat demeaning#
The predicate "good", Quillian writes, is then 
super-added to all that is described by the scientist, 
as if it were something totally-other, and did not de­
pend on its natural existence and expression# In that 
case we ask the question directly: From where did it
come? It is human ethical behaviour we are talking 
about, not a philosophical idea of the good as "truth" 
or "beauty"# It is the "good", as it appears In the 
activity of individual human beings and in the relation­
ships which that individual human has with others# There 
are serious problems involved when one writes that the 
good is "super-added" and is not derived from the logical 
and causal relationships established by descriptive 
science.
Take, for example, a decision so relatively simple 
as giving a check for $100 to a local charity# Is the 
act good? Much as the normative word might apply in de­
ciding that in theory freely-given gifts to local worth­
while charities are good# The motivation, the intent, 
the availability of funds, the other charities which 
could also use the money, to say nothing of the feeling 
of satisfaction the individual gets, or the tax advan­
tage in the gift - these and many more are involved 
primarily, logically, and causally# They are also part 
of what Quillian has called the "is".
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The "good," as a philosophical ideal to contem­
plate, is something in which the natural scientist has 
little ability, and probably less interest. But there 
are so many other determinants in %?hioh the "is" - that 
which can be described and verified by scientific inves­
tigation - determines the "ought." The good is not 
"super-added," as something from the outside alone. It 
is a quality which belongs also to the facts and to theix' 
logical and causal relationships. The ethical speculation 
that I "ought" to return an overdue book to the local li­
brary, depends first of all exclusively, on the "is" of 
whether X happen to have borrowed the book in the first 
place, and whether it is presently overdue, or whether I 
have a prior obligation to do saaething else, such as 
finish my book review.
More directly to our thesis topic : the "good" de­
pends upon the facta of human existence. It would be 
naïve and logically absurd to analyze a type of behaviour 
normatively - good or bad - without first discovering 
the situation in which the act occurs, and the other 
possibilities which were open to the individual at that 
time. Abstaining from pre-marital intercourse, e.g., 
can well be a "good" of human behaviour, provided it is 
consciously chosen as an act of free will, in personal 
discipline or communal love and I'sspeet, But it can 
hardly be called an equal good, if abstinence is a result 
of some abnormal sex pattern in the individual which does
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not permit sexual activity in the first place* The 
type of judgment we make normatively, depends on what 
the description is.
There is, of course, a point of difference, a 
way in ifhioh each "is" and each "ought" operates 
separately - both for the convenience of investigation 
and in the separate categories of knowledge. If in no 
other way, evolutionary biology and moral philosophy 
have to remain separate because of the specialization 
required to master their details, to authority in one, 
however eminent he is for example as a biologist, does 
not become an authority in the other. They should look 
to each other to complement the work. The domains are 
not inherently separate, and we plead here that they 
can be seen as two complimentary expressions of the 
same pursuit#
Quillian consents that a normative science can 
also be descriptive, and therein reduces some of the 
weight of our criticism. "Normative science," he says, 
"purports to give us a true account of matters of fact."^ 3 
"The distinction then, must be sought in the particular 
aspect of the facts described from each point of view#"54 
But Quillian*s qualification is too little and too late.
He has already drawn the line between the two, and then 
only allows that the normative can include the descriptive*
p. 80
54 Ibid.
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He no where hints that the descriptive can also include 
the normative#
After establishing the "fallacy". Dr# Quillian 
goes on to describe how it fails to account for the 
origin of moral consciousness# While it is successful 
in tracing the backgrounds of certain acts to which we 
now attribute moral value, it does not account for the 
idea of moral consciousness itself* Ha notes that "there 
is no difficulty in explaining naturalistically, the 
development of natural feelings of sympathy and of con­
cern for o t h e r s * ( T h a t  would simply be the duty of 
the descriptive science alone*) "Social tendencies as 
well as selfish passions belong to man as part of his 
natural "inheritance", but as such, they are neither 
moral nor immoral*"
The problem, as Quillian sees it, is that the 
evolutionary moralist
* # # after accounting in this fashion for certain natural tendencies which are found in the lower animals and man # * $ claims that the actions which are prompted by these tendencies are, in the case of mankind at least, morally good*>^
It is at this point that the evolutionary moralist moves 
from the descriptive to the normative role, and accord­
ing to Quillian, is in error#
The evolutionist’s account explains that man’s feelings of right and wrong are the result of the development by natural selection of the simple feelings of pleasure or dissatisfaction which are
5^ Ibia., p, 82
Ibid., p. 83
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respectively felt when a natural tendency or in­stinct is obeyed or when an individual is thwarted in following such a tendency*^^
Our objection here is not so much directed to 
Quillian*B point* The problem we see is that he is re­
futing only the "straw man" he set up in the first place.
If the position of the evolutionary moralist were that 
which Quillian describes, then we would have to agree; 
that is, if evolutionary moralists based their interest 
in ethics only on the feelings of right and wrong which 
a person has as a result of inherited tendencies from 
the pre-human animal life, then Quillian’s word of 
criticism would be a propos# But there is more to it 
than that, a point to which we have referred already 
and to which we will later return* Professor Haddington, 
e*g#, bases his evolutionary type of ethics not on the 
inherited feelings of right and wrong, but on the "author­
ity acceptor system" within the human child which "allows
58him to receive teaching on ethical rights and wrongs* " 
Quillian writes further of "the genetic fallacy" 
involved;
This naturalistic account, locating as it does, the seat of morality in Inherited impulses or ten­dencies and their attendant sensations, fails com­pletely to explain the unique characteristics of the moral consciousness* It misses the significance of the appearance in the human individual of self- consciousness with the consequent judgment of right
57ibid., p. 83
Of. pp. 137-148; discussion of evolutionary ethics
36
and wrong and with moral self-determination. The error that has been made is commonly referred to as the "genetic fallacy".
He then argues that the evolutionary moralist is guilty
of confusing the origin of a moral ideal or act with its
present expression in man. He quotes Edward Caird from
The Evolution of Religion, to note that: "to trace a
living being back to its beginning, and to explain what
follows by such beginning, would be simply to omi.t almost
60everything that characterizes it . «
The origin of an act or a belief or an ideal, as 
William James made perfectly clear also in another con­
text, does not account for its present worth and use­
fulness in man. That, of course, is true. But it does 
not serve to keep the evolutionary moralist out of 
discussions on ethics. All that the latter would want 
to say is that the roots of an act, while not determining 
the course of the activity itself, are still essential in 
determining how it came to be the way it is, and what 
part it played in the development and selection of man. 
None of the writers, either those covered in the Quillian 
argument, or of the modem ones, would want to disagree 
with this phase of Quillian*s comments on the origin of 
ethical acts.
He then enumerates a listing of several specific 
ways in which the evolutionist fails to account for human
^%bid*, pp. 85-86
60ibid., p. 86
37
morality, with the oontinulng intent of banishing the 
descriptive scientist from ethical reflection and the 
formulation of ethical concepts. The first of these, 
and by far the most important is the rational element, 
for;
Try as he may, the evolutionist cannot account for the moral consciousness by his naturalistic description, one element in the moral conscious­ness which cannot be explained by a genetic account and which is of the hipest importance is the rational element.
He explains the rational element as the part of human 
morality which says that " . . .  quite apart from feelings, 
this act ought to be done by any rational creature in 
this situation". Limited as the evolutionary moralist 
is by hi.s belief that morality originates in the in­
herited tendencies to do one thing as against another 
on the basis of his innate feelings, he cannot account, 
says Quillian, for this rational element in ethics.
What Quillian does not understand (or if he does, 
he has not made it clear in this book) is that even this 
rational element itself; i.e., man as he is thinking, is 
also the same man who has arisen out of the evolutionary 
process and the thinking itself - the rational element, 
from an evolutionary point of view, is also part of what 
he has received and developed in his natural endowments. 
Or, more briefly, the thinking man can sometimes be a man
p. 86
62Ibid., p. 87
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who "thinks'- he is thinking* The non-rational origins 
which affect his behaviour can also affect his thought.
There are also some other facets of moral con­
sciousness which are out with the boundaries of the 
descriptive moralist which Quillian notes. One is that;
Along with the rational factor there are other characteristics of the moral consciousness which the naturalistic genetic account fails to cover.It is unable to explain the imperativeness of the moral demands which a moral being recognizes ; an imperativeness which cannot have grown f rm the mechanical necessity of the natural law.
Evolutionary morality also fails to give "a satisfactory 
explanation of the consciousness of individual responsi­
bility," "the sacrifices far beyond anything demanded by 
personal attachments;" "the belief that one could have 
done better," "the sense of guilt," etc.
Thus it is clear that the evolutionist’s formula misses the essence of the moral consciousness which it undertakes to explain because morality involves normative considerations which cannot be reduced to something else by the.descriptive method of Evolutionary Naturalism.
It should be made clear that we are not in this 
thesis defending evolutionary ethics as the only legiti­
mate way to conduct ethical discussion. But both the 
evolutionary scientist and the moral philosopher are 
involved in all levels of ethical reflection on the 
behaviour pattern of man. There is a natural or "rion-ra- 
tional" element involved even where the moral philosopher is
^Ibid., p. 89 
64Ibid., p. 89
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engaged in purely philosophical pursuits* The realm of 
ethics and what one believes, is normative morality, and 
cannot be successfully removed from the human situation*
The moral philosopher is also a man, involved in the 
limitations of culture and personality and oreaturehood.
Quillian complains that;
In explaining the moral consciousness he (the evolutionary naturalist) begins at the biological level of instinctive actions and, though various modifying factors are introduced, they too are of the zmtural order, and so the theory never gets beyond the natural or non-moral level
But let us examine that conclusion as it applies 
to a few of the specific factors in ethics which Quillian 
parceled off for the moral philosopher, and from which 
he excluded the naturalist* He wrote, for example, of 
"the rational factor", the "sense of guilt", and "the 
consciousness of individual responsibility"; as being 
elements in ethics where the evolutionary moralist is 
an Intruder* But when Darwin discussed the rational 
factor in human behaviour, he concluded that all of 
what man is and does, including his rational and moral 
abilities and behaviour are influenced by his natural 
origin* Haddington and Huxley have used some of the 
psychological studies, especially though not exclusively, 
Freud to help them to explain the very things which 
Quillian writes about; the sense of guilt, moral con­
sciousness, etc. In short, though we cover it later
p. 86
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in this thesis, they expand their interest far beyond 
Professor Quillian’s belief that they depend on the in­
herited tendencies towards certain kinds of activity which 
in man are "good or evil," How a person comes to feel 
about what his responsibility is, and how universal is 
the imperative within his rational thought, and everything 
else about his ethical reflection and behaviour, is subject 
to empirical investigation. The descriptive account is 
more than the matter on which the normative scientist works; 
it is an integral part of the reflection itself,
Quillian also argues that while the evolutionary 
moralist recognizes that man sometimes has a sense of 
obligation, he misses the fact of obligation itself#
He writes;
Obligation, then is seen to be not a product of natural feelings, but a result of man’s reflec­tion upon his relations to his fellows and his Insight into the purposive order of his own life, into the teleolo^cal structure of his own per- sonality,^ ^
In all of this, and the source of another of our 
Objections to Dr# Quillian’s argument, is that he does 
not seem to understand that the evolutionary moralist 
can view man as more than an animal.
He ( the evolutionary moralist ) considers human beings and all that is characteristic of them as being no other than objects about which he may gradually acquire inîorBaEïbn«^T
p. 96
67'ibid., p. 99
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That statement is unfortunate* When Professor 
Thorpe wrote of the "unitary foundation underlying all 
experience - scientific, artistic, and religious," he 
was writing from an evolutionaiy point of view. Man, 
as Bolanyi shows, is also the subject of this experience 
and experimentation# Without the subject, without the 
man who in experiencing becomes part of the experience, 
and thus interpreting the universe as a participant and 
not as an observer, there would be no thought nor moral 
philosophy,
Quillian’s argument against a deteminism in 
human behaviour is essentially correct; but there is a 
naivete' about his handling of the topic which high­
lights our point here. He writes that to the evolutionary 
moralist, a dog stealing a piece of raw meat and a man 
stealing a cooling pie from the window sill, are based 
on "essentially similar considerations."
However writes Quillian the man’s reaction to the circumstances of hunger and presented food would depend, not simply upon his inherited tendencies, as would the dog’s reaction, but also upon his concep­tion of himself as a moral^agent with conscious ends and values to be realized.^o
There are two basic problems in that quotation. For one
thing, it shows again how Quillian is unable to understand
that one who believes in the natural causes of human
behaviour, can also believe in the moral nature of man.
For another, it also shows a basic misunderstanding of
68Ibid., p. 98
  . ^,
42
the way instinct works, even in animals themselves.
Although he wrote formerly of the importance of seeing 
man as a part of the natural process, here he denies 1the basic continuity of man with the process» Even
with pre-human animals, and more especially in an
organism so complex as a dog, instinct does not operate
alone to produce behaviour» Professor Thorpe has made
this clear in his classic study. Learning and Instinct
in Animals »
Quillian concludes:
A man’s character, then, is not simply the sum itotal of his inherited impulses; it is a particular organization of these natural functions in accordance with a dominating purpose or end»69 «
Therein is an important issue, the one on which hinges 
the non-natural origin of human morality# But, even here 
we note that "the dominating purpose or end" also has a 
non-rational element in its origin.
Later in the book, Quillian sets forth "The Meta­
physical Foundations of Normative Morality" In the 
first place # # . man belongs to nature# As an animal, 
he is "a product of the natural process". But, "man 
possesses important characteristics and capacities which 
are not found in the lower animals"*
Man differs from other living beings in that in him we find reason and self-consciousness and self- determination » » * he is a being who, while rooted ^
^9lbid., p. 96 
70ibj.d,i pp. 119 ff.
43
the natural process, stands in a measure above it and is able to direct it to his chosen ends * # • and (he is) capable of at least temporarily suspend­ing or arresting the flux of the instinctive life #7^
"Only such an understanding of man can make sense of the 
moral life."^^
With that we agree, as would the outstanding pro­
ponents of the evolutionary ethic. But we dissent when 
Quillian assumes that there is no natural element to 
those "more-than-natural" moral acts. l/7hat we must say 
about man, we must also say about his morality: along
with his eupra-natural destination and Importance, there 
is also a natural origin within the whole creative process 
The two cannot artifically be separated, but must be 
understood as two parts of the same phenomenon - "The 
Phenomenon of Man."
Those who adopt the spiritual explanation are right when they defend so vehemently a certain transcendence of man over the rest of nature. But neither are the materialists wrong when they main­tain that man is just one further term in a series of animal forms.’3
T^Ibld., p. 120 
T^ibld.
^3pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (London: Collins, 1959), p. l88
II. The Life Sciences and Ethics
XI. THE LIFE BCIENOEB AND ETHICB
In The Nature of Life Professor 0* H. Haddington
suggests that the most characteristic feature of biology
and its point of greatest difference from chemistry and
physics is that it "deals with entities which must be
envisaged simultaneously on four different time scales*"^
Not only must we study the hour-to-hour or minute-to- minute operations of living things as going concerns, but we cannot leave out of account the slower pro­cesses, occurring in a period of time coB^arable to a lifetime . . .  On a longer time-scale again, there are phenomena which must be measured in terms of a small number of lifetimes; they are the processes of heredity, by which characteristics of organisms are passed on from parent to offspring. Finally, on the time-scale of many lumdreds of generations, there are the slow processes of evolution, by which the character of the individuals in a given popula­tion may become split up into two or more different species.^
All four are related to this thesis, in reverse 
order: There are points at wîîich we must begin with the
"sloxf processes of evolution, in the time-scale of many 
hundreds of generations," in the area of what evolution 
has to do with ethics. From evolution, continuing up
1C. H. Haddington, The Nature of life (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961; third edition, Unvriln Books Paperback, 1963), pp. 26, 51, 97, etc.
^He should also note that Professor Thorpe in Bcience, Man and Morals draws the exact division, in many cases ' using the' exact same words.
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Haddington’s time-scale, we come to the hereditary 
process - "the measure of a small number of lifetimes", 
and the contribution of the geneticist in particular.
It is necessary to examine the genetical inheritance of 
the individual person in the fomation of his individual 
ethical life, to see whether man’s ethical ideas and 
activities are affected by the "requirements' of his 
genetic make-up* G. Rattray Taylor recently noted that: 
"The most serious of all human problems created by bio­
logical research: (is) man’s immanent power to interfere 
with the processes of heredity".® Eugenics is an old, 
but increasingly serious ethical problem which must be 
faced directly.
Finally, we will refer to the biological setting 
of the day-by-day, and minute-by-minute development of 
ethics with particular individuals. Temperament and 
character, "the operation of the living thing" as we 
have long realized, are obviously affected by the non- 
rational biological and physiological processes within 
the body, both during the lifetime of the particular 
organism, and at any given moment within that life. In 
some ways that we will mention later, these appear to 
set the limits of the ethical response which a given 
individual may reach. Biological factors influence ethics 
on all four divisions of Haddington’s time-scale.
^Taylor Biological Time-Bomb, p. 158
A* Evolution and Ethics 
1$ The Acceptance of Evolution
This paper id.ll not argue the validity of the 
evidence in favour of evolution. As a general explanation 
for the development of human life, the process of evolu­
tion is accepted* The acceptance does not seem the least 
irresponsible for as David Lack wrote in his article on 
"Natural selection and Bman Nature" ; "Evolution, that 
is the production of new forms of animals or plants from 
pre-existing forms, is today accepted as a fact, including 
the origin of man from ape-like ancestors."^
In the past there has been much religious controversy 
over Danfin and Evolution. 5 some Christian cormunities 
still object to the findings of evolutionary biology re­
garding the origin of man and his behaviour. Care must 
be taken in dealing with these objections where they are 
based on a concern for truth, and not simply a refusal to 
examine the evidence. It was 1967 before the Tennessee 
"monkey law," which prohibited the teaching of evolution
^^ David A* Lack, in Biology and Personality, edited by Ian Ramsey, p# 40
^Although A* Ellegard and John Kent (From Darwin to Blanchford), p# 7, have recently made it wite '^ clear t!hat'''the "general theory of evolution was accepted among the educated, including the churchmen, as early as I870,
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in the state’s public schools, was finally repealed* 
Tennessee is the state in which the infamous Scopes trial 
took place in 1925, when public school teacher Joto T. 
Scopes was convicted because he taught evolution to his 
students. Clarence Darrow lost the case for his defense 
and the world laughed out loud at Tennessee justice. The 
law remained for over forty years more. In the autumn of 
1968, the anti-evolutionary law in neighboring Arkansas, 
although supported in the state courts, was finally over­
ruled by the United States Supreme Court.^  More recently 
three New York nuns were fired by the Pastor of the parish
of St. Mary of the Assumption, because they taught evolu-ntion in the Staten Island parochial school. Incidentally, 
at the turn of 197O, it was still illegal to teach 
Darwinism in the state of Mississippi*
As Professor Lack again writes, this time in his 
own book on evolutions Evolutionary Theory and Christian 
Beliefs
Even today, a few Christians seem to consider it their duty to imply that serious doubt still exists, sometimes supporting this suggestion by quoting out of context an over-cautious statement by a biologist, perhaps as reported in the daily press. So let it be
^Tha Scientific American, July, I967, P* 42, where another school teacher was fired prior to the repeal, "ap­parently by coincidence - for teaching evolution*" Local school boards control the content and quality of teachers and curriculum, so this is not to say the archaic opinion is representative of the entire state*
United Press Release, Pittsburgh Press, January 7> 1969, pp. 1 and 7# Of* "The End of the Monkey War," by L* Sprague de Oa%>, in Scientific American, February, I969, vol. 220, #2, pp. 15 ff.
^The National Observer, October 21, I968, p. 6
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stated categorically that the evidence for the oc­currence of animal evolution is overwhelming and that all serious students accept it.9
Ho longer can we base our Christian concept on the unique­
ness of man in an extra-evolutionazy physical creation of 
Homo Sapiens. Man belongs to the same life line which 
supports the rest of the animal world* The overwhelming 
evidence amassed in the centuiy since publication of 
Darwin’s Origin of the Species ^ in 1859a is so convincing 
that no man can reasonably deny it, either because it is 
unbiblical, unreasonable, or unproven* Everything we 
know confirms the fact of evolution* "The general posi­
tion of man within the animal kingdom, within the verte­
brate sub-phylum, and within the mammalian class, is 
absolutely established and beyond any doubt*
In fact, a further, and prior, issue is now being 
settled* Soon the same categorical statement will have 
to be made regarding the relationship of "living" and 
"non-living". W* H* Thorpe writes;
As biological knowledge has accumulated, so has the meaning of the ordinary English words "life" and "living" become more and more indefinite* Some at least of the features which are usually regarded as characteristic of life are now detectable in many entities which, at first sight, we should certainly not have thought of as living organisms*^
^David A* Lack, Evolutionary, ^ beory and Christian Belief (London: Methuen''ahd~'W*'r''Ltd, plTSST"
^%eorge Oaylord Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution (London; Oxford University Bress,~’'1950J,'"’F*   ™
^%horpe. Science, W m  and Morals, p* 1
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Further, Professor A. R* Peacock also writes;
The investigation # . . served to show that there is no unbridgeable gulf between living and non-living matter* There is in principle no gap to be filled,
Teilhard de Chardin explains the "stuff of the universe"
as evolving from "Pre-Life to Life to Thought", the last
depending on the first %vherein was the potential for
everything which was to follow* Again, Bishop (then
Professor at Oxford) Ian Ramsey wrote in his introduction
to Biology and Personality, "already it seems clear that
there is in principle no ultimate gap between living and
non-living matter, and
* . • that the possibility of matter being organised in the forms we call "living" was logically implicit in the molecular properties of all matter from the start* What then is distinctive about human personality except its particular complex molecular organization?13
We can speculate, on the basis of the scientific experiment
and the hypothesis so far advanced, that the same primeval
gas of fundamental particles which encircled the earth
when darkness was upon the face of the deep - long before
anything or anybody breathed life - and the mind of modern
man which now tries to fathom the depths of that emptiness
and the origin of that "life", are of one and the same
substance*
The importance of evolution to the Christian under­
standing of man is acknowledged by many theologians in the
E» Peacock, Biology and Personality, ed* Ian Ramsey, p* 35
^3ian T. Ramsey, ibid*, p# 1
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modem world, but it is important to note a continuing 
reservation regarding it by the Roman Catholic Church*
The official statement now leaves some room for the study 
of the possibility of evolution; but it is doubtful that 
the "room" is actually intended to include accepting the 
implications of the natural origin of man in our theology 
and ethics. It was not so open that Teilhard de Chardin 
was given permission to publish during his lifetime* In 
the most recent papal statement concerning it - in July 
of 1966 - Pope Paul VI addressed a group of theologians 
on the topic of evolution* He did "commend the attempts
i  itof the theologians to be in touch with science"; but he 
also stressed the limits ifhich "ought not to be impru­
dently overstepped". Authors who start from the assump­
tion - "which is anything but firmly proved", that the 
human race is descended "not from a single pair of 
progenitors, but from several progenitors", were warned 
that the Ghurch "is the supreme norm of truth for all the 
faithful",
In 1941 Pope Pius XII, in an address to the 
Pontifical Academy of Science, altered it slightly to 
mention "the essential superiority of man" over the rest 
of creation, by reason of his soul. He also reiterated 
the derivation of the first woman from Adam; and the
Original Sin and Evolution", The Tablet (July 23,1966) Vol. aao, HO* 6583, pp* 851, 85a ^
^^Ibld., p. 851
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"impossibility that the father and progenitor of a man
could be other than a human being". And, in 1948,
Cardinal Suhard, Archbishop of Paris, upheld a 1909 decree
in Acta Apostolicae Cedes, and shortly thereafter came
B m w i  Generis in 1950*
If by progress we mean movement in the direction
of accepting evolution and the evolutionary origin of man,
HUmani Generis is somewhat progressive# There we read of
the "fictitious tenets of evolution", which repudiate all
that is absolute and firm and Immutable; The Hagisterium
of the Church does not forbid that the theory of evolu-16tion # # . be investigated", but the Catholic faith obliges 
us to hold that the "human soul is immediately created by 
Ood"# The "greatest reserve and caution" is demanded in 
this controversy.^^
^%ather A* C* Cotter, S*J*, The Encyclical "Hhman Generis", With a commentary (MassaehusoEtW^ston^lloCT KessV '1%1')'; pV 41------ ^
is no disrespect intended here to the Roman Catholic Church* In fact the literature which deals with Roman Catholics and evolution is extensive and interesting* In the interest of ecumenical studies and discussions, how­ever, we need first to know the exact position which is taken by the official Church spokesmen# I am indebted to Father John Russell of Heythrop College, Oxford, for his kind assistance in pointing out some of the more recent and relevant material* J* Franklin Evdng gives a careful, if conservative, summary of "Current Roman Catholic Thought on Evolution", which is part of Volume III, of Sol Tax’s monumental edition of Evolution After Darwin (University of Chicago Press, i960)*"' Ewi'hg''writes"'for"'a large group of Roman Catholic theologians who are attempting to work out the Implications of evolution# Fothergill, in Evolu­tion and OhristianSj gives an admirable discussion of the toE>^ c'^ "I%& the point Of view of a Roman Catholic biologist. John Russell himself published a clear concise article on
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Since the work of Teilhard has been praised 
throughout the world, and others of more local interest 
have attempted to follow the implications of what evolu­
tion can mean to the Christian faith; scholars such as 
John Bussell and Maurice Flick in Great Britain, as well 
as Gleason and Ewing in the United States, have been 
careful to stress that the transformation from pre-man 
to man cannot be of causes purely immanent, but they have 
also accepted the biological origin of man in the evolu­
tionary process* Flick concluded:
Even if science one day abandoned evolutionism as the explanation of the origin of living species, it would still be a gain for our understanding of the faith if we realized that dogma does not neces­sarily exclude such a theory, whatever may be its intrinsic value.
"Evolution and Theology" in The Tablet, September 16, 1967 Father A. G* Cotter’s booktary, mentioned above, is fair and helpful* Father Walter G* Ong’s Darwinism and Christian Perspectives# with its introduction by Mttsburlh" Bishop (Hew York: The Macmillan Company, 196Ô), is expressive of a wide range of B<man Catholic opinion* Father Maurice Flick’s two articles "Original Sin and Evolution" in The Tablet, September 10th and 17th, 1966, are comprehensive and indicative of the changing theological opinion in the direction of maintaining the spirituality of man in his evolutionary setting* In additim to the rather cautious conservatism of the Homan Catholic official comment, there are many priests and scholars who are trying to work out the implications of what an evolution "#%ich could pos­sibly be true, so long as it follows the rules set down" could mean to their theology and to the life of the Christian people in the Church and the world#
^%aurice Flick, "Original Bin and Evolution", The Tablet (September 10, I966), p. IOÔ9 ---
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There ara different approaches to the study of 
evolution which go beyond the "natural’ explanation.
M# Folanyi insists that an "ordering principle" is es­
sential to an understanding of evolution.^^ Teilhard 
proposes what we could almost call a Ohristocentric view 
of the evolutionary process»^^ Sir Alister Hardy’s 
Gifford Lectures plead for an awareness of the religious 
presence in natural historyTheodosius Dobzhansky 
concludes with his Tellhardian Synthesis in The Biologyopof Ultimate Oonoem, and H* Graham Gannon argues that 
the evolutionary movement is more than accidental and 
non-purposive. Neo-Darwinians, he says, have overlooked 
that "great something" which directs the process to its 
purpose and destination*^3 These, and others, are 
important to the interest which a Christian student has 
in biological evolution. But each becomes relevant as 
it begins with the acceptance of the evolutionary origin 
of life and man.
Bolanyi, Personal Knowledge (London: Eoutledge and Kegan Paul, 1958)7 %P# cKap. 13, "The Rise of Man"
^^Teilhardj Phenomenon of Man
^^Sir Alister Hardy, The Living Stream à The Divine Flame (London; Collins, vol   %66)
^^Theodosius Dobzhansky, The Biology of Ultimate Concern (Hew York; The Hew Ameriban^Tibrà^^'ÏS^l "
Graham Cannon, The Evolution of Living Things & Lamarck and Modem Gwetibs'''''(Mmchest# W  Press,195'8y 1959)#esp'% B v o l u ^ ' w L i v i n g  Things, pp. 118-119
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There is the theory of evolution and there are theories of evolution* The theory of evolution is the fact - it may surely be called that in the vernacular - that all organisms that now live or ever lived, all they are and all they do, are the outcome of genetic descent and modification from a remote, simple, unified beginning
24Anna Roe, Behaviour and Evolution (ed. Roe and 0. G. Simpson) (Ne¥TïaWm""YaÏ0"‘'ÜhïviHîty Press, 1958) P* 17
2. Evolutionary Theory - A Brief Account
The idea of evolution did not originate with Charles 
Darwin, and The Origin of the Species was not the first 
hook to discuss it. The ancient Greek philosophers 
speculated on it. It is also found in the Vedas, which 
date back to 2000 A great many others from that
time to 1859, offered some vague and general form of 
evolution to account for the world and its living things; 
notably Darwin’s own grandfather, Erasmus Darwin who 
published Zopnomia before Charles was born; and Darwin’s 
"most important rival", French biologist Lamarck, who
presented a "fully worked-out theory of evolution" as
2Tearly as 1809, a full fifty years before the Origin, 
prepared the way.
But it is Darwin to whom we look for the foundation 
stone of our modem theory. Much like Freud, and the
5^sv]rani Nikhilananda, "Hinduism and the Idea of Evolution”, in A Book that Sho^" the^br^^ ed, Kaïph Buchsbaum (University oF’KtïsBuî^' 3rd printing,1968), pp. 48-^ 49
^^See esp* Bentley Glass et al. Forerunners of Darwin ^ 1745-1859 (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 19591’i Basil 'Hïïleÿ, Darwin and Butler; Two Versions of Evolution (London: Chatto'5üdlvïndüs Lecture XI,pp. and Gerhard Wichler, Charles Darwin (Oxford:Pergamon Press, 1961), Part I, p p . 1^78
^^8. A. Barnett, A Century of Darwin (London: Heinemann’s Paperback, 1962), esp. article~by G. H. Haddington
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latter*0 "discovery" of the unconscious,^^ Darwin was 
the first to demonstrate that evolutionary theory could 
he tested in independent experiments by others.
The key to that demonstration was what Darwin called 
"natural selection". The theory of evolution is that 
"living things do not remain unchangeably the same from 
generation to generation, but gradually alter in character 
until they eventually become significantly different from 
their early ancestors". ^ Natural selection holds that 
living things change as certain aspects or abilities are 
favoured in the selective process of nature. The "fittest" 
will survive. Recent advances only confirm the idea of 
natural selection, so much so that it has been called 
"the main unifying idea of biology".
Who, in fact the fittest are, and what has in fact 
been favoured, is a subject which has consumed the interest 
of Darwinians through the years. There are various inter­
pretations of Darwin at this point. Some wrongly believed 
fitness to be a matter of physical strength. Others, 
equally incorrect, have over-emphasized the qualities of 
social cooperation - "togetherness", they say, works in 
nature.
oftL. L. Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud (Londoni Tavistock
^^waddington. Chapter 1, A Century of Darwin, ed. Barnett, p. 1
3%. Maynard Smith, A Theory of Evolution (HArmonds- worth, Middlesex: Penguin Sooki^ r%rlht, P* 11
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While both of these extremes belong somewhere in 
our discussion, they do not touch on the simple fact that 
"fittest", to Darwin, means nothing more gladiatorial and 
nothing more glamourous than the ability to reproduce 
successfully in relation to other members of the same 
species# Since so many individuals of any group will die 
in infancy, and since so many others will fall prey to 
predators and the elements of nature; it is the parent 
with the most offspring who themselves live to reproduce, 
that is "selected" and declared "the fittest", by natural 
selection. "The word fitness, then", writes Medawar,
"has come to mean net reproductive advantage.students 
of heredity do not deliberately use it in any other sense.
There is a possible confusion at this point, which 
was pointed out to me by Dr. H. Cecil MacGregor at the 
University of St* Andrews, regarding the matter of 
"numbers of offspring". It is not the number of births 
alone. As a matter of fact, the usual single birth of 
humans has played an important part in man’s evolutionary 
progress. 8. A. Barnett explained in Instinct and Intelli. 
gence, that a lengthy childhood is an essential feature 
of man . « .Our propensity for teaching the young is 
unparalleled.3^ The single infant birth helps to insure
3%ir Peter Medawar, The future of Man (London; Methuen è Co., Ltd., i960), p."'“28"’"
A. Barnett, Instinct and Intelligence; The Science of Behaviour in Animals and Mèn "^ (Ikmdon: ïîte.cgibbon and Key, 1967), p. 220
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that he will receive extended care during the first few 
months of life, a period which we increasingly realize 
is important to the formation of his personality, to say 
nothing of the protection necessary for the very survival 
of his life#
Fitness means the survival of offspring who live to 
reproduce, in relation to others of the same species. It 
could be that the stronger is the male who eventually mates 
with the female, but this need not be the case, and cannot 
be said to be the dominant factor in selection.
Dobzhansky explains in Mankind Evolving;
"Natural" in "natural selection" does not mean savagery or conditions preceding or excluding man- made changes in the environment . • . Who is the "fittest" in the evolutionary survival of the fittest, is a most complex matter which has not been fully clarified even yet# One thing which js clear is that the fittest is not necessarily a romantic figure, or a victorious conqueror, or a superman.-o He is most likely to be merely a prolific parent.
Or, as Paul Ramsey quotes with agreement ;
The fittest, in the evolutionary sense is nothing more spectacular than the quiet, often unobtrusive fellow who, rather than spend his time in combat, produces,^feeds, and teaches a large family of children.3^
33Theodosius Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving (New HavenÎ Yale University Press, 1962")
^^HoB^ton Xi. Carson, Heredity and HUman Life (New York: Columbia University Press, l9o3J>P* 137 Quoted by Paul Ramsey in Genetics and the Future of Man, ed.John D. Roslansky ^Amsterdam; HollWi PublishingCo., 1966), p. 114
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There, in ridiculous brevity, was Darwin’s contribution: 
The most fit in any given species, are usually the most 
prolific! "Fitness is the ability to contribute to the 
gene pool of the next generation# "35 The attributes of 
some particular parents will be passed on to the next 
generation# Other attributes, from individuals without 
surviving progeny, will not# A "natural’' selection will 
have been made#
One of the clearest explanations of Darwin’s theory 
is found in J# Maynard Smith’s Theory of Evolution. After 
reviewing the setting in which natural selection was con­
ceived, noting that Darwin was indebted to the science of 
his day. Smith begins:
His (Darwin’s) theory of natural selection starts from the observation that in optimal conditions # « • all animal and plant species are capable of increas­ing in numbers in each generation.3o
But, since they do not in fact increase indefinitely:
It follows either that not all individuals b o m  survive to sexual maturity, or that some sexually mature individuals produce fewer offspring than they would under optimal conditions#37
Taking an acknowledged clue from Malthas, Darwin concluded
that animals and plants, as well as human animals, tend
to level off their numbers in proportion to the available
food and other limitations.
^^Emat Mayr, "Accident or Design: The Baradox of 
S^Maynard Smith, Evolution, p. 33
37lhld., pp. 33-34
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Starting here, saya Smith, we introduce another 
observation# It is obvious to the observer that not all 
individuals in a species are alike* This applies, as 
we note each time we recognize another person, to human 
beings; but to the trained observer it applies to animals, 
plants, and even insects, as well# Bo, continues Smith;
# # . some of the differences between them will affect their chances of survival and their fertility* Some individuals will be better than others at catch­ing food or escaping from predators, at finding mates, or raising their offspring #3^
Those better fitted to survive in these areas are "chosen" 
as parents of the next generation#
Children, or offspring, tend to resemble their 
parents, and it follows that; "The better adapted indi­
viduals in each generation # # » will tend to transmit 
to their progeny those characters by virtue of which 
they are a d a p t e d # T h u s ,  by the combined processes 
of natural selection and inheritance, "the adaptation of 
the population to its environment is constantly perfected, 
or is constantly adjusted to a changing environment#"^^ 
Natural selection works on the inherited differences 
within the population# Darwin was not far wrong as far 
as he went #
38ibid,, p. 34 
3%bld., p. 34 
^Olbld., p. 34
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But, he did not go far enough# There was a major 
gap from the beginning# As Dobzhansky writes; "The lack 
of understanding of the sources of heritable variation was 
the Archilles-heel of Darwin’s t h e o r y * T h e  weakness 
and the gap had to do with what is inherited# Granting 
that natural selection will cause changes of some kind,
"can we be sure that these changes will be adequate to 
account for the evolutionary alterations which would be 
necessary to convert one species into another?"^^ The 
answer, continues Waddington;
* . * must obviously depend on the kinds of hereditary variation which occur in natural popu­lations and are thus offered as raw materials for natural selection to work on«^3
Fr<m what we Imcm now, Darwin did not fully under­
stand heredity nor the variations which it brings forth* 
When the theory of natural selection \*ras first put forward, 
"by far the vaguest element in its composition was the 
principle of Inheritance # " ^  And, although Darwin was 
probably at times dissatisfied with it, by and large he 
accepted the Lamarckian theory of the "inheritance of 
acquired characteristics *"^5
^^^Dobzhansky, "Evolution and Environment," vol# 1, Evolution After Darwin
^^Waddington, Century of Darwin, p, 6 
44H* A* Fisher, The Genetical Theory of Natural Se- lecti^ (Oxford* ciare%a9n'%eB7 I936y7'p^ vi---------- ;
^^Fisher, "Difficulties Felt by Darwin," in Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, pp, 5 ff#
Lamarck had suggested that "the conditions under 
which an organism lives produce in it effects which are 
inherited". His theory started boldly with the belief 
that animals, through what he called "an exertion of the 
ifill", choose to live their lives in a certain way. By 
choosing to use, or choosing not to use a particular 
organ, for example the use of certain muscles or eyesight, 
the individual could increase or decrease the effective­
ness of that particular organ#
The concept of the "will" is a difficult concept 
for a biologist, even though the increased effectiveness 
of various organs and attributes is obvious* The trouble 
with Lamarck’s theory was that he took the "acquired 
characteristic", i.e., the improved muscle or developed 
eyesight, and passed it somehow through the reproductive 
cells, so that it could then be inherited by the offspring 
of the generation which acquired it in the first place. 
That is to say: If X as a parent am careless with my eyes
during the course of my lifetime, my deficiency could then 
be passed on genetically to my children* Eyesight is an 
incidental choice of example, serious though deficient 
eyesight is. Far more often do we tend to attribute 
matters of conduct and character to the mistake of the 
parent, even as much as the Pharisees queried when the 
beggar’s sight was restored by Ohrist, "Hho sinned, this 
man or his father?"
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Although there is no known way that a strictly 
Lamarckian type of inheritance can take place> it is 
obvious to the careful observer that a type of Lamarckian 
situation often seems to occur# Professor Thorpe, e.g., 
reports an experiment on the fruit-fly Drosophilia, where 
modifications of behaviour showed a Lamarckian type of 
result.And, says Thorpe, discussions of Lamarck 
usually miss the point that "all characters of all 
organisms are to some extent acquired in the environment 
# . • (and) similarly, all characters are to some extent 
inherited since an organism cannot form any structure 
for which it does not have the hereditary potentiality.
Sir Julian Huxley agrees in Essays of a Humanist;
We know now that apparently Lamarckian results may be obtained in a non**Lamarckian way, by what Waddington calls Genetic Assimilation# With char­acters which in noimar stock are only produced by special environmental stimuli, selection of those individuals showing the character in extreme form may in a comparatively few generations, lead to the Character appearing in a few individuals without exposure to the special stimulus
There is more to learn from Lamarck* Fothergill writes:
Lamarck died in 1829 * * . As a biologist he stands as one of the greatest men of his time; his contributions to systematic zoology alone entitle him to the greatest respect* He was the real founder of evolutionary theory, and by his theory
^^Thorpe, Science, Han and Morals, p. 16
^‘^Xbid.
^^Sir Julian HUxley, Essays of a Humanist (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), p*" 29"
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of the inheritance of acquired characters he founded a school which VîXXl long have its ad­herent s. 49
Fothergill, it seems to us, is too close to the possi­
bility of Lamarckian inheritance, but he does supply a 
fitting testimony to the place of the master French bio­
logist in the history of biology.
Aside from Russian biologist lysenko, who tried to 
couple good Lamarckian results with good Soviet-Russian 
social theory; one of Lamarck’s most sympathetic students 
today is Professor H. Graham Cannon at the University of 
Manchester. In two b o o k s , 50 argues for a renewed
study of Lamarck’s writings. But Cannon’s main argument 
has to do vdth other aspects of Lamarckian biology than 
the inheritance of acquired characters. He does not 
argue for a restoration of the inheritance of Lamrckianism. 
He mainly points to what we have missed or misinterpreted 
in Lamarck. G. G. Simpson also gives fair treatment to 
Lamarck in This View of Life.53- But, concludes Simpson:
"the only trouble with neo-Lamarckianism, in any of its 
various seductive guises, is that it is not true."5^
49Philip G# Fothergill, Evolution and Christians (London: Longmans, 1961), p. 33
50H. Graham Cannon, The Evolution of Living Things (Manchester University BressT IS^l ^ ncT Genetics (Manchester University Press, 19551
G. Simpson. This View of Life; The World of an Evolutionist (New York; m r c c E r t T B ^ ^H r i r m î î ô n '  194T3 Second lg64% p. 1?
5%bid.
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Darwin understood that, in part. He seemed to 
have realized that if hereditary potential can be altered 
during the lifetime of the individual parent, there can 
be no guarantee that it will last any longer than one 
generation; during which another acquired characteristic 
could easily replace it, and any lasting value or lack of 
it, would be lost in the next generation*
The effectiveness of natural selection in improv­ing the adaptation of a population to its environment depends on how far the differences between individuals which are responsible for their success or failure in the struggle for existence are inherited by their off­spring *53
There remains another problem. In the main, Darwin 
accepted the theory of inheritance which was prevalent in 
his day; not only, as we have already mentioned, in the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, but also in that 
he probably also believed - wrongly - that the hereditary 
qualities of each parent blended together in the child, 
co-determining, fifty-fifty, what particular qualities 
the offspring would have. But if that were true, char­
acteristics would soon converge, as the blending process 
would bring them all closer together and eliminate the 
distinctiveness of those which work for the improvement 
of the species. There had to be some way in which heredi­
tary gains of the "new parents" could be passed along to 
their posterity.
53Maynard Smith, Theory of Evolution, p. 42
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That way was discovered by Gregor Mendel,'^ whose 
original research took place in no more scientific a 
place than the back garden of his Augustinian Monastery 
at Brîînn in Moravia, where he raised ordinary garden peas. But, 
Mendel was no ordinary gardener. Although he had pre­
viously been unsuccessful in his examinations in Natural 
Hi story, he succeeded in experiment where others had 
long failed in theory. By cross-breeding different 
varieties of peas, he found that the first generation 
always resembled one parent or the other - never both.
There was no blending of characteristics. One character 
was always dominant over the other. "Tall plants crossed 
with short gave only tall. Round-seeded plants crossed 
with wrinkled ones, gave only round.
In the second generation he found that the recessive 
characters of the first parents reappeared - and hence 
were carried unnoticed for a whole generation, in exactly 
one-fourth to three-fourths proportions. . ♦ . Seven 
thousand plant countings later, he discovered that the 
proportions held truel^^
^^Cf. Hugo Iltis, Life of Mendel (German ed., 1924;New York: HAfner îUblishi2g'"ôcmpâny7 éd., 1966)
55c. D. Darlington, Genetics and Man (Pelican Books, 1966), p. 90
S^ibid., p. 92
57J. Maynard Smith In Theory of Bvolutlonj reported that "People seem to be divided^'rather ' sHarply ' into those who find Mendelian genetics easy, and those who find it Incomprehensible." p. 12
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His paper reporting this r e s e a r c h , 5® published in 
1865, was absolutely ignored. Nobody that we know of saw 
its importance then. Although it could have been available 
to Darwin and the early evolutionists, it was not "dis­
covered" until 1900, when Bateson in England, Correns 
at Tubingen, and Tschermark in Vienna,found it at about 
the same time. Then, as Waddington comments; "Within a 
few decades after 1900, biologists gained a thorough under­
standing of the mechanisms by which hereditary qualities 
are passed from generation to generation, It is the 
combination and recombination of heritable qualities 
(genes) which allows for the possibility of immediate and 
permanent change. It is in light of this knowledge that 
Darwinism can now be expressed as a "genetical theory of 
natural selection" - by favouring the "fittest" to repro­
duce, it brings about changes in the hereditary qualities, 
the genes, of the species.
Once the "permanence" of natural selection is as­
sured, and Mendel corrects both Lamarck and Darwin, we 
must note finally the post-Darwinian understanding of the 
"origin of new variations". This is the final piece left 
in the puzzle of heredity* New variations do certainly
5^"Verusche uber Pflanzen Hybriden", English trans­lation in Bateson’s Mendel’s Principles of Heredity (Cambridge; University"Brass, 1909, rart IT,’ "Experiments in Plant Hybridisation")
^^Cf, Darlington, Genetics and Man 
^%addlngton, A Century of Darwin^ p* 9
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arise; for "evolutionary changes would soon cease if it 
were not that processes also occur whereby individuals 
with new, genetically determined characteristics may 
a r i s e , A  full theory of evolution must contain some 
account of "the initiation of heritable novelty,
We cannot take space here to summarize how this 
occurs in detail. For our purposes it may be sufficient 
to say that "newness" does occur in the evolutionary 
process for causes which for the most part are presently 
unknown. We can discuss "the origin of new variations 
under three headings of (1) segregation, (2) linkage, 
free and potential variability, and (3) gene mutation.
The first has to do with the selection which takes place 
at different times for different purposes, and thus a 
variety of "selected qualities," By combining the 
already existing potentials in different combinations, 
a wide range of variation is assured,
"Linkage, free and potential variability," is a 
more complex and technical topic. As a consequence of 
"genetic linkage," e,g,, a selection which takes place 
for one particular characteristic, may carry with it, 
unrelated but predictable "side effects," "A genetic 
change at a single locus may affect more than one
"*"8mith. Theory of Evolution, p, 103 62R, A, Fisher, Genetical Theory of Natural Selec­tion (Oxford: Clarendon îress,"Tÿ30), P# 12
63Smith, Theory of Evolution^ pp* 103-120
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character. A characteristic which has no known ad­
vantage in the process of selection, can be carried with 
one which does.
The third source of variation, gene mutation, is 
the best known, but often misunderstood. Mutations 
obviously occur:
Normally, genes are reproduced, or are copied exactly at cell division# But occasionally, either as a consequence of mis-copying during reproduction, or a change during the period between cell division, a gene is changed in its chemical structure and in its effects during development. Such a changed, or mutated, gene is subsequently reproduced in its altered form as accurately as was the original one. ^
Usually the causes of mutations are not definitely known.
R. A. Fisher wrote only so general a comment as that "we
cannot but ascribe them either to the nature of the
organism, or to that of its surrounding environment, or,
more generally, to the interaction of the two.
We do not know much more than Fisher did. %at
modem biology does seem to know is that gene mutation is
rare,^^ often harmful,apparently without purpose; and
^^Ibid., p. 108
^^Smith, Theory of Evolution, p. 110
^"Fisher, Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, p. 13
^^"Rare" is of course always a relative word. Its range of use among the sources used in this paper, is from one in 50,000 (Smith) p. 113; to one in 500,000 in deBeer (Evolution), p. 15)
^^Dr. H. C. MacGregor warned me that there is no objective way to support the statement that mutations are "Harmful" - much as most scientists would agree that they usually cause "harm." He referred me to a recent research '
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consequently Is not the controlling factor in evolutionary 
development* "Most mutations," concludes Simpson, "are 
harmful. The few that may become useful are, as a rule, 
slowly adjusted into the existing genetic system of the 
species*
There is often seme difference in emphasis in the 
way the biologist deals with mutation. But:
It is probably safe for a student of evolution to assume that mutation is random in the sense that the phenotypic changes produced by mutations are not adaptive to the conditions which caused them, and are just as likely to be in the opposite direction to any evolutionary changes which may be occurring as they are in the same direction* * ^
In answer to his own question; "What controls the 
emergence of evolutionary novelties?", Professor Ernst 
Mayr answers;
Changes of evolutionary significance are rarely * * . the direct result of mutation* * ♦ « The emergence of a new structure is normally due to the acquisition of a new function by an existing struc­ture. In both cases the resulting "new" structure is merely a modification of a previous structure.71
project which may in the end show that some organisms ^mutate on purpose," with highly desirable results to their own survival* Dr* j^ îaçGregor’ s m m  research and opinion are not given as confirmation of one side or the other, but it is an interesting debate which is still open and one which might be critically important to a complete understanding of evolution and the development of species characteristics ^ I am grateful to Dr. MacGregor#
^^Simpson, TMs View of life, p* 273
^^Smith, Theory of Evolution, p. 114
'^^Emst Mayr, "The Emergence of Evolutionary Novelty" in Evolution After Damlh, Vol* 1, ed* Sbr 377
71
"It is natural selection^ not mutation," aonoludes 
deBoer, "that has governed the direction as well as the 
amount of evolution# Without mutation at all, there 
is variation enough in the genetic pools of the plant 
and animal kingdoms "for evolution to continue for as 
long in the future as it has gone on in the past#"^^
* * * * * * *
(<*N
In concluding this resume of the contemporary 
understanding of evolution, we must mention one further 
point which has to do with the general use of the word 
"evolution#" There is a td.despraad use of the word which 
is intended to cover the whole of the evolutionary develop­
ment, both before the appearance of life, and after the 
appearance of man* When Julian Huxley or 0* H* Waddington 
or Teilhard use the word "evolution," they are speaking 
about a category which includes what we would more normally 
call the cultural development of mankind# % e n  IRixley 
uses "psycho-social evolution," and when Waddington uses 
"soclo-genetic transmission, " and when Teilhard uses his 
concept of ‘ noosphere, " they are actually referring to 
the development of man as man* But this development is 
so closely related to the evolution of both pre-life and 
life, that our concept of evolution must be extended to 
include the movement of man in his development*
^^deBeer, Evolution, p* 1^
p.
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This distinction, and definition, will become 
increasingly important as we discuss modem expressions 
of the evolutionary ethic, particularly in the work of 
Julian Huxley and Professor Waddington#
3. Man In the Evolutionary Process
In his Preface to the Phenomenon, Teilhard de 
Chardin writes that we should accept two basic assumptions 
about man and his existence# The first is what he calls 
"The Organic Nature of Mankind"5 and the second is "The 
Pre-Eminent Significance of Man in Nature# We will 
borrow Teilhard *s phrasing in elaborating our point that 
we must view man on these two different levels of his 
existence#
a# The Organic Nature of Mankind
There are three separate, but related, arguments 
which lead us to the conclusion that the emotional, moral, 
and ethical behaviour of man are related to the basic 
stuff of life, and are subject to scientific examination# 
(1) First, there is the historical and Biblical 
assumption that we cannot separate man's physical attri­
butes from his emotional, moral, or spiritual life* We 
do not arrive at manhood with a body and then find a mind, 
brain, and spirit# They all belong together and are part 
of the same unitary concept# This was understood in the 
Old Testament which always speaks of the unity of the 
soul-body (nephesh)#^^ Each depends on the other for its 
existence and esqpression# There is never a body and a
^^Teilhard, The Phenomenon of Man, pp# 38-33
75Robinson, Christian Doctrine of Man, p# 16
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spirit, but a body with a spirit, and a spirit with a 
body# Consequently, when we relate this Judeo-Christian 
understanding of man to the concept of man's evolutionary 
origin, we must conclude that when the first man( or men) 
became a distinct species, and a unique part of creation 
by some extraordinary development, he (they) crossed the 
line into manhood with more than physical appearance# He 
brought with him the wide range of needs and attributes 
which have to do with his behaviour, including that be­
haviour to which we assign moral and ethical values.
(2#) From the research of contemporary genetics, we 
understand that an individual person receives more than 
his physical endowments from his parents# This has been 
known in a general way, but we are becoming more specific 
as the research accumulates# The individual receives an 
ihheritance of character-forming traits, or at least the 
potential for them, from his parents and the generations 
before them# Man's own genetic pool is one that has been 
existing since the first "non-man" became a living, breath­
ing spirit# Bentley Glass may be limiting ethical value 
too much when he writes that:
Our highest ethical values - the love of mother for her child and of the man for his mate, the will­ingness to sacrifice one's own life for the safety of the family or tribe, and the impulse to care for the weak, the suffering, and the helpless - all of these too had the same primitive beginnings.'^
7%entley Glass, Science and Ethical Values (Londons Oxford University Press;' Ohaper MIIï TCe"Ü ofNorth Carolina Press, 1966), pp# 69-70
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Bat he does remind us forcefully that such tendencies are 
present in pre-human life# We are equipped with the "stuff," 
out of which potential, the entirety of life is made*
The logic would seem to follow that the first man, 
unless God chose to equip him with entirely new charac­
teristics of biological and genetic life, had "inherited" 
his potential manhood and personality, as well as his 
physical body# His willingness to share the rewards of 
his hunting with his "family"; as well as his ability to 
be successful in the hunt itself, was in the range of 
characteristics he received from his predecessors*
(3 # ) Thirdly, we point to the contemporary aoological 
studies of behaviour* From ecological and ethological 
studies we have learned that much of what we formerly 
thought was exclusively human behaviour is also present 
in sub-human living things# There are difficulties in 
making a direct comparison between animal and human 
behaviour. But scane valid experiments in animal be­
haviour studies, especially in the species most closely 
related to man, are relevant to the study and control of 
human behaviour. As Professor W. H# Thorpe writes :
We all exhibit in our behaviour types of action and reaction which we share not merely with our primitive primate ancestors, but with the dog, the protozoan, and the plant* This means that with due care, the attempt to understand animal behaviour by comparing it with our own can sometimes carry us further than, on the face of it, we should have be­lieved possible.77
77w* H* Thorpe, Biology and the Nature of Man (London: Oxford University Pre¥s, 1962), ^
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In the evolutionary process; at that point when that which 
was "not-man" becomes "man, " we can discover the rudiments 
of some of that which came to be called ethical acts*
Canon Raven set the stage for the discussion in Natural 
Religion and Christian Theology, where he writes:
For the scientist, especially in these days when the evolution of behaviour is attracting the attention both of the biologist and the psychologist, the study of this passage from the animal to the human, is plainly of the greatest importance *7o
b* The Significance of Man in Nature
The point we make here is that while we must 
examine man as a "natural" occurrence in evolution, we must 
also show he is unique and has "a pre-eminent significance. " 
In the first place, we will insist that the question of 
man's uniqueness is a real question which must be asked 
anew in each theological generation since Darwin* We 
cannot approach the study of the nature of man certain 
that we already have the answers, and support our own 
notions by a reiteration of our pet theories* There is 
a legitimate question to be asked regarding what the 
Imago Dei means for our generation in the light of our 
knowledge; and what aspects of man's humanity separate 
him from the rest of creation.
To some, the very question of man's uniqueness is 
out of place and unnecessary, at least as a serious ques­
tion. They miss the importance of the discussion and
78' Charles B. Raven, Natural Religion and ChristianTheology (Cambridge: OniversltF'H‘'®’s,' lyb'iJ'j" UiiT0rd-IB5'=---tures, Edinburgh^ 1952)i p. 26
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force of the conclusion, for they have never broached the 
question. An opinion, like that expressed by E* L* 
Mascallî
There is nothing in the history of the human race as it is envisaged by evolutionary biology which need lead us to abandon the traditional belief of Chris­tendom that man is the uniquely favored creature upon whom God has stamped his own image.79
while on the surface quite true, is yet misleading for it
misses the question of uniqueness.
To many others, the opposite Is true. The nat­
uralist allows for nothing beyond man's evolutionary 
existence, and the gaps in our knowledge are but gaps in 
our ability to comprehend, not in any extra-natural unique­
ness of homo sapiens. To them we repeat Niebuhr's theme 
that;
Subsequent developments, after the triumph of Darwin, proved that the religious impulse to defend the unique dignity of man were not as foolish as they seemed, though the methods of defense were both foolish and futile.GO
To others, the uniqueness of man in nature is a 
question which demands an answer. It is ultimately 
classed as a matter of belief, unprovable but not die- 
proven; a matter, like so many other matters of faith, 
which can be argued Indefinitely unless one brings a prior 
consideration to the discussion. Thorpe warns of the
L. Mas call. The Importance of Being Human;Some Aspects of the Christian Doctrine of Man (Mew York: •Columbia inlvoBItyTre — ---
^^Niebuhr, Book That Shook the World, p. 33
78
danger In the smoothing over the differences and pretend- 
ing that all of the controversies have been solved# It
is essential that the differences be brought out into the
open.
At the start the acceptance of evolution opened the 
way for the dethronement of the one who was made a little 
lower than the angels and was crowned with glory and honor. 
From the exalted position as the "Lord of all creation," 
man became - to some - "an ape with a few extra tricks." 
Since then we have faced a steady stream of closely imven 
evidence that man is not different in kind from other forms 
of life. And, concludes Professor Bronowski;
This is where the fulcrum of our fears lies; Thatman as a species, and we as thinking men, willqbeshown to be no more than a machinery of atoms.
Canon Haven noted that "a question immediately arises con­
cerning the status and peculiarity of mankind. The 
uniqueness of man is an issue which must have serious 
consequences in our theological and ethical thought*
Here there are two distinct aspects of the subject 
which concern us in this thesis. One involves the unique 
characteristics of man the species (what separates man 
from the rest of nature?)* The other involves the re­
ligious belief in the spiritual and theological signifi­
cance of man. We will maintain that both can be supported
BlThorpe, Science, Man and Morals, p. 131DpJ• Bronowski, % e  Identity of Man (London: Heinemann, 1965), p.
G%aven, Natural Religion, p. 22
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in the light of contemporary research and reflection*
(1) From the biological and historical point of
view, there can be no doubt that the human animal is
unique* The statement cannot be challenged seriously;
but it is not of great importance for our purpose. To
say that "Man is unique" is simply to say for man what
can be said for every other species or individual form
of life* Man is unique; but so also is the robin,
84studied by Professor David Lack; the Herring-gull,
studied by Professor Niko Tinbergen; the rats studied
by S. A. B a r n e t t t h e  Yucca moth studied by Hau; and
87the intra-cellular symblots, studied by Buchner* The
pre-Cambrian triglobyte who ruled the world of the sea
for almost 3,000,000 years, was also as "unique" as man
is now* So are the many thousands of other living
organisms who survive in their specialized environments.
Each is characterized by some special behavioural activity.88some in phenomenal ways* The complexities of reaction 
which take place in the insect, animal and plant worlds.
^^David A, Lack, The Life of the Robin (London;H. Ef and G. Witherby, 1943; Fev. 1946, Penguin rev. 1953)
^%iko Tinbergen, The Herring Gull's World (London: Collins, 1953) ™
85a. A* Barnett, A Study of Behaviour (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd*, 1963)
®7neported by Ernst Mayr, in Leeper's The Evolution of the Living Organism
88There are countless examples, see e.g., the dis­cussion of the behaviour of the larvae and the male stickle­back in Ronald Fletcher's Instinct in Man, or the dis­cussion of the cattle tick, xn Bleibtreu's Parable of the Beast .
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exhibit such Incredible behaviour (to the novice at 
least, and impressive to the expert) that their unique­
ness is important and purposive.
The statement of man's uniqueness becomes signi­
ficant when we begin to define the uniqueness. Human 
beings are unique in a number of different ways. We 
say that men are unique in their spiritual worship or 
their moral behaviour* But man is also unique in that 
he tends not to regulate his numbers; he tends to inflict 
fatal damage on members of his own species; he pilots 
airplanes; he plays football and he tells lies. It is 
a qualitative distinetiveness, and not the uniqueness 
itself, in which we are interested* The point at issue 
is whether the biological uniqueness is of such qualita­
tive importance that we can justifiably point to a 
singular significance of man in nature.
Our conclusion is simple and brief : It is and we
can. At that point we find a wide range of agreement 
with many working biologists.
While man is clearly an animal, he possesses unique characteristics which obviously madce him dif­ferent from other animals. Wîiat matters most for understanding him is that "humanness" which sets him apart from the rest of creation.G9
Raven's point that we shall have a "truer concept of the 
process if we study it from its end rather than from its
^^Rene Dubos, Man Adapting (New Hhven; Yale Uni­versity Press, 1965), p. 3“
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beginning"is well made, and convincing* Although man 
is part of the ascending scale of developing life, "he 
has passed a critical point where he became not simply 
the highest form of life but a different creature from 
any of those that had preceded him*
Sir Julian Huxley, who many years ago introduced 
the phrase "the nothing-but-fallacy," also discredited 
the belief that man is nothing-but an animal. Without 
a concern for Christian theology, he yet showed the 
opinion to be incorrect in its cynicism; and sub specie 
evolutionis, patently false* In his article from Be­
haviour and Evolution,98 elaborates:
In the past half century there has been much talk, chiefly originating from cultural anthropologists, of the relativity of morals, which has often been con­strued to mean that no type of morality is or can be better than another; much talk too, chiefly originat­ing from psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, but re­inforced from the camp of dogmatic religion and obscurantist philosophy, of the non-rational bases of human behaviour, which has often been construed to mean the supremacy of the irrational, the bank­ruptcy of reason, and the inadequacy of science, and has indeed led to a widespread revolt against reason and a glorification of unreason.93
He continues;
Even among professional biologists, who ought to know better, the thesis has been proclaimed that no
90Raven, Natural Religion, p. 12
^^Edmund W* Sinnott, Matter, Mind and Mans The Biology of Human Nature (New YorS^ Althenëüm^r^ pub7 l95t)> p. 1UÈ
Julian BUxley, in Behaviour and Evolution* ed. Simpson & Roe ^
93Ibid., p. 451
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organism can properly be called higher or lower than another, because all by the fact of their existence and survival, are "equally adapted” and historians have asserted there is not, or evpn cannot,^be any such thing as progress in human af­fairs *94
In answer to these critics of man, Hhxley wrote a volume 
of e s s a y s . T h e  recent study in biology, he argues, has 
reinstated man in an exalted position "analogous to that 
conferred on him as Lord of Creation by Theology. ' The 
"theological" view "had a solid biological basis
To Huxley the distinction cannot be established by 
an enumeration of the special activities which man per­
forms.
In point of fact, the great majority of man's activities and characteristics are by-products of his primary distinctive characteristics, and there­fore, like them, biologically unique.
On the one hand, conversation, organized games, education, sport, paid work, gardening, the theatre; on the other, conscience, duty, sin, humiliation, vice, penitence - these are all such unique by­products* The trouble indeed, is to find any human activities which are not unique. Even the fundamental biological attributes such as eating, sleeping, and mating have been tricked out by man q» with all kinds of unique frills and peculiarities.*^*
Huxley accepts these as part of our natural development,
but he insists that each attribute is removed, by meaning
and conscious adoption, from anything found in the
p. 451
95julian Bixle Chatto and Windus, jr,^ The Uniqueness of Man (London;
9%bld., p. 5
97ibid., p. 29
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sub-human x^ orld. We might well be Joined there at the 
source; but cultural evolution and the transformation 
by man himself, makes the human species "unique."
In the perspective of biology, our business in the world is seen to be the imposition of the best and most enduring of our human standards upon our­selves and our planet* The enjoyment of beauty and Interest, the achievement of goodness and efficiency, the enhancement of life and its variety - these are the harvest which our human uniqueness should be called upon to y i e l d .
Through all the Jungles of nature; through all the living 
predators who feed on other life; through all which on 
first sight degrades humanity, nothing can erase the 
closing words : final belief is in life - in the
uniqueness of man."
G. G. Simpson agrees ;
Among all the myriad forms of matter and of life on the earth, or as far as we know the universe, man is unique. . . . Recognition of this kinship with the rest of the universe is necessary for understand­ing him, but his essential nature is defined by qualities found nowhere else, not by those he has in common with apes, fishes, trees, fire or any­thing other than himself .99
"His place in nature and its supreme significance to man
are not defined by his animality, but by his humanity.
Further, Dobzhansky writes ; "Man is a most extraordinary
product of evolution. . . .  he cannot any longer be
9®Ibld,, p. 33
99sinijpson, Meaning of Evolution, p. 244 
^°Olbld,, p. 284
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loiunderstood except as a uniquely human phenomenon."
Judged by any reasonable criteria, man repre­sents the highest, most progressive, and most suc­cessful product of organic evolution. Strangely,this has been challenged.
Admittedly, the gap between man and the animals has 
been narrowed considerably in recent years. Much of what 
we thought was uniquely human, we now know that we share 
with much of the animal kingdom. The hallmarks of man 
are not so distinctive as once they were. But;
Man shares this causal capacity with all things, but in addition he is able freely to intervene in events and purposely to change things, to build up and to destroy, to shape freely and consciously many things in the world around him and in his own soul. Man has the capacity not only to be a link in a chain of causality, but also, after having grasped the importance of a good, to start with a new and freely chosen chain which he can meaning­fully and consciously direct toward an end.103
(2) With that natural distinction firmly made by 
those who have no vested interest in a theological view 
of man, we turn to the second; that which pertains to 
man as the "ethical animal" or the "theological animal."
Professor Ian Barbour wrote that;
In an age dominated by religion, it was necessary to assert the independence of science. Today, in an age dominated by science, it may be necessary to assert the independence of religion. 104
^Glfheodosius Bobzhansky, The Biological Basis of Bkman Freedom (New York: Columbia Cblu#ië %perbaok, i960, original I956), p. 6
102xbid., p. 86
lOSpietrlch von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics (New York! David McKhy Co., Inc., 1953)/ PP."255-86-----
l°^Ian Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (London! SOM Press Ltd/,' 1966),%. 51----------- ®---
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% a t  WQ assert now is the independence of religion re­
garding the significance of man as a theological being# 
However natural is the behaviour of man in its origin, 
we can continue to speak of his pre-eminent significance 
in nature# We can concur with Canon Raven when he noted 
that "nothing of religious significance is altered when 
we realize that our privileges are not exclusive to man#"^^^ 
Our concern, as Mas call reminds us, is to understand that 
the great line of division in the created universe "is 
not between the plants and animals, or between lifeless 
matter and living creatures# It is between the realm of 
matter, living and lifeless alike, » # # and the realm of 
the spirit. It is the realm of the spirit which con­
cerns us here#
There is indeed a sense in which man's morality and religion are part of man's adaptive response to his environment - that is half of the story* The other half is that, given our world and the process of life, man's morality and religion, and culture, the development of natural phenomena is incomplete apart from a larger destiny which includes^the spiritual dimensions of the life process*^^7
Professor Emil Brunner is helpful here in the 
"Christian Understanding of Man." Brunner wrote:
^^ Sjîaven, Natural Religion, p* 23
^^^E. L. Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science (London: Longmans, Green and Compimy, 1956 - Lectures, 1956) , P* 205
^^^Ryie Haselden & Philip Hefner, Changing Man:The Threat and The Promise (Garden City* New York:BôüBIeaëwy 10-11
. Brunner, "The Christian Understandlng ofMan," in T. E* Jessop, et alj The Christ'iah ühdërstand'ihg of Man (London: George Allen and Uhwih," ltd. ,1938)
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"It is the task of a Christian anthropology to show that 
it is impossible to understand man save in the light of 
God*"^^9 Man is a "theological being" first of all; the 
ground of that being, "His goal, his norm, and the possi­
bility of understanding his own nature are all in God." 
This does not conflict with the natural man. The theolo­
gian does not pre-empt the subject from science, but he 
does find "a special Christian doctrine of freedom and 
unfreedom, of the destiny and personal existence of man, 
which is more or less in sharp contrast with every other 
view of man.
The task of Christian anthropology becomes an 
inclusive one* It is always "aggressive and eager to 
get in touch with man," says Brunner* "It is essential 
* * « that it should always carry on discussions with 
its rivals*" For, explains Brunner:
To enquire into the nature of man means enquir­ing into the mind or the spirit from which all questioning springs. All problems are human prob­lems, and all interests are human interests. There­fore, the secret of man extends to the ultimate depths of existence; we cannot understand man aright unless we take into consideration both the primal origin and the final end of all things.3-11
". . . His existence includes his d e s t i n y . W h a t  man
thinks about himself, about his participation and
p. 142 
^^°Ibld., p. 143 
^^^Ibid., p. 145 
^^^Ibid., p. 146
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uniqueness in nature is critical to how man will ap­
proach his reflection and ethics.
The most powerful of all spiritual forces is man's view Of himself, the way in which he under­stands his nature and his destiny, indeed it is the one force which determines all the others which influence human life. For in the last re­sort, all that man thinks and wills springs out of what he thinks and viills about himself, human life, its meaning and its purpose*113
Bamnner then rejects rival conceptions of man in
favor of what he calls a "synthetic anthropology." The
Christian message is related to this view which holds
that man is composed of "body, mind, and spirit, and
yet is a unity. " That unity becomes his uniqueness when
we understand this three-fold summary of the Christian
man: (1) He has been created in the image of God; (2)
Through sin, man has come into opposition to his divine
destiny; and (3) In Jesus Christ, who reveals to man
both his original nature and his contradiction, the
original unity is restored*
These statements, writes Brunner, "are statements
of faith . . . they spring from the Divine revelation
alone# " But they refer to the actual man and do not
contradict what is discovered elsewhere* In them, man
becomes distinctive in the relationship which was, was
lost, and was re-established in Christ; the relationship
of personhood between man and his Creator*
p. 153
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The distinctively human element in man is not a state of existence which can be described inde­pendently of the relation to God; it contains some­thing peculiar which defies isolated description, that is, the element of transcendence#
The characteristic which distinguishes man from the rest
of creation is "this single and impressive facts that he
is responsible and personal#
It is true of course that even his particular mental endowments - his power to form ideas and to be determined by ideas - give him a distinctive place in the life of the universe, and single him out from all the sub-human Creation; but the absolute breach between man and all that is not man occurs here, at the very centres man alone is a person#^ ^7
Beyond Brunner, we stress the integrity of man's 
distinctiveness in the independent inquiries from theolo­
gical and moral points of view.
Evolution and biology may tell us something about the nature of man, but in that aspect of himself which makes him unique, man must make use of that very unique­ness in order to attempt to fathom his nature* Man is not just an animal; he is a glorious creation made in the image of God* Unless we can interpret evolu­tion, unless we can get a meaning out of it, contribut­ing in sane way to an understanding of man's uniqueness, the theory will have little value for us beyond the realm of biology #118
Pothergill is on the point. We must establish uniqueness 
beyond biology# The evidence is of course largely testi­
monial* Ultimately, one decides this issue on the basis 
of the value structure and belief he brings to it.
154-55
p, 151
llTlbld., pp. 171-72
118Fothergill, Evolution and Christians, p. 331
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We can borrow Mascall *s summary for our own:
We might sum up this lecture by saying that the great tradition of Christian theology, in spite of occasional hesitancies and divergences, has steadily taught that a human being is composed of body and soul, of matter and spirit, interpenetrating each other in the most intimate way, and that modem physiology, while casting a good deal of li^t upon certain aspects of that interconnection has certainly done nothing to supercede it.^^9
There we join the great tradition of Christian 
theology and hold both ends of the definition of man.
Ian Barbour is helpful again where he pleads for a 
return, not to the natural theology, but to a "Theology 
of Nature" - an attempt to view the natural order in the 
framework of theological ideas derived primarily from the 
interpretation of historical revelation and religious 
e x p e r i e n c e . More specifically, he writes ;
Our interpretation of living beings is neither mechanistic nor vltalistic, but organismic* No elusive entities of the sort postulated by vitalists or dualists are assumed, but the distinctive be­haviour of integrated totalities and the emergence of new. characteristics at higher levels are indi­cat ed.^ *^ -^
To be a "Christian naturalist" is an option for the moralist.
We could hope for greater clarity from Professor 
Barbour than the indication of "integrated totalities and 
the emergence of new characteristics," but he supports the 
point - the Christian view of man is compatible with
^^%ascall, Christian Theology, p. 251
IP OBarbour, Issues, etc., p. 5; also p. 270 
^^^Xbid7, p. 7
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modem theory* Man originates in nature; hut echoing 
the refrain which runs all the m y  through Teilhard's 
Phenomenon of Man:
In the world, nothing could ever hurst forth as final across the different thresholds successively traversed by evolution (however critical they be) which has not already existed in an obscure and primordial way*^*=*
More to the point is the Dutch Augustinian.
Father A, DUlsbosch* God's Creation is a plea to take
seriously the natural origin of man in dealing with
theology, and the doctrine of original sin* Hulsbosch
concludes that if we want to be serious about the unity
of man, the unity of body and soul;
* * * then we have to say that human existence in this world is radically marked by natural corpore­ality* All the actions of man, and also his spiritual activities, bear the seal of earthly corporeality* The activity of man is, in the strictest sense, one, that of a soul-body#
The integrity of the natural must be extended to the totality of human existence on earth, and to the existence of the Christian as well *^^8
All of the activity of man bears the seal of his earthly 
corporeality* The totality of man's existence is involved* 
Julian Huxley once complained that medieval theology 
urged man to think of human life sub specie aetemitatis*
He announced that he was attempting to re-think human life 
sub specie evolutionis*
^^%eilhard. Phenomenon, p. 77
Hulsbosch, God's Creation: Creation, Sin, and Redemption in an Evolving~World (lohd'oh:^Èheed and* Mrd#, pp. — —
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To which the present writer (Dohzhansky) would like to add that evolution, too, vd.ll have to he thought about in the light of eternity, eternity in the light of evolution, and human life in the lights of both,1^4
We add the same, Dobzhansky accepts the natural origin 
of man, but defends man's unique position in creation. In 
the end he proposes a religious synthesis, which charac­
teristically he calls The Teilhardian Synthesis^^^ ^ ^ 
synthesis which Incorporates the progressive evolutionary 
view with man's central significance in it.
Evolution is a source of hope for man. To be sure, modem evolutionism has not restored the earth to the position of the center of the universe. How­ever, while the universe is surely not geocentric, it may conceivably be anthropocentric, Man, this mysterious product of the world's evolution, may also be its protagonist, and eventually its pilot.In any case the world is not fixed, not finished, and not unchangeable. Everything in it^is engaged in evolutionary flow and development,
But everything is also engaged in a continuing importance, 
with man in a continuing relationship and response to the 
One on whom the creation depends, both for its existence, 
and its ultimate meaning. An understanding of his evolu­
tionary origin can enhance that relationship and response, 
and can bring greater meaning to his ethical decisions.
We can continue to speak with confidence and con­
viction regarding the significance of man; and conclude 
t'îith Teilhard:
^^^obzhansky. Biological Basis* p. 122 
^^9jjQ^ 2hansky, Biology of Ultimate Concern  ^chap. 6 
p. 7
92
Man: not simply a zoological type like the others. But man, the nucleus of a movement of in­folding and convergence in which, localized on our little planet (lost though it he in time and space) is manifest what is probably the most characteristic and most illuminating current that affects the im­mensities that envelop us.
j^ian, on who and in whom the universe enfolds itself.127
That man is pre-eminentî
^^* f^eilhard deOhardin, Man's Place in Nature (New York: Harper & Row, I966, pp. 33^6—
4. An Historical Account of Evolutionary Ethics 
a* Darwin
In The Origin of the Species, at first Darwin took 
great care not to include man in the evolution of life*
Its theme is simply that all living things develop from 
a single source, by means of "natural selection#" There 
was no "special creation" of each species# Basil Willey 
has speculated that Darwin deliberately refrained from 
emphasizing the descent of man, "lest the scandal of it 
should hamper the acceptance of his main doctrine#
The book was written to present a scientific theory# All 
Darwin mentioned about man in the Origin was a concluding 
sentence: "Mght will be thrown on the origin of man and
his history#" In later editions it was changed to "much 
light#"^^9 "God" and "Greator" appear in the book, and 
it seems probable that because of his respect for the 
Christian faith, whose ministry he almost entered earlier, 
he purposely withheld what appeared to go against the 
scripture.^^Q The closing lines of the book reveal the
Basil Willey, Darwin and Butler: Two Versions of Evolution fliondon: chatto' &''%induB#"'%#;T''py' '
Mortimer J* Adler, The Difference of Man andm e  mffern^  M  m m e s  (a M e r e d i # # 0k,-'wciïî ' W>V': (Soi > "îlèSi- orip Rinehart ■& Winston, 1967), p* 72
There is some continuing argument regarding Darwin's actual religious-■belief ♦ in The Autobiography
XoirBn's grwid^auglitsr), soae of the ofteinWt eutototography
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kind of respect which Darwin had both for the Creator
and the life process:
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms, or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful % d  most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved»^31
In spite of his caution, however, his critics and
defenders both realised that the implications and "the
light to be thrown on the origin of man and his history"
were enormous* Hot only from organized religion, but also
from scientists and secular philosophers alike, Darwin
was immediately criticized for violating the teaching of
Genesis,132
In answer to his critics, and to correct the bias 
of some of his supporters, Darwin published later a book 
dealing directly with man. It is not as well knowhjbut 
more important for us; The Descent of Man.^^^ There, 
as well as less importantly in The Expression of Emotions
which had been "suppressed" by the family to protect Darwin's "religious reputation" is restored* They indicate that Darwin had more doubts than we ever realized, but even now, an accurate rendering of what Darwin actually believed is most difficult,
^^^Darwin, Origin of Species, p. 490
a complete discussion of "The Reception of the Origin," see chap, 8 of Gavin deBeer^ s^ #iarles Darwin, pp . 157 rf, (New York and London: Thomas Nelsbh &  Bons, Ltd *,1963)
^^^Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (London:John Murray, first published IBt'l’, new ed* I901)
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in M m  and A n i m a l s , he discussed the impact of natural 
selection for man and his behaviour. As Darlington com­
mented, "He took courage in both hands," when he wrote; 
"Let us apply these generally admitted principles to the 
races of man, viewing him in the same spirit as a natu­
ralist would any other a n i m a l . "^35
Man was to be Included in the evolutionary process 
and more, the implications went much further than the 
relatively simple acceptance of his physical descent.
The Descent of Man makes an unrestricted application of 
evolutionary theory to homo sapiens. It included man's 
mind and behaviour as well,
Darwin approached the moral sense of man apolo­
getically;
This great question (of the moral sense) has been discussed by many writers of consummate ability; and ray sole excuse for touching on it, is the impossi­bility of here passing it over; and because, as far as X know, no one has approached it exclusively from the side of natural history.I3o
His approach was typically cautious. After we accept the 
conclusion on the origin of man, Dartfin said that we be­
come aware that "The high standard of our intellectual 
powers and moral disposition is the greatest difficulty
^^^Qbarles Darwin, The Expression of the Enotions in Man and Animals (London; John Murray, 1872) TKIF book îs3iîIir“uSeîuT31i the ethological studies of man. In it Darwin discussed anxiety, grief, suffering, joy, love, de­votion, anger, fear, weeping, et al, in their evolutionary settings and meanings.
^35narlington, Genetics and Man, p. 264 
^^^Darwin, Descent of Man, p. l49
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which presents i t s e l f , "^^7 Although he was admittedly 
not a keen philosopherDarwin was not easily fooled.
There was no great enthusiasm to debase man which would 
have taken him too far* There was no attempt to over­
simplify and hint that all aspects of man^s morality are 
discovered and understood in the evolutionary process*
He understood that*
Ultimately our moral sense or conscience becomes a highly complex sentiment - originating in the social instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, and confirmed by instruction and habit*^3^
Darwin subscribed to the judgment of those who maintained 
that of all the differences between man and the lower 
animals, the '^moral sense or conscience' is by far the
most important. It must be "the most noble of all the
attributes of m a n ,"^39
As a student of natural history Darwin did not pre­
tend to understand the intricacies of moral philosophy, 
but he did understand that the "specifically human at­
tributes," which have to do with our moral qualities, also 
appeared at some stages of pre-human life* The problem
137lbia., p. 931
ISGibia., p. 203
p. 148
^ See esp. Charles Darwin aad the Qolden Rule, by William Emerson Ritter (Rew Ÿork: Storm Stitjii'sherfe,' 1954) ed. from his writings by Edna Watson Bailey; pp. 39 ff.
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which arises with that knowledge must he faced with him# 
For;
The development of the moral qualities is a more interesting problem. The foundation lies in the social instincts, including under this term family ties* « * « Animals endowed with social instincts take pleasure in one another's company, warn one another of danger, defend and aid one another in many ways#^ "^ ^
It is doubtful whether Darwin realised that there 
would be so wide a range of study where his statement 
would apply. Animal behavioural studies are now coming 
into great prominence in the relatively new science of 
ethology*^^^ They confirm what Darwin wrote* Neither 
could he have been aware of the psychological and 
sociological research in the twentieth century which 
would make the issue more complex* But he did sense how 
critical this study of morality was for a starting-point. 
As the reasoning powers and foresight of men developed 
in his social setting, Darwin speculated that each indi­
vidual "would soon leam that if he aided his fellow 
creatures, he would commonly receive aid in return,
From that motive alone, the individual man could have 
acquired the habit of coming to the aid of his fellow- 
men: that is to say, natural selection would have
"favoured" the individuals who were best capable of 
acquiring the habit *
^^ D^arîfin, Descent, p. 932
Although it is probably correct to say that Darwin himself was the first ethologist.
^^^Danfin, Descent, p. 201
,,143
98
A tribe including many members who, from pos­sessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sya^thy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes| and this would be natural selection* * . * Morality is an important element in their success**^
And, if that sounds naive to the experienced student, it
is excusable in the pioneer setting in which Darwin wrote*
# "X" ’•X* "X" # T& #
There is a somewhat misleading rendering of 
Darwin's view of evolution-and-ethics in Professor David 
Lack's Evolutionary Theory and Christian Belief,^^5
First, Lack writes that Darwin "ascribed moral 
standards not to natural selection but to human reason- 
i n g * S e c o n d ,  he writes that Darwin "rejected natural 
selection as the agent of moral improvement * As 
proof for these statements Dr, Lack selects a brief 
passage from the Descent, Darwin wrote:
It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and benevolent parents, or of those who were the most faithful to their comrades, would be reared in greater numbers than the children of selfish and treacherous parents belonging to the same tribe.f^o
144Ibid., p* 203145Lack, Evolutionary Theory
Ibid., p. 91 
p. 93
148Ibid,, p. 93» Quoted from Darifin's The Descent of Man, p. 200 '
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In the first place. Lack's comment depends on a 
partial reading of Darwin. To write that Darwin "ascribed 
moral standards to reason and not natural selection," 
implies that Darwin intended to offer a source for rea­
soning and moral behaviour which is not found in the 
natural process itself: as if some Kantian a priori is re- 
introduced. But Darwin intended no such thing* He did 
use the words "reason" and "rational," but he usually was 
referring to these terms in their "natural" and not their 
metaphysical sense. This "reason" to Darwin, meant that 
"reasoning power" which came to man in the evolutionary 
process. As a corrective to Lack, Sir Gavin deBeer writes 
that:
Darwin's approach to this problem was to claim that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed in man.i49
The moral sense, i.e., the ability to make Judgments re­
garding moral behaviour, appears only in man at least as 
far as we are prepared to argue here. But the moral acts, 
or the acts to which we attribute moral values, appear 
first in the evolutionary process#
Lack seems to have misread Darwin and The Descent 
of Man# The quotations
It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and benevolent parents, or of those who were the most faithful to their comrades, would be reared in greater numbers than the children of selfish and treacherous parents belonging to the same tribe.
is taken out of context from Darwin's discussion of the
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difficulties involved in tracing the origin of the social 
and moral qualities in man*^50 parwin wotes
But it may he asked s how within the limits of the same tribe did a large number of members first become e dowed with these social and moral qualities, and how was the standard of excellence raised ?3.51
Then, immediately, follows the quotation Lack selected to
make his point? "It is extremely doubtful, etc*..^ The
quote is used correctly only as it highlights Darwin's
difficulty in tracing the origin of moral values of
particular individuals in any given tribe. That is a
different point from the one Lack was imking# In fact
Darwin goes on to explain the opposite. Moral acts, he
writes, have developed in the process. Darwin writes
further;
Although the circumstances leading to increase in the number of those thus endowed within the same tribe, are too complex to be clearly followed out, we can trace some of the probable steps
Then follows Darwin's estimate as to how the steps can 
be ttaced. As we have noted above;
In the first place, as the reasoning powers and f oresight of the members became izxproved, each man would soon leam that if he aided his fellow-men, he would commonly receive aid in return. 153
But another and much more powerful stimulus to the development of the social virtues is afforded by the praise and blame of our fellow-men. 5^4*
^^%arwin. Descent of Man, pp. 200 ff.
p. 201
153
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"We may therefore conclude that primeval man « * • was 
influenced by the praise and blame of his fellows *
And, finally, turning Professor Lack's comment and argu­
ment directly around, Darwin writes:
It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no ad­vantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an increase in the number of well-endowed men and an advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another* A tribe * # * always ready to aid one another * . * would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection.15b
* * * X* * *
But, to come back to our point: with Darwin,
natural selection was not a slave to the beastliness of
creatures who by brute force were able to conquer other 
forms Of life* It moved along the lines set in part, by 
social cooperation. Man is impelled by the same general 
wish to aid his fellows * Although similar to what takes 
place in the pre-human worlds, the difference is that 
moral behaviour:
. . • no longer consists (in man) solely of a blind instinctive impulse, but is much influenced by the praise and blame of his fellows. The ap­preciation of the bestowal of praise and blameboth rest on sympathy; and this emotion . . .  is one of the most important elements of the social instincts.*57
p. 202
156Ibid., p. 203
p. 934
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To Darwin the moral sense follows from the nature of the 
social instincts; and from man's acknowledgment of the 
approbation and disapprobation of his fallovr-meni and 
from the high activity of his mental faculties#^5® Man's 
strength as a social animal he owes in part, to his weak­
ness as an individual - man needs man to survive# The 
final analysis from Darwin is a hopeful one;
As man advances in civilisation and as small tribes are united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ou^t to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him# This point being once reached, there
Darwin contributed to our initial understanding of 
the behaviour of man in the evolutionary process* Man 
arose from the pre-human world without a major emphasis 
on power or force or aggression# He carries with him the 
vices of the animal kind, but he carries the roots of 
social virtue as well*
Animal mothers love and comfort their offspring, and adults sacrifice thmiselves for them# The basis of altruism is there* If to this level of behaviour were added the development of the higher mental f&cuL ties, and the power of articulate language, the guide to action would be the common good under the influence of approbation or blame from fellow members of the social group#loO
p. 933
2SSSS&.» P' 491-92. Quoted by Stephen Pepper, Ethics (NeiTîSaET Appleton-Century-Orofts, Inc*, 190O)
^^^deBeer, Dairzin, p* 213
b* Post-Darwin
As much as Charles Darwin believed that the moral 
sense of man was related to evolution, he lends no sup­
port to the establishment of an evolutionary ethics per 
^^161 term "evolutionary ethics" is restricted 
here to the theory which determines that we should find 
our source of "value" in the evolutionary process. We 
will mention a few, which for sake of brevity can be 
grouped into two divisions ; (1) what we will call "The
Ethic of Competition," and (2) "The Ethic of Cooperation#"
(1) The Ethic of Competition
The first we can approach through the writings of 
"the philosopher of evolution" and the grand champion of 
the Social DarwinistsHerbert Spencer* As opposed 
to Darwin, Spencer became the high priest of the gladia­
torial theory of existence #^^3 criterion of value
was in the struggle for existence which he felt was
161D* Daiches Raphael, A Century of Darwin, ed.S. A, Barnett, "Darwinism and EtELcs,"*"p7"34T
162Reinhold Niebuhr, with more care than most, is careful to point out that Spencer was not literally a social Darwinist; but he did regard "the Darwiniam triumph as vali­dating his orni historical fatalism," and consequently joined the social Darwinists in spirit* Of* Niebuhr, in A Book that Shook the World, p* 33. ^
16‘R■'For a good brief discuselon of Spencer where special interest is shown in Spencer's role in evolutionary social science and biological principles, see J. W. Burrow, Svolu- tion and Society; A Study in Victorian Social Theory,pp. 179-220  ^ ~ ^
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characteristic of the evolutionary process. Since natural 
selection chose the "fittest" to survive, society should 
insure that we continue likewise# Spencer said we need 
a rigorous maintenance of the conditions under which human 
life and society arose# "Natural competition" had 
moved from purely beastly struggle into a more civilized 
social conflict, with its subtle regulations, or lack of 
them# Only if we provide for the continuation of "natural 
struggle" could the evolutionary advance continue.
Spencer noted the importance of cooperative activity 
in the process, but mainly because this was part of the 
higher phase of evolution# In The Data of Ethics, he 
stated that "conduct gains ethical sanction in proportion 
as the activities become less and less militant." One 
should behave so that he will achieve his ends without 
preventing others from achieving theirs#^^5 But this 
was simply a kindly application of good Victorian ethical ' 
procedure, to be understood in the context of the natural 
working-out of evolutionary progress*
To Spencer, the "fittest" was the strongest, the 
one who was able to emerge victorious in the competitive 
struggles for life. As nature had previously chosen only
^^^Herbert Spencer, _____  _ ____ ___________Henry S. King & Go., 187S) Extract in Bert JaSes Lowenberg's Darwinism: Reaction and Reform (New York: Holt, Rinehart îmd Winston, 1957)'^ ' p." b
^^^Herbert Spencer, The Data of Ethics (London; Williams & Norgate, I879), pp.
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the strongest (or had allowed the strongest to become the 
chosen), our moral codes should do the same. Kindness, 
soft-heartedness, and public welfare were acceptable, 
but in the end were judged by how well they favoured selec­
tion. If they impeded advance, they were not considered 
to be ethical "goods." "For M m  the goal of evolutionary 
process turned out to be a kind of Victorian paradise for 
utilitarians with a passion for urban sanitation and 
laissez f a i r e , Nature's natural ethic is good.
The history of twentieth century moral ideals and 
societal activity has discarded Spencer's ethical system. 
Even if Spencer had been correct in his interpretation of 
evolutionary history then we would conclude that he took 
the wrong side in what wo should do about it* We would 
rather follow T. H. Huxley and conclude that if evolution 
is advanced by social struggle we should go out and fight 
against it.
Yet, despite its inherent weaknesses, Spencerism, 
as opposed to Darwinism, became an important ethical in­
fluence in some parts of the Western World, especially in 
the United states. The spread of this "Vogue of Spencer" 
is admirably recorded by historian Richard Hofstadter in 
his book: Social Darwinism in American Thought, w h e r e
^^^Casserly, Morals and Man, p. 73
exception is Sir Peter Medawar's appropriate praise of Spencer's Theory of General Evolution, in The Art of the Soluble (London: Methuen & Co., %95T), pp.~%0 passim* It should be added that we think Medawar is also wrong, ^^^Bichard Hofstadterj» Social Darwinism in American Thought (Philadelphia: The Uhivëfsitÿ bf''''fMladeiphia' EreSs,
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it is traced through many areas of American social philo­
sophy and economic development; including William Graham 
Sumner, Lester Ward, the American Pragmatists and many 
others, not least of which are a few of the industrial 
magnates such as John D. Rockefeller and Dunfermline-bom 
steel impresario Andrew Carnegie #^70 Rockefeller, for 
example, once taught his Sunday School class, which he 
conducted each Sunday morning in the Baptist Church:
The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest* * $ * The American Beauty Rose can be produced in the splendour and fragrance which brings cheer to its beholder Only by sacri­ficing the early buds which grow up around it*This is not an evil tendency in business. It is merely the working out of a law of nature and a law of Ood.^71
And Carnegie wrote about his "Gospel of Wealth" I
^^%here is a book dealing specifically with the American Pragmatists* It is a much more philosophical, as opposed to the thorough historical account of Mr, Hofstadter, but an excellent study; Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism^ by Philip Wiener " "(ïîitSbHïïip'i Massachusetts;’ ra ïfervard University Press, 1949)
170It is only of incidental interest that Andrew Carnegie, who at that time was on top of the United States steel industry, became a great friend of Spencer's. He became a devoted follower and adored the idea of non­intervention of government in business affairs * The "fittest" were surviving right well in the "natural con­flicts" of the business world. Of# Carnegie's own semi- Social Darwinistic The Gospel of Wealth (New York; The Carnegie Cozporatim, 19001; but not unmixed with charity to the less than fit* In the end Carnegie's "unnatural co#assion" gave way, and he distributed his wealth throughout the world*
*^^ *4îhis incident about Rockefeller is recorded in Anthony Flow's Evolutionary Ethics (Macmillan, 1957)> P* 5* In a similar end rësültV the way of all flesh, the Sunday School teachers won out; for, as is well known by now.
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A "law of God" - great assurance for one who was noted 
for the unkindly way Rockefeller chose to sacrifice the 
"early buds" of the poor small struggling business men 
who opened poor small struggling petrol stations, only 
to be sacrificed to the biggest and best "American Beauty" 
of all - The Standard Oil Company, largest and best sur­
viving rose in all the land#
Socia,! Darwinism was an ethic ideally suited to 
the "Robber Barons"172 the self-styled economic 
prowess of the age. Yet, the followers were neither 
Social nor Darwinists. Professor Ashley Montagu caught 
the contradiction when he wrote:
The tendentious habit of thinking of evolution in terms of the struggle for existence, by means of which it is believed, the fittest are alone selected for survival while the weakest are ruthlessly con­demned to extinction, is not only an incorrect view of the facts, but is a habit which has done a con­siderable amount of lmrm»^73
Or Niebuhr's more biting criticisms
Social Darwinism served to dull the conscience of the Western World to the Injustices of its rising industrialism. It prevented the adoption of the ameliorations of economic inequality, the creation of adequate equilibria of power by which the West was ultimately saved from Communism; but the illu­sions were potent enough to delay action so that
The Rockefeller Foundation in Hew York, aside from keeping many Rockefellers, continues to assist the American Bible Society, and countless other charitable organizations throughout the world.
I72gf^ Matthew Josephson's The Robber Barons: TheGreat American Capitalists, 1861 - igofTBew York : lÆr court" Brace %"lJo. 1534;------------- ------
^^^Ashley Montagu, The Direction of Human Develop - ment; Biological and SociarBaser7i;5hmi';"Wtt's, 1557), P.26
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the Marxist rebellion could be initiated among the desperate industrial classes of the continent.^74
From Spencer we locate the "ethic of struggle" in
the work of the late eminent British anthropologist. Sir
Arthur Keith* Keith introduced his thesis when he wrote
that:
Our present task is to account for man's inborn evil predispositions, his power to hate, to demand an eye for an eye, to slake his thirst for revenge, to explain his ruthless, merciless, cruel passions. There are, too, his ambitions, his hunger for priority, for place, for rank, for power, for profit, for praise* Why are most men competitive, aggressive, pugnacious, covetous, envious and self-seeking?*75
The answer which Keith gave is that it began in the naturel.
origin and development of man. In Essays on Human Evolu- 
176tion, he argues that the evolutionary process has
"taught" man his evil.
, . . the civilized mind does not work with, but against, the old powers of evolution. Indeed, one may say that the more anti-evolutionary the disposi­tion of a man is, the higher does he stand in the mental scale of civilization.^77
Part of the esqplanation had to do with Keith's concept of
tribalism. "Tribalism," he explains, "was nature's method
^^\[iebuhr. Book that Shook the World, p. 33
^^%eith. Essays, p. 21 (American title is more specific: Evolution and Ethics)
^^^For a more complete understanding of this phase of Keith's work (he was a most highly respected anthro­pologist in addition to this work on ethics and evolution) see The Place of Prejudice in the Modem World (London: Williams & Morgate, 1931} and Darwinism and #at it Implies (London: Watts and Co., Ltd., 1928)
^^^Keith, Essays, p* 86
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of bringing about the evolution of man^ «178
. . * such morality or ethical behaviour as favours the evolutionary growth and progress of a tribe is approved by the tribal conscience and is regarded as a virtue, while an opposite kind of behaviour is not approved and is named a vice *^79
He continues;
* . * birth determines membership. . . . One may be sure, seeing that individual freedom was regu­lated by tribal opinion, that any indulgence of liberty by the individual, in word or deed, would be frowned upon by the tribe unless it answered to a tribal n e e d #180
We have here a curious echo of what has been fre­
quently discussed in a slightly more personal way, under 
Freudian psychology, which warns of the inception of 
ethical ideals as imposed on the super-ego of the indi­
vidual child by the figures of authority; his parents. 
Those ideals then become the "unconscious*' part of one's 
ethical attitudes and behaviour. Keith raises the specu­
lation that the original tribes to which our immediate 
ancestors belonged, deposited something of the same kind 
of "unconscious" etliical attitudes into all of us. The 
earliest moral" act was forced upon the individual by the 
group. "When you know the basal mentality," writes Keith, 
"one fitted for tribal life - do you wonder at the disorder 
and turmoil which now affect the detribalized part of our 
world?"1^1
p, as 
p. 25
^®°Ibid., p. 33
p, 23
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According to Keith, the "original sin" of mankind, 
such as we can use the term in this context, is one which 
is in the evolutionary origin of man as he "inherited" 
the beastly parts of his nature.
Man's moral duty, Keith then writes, is to combat 
this natural origin. Keith laments the condition of 
modem man in words that almost belong to classical Chris­
tianity: "Bman nature will have to be re-made from top
to bottom. # . before we can hope to yoke Christian ethics 
to the purposes of human development."^®^ "So far evolu­
tion has triumphed over Christianity."1®8
Christ's directive to love our fellow-men, and our 
neighbours as ourselves, says Keith, annihilates the law 
of evolution; "throws a bomb right into the very heart 
of the machinery by which and through which nature has
sought to build up . . . mankind. irl84
Meantime let me say that the conclusion I have come to is this; the law of Christ is incompatible with the law of evolution - as the law of evolution has worked hitherto. Nhy, the two laws are at war with each other; the law of Christ can never prevail until the law of evolution is destroyed.^^5
Keith's point is of course compatible with much that 
can be observed in modem life. The warfare continues
p. 63 
^^^Ibld,, p. 58
^®^Ibld., p. 62
^®^Ibld., p. 13
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and can be seen In so many different corners of the earth; 
in the teen-age gangs in New York's West Side, in the 
continuing struggles in Vietnam, in the Middle East, in 
the more subtle but startling struggles which work their 
havoc through damagingly competitive business procedures, 
and in the personal lives of the people who are the per­
ennial victims of senseless violence. Keith makes sense 
in the daily forum of human experience.
But in fact he does not go far enough. He does not 
go on to note that nature has given us other tendencies 
as well. Spencer can more easily be excused for the de­
light he took in shocking the Victorian world %d.th his 
view of evolutionary struggle. He was among the first 
to champion Darwin, and in his haste to convince a non­
believing world, he misinterpreted the intent of the
But for Keith, it seems inexcusable* By the time 
tliis book was published in 1946, much research and re­
flection had shown how one-sided his point was. However 
sympathetic we want to be, remembering that he was writing 
when the world was ejqperiencing the holocaust of World 
War II, and the horrid atrocities of Hitler's Germany in 
its attempt to purify the human race by exterminating all 
those who were declared "unfit"; we must conclude that 
his evolutionary viewpoint is inadequate, and misleading. 
Natural selection is not the story of struggle, and 
our ethic should not be to fight against it# We conclude 
with a criticism, made by Professor G. G# Simpson;
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A similar Idea has been developed at greater length by Sir Arthur Keith in an extraordinary book # # . whose recent date 1946 makes it a gross anachronism* Sir Arthur gives an extended and hor­rendous exposition of tooth and claw ethics, which he never quite condemns and which he thinks in­herent in evolution* With this he contrasts human or ^s he insists ) antl-evolutionary ethics* In spite of talking all around every side of the problem, he never quite faces the issue as to which set of ethics can or should be followed or how they are to be reconciled #
Keith was against the struggle he saw as inherent in the 
process* At least he does not join Spencer in asking us 
to align ourselves with social conflict and open competi­
tion of the fittest* But his own ethic and his own inter­
pretation of evolutionary advance must also be rejected.
^®®Simpson, Meaning of Evolution, pp. 298-99
(2 *) The Ethic of Cooperation
Dear Friend, do not with weary soul aspire Away from the gray earth, your sad abode;NoJ Throb with th* earth, let earth your body tire - So help your brothers bear the common load#
Prince Petr Alekseyevich Kropotkin Ethics; Origin and Development
The second evolutionary ethic is "The Ethic of Co­
operation," wliich while acknowledging that struggle exists 
in evolution, favours the presence of social cooperation 
in determining what evolution teaches about ethics# The 
essential condition for evolutionary success, they say, 
was the increase in social harmony as the group learned 
to function as a social unit#
W# K* Clifford was the first post-Darwinian we 
know of who derived a social morality from "natural" 
cooperation# ^®7 The ensuing history of that idea is 
recorded by W# 0* Allee in The Social life of the Animals#^®® 
Professor Allee takes the theory, or some vague expres­
sion of it, back to the fifth century B.C., with the 
philosopher Empedocles; relocates it along the way 
(especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), 
and brings it to the early twentieth with Petr Alekseyevich
187W. K. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, ed* Leslie Stephen (London; Macmillan & Co., 1679)
C. Allee, The Social Life of Animals (William Helnemam Ltd., 1938)
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Kropotkin, whose brief sermonic poem we used to introduce 
this section. Allee ends with his own argument that 
"there is a general principle of automatic cooperation 
which is one of the fundamental biological principles.
The ethic derived is simples since social coopera­
tion has worked in the past history of animal evolution, 
we should adopt it for the basis of our ethical principles 
today* In discussing "some human implications," Allee 
writes !
Conscious cooperation is so comparatively new in an animal world many millions of years old, that we may underrate its strength and importance if we are not reminded of its foundations in simple physiology and primitive instinct.^^^
Before Allee, Scots Presbyterian preacher and some­
time natural scientist Henry Drummond tried to Christianize
Spencer's evolutionary theories, especially in The Ascent
IQlOf Man, published in 1894. He argued that Spencer had 
exaggerated the part which struggle plays. That was a 
partial truth, but the full view had to include a "Struggle 
for the Life of Others." Drummond was admittedly on an 
important point ; but he exaggerated in the reverse. Els 
favorite example of the good moral action which evolution 
seemed to him to teach was "the animal mother caring for 
her young - in the wind and the cold and the rain." But
^®^Allee, Social Life, p. 35
^^°lbld., p. 185
^  Henry Drummond, (The Lowell Lectures, on) The Ascent of #in (London; Hodder Ba Stoughton, 1894)
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Drummond, as John Kent recently noted, forgot about "the 
newly-born reindeer, dropped quivering in the snow and 
compelled to struggle to its feet to keep up with a herd 
which cannot wait for a weakling. The preacher was 
more familiar with carefully guarded household pets than 
with nature in the wild, although mother cats are also 
known to eat their kittens.
In trying to put a touch of warmth and sentiment 
into the evolutionary process, Drummond had imagined that 
the process was one in which altruism was gradually winning 
out, and had inadvertently taken sides with the coopera­
tive theory of evolutionary ethics, or at least had given 
support to those who had*
The first comprehensive treatment of the ethic of 
cooperation was in Mutual Aid; A Factor in Evolution^^^ 
by Pëtr Kropotkin, the leading, early proponent of the 
theory. In explaining the theme of that book, Kropotkin 
noted that "struggle" was present in the process as a 
matter of survival - life literally feeds on life - but 
it is chiefly "limited to struggles between different 
species." The predominant fact of nature, he wrote, is 
mutual aid.
^®%ohn Kent, From Darwin to Blanchfordi The Hole of Darwinism in Christian Apologetic 1875 to 19IO (ibhdbn:
^53pgtr A* Kropotkin, Mutual Aid; A Factor in Evolution (London; William Heihemahh, Ï9Ô2"i’ îëSwinmasnasworth, 1939)
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Within each species, and within the groups of different species we find living together, the practice of mutual aid is the rule, and therefore this last aspect of animal life plays a far greater part than does warfare in the economy of nature. , * • * Mutual aid is the predominant fact of nature
If nature is taken as a whole, there is no triumph of the
warlike features of man and the animals.
It seems, on the contrary, that species decidedly weak ♦ . . and not at all warlike - nevertheless, succeed best in the struggle for life; and owing to their sociality and mutual protection, they even displace much more powerfully-built competitors and ehèmies,195
In the later writing, Kropotkin pointed to "the 
steady progress of moral conceptions as the leading 
principle of evolution."^9^
I4an no longer needs to clothe his ideals of moral beauty, and of a society based on justice, with the garb of superstition; he does not have to wait for the Supreme Wisdom to remodel society* He can derive his ideals from Nature and he can draw the necessary strength from the study of its life. 197
No better description can be given of an "evolutionary
ethic"; "He can derive his ideals from Nature and he can
draw the necessary strength from the study of its life# "
A more recent proponent of the cooperative ethic
in evolution is akin to Kropotkin in many important ways.
Dr. Chauncey D. Leake, in a written dialogue with
^^^Kropotkin, Ethics; Origin and Development, tr, Louis S. Friedland a n H ^ o s ^ p E T ; Tudor Publishing Co., 1924; reprinted 1947), p. 14
195ibld., pp, 14-15 
^^^Kropotkin, Ethics, p. 19 
Wibia., p. 3
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philosopher Dr* Patrick Romanell,^58 $@$^8 for a 
"naturally operative principle to govern human conduct," 
and proposed that "a scientific versus a metaphysical 
approach to ethics" he adopted by modem man,
Leake calls his scientific approach to ethics 
"Ethicogenesis," Based on the assumption that "we can 
agree that for any individual or group of individuals, 
survival is 'the* g o o d , S i n c e  individuals and groups 
are in contact with other individuals and other groups, 
"survival for them is also good," The ethical relation­
ships must then be conducive towards the survival of all 
concerned.
From a consideration of our biological knowledge, the implication is clear at once that survival for an individual living thing or for a particular living species is "good" for that individual or that species, * , . Survival is "good," therefore, in the very sig­nificant sense that if the species fails to survive, "goodness" has no further meaning for that species,200
It follows then, says Leake, that we should derive 
a natural ethic which leads to human survival. And, echo­
ing Kropotkin and Allee, the probability of the survival 
of groups or individuals "increases with the degree with 
which they harmoniously adjust themselves to each other 
and their environment, He applies the biological
principle of symbiosis (the association of dissimilar
^ Chauncey D, Leake & Patrick Romanell, Can_¥e Agree? - A Scientist and a Philosopher Argue AbouF'"KHcs
p, 24
so^ibia,, p, 18
^^^Ibid., p. 26
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organisms to their mutual advantage) to the behaviour 
of human beings, and their ethical behaviour as well*
This symbiotic principle becomes significant in 
our everyday affairs* All organisms, says Leake, survive 
to the extent to which they adopt the principle of mutual 
cooperation with each other in the environment*
There are several important implications which follow from the symbiotic principle as stated. Since satisfaction is a biologically and psychologically significant factor in survival, there will remain the urge on the part of human beings to achieve satisfaction*
If then it is appreciated that relationships be­tween humans tend to survive in proportion to the mutual satisfaction derived from them, it is incum­bent upon an individual to help make the relationship in which he participates with another individual as satisfying to the other individual as to himself
A kind of biological golden rule, with scientific support.
And, if one can side with Leake in the beginning, i*e*,
if we can postulate that survival is the ultimate value
for man, it is difficult to argue with him as his argument
develops. It is his premise and the procedure which elicit
our criticism.
The premise that "survival la the good for man" is
one that Professor Romanell calls a "biological egoism,"
Earlier, Leake wrote that "If a species fails to survive,
'goodness* has no further meaning for that species * " But
that would be true only if we saw morality alone in its
natural setting, rather than expand the meaning of moral
judgments into the larger metaphysical realm which make
other considerations important*
202Ibid*, pp* 26-27
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BUrther, from a study of the way natural selection 
works, we add that Leake has ignored a fact of evolutions 
that the will to survive is occasionally not the motivating 
factor of behaviour# The defense of one's territory, or 
of others in the group often takes precedence over the 
individual will to survive# At times, survival is not 
only secondary; but, in the interests of the group, it 
can be selected negatively*
Leake is not unlike so many other proposers of 
evolutionary ethics when he takes a metaphysical goal 
from outside biology, in this case the "good" of survival, 
and uses evidence from science to support it from within. 
Dr# Romanell's brief summary is appropriate: Leak# * s 
'Golden Rule' is incompatible with its metaphysical foun­
dation, ,,203n
Beyond that initial objection, Romanell includes
a convincing methodological argument which arises out of
the definition of ethics*204 Leake had argued that ethics
^ incidentally, in making his refutation of Leake, Romanell shows a distorted view of Darwin and natural se­lection; as if cooperative behaviour was unimportant to the species, and that Darwin taught only the beastliness of the world of nature# His distortion is far more serious than the one-sidedness of Leake* The latter is marshalling evidence for one side of a scientific theory, to support the principle of symbiosis* He consequently does not choose to include detail on what he obviously as a biologist knows is true* Romanell, on the other hand, does not appear to understand that Leake's evidence as presented, is true and con^atible entirely with Darwin and what we know of evolu­tion* Of* e*g$, p. 49
^^^^Leake & Romanell, Can We Agree? p, 50
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belongs to science and not to metaphysics; and that the 
naturally operative principle should replace metaphysical 
speculation* Romanell's response is convincing?
Ethics, by definition, is necessarily a normative pursuit because it aims at determining systematically whether a special class of non-sensory objects of human conduct or character has or has not the specific type of value designated as moral* %#ereas, for example, biology is the study of life as it exists innature, ethics is an examination of the good life, whether it exists or not
A natural ethic, cooperatively based or not, keeps us
bound too closely to the "is*" "Man may ve%rwell survive
in the flesh at the terrific cost of perishing in the
spirit*
We can accept that social cooperation among human 
beings is a partial answer (perhaps even a key answer) 
to the ethical problems of our society, without also 
believing that it is dictated to us by natural aelec- tlon.207
p. 35 
p. 56
'^ Also of Interest here Is a recent article by John H* Crook on "Cooperation in Primates" (35ugenics Re­view; vol. 58, no. 2, June 1966), Crook is dlscussïng”"the defensive behaviour of adult baboons defending each other, and appearing to cooperate with each other not only in the defense of the tribe, but in sharing food, protecting in­fants, and where a token system of norms for behaviour ap­pears to bo enforced by punishments for failure to comply. Crook also relates a study from Hall and Devore, where a mother with an infant baboon attracts much "friendly in­terest" from passers-by; and older males show scaae limited "play activity with the young* A truly remarkable pos­sibility in this study*
Anthropomorphism is of course an obvious danger, for even the most objective student cannot help seeing the be­haviour through the eyes of a man, but it is a danger of
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which Crook and M s  fellow researchers are fully aware* Oonseq.uently there Is especial care to show objectivity*For example, he confesses to the inability to establish clearly that "cooperation" has occurred when a group of chimpanssees, for example, all wave clubs at an attacking leopard# It appears to be a community effort, but it could after all, be but "a response of separate individuals re­sponding to a common stimulus - like a crowd rushing from a burning building*" (p* 64, etc*) But he establishes the similarity of behavioural activity and notes how signifi­cant they can be for an understanding of human behaviour; even if in the end he draws the clear distinctions "Buman cooperation is performed with conscious intents it is truly teleological behaviour. Primate behaviour often ap­pears both deliberate and purposive, but to infer "purpose" is generally suspect among biologists unused to such high grade performances*" (p. 54)
c* Evolutionary Ethics: Tno Modem Expressions
The problem of the relationship of evolution and 
ethics is an enduring one, T^ fo modern proponents deserve 
our mention: Sir Julian Huxley and Professor 0. H, 
Waddington, Some others such as Professor 0, 0, Simpson 
of the United States or Teilhard de Chardin could be in­
cluded, But Simpson is less important and ethics com­
prises a small part of his evolutionary writing, Teilhard 
is another matter. His ethic can be summarised in the 
"love" ifhich is ever present in all evolution, but comes 
in crescendo force in the last chapter of The Phenomenon 
Of Man, But, Teilhard is not really witing of ethics 
per se. He is more the philosophical biologist cum poet, 
directing occasional attention to the ethical problem.
It was decided to omit him on that basis, as well as the 
overwhelming volume of writing whicli has been done on 
Teilhard and his work,
(1) Sir Julian Huxley
Sir Julianas ethics are in contrast to those of his 
grandfather, Thomas H, Huxley who was a noted biologist, 
Darwinian, and sometime pMlosopher of the late nineteenth 
century, Sir Julian himself puts it this way, as in 
Evolution and Ethics,where he joins the Romanes Lecture
^^^BEuxley, T, H, & Julian, Evolution and Ethics 1943 (London; The BLlot
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of T, H. i&ixley in I894, to his own lecture some fifty 
years later*
The simple theme of the first Romanes Lecture was 
"Evolution against E t h i c s . T .  H* Huxley probably 
held a different attitude formerly,^^^ but by 1893 he 
concluded that there were no ethics of evolution* The 
cosmic process furnished no guide for morality.
Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and evil tendencies of man may have come about, but in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before.
In the Romanes Lecture, T. E. ïtoley criticized those who 
seek to base ethics on evolution, for although an evolu­
tion of "ethical acts" can be traced in the process, so 
as well can the unethical, "There is, so far, as much 
natural sanction for one as for the other.
But T. E. Huxley did not stop there. His under­
standing of the evolutionary process revealed "Man" as 
the recipient of the beastliness of nature * s struggles.
^ %or a more complete description, see T. H*Huxley, Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays (London:The MàcmlilW Bo',", andOther Essays (London: James  Li­brary, nodate but circa 1900). For a brief, but ac­curate summary of TT' fiT'Euxley, see Ritter *s Darwin and the Golden Rule, pp. l62 ff.
210See Gertrude Elmmelfarb, Darwin and the Darviinian Revolution (London: Chatto & Hindus," 1559)  ^pp. 532 ff,, esp, regarding the part that social cooperation played in the development of man.
^^^Huxley, T* 11. 6b Julian, Evolution and Ethics, p.80
212Ibid,, p, 80
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If anything, evolution taught us to go against what had 
succeeded in the past. Man, the Older Huxley taught, be­
came successful throughout his savage state by relying on 
those qualities which he shared with the ape and the tiger; 
including "his physical organization, his cunning, his 
ruthless and ferocious destructiveness when his anger is 
roused by opposition#"^^'^
After the manner of successful persons, civilized m m  would gladly kick down the ladder by which he has climbed. He would be too pleased to see the"ape and tiger" die,^^
But they remain alive, said T# H* Huxley, to plague the
attempts of man at a truly civilized life, adding "pain
and griefs innumerable and immeasurably great, to those
which the cosmic process necessarily brings on the mere
animal#
These inherited promptings, he said, man now labels
as "sins," and he punishes the acts which spring from
them. In the end:
Whatever differences of opinion may exist among the experts, there is a general consensus that the ape and tiger methods of the struggle for existence are not reconcilable with sound ethical prinoiples.^*^^
The laws of morality are the necessary restraints wMoh
man has had to put on the conditions of the continuing
struggle* Consequently, thought T# H# Huxley, ethics is
opposed to evolution** * * * # # *
p. 63 
pp. 63-64 
p. 64
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with grand-filial affection in acknowledging his 
grandfather*s contribution to the subject. Sir Julian 
comes to the subject with a different emphasis. "For 
T. H. Huxley," Julian writes, "there was a fundamental 
contradiction between the ethical process and the cosmic#
The trouble was that by "ethical process" T# H# meant 
"the uhiverealist ethics of the Victorian enlightenment, 
bred by nineteen century humanitarianism out of traditional 
Christian ethics," and in Thomas Huxley personally,
"tinged by a noble but stem puritanism and an almost 
fanatical devotion to scientific truth and its pursuit 
The cosmic process, to T, H. Huxley, was "re­
stricted almost entirely to biological evolution and to
219the selective struggle for existence on which it depends#" 
With the terms so limited, it was inevitable that the 
contradiction should occur# But it need not be so today 
as wo are in a good position to enlarge our terms of 
reference and to eliminate the apparent contradiction#
Sir Julian does not abjudicate the argument over 
what the evolutionary process brings man in the specifics 
of "moral" or "immoral" impulses# T# H. Huxley and 
Herbert Spencer would be correct and incorrect# There is 
conflict in evolution; both "good" and "evil" belong#
217Ibid#, p# 105
p. 105
™lblO.
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And, drawing an analogy to the super-ego of the psycho­
logical unconscious, Julian Huxley writes : "Conflict is 
a necessary pro-requisite for ethics # • « its existence 
has determined some of the characteristics of the develop-
. a »220ing human mind.
Specifically, says Julian, T, H, Huxley never ex­
plicitly enunciated what seems to he the fundamental 
point - "tliat man is inevitably subject to mental conflict 
as a normal function in his life," And further, that this 
contradiction is the necessary basis or ground on which 
conscience, the moral sense of nrnn, and our systems of 
ethics grow and develop,
Today, the contradiction can, I believe, be re­solved - on the one hand by extending the concept of evolution both backward into the inorganic and forward into the human domain, and, on the other by considering ethics not as a body of fixed principles, but as.a product of evolution, and itself evolving.
In developing his theory, Sir Julian turns to 
"psycho-social evolution" - his specific phrase for the 
evolution of man as man*
We must acknowledge that the greatest change since 1893 in our attitude towards the great problems of ethics has been due to the new facts and the new ap­proach provided by modern psychology, and that in turn, owes its rise to the genius of Freud*“ j
220*^^Ibid., p* 2 22iibia., p. 2
222^Ibid,, p. 105
223%bid., p. 25
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To understand Huxley, we must understand that the whole 
occurrence of "psycho-social evolution," I.e., the Inter­
action of hereditary and environmental influences form 
his "Evolutionary Ethics."
It is with Freud in particular that Huxley elaborates
his ethic. Hot that Freud is without failure for, Huxley
writes. Fraud*8
primitive and absolutist ethics, based on non-rational and unconscious mental processes, inevitably tend to an undue restriction of his human activities . . ,To arrive at a constructive and truly humanistic ethics, he needs to liberate these forces from their unconscious grappllng."^ '^ ^
But if Freud had buried ethics too deeply in the un­
conscious mental process, he had also discovered the 
origin of ethical ideals.
These discoveries of modem psychology # . . have finally put out Of court all purely intuitive theories* . . . The child^s intuitions as to what is right and wrong are derived from its environment, largely mediated through its mother
The normal infant develops a "forerunner for the moral
stiffening of adult ethics," in what Freud called the
super-ego, and what Huxley prefers to call "the proto-
ethical system. It arises in the conflict of the
"unregulated impulses with which the Infant is endowed."
As conflict is important to the development of a species
in evolution, so it is also essential to the development
of ethics in man.
pOlL'ibid., pp 111-12 
p. 109 
GG^lbld., p. 107
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Ethical judgments will thus be relative, writes 
HUxley, relative to the particular Individual and his 
environment; for he writes :
This at once implies a relativity of ethics. Individual ethics develop, social ethics evolve.And the solution of ethical systems and standards shows a broad correlation with that of the societies in which they flourish.^-7
At first, there does not appear to be any external 
standard for measuring the validity of morality. Huxley* s 
question back in the beginning paragraph of the book is a 
good ones
Is there any external standard for morals? Any touchstone by which goodness may be recognized, any yardstick by which it may be measured? Does there exist any natural foundation on which our human , super^structure of right and wrong may safely rest, any cosmic sanction for ethics ?^^^
His answer is that he has found "the external standard";
and there is, to him a natural foundation underlying it#
Tliis then, is the critical point for understanding 
Julian Huxley’s evolutionary ethics "The evolutionary 
trend provides us with the clue for ethics." In it we 
find the "yardstick," the "touchstone," and any other 
measuring device we need. Our ethics should help to for­
ward the progress which evolution has made toward several 
important characteristics. Progress, or what we can 
rightly call "progress," consists in the capacity to
Ibid., p. 115
p. 1
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attain a higher degree of organization, but Mthout clos­
ing the door to further advance." Progress is all-round 
biological improvement; Man ^  the latest dominant type 
to be evolved, and this being so, we are justified in call­
ing the trends which have led to his development progrès- 
sive#^^^ îteeley does not believe in a view of evolu­
tionary progress, but "we can discern a direction - the 
line of evolutionary progress * The actual trends, in 
a most general order, are;
Increase of control, increase of independence, increase of internal co-ordination; increase of Imowledge, of means for co-ordinating knowledge, of elaborateness and intensity of feeling.^ 3i
Once found, these abilities are the criteria by which the
progress of evolution is judged.
And what ethics and moral conclusions does that 
lead us to? Huxley’s answer is his "Evolutionary Humanism.** 
In Essays of a Humanist, he enumerates the four major 
tenets of this particular humanism;
(a) Though biological evolution operates by a purely quantitative mechanism, in the shape of natural selection, it results in qualitative improvement of actual organisms*
(b) That increase of knowledge or awareness, and improvement in its organization, have been the basis
229Julian Htoley, Evolution; The Modern Synthesis (London; George Allen &
p. 576 
GSllbia., pp, 576-77
232Huxley, Essays of Humanist, pp. 10-11
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of a persistent trend tov^ ards real advance in biolo­gical evolution#
(c) The study of trends or directional pro­cesses . # # is Of the greatest importance, both in itself and as a guide to further advance# ♦ • . In psycho-social evolution they must be studied from the functional point of view*
(d) The present is largely a crisis of con­vergence - a convergence of human nations, cultures, and populations , * * of the branches of science, and of conflicting ideas and values demanding to be reconciled and integrated into some new evolutionary and humanistic system.
In psycho-social evolution, man can impose some 
control on the evolutionary process.
After his emergence onto life’s stage, it be­came possible to introduce faith, courage, love and truth, goodness - in a word, moral purpose - intoevolution.
Man represents the "culmination of that process of organic
evolution which has been proceeding on this planet for over
a thousand Mill on years Evolution presently is
primarily cultural, and primarily in man’s control. He
is "no longer supported and steered by Instincts, but he
can use his conscious thoughts as organs of psycho-social035evolutionary direction. The selective mechanism which 
determines what elements shall be incorporated and what 
rejected in the systems of traditions, "is primarily 
psychological (or mental), involving human awareness in­
stead of human genes By means of his conscious
Huxley, T. H. à Julian, Evolution and Ethics, p.133 
^^^ H^Uxley, Uniqueness of Mmi, p. 32
Julian Hmcley, The Huimnist Frame (London; George Allen & Unwin, I96I), p#
236Huxley, Essays of Bmanist, p. 37
reason, man can substitute less wasteful and less cruel 
methods of change than those of natural selection#
The central belief of Evolutionary Bmanism is that existence can be img>roved, that vast untrapped possibilities can be increasingly realized, that greater fulfillment can replace frustration* 237
If that were not so, there would be little point to pro­
ject any type of ethical system or directives* Ko one 
could choose to follow it anyway*
The specific morals Huxley derives out of this 
theoretical approach are widely known* For the past 
forty years he has projected his favorite ideas in many 
books and lectures* They are best condensed in The 
Humanist Frame* There he writes of the "huge monsters in 
our evolutionary path.**^^® These must be fought and 
defeated before progress can continue* Some of them are: 
the threat of super-scientific war; nuclear, chemical and 
biological; the threat of overpopulation; the rise and 
appeal of Communist ideology; the exploitation of natural 
resources; the erosion of the world’s cultural variety; 
our general preoccupation with means rather than ends, 
with teclmology and quantity rather than creativity and 
quality; and the Revolution of Expectation, caused by the 
widening gap between the rich and poor nations of the world*
They are all symptoms of a new evolutionary situa­tion; and tliis can only be successfully met in the light and M t h  the aid of a new organization of thought
^ Huxley, B^nist Frame, p* 48
pp. 21-22
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and belief, a new doMnant pattern of ideas relevant to the new situation #'^ 39
Art is "good," for it creates significance* Science is
"good," for it increases both comprehension and control.
Religion is "good,* for it keeps alive "man’s sense of
wonder, strangeness, and challenge*" And finally:
Our new organization of thought . * • must grow • . • in the light of our new evolutionary vision*So # . * it must be evolutionary, that is to say, it must help us to think in terms of an overriding pro­cess of change * . * instead of the rigid frame of fixed dogma *240
At first sight it appears that he has found some
objective standard of ethics: as Anthony Quinton once
condensed it to this simple injunction: "Keep Evolution
Going I Actually, he has not * To support his natural
evolutionary ethic, Huxley has but chosen a set of more or
less commonly agreed and developing ethical ideas of the
twentieth century Western World* His "higher values"
are descriptions of what he finds there, and then the
process of natural selection and psycho-social evolution
are used to give them respectable non-religious support*
The important ends of a man’s life should include
the enjoyment of beauty, increased comprehension, and a
more assured sense of the significance, the preservation
of wonder and delight; fine scenery and unspoiled nature,
p. 21 
p. 22
S4lQuinton, Biology and Personally, p. 119
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limer peace and harmony are active ethical values.
Nations • . . are remembered not for their wealth or comforts or technologies, hut for their great build­ings and works of art, their achievements in science or law or political philosophy, their success in liberating human life from the shackles of fear and ignorance *^43
The list sounds familiar* For the most part these are the 
things one can admire and might expect to hear from any 
well-educated, cultured, non-Communist British biologist 
of the twentieth century,whether he believed in evolu­
tionary ethics, or Natural Selection, or Winston Churchill* 
If Grandfather Huxley was too puritanical, and tied too 
closely to the general opinions of the Victorian Age (as 
Julian earlier commented), his grandson has hardly set 
himself free from his own*
What is certain is that Huxley has not shown us the 
way in wiilch evolution provides the rules, or gives them 
final sanction. Sir Julian interprets them to such mean­
ing, but mainly because these moral recommendations are 
his responses to problems of the modem world. He re­
inforces his natural ethics vrilth non-natural ideals:
An ethical theoiy that requires this sort of reinforcement, however much evolutionary material it makes*.use of, is not really an evolutionary ethic at all.^ 4*K
It is a well worked and Impressive example of selecting 
one’s own material to support an assumed ethical end. As
^^^Huxley, Bmanist Frame, pp. 25-26 
p. 25
® Quinton, Biology and Personalityj p. 119
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Professor Lillie once wrote of Spencer’a ethic:
In our examination of Spencer’s theory we have seen that he certainly introduced the notion of ends again and again in his evolutionary ethics* Good conduct for him is not merely conduct at a later stage in the course of evolution; it is conduct which leads to longer lif^. or to fuller life, or to a surplus ofpleasantness .*^ 45
In îtocley’s case, it would lead to world peace and brother- 
hood and an increase in culture. But it is not the dis­
covery of "the good."
The evolutionary process has of course brought them, 
along with many other things* But if evolution teaches us 
that brotherhood and cooperative enterprises work; what of 
the violence and war and Imtred, wMch are also present in 
the modem stage of evolutionary progress? We need some 
external criterion by which to judge them as well.
In his introduction to the English translation of 
the Phenomenon of Man, Huxley admits that his evolutionary 
ethics are "inadequate* We will take him at his word. 
It is precisely at the point where sorae relationship be­
tween ethics and evolution is called for, that the in­
adequacy is most apparent. Dobzhansîçy has pinned the 
point down quite firmly when he objected that;
Ho theory of evolutionary ethics can be acceptable unless it gives a satisfactory explanation of just why the promotion Of evolutionary development must be re­garded as the summum bonum . # # Despite any exhorta­tions to the Gonlriïy^ man will not permanently deny
^^%illiam Lillie, An Introduction to EtMcs (Hew York: Bames and Hoble, University IKpeÆab pub.1948, reprinted 1963), p. 188
^^^Teilhard do Chardin, Phenomenon of Man, p* 12
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himself the right to question the viisdom of anything* including the wisdom of his evolutionary direction#^^/
Seen that way, Huxley fails, even on his o m  terms. The
famous refutation by G# E. Moore of the ^'naturalistic
fallacy," which we mentioned earlier, although misdirected
in some other cases, could be applied at this point to
Julian Huxley’s evolutionary ethic.
For Huxley, either the process itself is "good"; or 
it brings us to the "good" we already have. If we must 
use our existing ethical notions to support the natural 
ethic, we are no further ahead than before. îteley does 
not succeed in describing the intricacy of the way in 
which man’s ethical activity is related to the evolu­
tionary mechanism. It is a notable failing, and leads us 
to reject his theoretical framework for approaching ethics.
But, we conclude on an affirmative note* Itocley 
is allied with Christian ethics at many points of practice* 
He is at one with many of the ends that we, too, have se­
lected from the cultural milieu# To pretend that as 
Christians we are exempt from the cultural setting in which 
we make our ethical judgments, or from the individual psy­
chological background, would be untrue* As there is an 
acknowledged change in the ethics of the two generations 
of HUxleys, so we can note a change within the ethics of 
the Christian Church of the same periods. Our "recom­
mended morality"; and far more acutely, our practiced
^^^Dobzhonsky, quoted by Haddington in EthicalAnimal, p. 176
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morality, in the late Victorian Era, was vastly different 
from the present# Both in the unofficial activity of the 
majority of Christiana, hut also in the "official" publica­
tions of ethics (save perhaps the Homan Catholic pro­
nouncements on birth control) we can note a steady change: 
sometimes gradual and sometimes abrupt. We need look no 
further than the social gospel in the United States, and 
its implications for a Christian society; or to the Sex 
and Morality^^ Report of the British Council of Churches 
published a few years ago*
We, too, are the children of our time : as was 
Joshua in his raids on the promised land, where women and 
children were exterminated in the name of the Lord; as 
also is Julian axxley.
and Morality, British Council of ChurchesReport (London: S^(M"PreBB, October, I966)
(2) Professor G. H* Haddington
A second modem evolutionary ethic is that of 
Professor Conrad Hall Haddington# His argument intro­
duced in Science and E t h i c s , a book which he edited in 
1941; it also appears briefly in The Nature of Xifes^^^ 
but it is fully developed in The Ethical Animal»^^^ There 
Haddington presents an ethic which, while different from 
all the earlier attempts, is based on the evolutionary 
process#
At some points it is similar to Huxley;
It has often been argued that the existence, both within the sub-human animal world, and in the world of mankind, of general patterns of change which merit the title of evolutionary progress, provides us with an inspiration which guide mankind’s ethical strivings# One of the most proxainent advocates of this type of ethical humanism at the present day is Julian Huxley* A similar argument has also been put forward from a more definitely religious point of view by Teilhard de Chardin# I personally agree . very largely M t h  their conclusions
Italey and Haddington are similar in that neither is In­
volved in the "old evolutionary ethics" controversy over 
whether social cooperation or struggle is the predominant 
force in the rise of man#
H. Haddington, Science and Ethics (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd#, 1 5 # T — ----------
^^^Waddington, Nature of Life
^^\?addington. Ethical Animal
^^%addington, Nature of life# p* 108
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With the realization that Danfinian "fitness" is a very special concept relating to the leaving of offspring and not to any other form of success within the individual’s own lifetime, the basis for this theory of Social Darwinism disappeared. It can now be regarded as no more than a temporary aberra­tion in the history of thought**93
Huxley and Haddington also share the concept of
evolution as extended to include the evolution of man as
man* Huxley called this "psycho - social " evolution*
Haddington calls it "socio-genetic transmission." They
agree that since the appearance of man, evolution is no
longea* controlled significantly by evolutionary influences;
but in relation to the general processes of human ad­vance they cannot be regarded as more than suggestive* This is so because human advance does not take place only, or even mainly, by means of biological evolu­tion*
Biological evolution has in mankind been reduced
Critical to both Huxley and Haddington is the 
further agreement on the belief in evolutionary progress 
and direction* "The most important lesson to be learnt 
by man from the consideration of evolution," arises (writes 
Haddington) not by the methods by which evolution has been 
brought about, "but from the nature of the results which 
it has achieved* "^95 what we have now is important, not 
what we thought we had along the way* Just as the evolu­
tionary processes vd.ll lead to an improvement in carrying
p. 97 
p. 98
256 p. 102
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out a particular task, so we m y  expect them to produce 
Improved organisms*
This is, in fact, what has happened; and it is improvement in respect of finding some way of exploit­ing the environment to make a living that justifies the use of the phrase "evolutionary progress*"^56
"Progress" Involves the movement toward "independence from 
the environment" and the ability to control the environ­
ment," or as Haddington rephrases it: "utilizing the en­
vironmental variables*"^57 To Haddington "direction" and 
"progress" in their evolutionary settings, are not meant 
to convey the ordinary meanings of these words, and also 
not the same meaning as I&ixley’s*
If , * # one says, as Herbert Spencer did and probably Julian Itoley also, tliat the evolutionary progress is good and therefore the good can be de­fined by means of evolutionary progress, the argu­ment does not escape from the imputation of being a vicious circle
Nevertheless, evolutionary direction and progress, as de­
fined in the relationship which the organism has to its 
surrounding environment, are "an inevitable consequence 
of the nature of the process and the organism involved 
in it*" That is critical to the further development of 
Haddington’s argument:
The thesis I have proposed has involved the as­sumption that it is possible to discern in the re­sults of evolution some general over-all direction
^^^Ibid., pp* 105-106 
^^^Haddington, Ethical Animal# p* 136 
^^^Ibid., p# 80
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of change wMch can truly be regarded as a specialdirection*^99
Haddington handles those who do not believe that 
evolution can be characterized by any type of direction 
or "progress." To those who ask why we should consider 
ourselves better than the worms, he parries with a short 
answer similar to Dr. Johnson’s, who when quarried on the 
reality of the external world, simply kicked his foot 
against a stone; Haddington writes : "He might say that 
we will take seriously the worm’s claim to be our equals 
when the worms come and present it, but not before.
* * * * * * *
Haddington then departs from the argument of Julian 
Huxley, and there are important differences in the two 
"systems." Hhile %ixley is attempting to demonstrate 
"a connection between the evolutionary process and man’s 
ethical feelings," stressing that natural selection has 
provided man with values, Haddington (as Dobzhansky also 
noted) writes of "the capacity to acquire ethics and 
values." The clearest difference between the two ap­
proaches to ethics is just there. Haddington refers his 
ethical discussion directly to the way in which man’s 
ethical ideas are related to the process. Julian Huxley 
does not. îkixley seems to be content with discovering
^5%bld., p. 65
^®*^Waddlngton, Nature of life, p. 104
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the direction of evolution, and enjoining us to follow it# 
Haddington ties it directly to his understanding Of the 
way socio-genetic transmission works* To him, principles 
do not arise automatically in the process. Nor does the 
existence of any naturally selected form of action mean 
that it in time becomes the "good*" He find only the 
framework within which we can discuss and evaluate ethical 
systems, especially as we look to the socio-genetic trans­
mission of ethical-acceptance tendencies # The thesis of his 
major book on the subject Is that such a framework "is to be 
found in a consideration of animal and human evolution*
In The Ethical Animal Haddington condenses his 
"ethic" into an outline of the four main points in under­
standing the framework "within which our ethical beliefs 
should be evaluated and criticized":
(a) "Socio-genetic" transmission of information 
has beccme the mechanism on which human evolution mainly 
depends*
(b) It can operate only because the psychological 
development of man is such that the newborn baby becomes 
moulded into a creature which is ready to accept the 
transmitted information*
(c) There is "general evolutionary direction" 
which has a philosophical status similar to that of healthy 
growth in nature*
^^4faddington, Ethical Animal* p* 23
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(d) Any particular set of ethical beliefs can be 
meaningfully judged according to their efficacy in further­
ing this general evolutionary direction#
In the time of recorded human history we detect 
only slight indications of biological evolution but there 
is overwhelming evidence of changes in human culture. To 
Haddington, the cultural alterations are not undirectional, 
any more than were the changes produced by biological 
evolution prior to man. As humans, we have what in ef­
fect amounts to "a new mode of heredity transmission# "
True, it cannot bring a new variation in the structure of 
our genes, and it does not principally affect biological 
changes :
but it can transmit conceptual knowledge, beliefs, feelings, aesthetic creations and other mental phe­nomena. # . It may be referred to as the cultural system.
Hith the advent of the cultural system came the pos­
sibility, or as Haddington would prefer it, borrowing 
half-a-point from Darwin; The necessity of ethical con­
siderations. Man alone is the ethical animal. The same 
process in which he developed also brought the necessity 
of ethical reflection and ethical acts. "The existence of 
ethical beliefs is a necessary part of the human evolu­
tionary system.
p. 7
p, 102
p. 173
143
So far as man’s evolution is carried on by his 
socio-genetic system - and in effect it is so in major 
part - the fact that he is an ethicizing being is an es­
sential cogwheel in the whole machine.^^^
Haddington then continues his analogy with reference 
to biological evolution. As biological "information" is 
transferred through the gametes in the genetic make-up of 
each new Individual, so in human evolution (the socio- 
genetie process) there must be a similar way in which the 
transmitted information will be received, or at least re­
ceived with enough regularity to become a part of the 
species# This takes place because (in what Haddington 
calls the most crucial step in the whole chain of the 
argument) the development of the newborn child into an 
authority acceptor, involves "the fozwation within his 
mind of some mental factors which carry authority." These 
are formed in the interaction of his innate potentialities, 
one of which is the intrinsic potentiality for ethicizing, 
with the environmental factors which he encounters.
An "authority-bearing system is essential within 
the mind if the infant is to become a recipient for 
socially transmitted information’*^^® Then, in the psy­
chological process described by Freud and Piaget; that 
"internal force" and the "external circumstances" form
p. 29
p. 157
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the setting In which the newborn infant becomee an 
ethicizing being. The authority required to make socio- 
genetic transmission possible at all, and the authority 
which is involved in the ensuing development of ethical 
activity, are two aspects of one and the same type of 
mental functioning.
The mechanism which has actually been produced dur­
ing the evolution of mankind is one in which these two 
aspects of authority are indissolubly connected.^®^ Man 
is the sort of creature who goes in for having ideas of 
right and wrong as an essential part of his mak^-up. To 
Haddington, man has what Lack called "a psychological 
(biological) compulsion to form ethical concepts»"^®®
"The basic nature of our ethical character is, then, that 
it is part of our special human or socip-genetic type of 
cultural heredity m e c h a n i s m . (Underlines ours)
So much for the mechanism of authority. Once we 
ascertain the general character of human evolution, we 
should then inquire of any ethical belief or action "how 
effective it is in mediating this empirically ascertained 
course of evolutionary change?" Then, by considering the 
present process as it is repeated in each human individual, 
we can find a criterion for judging ethics and ethical 
behaviours in short, by whether they suit both the socio-
Haddington, Nature of Life, p. 109 
^®®Lack, Evolutionary Theory, p* 97
269Haddington, Nature of Life, p. 110
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genetic transmission of information, and whether they 
will assist the evolutionary direction of man#
As we judge genetic changes by whether they are suitable to carry forward evolutionary progress on the biological level, so we can judge various dif­ferent types of ethical belief according to whether they seem likely to carry forward human evolution.
* * * * * * *
Haddington’s argument, while carefully presented, 
is complex. One possible way to simplify it should be to 
turn to the ethics which follow, to the practical aspects 
of the theory. Granted, he is not advocating a system of 
ethics and a set of moral rules for man to follow. His 
"system" is only a broad general criterion by which other 
systems of ethics can be judged. It is more a theory on 
the origin of ethics itself* But he does write that evolu­
tion has led us toward a "richness of experience." We 
should encourage the forward progress of the human evolu­
tionary scene. We should increase communication between 
cultures, respecting the diversity of cultures throughout 
the world. Our major ethical task is the prevention of 
war, mainly because these days, a major war could endanger 
the process itself and the socio-genetic transmission of 
ethics vfhich goes with it. We must also work out creative 
ways to use our leisure and appreciate the part science 
plays in the world (the latter a comment from an educator 
who feels too much emphasis has been placed on the arts 
to the detriment of science.)
p. 110
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While there is no single ethical ideal which would 
he universal^ our ethics should always he on a large scale; 
"not unduly restricting," and enlarging our scope of social 
heritage* The ethical problem can no longer he phrased 
in terms of personal relationships alone* What each of us 
does in the individual acts of our lives is important, 
perhaps critical, in the personal relationships and per­
sonal character development# But what happens to the 
social, political, and economic relationships of the large 
groups of nations, affects the entire future of the world 
and man# "An ideal, to he worthy of belief, should he on 
a large s c a l e * T h e s e  are the kinds of things which 
the evolutionary ethic requires, and all are acceptable*
But he has not succeeded in solving the ethical 
problem* And even though that criticism can he leveled 
against many others who work in the subject matter of 
ethics and morals, it is yet a significant failing* The 
basic problem with Waddington is that he allows for no 
criterion external to the natural world and the natural 
understanding of the human ethical animal*
In The Ethical Animal, Waddington exempts himself 
from the criticism that he has attempted to derive the 
criteria for ethics solely from the natural history of 
the world, although he admits that it is a failure of 
Julian Huxley. But ultimately, he is caught in the same
271Waddington, Ethical Animal, p* 195
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net# It Is true that he does not fabricate a scientific 
system out of his individual beliefs; nor does he call 
evolutionary promptings to certain kinds of behaviour 
"goods"; but the structure of his ethical approach depends 
on the existence of "goods" in the evolutionary direction 
of the biological and socio-ganetic development#
In Science and Ethics he wrote that "We must accept
the direction of evolution as good, simply because it is^
good according to any realist definition of the concept #"272In The Ethical Animal, in answer to Raphael's criticism, 
he explained that the "good" referred not to ideas con­
sidered good by any individual, but to the general cri­
terion by which ethical beliefs may be judged#
What would be wise for me to do and for what reasons? can be deduced from the answer to the ques­tion; "What has the world at large been doing in its history and for what reasons?"273
That is admittedly not an individual preference 
which determines ethical discussion and action; but the 
insistence that because it is a large number of individuals 
(even if Waddington would say that it is everyone who ever 
lived or is living now) does not change the fact that he 
is deriving ethical judgment by what is, or was# While 
he insists that he is referring to the socio-genetic 
system, by which the individual's willingness to accept 
direction and authority which is involved in the natural
272Raphael, Century of Darwin, chapter 15, p# 347 ff# There is also detailed cfïti'cisiû of Waddington in Lack's Evolutionary Theory, chapters 9> 10 and Quinton's Biology and ?efs<^ality, cmpter 8#
^^%addington, Ethical Animal, p# 58
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equipment of the man, that Is also using "good" to mean 
the best that we can transmit, and the best procedures 
that nature has collected to transmit it#
There is something meritorious in his work on ethics, 
because there is something iBiportant for us in the exami­
nation of both the evolution of ethics, and "Ethics and 
Evolution#" The origin and development of human behaviour 
is an interesting and rewarding pursuit. Waddington is 
corrects we cannot hope to understand ourselves and our 
actions if we ignore the process which brought them about*
But equally, we cannot end there without ignoring the other 
essential aspect of ethics: that which is beyond the
natural#
It is fair to conclude with Waddington that it is 
desirable both to continue the life process, and to con­
tinue those agreed "goods," which it has taught* But 
with Quinton we say:
that the case for the primacy of biological efficiency amongst the set of technical values has not been made out# That it is a good cannot seriously be questioned* What has not been shown is that it is the good*^* ^
As H# ?* Owen sums up both Waddington and Btaley with the
caution that:
Morality can be derived from evolution only if evolution is read in the light of preconceived moral terms* # * # The direction which the evolutionary process takes - turns out to be what is in accordance with those moral standards that we independently pos­sess* The evolutionists argument is circular*^
^^^Quinton, Biology and Personality, p# 121
P. Ovæn, The Moral Argument for Christian Theism (London: George Allen E"'@nwln^^tdTT'
B# Evolution and Behaviour 
Some Initial Investigations 
1# General and Territoriality
Although we conclude that the evolutionary ethic 
cannot provide us with an ethical system, we are yet work­
ing out the thesis that an evolutionary study of ethics 
is a requirement for the Christian moralist* Professor 
Thorpe noted that while the fundamental ideas of morals 
are not directly involved, still "much of ethics can he 
derived from the evolutionary p r o c e s s . I t  is that 
"much" of ethics which concerns us novz.
Professor Waddington is helpful in setting out a 
general principle at which our investigation of ethical 
problems can begin# It derives from his concept of the 
"aocio-genetic" transmission of information from one 
generation to the next, where he concluded that "the 
capacity to acquire ethics,’ as the ability to think it­
self, is a species characteristic of man*^^^ Man's power 
of conscious thought is a species characteristic which 
was instrumental in his ability to cope with, and tran­
scend his immediate environment* It was "favored" by
^^^Thorpe, Science^ Man and Morals, p* 137
lüB/biii'GûLjLstdLc: <]dr jkWLncl," 3:, %I. ICi'ijkoi\iELn,chapter 11, naturalism and the Human Spirit (Hew York;Columbia University Press, 1 9 %  fbuHn pHhting), pp* 242 ff*
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natural selection, or it would not have survived# As 
J* B# Eabgood noted in another sense, "The role of con- 
saiousnesa oamot he irrelevant in evolution, otherwise 
conscious creatures would never have evolved# Ultimately, 
our thought, and in particular ethical thoughts, may he 
God-given in creation, but only in the Teilhardian sense 
that everything which presently exists was there potentially 
in the primordial stuff of the universe# Its gradual un­
folding takes place in the evolutionary developments we 
have previously discussed* How the developing mm  acted 
in what we now call ethical situations, e,g#, social be­
haviour, sexuality or violence, was instrumental in the 
kind of man who developed#
It is especially relevant as we move from ethical 
theory into the practical matters with which Christian 
morals have to deal* There we will shift our attention 
from the more theoretical work of philosophical biology 
to the practical work of the ethologists who study animal 
and human behaviour*
Professor Thorpe is helpful in opening up this aspect 
of our study;
Biology tends to blur many of the sharp distinc­tions which find their expression in everyday langu­age, This seems to me to be true, whether we are dealing with the nature of life, the development of consciousness, the development of aesthetic apprecia­tion and of moral values*^™
278■ Habgood, Religion, and Scienc#a p. 68
H. Thprpe, Biology. gsyBfaology and Belief (GaJBtorldge: Unlvarelty Preis; iffel), p.
151
In the concluding part of Science, Man and Morals, Thorpe 
brings his ethological studies directly to hear on some 
of the most difficult ethical problems facing contemporary 
man*^®^ His treatment of pre-marital intercourse, homo­
sexuality, aggression, war, etc*, are necessarily brief 
and inconclusive. But it augurs well for much additional 
study along these lines, and is a good introduction to 
how critical that study can be#
Our subject has been attracting much popular atten­
tion and we should note in passing that a few of the 
writers in this field are widely read* lihen we are deal­
ing with Teilhard or Konrad Lorens, it is not much of a 
problem; for although they too are popular writers, the 
scientific base of their work is usually well founded 
and they help to make the subject intelligible to a large 
number of interested readers. It is an important task*
But when we look to Desmond Morris, e*g*. The Haked Ape,^  ' 
which plays on the sexual aspect of the human animal; we 
find that a qualified authority in zoology, who studied 
with Hiko Tinbergen and has a doctorate in Animal Behaviour 
from Oxford, has oversimplified the topic* We can go as 
far as Arthur Koestler in recommending that the book be 
read by readers who are "able to savour its wealth of
282information without swallowing all of its conclusions,"
280see esp* chapter 4, "Animal Societies and the Development of Ethics, " pp. 93 ff*
^^^Desmond Morris, The Haked Ape (London: Johnathan Gape, 1967) --------
^®%rthur Koestler's review in THE OBSERVER,
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Also notable In this group of popular writers is
the American joumalist-dramatist and sometime scientist,
Robert Ardrey# African Genesis^^^ and The Territorial
Imperative^^^ do deal with important questions in this
field! but we can ultimately set Ardrey aside from the
body of this research#®®^ Dobzhansky's firm rebuke of
his dramatic organization and emphasis puts Ardrey in
proper perspective;
Ardrey appears to see no particular virtue in humility, and if he understands the difference be­tween "the record of facts" and "flights of fancy," he keeps it well hidden in his book.Soo
Ardrey's flights of fancy can be briefly summarized under
two headings; Animal Instinct in Man,and Human Territorial
Behaviour; both of which are important aspects of our 
discussion, but neither receives a scholarly study with 
Mr* Ardrey#
Ardrey overlooks the fact that he is dealing with 
man, whose psycho-social evolution has been of a nature
October 15, 1967# Incidentally Koestler is himself a pro­lific and popular writer on the biological nature of man* See esp# his recent book The Ghost in the Machine (London; Hutchinson and Compare, 1967)^
Robert Ardrey, African Genesis (Hew York; Dell Publishing Company, I963)
^Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (Hew York: The Atheneum PublisheW,“T9B6) ^285There is a nostalgia in this statement# It was Ardrey*s first book on this subject that initially aroused my interest in the possibilities of researching this thesis #
Th# Dobzlmnsky, Animal Behaviour (Review -1967), p. 393 Book Review,' Rhb^rt'"Ard%y's TerritorialImperative and Konrad Lorenz ' On Aggression;April/JUly, 1967 ----  ------
different from other organisms To suggest that man
is driven by the biology of behaviour, and to ignore the 
culture which has molded him as much as he molds it, is 
to ignore a most obvious and important aspect of human 
behaviour*
Ardrey *0 other abuse of zoological information is 
found in his application of territorial behaviour to man* 
Man, says Ardrey, is a territorial animal, "as is a mock- 
ing bird singing in the clear California night*" Our 
territorial behaviour, he says, is as much a mark of our 
species as is our bone structure or the development of 
the human brain* Territoriality, says Ardrey, is the 
explanation* Birds fight over territory then win the 
affection of their mates. Unpropertled males get no 
partners. Ugandan kobs divide up their territorial 
space into sub-territories and await the female kobs, 
who, says Ardrey and kob authority Helmut Brueohner, 
select a mate not by his worth, far less his looks, but 
by the worth and the look of his territory. Male 
sticklebacks dig out a territorial nest on the sandy 
bottom of some shallow water. Eels swim thousands of 
miles to breed in the exact same sargasso Sea territory 
where they all were bom. And homing pigeons always come
deBoer, Evolution# p* 21 
^®®Ardrey, Territorial Imperatiye, p* 5
^%bid., p# 45* Ardrey's sense of humour in these analogies is delightful, however inappropriate they are in scientific analogy to human beings.
home# Territoriality, says Ardrey, Is the basic mechanism 
of animal behaviour*
And concludes Ardrey, since man is a result of the 
evolutionary process, territoriality is a chief mechanism 
of his behaviour and the basis of a natural biological 
morality*^^ The conclusion is misleading.
Territorial behaviour Important to students of 
animal behaviour, and occasionally there is some confirma­
tion of the idea that it may have important consequences 
in man. Professor H. P. Hediger, e.g., writes:
It can be assumed that the natural history of territoriality in the animal kingdom represents the introduction to the first chapter of the history of property in mankind. A piece of land or a section of space was most probably the very first thing that living beings took possession of, and that they de­fended even against their omi kind**^ “-^
Others have shared the concern* Henry Eliot Howard, who 
published Territory in Bird Life^^  in 1920, was the first 
to notice the phenomenon in detail# Men such as C. E* 
Carpenter and S. Zuckezmon in non-human primates; G. W. 
Bradt and K# Gordon with rodents; M. M* Hice also with 
bird life, and many others are agreed on its importance
in animal behaviour# Sir Arthur Keith also writes
p* 79
[* P* Hediger, "The Evolution of Territorial Be­haviour" in S* L* Washburn's Social Life of (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd,
"Henry E. Howard, Territory in Bird Life (H.Y. : Athenenum Press (Reprinted)"T^BAJTst ed. 1920j“™
^"A good review of the subject is found in Be- haviour and solution* chapter 11, "Territoriality;"^ Review of doncepts and Problems"
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Every tribe, no matter how primitive or how small it may be, claims to occupy and own a certain area of country, the frontiers of which are known by every tribesman# Tribesmen are bound to their native soil by a strong emotional bond; they regard its in­tegrity as a sacred trust; if the life of the tribe is to continue, frontiers must be preserved#^^^
We should add that the importance of territoriality,
and its possible implications for the behaviour of man, is 
part Of the purpose in this research* But to elevate it 
to the controlling factor in man's present activity is 
something entirely different, not only premature, but 
almost certainly false*
In addition to our more general objection, we will 
note the continuing disagreement in ethology regarding 
the Importance of territoriality in animals, and far more 
in its application to man* Dr* Davis, for example, warns 
of the danger in dwelling too long on any specific aspect 
of animal behaviours
The seeming universality of territorial behaviour may have blinded researchers to the possibility that some species lack territory completely* (it ) is clear that territorial behaviour is not essential for the success of a species
And, continues Davis, there is another means of organizing 
animal populations which is equally known and equally valid - 
"that of social rank."
Examples of social rank are found tliroughout the 
animal kingdom; crayfish, crickets, dogfish, salmon, large
^^^Keith, Essays on Evolution, p, 6
^^^David E* Davis, Integral Animal Behavior (Hew York: The Maemillan Ccmpany, x9dd )^  p.
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fish, reptiles, lizards, birds, roosters, hens, African 
antelope, moose, camels, and primates as well, order 
themselves in a rank of social dominance If we are 
to borrow directly from observed animal behaviour, then 
we could also argue that a pecking order Is natural for 
man, and draw the implications that captivated the social 
Darwinists: social rankings should stay the way they are,
for that is what evolution teaches#
Barnett's reasoning on territoriality is an even 
clearer refutation to its application to humans. He con­
cludes cautiously that for many species, territoriality 
appears to be important for:
Crowding could result in over-use of essentials, especially food and shelter# A territory may also allow undisturbed coitus, and it could aid in the protection of the young* All thebl statements have to be hypothetical: there is no decisive experi­mental evidence to support thern#^  ^*
But, even if m  assume that it is important for all other
species, there is a difficult problem to be overcome in
applying it to humans# comparisons are hazardous* While
we can use the term ’'territory" for a "defended region,"
Territorial behaviour in animals depends on systems Of signals common to the whole of each species * # *By contrast, in man, the rules regarding property are culturally determined: each one of us has to learnthem for his own group, in childhood; there is no pattern ofosignals or responses common to the wholesuedes
pp. 68-75
Barnett, Instinct and Intelligence, p. 135
298.TMrf^  ^p. 108
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All that can reasonably be said at present is that 
in many species a territorial behaviour exists, where the 
members of the species defend a certain section of property, 
or space, seemingly making it a matter of first importance# 
If it is a species characteristic of man at all, it must 
be grouped with all other behavioural tendencies which 
find expression in their existence in the human phase of 
evolution, where they exist in and are modified by the 
cultural environment which is characteristic of man.
2, Konrad Lorenz and Aggression
As a corrective to the mis-use of scientific ma­
terial, we turn to the work of Dr# Konrad Lorenz, the 
well-known student of animal behaviour, whom Huxley once 
called "the founder of ethology* In some of his 
popular works as wall as in his more serious scientific 
writings, Lorenz is important for our discussion*
Lorenz begins his study of human behaviour in the 
belief that there are innate behavioural activities which 
man shares with the animal world as a result of the evolu­
tionary process* He accepts that "instinctual behaviour" 
is not only important in the behaviour of man, but that 
it takes its roots in the inherited genetic structure 
when man first became man#
Julian Huxley, introduction, to Aggression, p. vii, althou#i we should note that P a n E n ^ Spression of the Emotions in Animals and Men is the first book bn We^ s&3ect'7‘'
®^^In most instances we use the word "instinct" or the phrase "instinctual behaviour" in the general "dictionary definition" sense to mean "unreasoned ten­dency to specific reaction, behaviour, etc." In Leam-ing and Instinct in Animals» Thorpe points out that ïEeoriginal L ^  wbrd^lmplies "being driven from within" (p# 15)# Its proper and distinct use in ethological science limits it to "patterns of behaviour which are not learned and are performed without foresight of the end#" Precision in scientific language is of course essential, and where it applies scientifically we re­strict its use to that meaning* But for our purposes, we use words like "drive," "innate tendency," "unlearned response," "requirement," etc., to mean the biological- physiological, hereditary needs of the organism, as op­posed to psychological, social and environmental ones.
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It is no daring speculation to assume that the first human beings who really represented our own species, those of Cro-Magnon, had roughly the same instincts and natural inclinations as we have our­selves. Hor is it illegitimate to assume that the structure of their societies and their tribal war­fare was roughly the same as can still be found |n certain tribes of Papuans in Central Hew Guinea.
The one "natural inclination" which Lorenz has dis­
cussed in great detail is that of aggression. The presence 
of aggressive behaviour in the world of animals is well 
documented and universally accepted* What is essential for 
our task is that we work from the observed presence of ag­
gression into the questions of how it first arrived, how 
it worked in the animal world, and how it influences the 
behaviour of man. Lorenz reminds us that;
. * . behavioural science really knows so much about the natural history of aggression that it does became possible to make statements about its causes and much of its malfunctioning in man. To achieve insight into the origin of a disease is by no means the same as to discover an effective therapy, but it is certainly one of the necessary conditions for that./^ ^^
The biological scientist, says Lorenz, cannot doubt that 
"intra-specific aggression is, in man, just as much of a 
spontaneous instinctive drive as in most other higher 
vertebrates."3^3 Aggression preceded man in the evolu­
tionary process. Prior to man it first arose in the 
important part which it played in individual survival.
®^^Eonrad Lorenz, On Aggression^ translated by Marjorie Latzke (London; M f t m &  Ltd., 1966), p. 215
p. 215
^Konrad Lorenz, "Ritualized Fighting," in The natural History of Aggression, ed. Oarthy and Bbling, p. 49
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Later, aggression became ritualized and was re­
directed into other areas as evolution discovered a solu­
tion to the problem which overt aggression posed to the sur­
vival of the species as a group, "We Imow from many other 
observations that aggression, though evoked by one object, 
can easily be directed towards a n o t h e r , In the evolu­
tion of vertebrates, and ultimately man, it worked toward 
the establishment of ritualized aggressive behaviour, 
which Lorenz develops further in the establishment of the 
roots of "bond behaviour, " Lorenz defines bond behaviour 
as "the keeping together in space of two or more indivi­
duals by a set of responses which each of them selectively 
elicits in the other, A protective evolutionary 
device which helps to Insure that individual evolutionary 
development could give way to the selection of small groups 
(or families) came into being#
We know that, in the evolution of vertebrates, the bond of personal love and friendship was the epoch- making invention created by the great constructors when it became necessary for two or more individuals
But the bond is in part controlled by innate responses over 
which the human has no conscious control, at least not over 
the initial presence. Aggression is important in the
3°^Ibld., p. 45 
b:blcl., p. 47
’Lorenz, to_A®eresslm, p, 258
development of man for while it can be redlreeted into 
other outlets which work for his continued initiative 
and progress, it also can work toward the establishment 
of pair bonding (personal love and friendship) which is 
necessary for the development of communal life and the 
care and education of the young.
In answer to "the widely held opinion, shared by 
some contemporary philosophers" : that all human be­
haviour patterns which help the development of man and 
his society are dictated by "specifically human rational 
thought," Lorenz counters that the opinion is not only 
unfounded, but "the very opposite is true, " We have 
received rich and noble endowments in the transfer of 
the complex range of social instinct from the animal 
kingdom to our own;
Our pre-human ancestry gave and received friend­ship, were tender and kind to the young of their communityi and under the^right conditions gave their lives for their fellows,
Lorenz then discusses at some length the question
of why reasonable men behave so unreasonably# The one
who was created a little lower than the angels, and who
is crowned with glory and honour is, as the Old Testament
also knew, capable of the worst sort of inglorious action,
"All Of these amazing paradoxes, " writes Dr# Lorenz i
find an unconstrained explanation, falling into place like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, if one assumes
p. aia
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that human behaviour, far from being determined by reason and cultural tradition alone, is still sub­ject to all the laws prevailing in all ghylo-genet- ically adapted instinctive behaviour *3vo
Lorenz does not deny that cultural or rational con­
ditioning occur* But they are important, not aside from 
innate behaviour, but because man is genetically con­
structed so that he needs to be complemented by culture - 
a larger expression of waddington's point that ethics is 
also a "need" with man* The potential for cultural develop­
ment is there at the inception, or it would never have 
developed at all*
Oontenporary man is by nature a being of culture*In other words, man's whole system of innate acti­vities and reactions is phylo-genetioally so con­structed, so calculated by evolution, as to need to be complemented by cultural tradition*^^^
The logic of the relationship, to Lorenz, is clear*
If one could come onto the human scene from outside the 
earth (from Mars, as Lorenz suggests), it seems entirely 
reasonable to guess that there would be no doubt that all 
of life belongs to the same life-line, and, that as it 
continues in development the continuation belongs to 
human behaviour and culture as well, the latter depending 
on the former both for its existence and its expression*
Hot being Martians, and unable to extricate our­
selves from our subjective involvement, we are likewise 
unable to examine the subject of our human behaviour without
^ Ibid., p. 804 
ibid., p. 888
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being personally committed to the conclualona# Yet we 
must make the attempt#
Xf * * * humanity is so obviously powerless to stem the pathological disintegration of its social structure and if it behaves, as a whole, in no way more intelligently than any species of animals would under the same circumstances, this alarming state of affairs is largely due to that spiritual pride which prevents men from regarding themselves and their be­haviour as parts.of nature and as subject to its universal laws.3iu* * * * # # *
Lorenz introduoea the topic, but there are two 
points at which we must reject his conclusions# The first 
is a general point: Lorenz's conclusions derive out of
his conviction that man can be explained by his natural 
origin* Although this thesis clearly accepts that what 
man is and does can be examined from the evolutionary, 
or natural, point of view, we mist repeat an earlier 
criticism that Lorenz has reduced man and his behaviour 
to a natural view alone* The perspective which allows 
one to view the ethical life of man from a point beyond 
its natural origin and cultural setting is missing in 
Lorenz* Oro-Magnon man probably did have the same "in­
stincts and natural inclinations" as modern man; but the 
man which we see presently in creation is more than his 
instincts, his natural inclinations and his cultural 
setting* Els existence is in debt to more than the genetic 
pool which has allowed him to develop as man*
^^^Lorenz, "Ritualized fighting", p* 50
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But, second, there Is another critiaism which Is 
more directly related to Lorenz; one which is also made 
by his fellow ethologist; 8# A* Bamett# In a highly 
critical review of On. Aggression, Barnett concluded 
that Lorenz has misled his readers# "She crucial ques­
tion, " wrote Barnett, "is how the violence arises (in 
man)* Lorenz believes that the question can be answered 
by studying patterns of behaviour « * * that are common 
to an entire animal species#" But, says Barnett, Dr, 
Lorenz is confused because he fails to take account of 
the development of behaviour during the lifetime of each 
individual# Instinctual behaviour does not occur inde­
pendently from the environment in which the Individual 
organism develops# The emphasis in Barnett's criticism 
is on the individual organisp, and not on the more general 
cultural influences on man* For Barnett there is no 
instinctual life for a species which can be recognized 
by the student* At the most, only the potential for 
certain types of behaviour can be said to be present, 
and these only as the individual life develops them in 
its individual environment*
Barnett, we should add, is opposed to Lorenz in a 
far larger area of subject matter than his review of On 
Aggression* In his own book. Instinct and Intelligence^, 
he warns of the danger involved in comparing animal and
^^^8. A.# Barnettj Boientific American^ Vol. 216;
human behaviour; "awh compariaons, especially when they 
entail a search for similarities, can easily lead to error, 
and it is useful to try to make the various sources of 
error explicit The answer of how we can control human 
behaviour ' is not to be found in the behaviour of other 
species." That approach leads to a "gross misinterpreta­
tion of animal behaviour," and "one may be led to think 
of human behaviour as fixed , . » and difficult to alter.
While he provides a good balance for the enthusiasm 
of an ethologist like Lorenz, we must also point out that 
Barnett's objections are not entirely valid* Examining 
the sources of human behaviour does not necessarily lead 
to a "gross misinterpretation of animal behaviour" - for 
surely Dr. Lorenz has remained a careful student of animal 
experiments# It can also lead to a well-reasoned and 
useful approach to behavioural science - a point which 
Barnett himself well realizes in his book.^^"^ He does 
not ignore the implications which such studies have in 
approaching strictly human problems* Nor, also, must 
it lead to the conclusion that "human behaviour is fixed 
* . * and difficult to alter." Especially where there is 
a full awareness of the environmental factors of behaviour, 
such studies can help to expand our information and pos­
sibilities of control*
Barnett, Instinct and Intelligence, p. v. 
p. 109
esp. Bamett*e discussion of the social con- sequences and altruism arising out of his consideration of the early hunting habits and food sharing, p$ 227
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The ethologlool argument is not our main o m o e m #  
That is better left for the professionals in that field# 
But we can better understand the emphasis which Lorenz 
is making if we look to another more technical book which 
he wrote* Evolution and the Modification of Behaviour# 
There Lorenz discusses the different attitudes to the 
concept Of the ''innate# " The primary aim of this writing 
ia to argue for the importance of innate factors in 
animal and human behaviour# One approach, that of be- 
haviorist psychology, eliminates innate behavioural 
concepts entirely, for "innate behaviour" there "implies 
a mechanism which is independent of environment," and 
behavioural psychology insists that all behaviour is 
learned. But, replies Lorenz, "The assumption that learn­
ing 'enters into* every phylo-genetically adapted be­
havior mechanism is neither a logical necessity nor in 
any way supported by observational and experimental 
faot."315
Another approach, "taken hy laaior English speaking 
modem ethologists, " is also in error when it assumes 
that "innate and learned" are only two extremes of a 
continuum of gradation." Ho reason exists for assuming 
"that individually acquired information enters into every 
kind Of behaviour# And, while "innate" and "learned"
^^%onrad Lorenz, Evolution and the Modification Of Behavior (Londons M e t l m S T T W r i m r ; —   ------ —
Ibid., p. 89
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are not mutually exclusive concepts, the recognition that 
there are innate responses in man is essential.
To deny that it exists (behaviourist psychology) 
or to blur its distinctive existence (some modem ethology) 
is to remove it from its essential place* Barnett's 
emphasis is in the other direction and no doubt, though 
unnamed, he is included in Lorenz's criticism of modem 
English-speaking ethology*
But, to come back to our point, we hold that Barnett 
is correct in his initial criticism of Lorenz. The di­
rect analogies which Lorenz draws between the behaviour 
of jewel fish, sticklebacks, Chow dogs, eagles and jack­
daws, all of which have been household pets of Lorenz and 
his obviously patient wife, are misleading,^^7 we cannot 
reasonably say, nor should Lorenz, that because the ag­
gressive love interplay takes place in a certain way among 
greylay geese (which prompted Koestler to quip that Lorenz 
has offered us an "anseromoiphio view of man"), it follows 
that the same is true for the relationship of aggression 
and love in man*
he (Lorenz )seems to forget is that a species which is able to invent atomic weapons must have very unique and ramrkable biological, as well as cultural, characteristics * The hope for non-extinction of man­kind would be scant indeed, if it had to depend on natural selection making us biologically adapted to
^^^Arthur Koestler, in his review of On Aggression, in The Observer (September 18, 1966) scknowledieanEESt**" LoreM lb "on the side of the angels," but wondered how he ever got thereI
every new technological invention. In short, for many thousands of years mankind has been adapting its environment to Its genes more often than its genes to its envlroimemt # 3io
Lorenz has overstated his point, hut he retains his 
importance for our thesis* He alerts us to the neces­
sity of continued examination of ethological studies 
Insofar as they hear on the discussion of human behaviour. 
For we are part of that evolutionary process, and now 
partially conscious of what the process means*
Arising out of Lorenz's concern with aggression 
are two social problems which bear directly on the ethical 
problems of our day* the growth of social behaviour in 
children, and the presence of violence and war. An 
historical study of aggression is essential here.
With humanity in its present cultural and tech­nological situation we have good reason to consider intra-specific aggression the greatest of all dangers. We shall not improve our changes of counteracting it if we accept it as something metaphysical and in­evitable, but on the other hand, we shall perhaps succeed in finding remedies if we investigate the chain of itr natural causation,
Dobzhansky, Animal Behaviourj 1063, p, 393 
^^^Lorenz, On Aggression, pp. 22-23
3# Freedman and Roe: Anxiety and Conflict
The epitome of the kind of study which will be 
increasingly helpful in our understanding of human be­
haviour is the careful analysis of "Evolution and Human 
Behaviour," by Anna Hoe and Lawrence Freedman, which 
«•PPaars in Roe and Eimpson's volume Behaviour and Evolu- 
tion,3^ G
Their particular concern is the genesis of an­
xiety and conflict in man, which is examined in its 
evolutionary origin:
It is impressive to note the biological anti­quity of the conflicts found in human psycholo^ between mutually incompatible but strongly felt aggressive, sexual, or fearful responses to the same person or objects#321
The dynamics of the individual psyche are important to
anxiety and conflict, but the roots of the behaviour and
the beginning of the study is rather in the "antiquity
of the conflicts#" In answer to those who stress that
the mind of the individual man is the mediator of his
specialized behaviour, they reply that:
Man's emotional behaviour^^® continues to be under the dominance of a system which lacks abilities
320Roe, etc., "Evolution and Bman Behaviour", in Behaviour and Evolution (Hew York: Yale University Brass; 1958)-----------^
Emotional 'behaviour" is an unfortunately obscure phrase. We take it here to mean non-rational behaviour,
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for specific discrimination, for verbal or symbolic capacity, or for self-awareness
In short, it operates under the necessities of the biolo­
gical system which he has received in the process of 
evolution* From the beginning "man is an animal with a 
potent pre-disposition to the genesis of internal conflict 
and anxiety*
Throughout the article the authors keep the neces­
sary balance in the distinction that emphasis also must 
be placed on "cultural" and environmental factors in 
human behaviour; but, important as these are, they come 
after the pre-dispositions to behaviour in man's evolu­
tionary endowments *
As a focal point for the entire discussion, they 
propose as a working hypothesis that:
Man's evolutionary endowment, successful though it has made him, contains within it hindrances to his social évolution as well as self-destructivepotential.3^ ^
Since it is "probably true," that man's biological survival 
and social evolution can be understood only "within the 
context of his relationship with other humans," his 
greatest promise and his most fearful potentialities spring 
from the nature of these human dependencies. Man's be­
havioural tendencies are best understood by reference to 
the dependent existence he lives within his social groupings
323Ibid., p. 459
p. 461
Ibid., p, 455
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Free«Man mû Roe work from the Darwinism understanding 
of man as an animal endowed with superior intelligence 
and social instincts; man is an individual with indi­
vidual intelligence^ but he works out that individuality 
in his social contacts^ in the beginning through the 
small family group*
In other words ^ in order for man to become man he 
had to become socially involved with the other humans 
as natural selection began to **favor" the survival of 
the small group more than the individuals outside it*
The essential conditions for the survival of man as man 
included a wide range of what became characteristically 
human behaviour* The extended period of infancy^ e*g*, 
during which the individual is almost entirely dependent 
upon others in the family group^ is a necessary pre­
requisite for cultural psycho-social evolution to take 
place* If man is to transmit a large body of "cultural" 
Information to each future man and woman^ there must be 
the extended period of dependency in which the infant 
can be educated# But the possibility of an infant sur­
viving through an extended period where he is relatively 
helpless (unlike a puppy for example which leaves its 
parent and is relatively able to take care of itself 
within a few months) depends on the existence of a family 
unit which is willing and able to protect and teach him* 
It is the cohesive small family unit whioh^ especially in 
the period of primitive man^ protects the individual and
provides for M s  needs. But to do that^ the unit must 
he stable and coopérative in its task* Benoe^ any be­
haviour which is counter to the preservation of the small 
family unit will be selected negatively*
Prolonged deprivation of parental care has quite different significance for the child in a hunting or primitive agricultural culture than it has for the child whose parents are relatively free from constant preoccupation with food production*
The point is clear: natural selection favoured the
behaviour which was able to put the safety and survival of 
the small family unit above the preferences of the indl- 
vidual.3^? Individual aggression against other members 
had to be ellMnated* But conflict was inevitable. The 
individual retained M s  individual drives for M s  own in­
dividual needs* But in the new setting he is forced to:
sublimate M s  socially harmful or unacceptable im­pulses into their opposite and to divert the object of biological drives from outside foci back toward Mmself *^^^
If he had not done so^ man as we know Mm^ would not have 
survived*
Incompatible elements of individual expression 
would have disrupted the security of the family group^
Ibid., pp. 474-75
point is orltloally li^ortant, but the proper vocabulary for expressing is difficult and probably mis­leading* It sounds as though "natural selection" had a consciousness of its own which allowed it to choose the behaviour wMch is somehow liked* But from the evolutionary viewpoint wMch we have adopted> such consciousness on the part of natural selection itself would be difficult to un­derstand. Perhaps we should say only that tMs type of behaviour was selected.3a8Ko6a etc., "Evolution and Iftuaan Behaviour", p. 465
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and helpless infants would have died in infancy. The 
incompatible elements were selected out in favour of 
those which were able to manage a repression of the in­
dividual instinctive drives, in favour of the small family 
unit.
Man is a conflictful, ambivalent, bipolar animal who achieves a measure of adaptive stability by re­pressing some part of his incompatible strivings, delaying, inverting, or transmuting others, and fulfilling some.3^^
To allow for the emergence of modem man, the protection
and existence of the family unit had to become more 
important than the individual members. A selection of 
a "population" took place* To ensure the essential 
period of development, the family group had to work 
against the individual outlets, which themselves were 
driven by instinctual drives built up in preceding evolu­
tionary development.
This analysis leads naturally to a direct discus­
sion of the relationship between the evolution of animals 
and the psychology of man; which is seen most clearly in 
the aspects of conflict between what the individual would 
otherwise do, and what must be done within the family or 
social unit. Roe and Freedman*a historical analysis also 
leads to a current application.
Since the family is a group of individuals which shares food, territory, and property, it follows that for the success of the group, the acquisition of such
Ibid,, p. 466
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materials must come under rather rigid social regu- lation.330
But the rewards and punishments of this regulation cannot 
be internally consistent, as modern psychology so com­
pletely confirms# The beloved person is also the frustrat­
ing agent, and the pleasure-giving object also inflbts
Although Roe and Freedman accept the evidence that 
"a propensity to aggressivity exists in humans as part 
of their genetic endowment," they are also aware of the 
difficulties involved in determining how much aggressive 
behaviour comes by genetic pre-disposition, and how much 
is "learned" during the life history of the individual 
person.
Thus far no environment has provided, at least to any mammalian group, a frustration free life ex­perience, nor has any aggression free species ap­peared. The distinction between physical aggressive­ness and psychic aggressiveness is the difference between behaviour and fantasy, the act and the idea*But physical aggressiveness is the antecedent; the "drive is a necessary precondition of the thought
Instinctual requirement precedes the actual aggressivity 
which appears during the lifetime of the individual.
Following a similar line of argument as that used 
in "aggression," the authors also discuss the sexual needs
of the individual, which exist in the same matrix of family
p. 465
331lbld., pp, 470-71
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conflict* Anxiety came to the individual who, as a result 
of the limitations on his sexual outlets enforced by the 
family group, was unable to "fulfill" the physical and 
sexual needs which were suggested by his individual 
genetic requirement. To maintain the stability of the 
family, the sexual behaviour of its individual members 
must be regulated. But then.
The presence of sexual needs in a developing human who is prevented from gaining sexual access to the males and females in the familial environ­ment . * .leads to privation, frustration andconflict.332
The conflict results from the previous development of 
&ggro88ive behaviour in Individual sexual beha-vtour* The 
method of obtaining a partner in evolutionary history is 
often competitive and frequently combative. Darwin 
called attention to the sexual advantage for the aggressive 
male in particular: it gave him access to the females
as he subdued the other males who were his sexual rivals *^33 
In the evolutionary development of animal life aggressive 
behaviour worked to the individual*s selective advantage*
The thesis of the article is made clear once again: 
the same instinctual requirements which were selected by 
the natural process and were necessary for the Individual, 
became a hindrance in the small family setting. Evolution 
brought the sources of the conflict*
p. 468
p. 469 - No re-issue of the survival of the fittest is intended. See discussion circa page 58*
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It is equally important, however, to understand 
that as natural selection brought about the small unit, 
and thereby created difficulties for the individual, it 
brought also the potential for humanity as it exists in 
the modem world# The individual drives did not dis­
appear* They became, as modern psychology attests, re­
directed into the outlets which favoured the development 
of modem civilized man* Through sublimation of his 
natural instincts, or naturally acquired instincts,
(which we can say were forced upon man in his development), 
man can redirect his biological needs to a higher level 
of behaviour and to a concern for a larger group; "to 
love of family, his community, state and the world* "
His sexual nature (for example ) may lead him to widening ambits of human affection, his acquisi­tive propensities to an optimum balance of work and leisure, and his aggressive drives to heightened social efficiency through attacks on perils commonto all men.335
There the relevance of such studies to ethics be­
comes perfectly clear. The highest type of Darwinian 
fitness of human genotypes, as Dobzhansky once noted, is 
the capacity for education, "to profit from experience, 
and to adjust one*a behavior to the requirements of one*a 
surroundings »
p, 469 
335ibid,, p. 478
^^%obzhan0lcy, Majalclnd Evolving;* p. 251
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We learned, or it was learned for us, that the 
adjustment of behaviour to the requirement of society 
was a desirable trait which led to the success of those 
who best so adjusted. Social behaviour, the area in 
which ethical activity takes place, is a part of man's 
basic requirement, as Iioranz said, he has to be comple­
mented by culture* The process favoured the develop­
ment of the man who was capable of developing beyond 
the individual inclinations of his instinctual behaviour. 
Homo Sapiens was able to "subdue the dominions of the 
earth" because of the human social life which arose out 
of the potential in the life process itself#
We are equipped to do more than survive. We are 
enabled naturally to go beyond the instinctive life into 
the realm of thought and ethical speculation# The evolu­
tionary process:
implanted in us extraordinary strivings for self- actualization and self-transcendence, for beauty and for rectitude# HOmo Sapiens is not only the sole tool-making animal' ' and the ' sole political animal, he is also the sole ethical animal.337
As one of more than a million biological species which 
have inhabited the earth, man has been the recipient of 
that ethical sense which enables him to search for him­
self into the meanings of his distinctive behaviour#
The tree of the knowledge of good and evil belongs to 
the creation story: it is at that point where a living
breathing creature became man. Man is, as Waddlngton 
notes, "The Ethical Animal."
33?Ibia., p. 339
G» Evolution and Ethiaa
Borne Intérim Conclusions
While admittedly there is a risk in drawing con­
clusions in a field of study expanding 00 rapidly, we 
can see some interim conclusions emerging in the work of 
Freedman and Roe, as well as the other authors we have 
discussed* They point to three areas:
1# Concerning the presence of social-ethical 
behaviour in humans which has its roots in the evolu­
tionary process preceding man*
2. Assuming this general presence, they introduce 
some of the particular behavioural tendencies which can 
be investigated*
3# They relate how an understanding of these 
tendencies is appropriate and important for a study of 
Christian ethics.
1# On the first, this thesis concludes that there can 
be no reasonable doubt. The weight of evidence goes to 
support it* Drawing on an earlier conclusicm that the 
passage from animal to "man" involved more than his 
physical appearance, we repeat now that we cannot ap­
proach the study of man's ethical behaviour and ignore 
its origins in the animal world* Man did not arrive as 
a shapeless mass which cultural, environmental, and
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psychological pressures molded into a human being; con­
trary to what has been, and is believed by behavioural 
psychologists and some moral philosophers * 338 arrived, 
in the first instance, as well as in each individual life, 
with certain biological directives which influence far 
more than the shape of his skull and the tilt of his jaw.^^^ 
And, although we admire the caution of writers like Maynard 
Smith;
In fact, we can be fairly confident that the "nature," (i.e., the genetically determined capaci­ties) of human beings has not greatly changed since the neolithic revolution, . . # There are probably genetically determined differences of a statistical kind in temperament and talents as well as in the physical type between human races # *
we conclude that these genetically determined character­
istics help to direct the intellectual and socio-ethical 
behaviour of man* These can never be thought of as 
autonomous, but, as Freedman and Roe so ably pointed out, 
they precede the development of cultural and personal 
behaviour* Unless a "genetic requirement" is present in 
the individual man, the observed behaviour pattern cannot 
develop* More particularly it is always the inter-working 
of basic needs and actual fulfillments which determine 
behaviour.
G* H* Waddlngton writes in The Ethical Animal,"Remarkably few professional day so much as mention the fact that the human sensory and intellectual apparatus has been brought into being by an evolutionary process whose observed effects in all other instances are to produce operative systems conformable to the situations with which they will have to deal*" p. 74
33%f, pp. 73-75 in this thesis 
340*'Smith,
We must, of course, repeat a corrective which 
Barnett aimed at Lorenz; insofar as we cannot finally 
speak about the genetic requirements of "man" in general, 
as if we were all endowed with the same genes. It is 
always the individual man on whom the genetic pre­
disposition works. What will generally be true for the 
species, will in some instances be untrue for the indi­
vidual. But whatever the specific, we conclude: "that
through the recent work done on instinctive behaviour in 
animals and man, we now know that human beings really are 
b o m  with built-in d r i v e s . "34l "built-in drives,"
initially at least, are inherited from our primate 
ancestry and are carried along in the genetic pool of 
mankind. Thus the recent statement of Professor Thorpe 
that we are coming now to realize that there is "hardly 
any aspect of the behaviour of animals which may not 
have some reference to problems in human behaviour" 
directs us to an examination of ©thological research.
In the years of this century the work of the 
psychologists and sociologists has for the most part 
been accepted into the work of the faculties of our 
theological colleges. Through the years we have realized 
that what appeared to be an attack on our truth at the 
start, was an attack mainly on our pretentions. We
^^^Oarleton S. Goon, Man and His Future, "Growthand Development of Social Groups, ” ed* (London: J M  Ohurchill, Ltd., 1963), p$ 122
. H. Thorpe and 0. L, Eangwill, Current Problems in Animal Behaviour (Cambridge: University B?iii7T55r)T
I8l
have found them to be helpful companions in our attempt 
to understand man and his behaviour. Such, in time, this 
thesis suggests, must be our attitude to the biological 
sciences, and especially the students of evolutionary 
science*
Man is inseparable from nature and is understood 
as part of the whole life system*^^^ M a  social behaviour 
is part of the system and cannot be separated from the
universal process which brought him into being#
Man can alter the external environment to fit his physical needs, foibles, and wishes, but * * * his in­nate responses are still those which were developed during his evolutionary past to adapt him to the conj- ditions then prevailing but which no longer e x i s t .344
If we have learned that "the behaviour of man is
far less subject to reason and intelligence than once was
s u p p o s e d , we should also learn that it is far less
subject to his particular lifetime than we thought, and
examine it through its origins in the animal world*
2» Assuming this presmoe, we can then discuss some 
of the particular behavioural tendencies which should be 
investigated:
In The Direction of Hmmn Development, Professor 
Ashley Montagu announced the purpose of his book as an
L. li* J^hyte, The Mext Development in Man (London; The Cresset Press, i9447Tw^54^^55*~'
^^^Dubos, Man Adaptingj, p. 28
H* E* Elvers, Instinct and the Unconscious (Cambridge: University PreslTTWIT^Seo^HTSItlmJT^P» 40
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attempt to answer the question: "Uhat is man's original
nature, and how is that nature influenced and conditioned 
to assume a socially functional That funda­
mental question we can borrow as a suitable purpose for 
this concluding section of Part IX in our research.
For man is not simply a social creature; indeed, he could never have become the kind of social being he is without the unique biological equipment which supplies the potentialities enabling him to undergo socialization. It follows, therefore, that in order to comprehend the nature of the processes whereby man becmes a social being, it is essential to under­stand, as far as possible, not only the nature of these organic potentialities of human behaviour, but also the nature of their interaction with the sociali­zing process*347
In the following where we outline certain specific areas 
where this "socialization" takes place, we will note that 
the interaction, rather than the "instinct" itself, is of 
first importance. But "the hereditary element in our 
ethical codes," as Miriam Rothschild pointed out in 
Waddlngton*s Science and Ethics, have been underestimated 
and have unduly emphasized the role of individual psy­
chological types, experience, reason, etc. While:
Borne of the most striking phenomena in animal behaviour are those i^erited trends of behaviour which require a relailvely^rezy small amount of conditioning in order to fix them.34o
0, R* Carpenter adds;
Those activities which are ethically accepted such as altruism, strong emotional affection, and
3^Ibid., p. 1
3 i^faddingtoEi> Science and Ethics, p. 89
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co-operation - are attributed to man's higher intel­lectual processes if not to super-human origins*The naturalistic approach to the study of human be­haviour, ecmpetitive and co-operative, egoistic and k antagonistic, recognizes roots at a pre-human level.3W
The over-all intent of Carpenter's comment would be mis­
leading, if it is taken to mean that "super-human origins" 
and "man's higher intellectual processes" are not involved 
in these ethically accepted activities; but pre-human roots 
are evident*
We will introduce a few of them briefly as token 
representation of the possible areas in which further de­
tailed study can be undertaken* Each of them could form 
a suitable research topic in itself.
1. Social Behaviour: the important ethical impli­
cations of man's involvement with man* This broad topic 
concerns the history of man's relationship with man: the
relationship in which ethical activity takes place. Hoe 
and Freedman introduced one aspect of the topic.
Carleton B* Goon offers another, and gives firm support 
for the importance of examining early man in his small 
group unit; for:
During the vast expanse of the Pleistocene, in which man evolved, breeding populations and nations were small* Only during the past eight or nine millenia can any have grown much larger* It may therefore be that Homo Sapiens is primarily adapted to living in small, simply organized, face-to-face
OhQQuoted by Robert Ardrey, African Genesis, p. 171, where Ardrey accepts the quotation to mean precisely what we mentioned as misleading*
groups, and this is perhaps true of the vast majority Of mankind today,350^
We will not attempt to repeat Kropotkin's exaggeration of 
"the ethie of oo-qperation" as the oontrolling mechanism 
of natural selection, but it is important to mention again 
the work of W. 0# Allee and others, regarding social co­
operation of animals# Co-operative action with other mem­
bers of the small social unit existed and exists in the 
"pre-ethical" setting# Before the intellectual development 
of man allowed for philosophical discussions of the meaning 
of moral action, the behaviour itself was present# Gavin 
deBoer noted;
In many of the hi#er animals, parental care and self sacrifice, in the interest of other members of the family, such as incubating gravid females and young, have been favoured by natural selection and conferred benefit on the species# Wrm earliest human times, the survival value of altruistic be­haviour has been enhanced because of the prolonga­tion of childhood and the consolidation of the family that have characterized the evolution of man#351
As is well demonstrated, a social bond was developed in 
the history of the primates prior to man# M# E# A# Chance 
makes it clear that this form of social life, "shown by 
some present day primates" may well have played "a crucial 
part in setting us on the course we have now t a k e n #  "352
Coon, "Growth and Development of Social Groups^ in Man and Bis Future# p# 122
deBeer, Evplution, p# 21
352M# R# A* Chance, "The Mature and special Features of Instinctive Social Bond of Primates,"ed# Sherwood L# Washburn, p# IJ
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Hallowell adds that the major clue to the basic
continuity between man and the other primate groups, and
the clue which makes comparisons of similarities and
differences significant:
is the fact that we are dealing with gregarious ani­mals* Whatever the ultimate determinants of sociality in the primates # . * all forms of cultural adapta­tion . * • are based on seme system of social action. But systems of social action are not unique in man* They also occur In infra-human primates and # , » constitute | generic and characteristic mode of adaptation$353
Caution is required, as Thompson noted;354 at 
present we cannot provle any "phylo-genetic trait." But 
that says only that we do not have enough Information yet 
to draw final knowledge on the specific traits involved.
It does not detract from the belief that we are able to 
understand human social behaviour better in the light of 
research into the evolutionary origin of social man, A 
series of studies such as those in Washburn's volume 
Social Life of Early is a sure entrance into
this study.
What can be said for now is that many aspects of 
human behaviour to which we attribute socio-ethioal value 
are activities and goals which appear in the natural 
setting of our animal ancestry.
Irving Hallowell, "The Proto-Oultural Founda­tions of Human Adaptation," Washburn volume, pp. 237-38
^^^illiam Thompson in Roe and Simpson's Behaviour and Evolution, p. 308
35531^^ 3^ 00^ Washburn, Editor, Social life of (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.,
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Man Is a moral animal# Moral and ethical systems are necessary for normal human functioning, and are major adaptive elements in religion# The propensity for developing moral concepts and the disposition to learn them, as well as the precepts themselves, are adaptations acquired in the course of our biological and social evolution# When viewed in this way, rather than as mere edicts from a stem and incomprehensible source, those precepts achigye a hi#ier sanction and become the more impelling*350
This View of life, p# 233
a. Aggression
To the work of Konrad Lorenz in On Aggression, we 
can add independent testimony from other sources* The 
central point made by Lorenz was that aggression in man 
is a basic biological phenomenon which is inherited from 
his predecessors*
Roe and Simpson agrees
Clinically we know that inner alarm and outer aggression are not uncharacteristic of man; possibly he is reflecting his mixed evolutionary heritage* Certainly a level of aggressivity is adaptative and essential for survival.35f
His "mixed evolutionary heritage" is the clue here. Ag­
gression is partially understood in reference to its 
occurrence in the social "bond" behaviour of early man. 
Thorpe makes it clear that "all animals with bond behaviour 
also have aggressive b e h a v i o u r . "^^8 Arthur Keith also
explained the "duality of tribal mentality," where at one 
moment, acting within his own social unit, the individual 
assisted in the co-operative welfare of the tribal mem­
bers* At some other moment, in opposition to neighbouring 
tribes which threatened his own, the action was reversed* 
Thorpe again observess
Roe and Simpson, Behaviour and Evolution, p. 470
^^®Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, p. 84 
359
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It Is quite easy to imagine that in a kind of society which many of the ancestors of man may have passed through, hate may have been a good thing ♦ . * The hate of an animal society for strange clans or groups of its own species may in fact be ethologically eugenic from the point of view of the selection of characters which go to develop a highly elaborate and secure social life* Thus is may be that the greatest social, moral and religious problem of today, namely that of war, cannot be fully under­stood without recourse to a knowledge of the progress of the evolution of human social llfe*30u
Thorpe is correct here «361 The major ethical problem of 
our time may indeed be war* But also in the relatively 
minute problems of everyday existence. Individual aggres­
sion may be reflecting the aggressive "instinct" of the 
evolutionary past*
Dubos continues with another illustration of the 
fact that man retains "essential traits of his evolu­
tionary past." In man there is the persistence of 
hormonal and metabolic responses;
which were developed to meet threatening situations during his animal ancestry, but which no longer fit the needs of life in civilized societies* * # * This power to mobilize * * * resources for flight or for fight has been certainly of great advantage throughout evolution • * • in particular with predators and ene­mies of all sorts* But what was once an advantage is increasingly bec<ming a^handicap under the conditions of modem human life*3o<2
E* ¥* Sinnott may have gone too far when he refers 
to the "selfish instinct" which is "an ingrained trait in
Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, p* 85
"Ibid,, pp. 122 ff# Thorpe discusses eugenics, monogamy, pre-marltal intercourse, homosexuality, etc*
3^ D^ul30s, m n  Adapting* p. 29
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man," as the "source of that original sin which theo­
logians talked so much a b o u t * But he is allied with 
the others in emphasizing the continuation of individual 
aggressivity from animal to man*
Ethologist Eibl-Eibesfeldt pinpoints the issue in 
his useful article "The Fighting Behaviour of A n i m a l s * "364 
There he discusses the universality of fighting among 
members of species with aggression as a basic biological 
phenomenon* He too, complains that investigators of 
aggressive behaviour in man "have usually been satisfied 
to find its origin in the life experience of the indi~ 
dividual animal or of the social g r o u p  *"365 prQ,%ing on 
his own experiments as well as others he points to;
A growing body of evidence from observation in the field and experiments in the laboratory, how­ever, points to the conclusion that this vital mode of beîmviour is not learned by the individual but is innate in the species, like the organs specially evolved for such cmbat in many animals* The ceremonial fighting routines that have developed in the course of evolution are hi#ily characteristic for each species; they are faithfully followed in fights between m^bers of the species and are almostnever violated*3«o
It seems likely, he continues, that in the human species: 
^^^Binnott, Matter, Mind and Man, p, 162; a bookwhich also indulges"'ffi"'Sther excesses, especially regard ing the presence in evolution of a bioloj^cal "will" which motivates the organism to develop forward*
3^^Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, "The Fighting Behaviour of Animals," Scientific American, December 1961, pp. 112-122
p. 112
^ Ibid., p. 112
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Aggressive behaviour evolved In the service of the same functions as it did in the case of the lower animals # Undoubtedly, it was useful and adaptive thousands of years ago, when men lived in small groups.367
In contemporary human society the problem now is that a 
formerly useful behaviour is in large part maladaptive.
But Eibl-Bibesfeldt also realizes that aggressiveness "is 
not the only motive governing the Interaction of members 
of the same species."
In gregarious animals there are equally Innate patterns of behaviour leading to mutual help and support, and one may assert that altruism is no less deeply rooted than aggressiveness. Man can be as basically good as he can be bad, but he is good pri­marily toward his family and friends. He has had to learn in the course of history that his family has grown, coming to encompass first his clan, then his tribe and his nation# Perhaps man will eventually be wise enough to learn that his family now includesall mankind.360
In Psychoanalysis and Politics, psychologist Money- 
Kyrle, who investigated the atrocities of Hazi Germany 
during World War II, observes that since we want to dis­
cover more about what determines aggression in group 
relations;
We should begin by allowing full weight to the instinctal legacy bequeathed us by the rigorous con­ditions that brought our species into being# Natural selection in a competitive environment favours the development of self-preservative instincts which are always egoistic and usually predatory as well# But we must remember that it does so only so far as these instincts favour the survival of offspring to inherit them#369
367Ibid., p# 122
p. 12a369 pp. 92-93
Evolution favoured those who by virtue of innate drives 
and cultural endowments were "best able to love their neigh­
bours as themselves and hate all strangers like the 
d e v i l .  "370 p3j.om his work in the psychology of the Nazi 
families who produced the keepers of the concentration 
camps, Money-Kyrle is fully aware of the family and cul­
tural settings which produce such monstrosities. But he 
continues regarding early mans
In producing such a character both biological and cultural selection must have played a part; but the fact that two thousand years of Christianity have altered it so little suggests that it is mainly a biological endowment * * • It is an intense ambiva- lence - a primary attitude of mind in which every object, and especially every human being, can simultaneously provoke the extremes of love and hatred#371
Agreeing with the accepted understanding of natural selec­
tion that the traits which produced the most offspring 
who survive will be favoured, he concludes :
A line deficient in egoistic instincts would soon be without parents to have offspring. But a line without altruistic instincts, to protect the family, would also perish for lack of mature children to con­tinue it! So we may distinguish two groups of In­stincts, or rather two groups of their derivatives since the same instinct may have derivatives in both; the egoistic which indirectly, and the altruistic which directly, favour the survival of offspring to inherit them *372
370Money-Byrle, Psychoanalysis and Politics, p* 93
37^ma.
372Ibid., p. 93
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We can then conclude that on the basis of this 
representative evidence drawn from various fields of 
scientific research, the potential assistance which an 
evolutionary study of aggression has for ethics is es­
sential to the completion of our task.
3# Bman Sexuality
In the current discussions of Christian Ethics, 
some of which will he cojaaidered later in this thesis, 
it seems reasonable to state that no issue is so con­
troversial as the ethical problems which surround sexual 
morality* Thus it may seem inadequate at first that our 
section here is so brief * We do return to the topic in 
later chapters when we discuss Barth and Barry, e#g#, on 
sexuality* It is mentioned now only because it so ob­
viously belongs in a presentation of evolution and be­
haviour* In the work of w* H* Thorpe, mentioned earlier,373 
and in Hitter's Charles Darwin and the Golden R u l e ; 374 
as well as in Darlington's Genetics and M a n , 375 
initial approaches to the topic are found* Montagu points 
out that the "fundamentally social nature of all living 
things has its origin in the reproductive relationship 
between parent and offspring* «376
In the nature of the reproductive process * * * we see, then, the basis for the development of social life, and the suggestion is timt social life repre­sents the response to organic drives, the expression
3*^%horpa, Science, Man and Morals, pp* 122 ff
^^ O^hapter 9
375„_„ Part II
^7%ontaigu, Plreotlon of Eamxk Developmentj p. 12
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of functions which are inextricably a part of the life of the organism. The universality of social life would seem to indicate as much.377
From that start we are introduced to a wide range of moral 
concerns which run from the problems of marital relation­
ships and homosexuality, etc., to the wider problems of 
population control and eugenics.
Finally, one specific study can serve our purpose 
to show the special importance of evolutionary information 
in the development of moral judgment on the subject of 
human sexuality. Dr. Richard M* Michael has written a 
useful article on "Bisexuality and Ethics," in which he 
discusses the evolutionary origin of bisexual behavioural 
patterns. Dr. Michael states that he is not attempting 
a direct analogy with the h\:iman situation, but such 
patterns are seen "with considerable frequency among 
the infra human-primates. "370 "if it is conceded that 
man, as a species, carries the weight of an evolutionary 
past on his shoulders" it is understandable that in one 
well-known study (Ford and Beach) "in only 20 of the ?6 
human societies studied were homosexual activities ab- 
sent."^^^ Bisexuality can be Influenced by non-rational 
factors.
378 Dr. E. P. Michael, "Bisexuality and Ethics," in Biology and Ethics, ed. F. J.' M)lin^n^rbc^d3ngs a Bym- pWium, HoyiT Society, London, Sept. 26-7,1969.(London; Academic Press, 1969), PP# 67-72
p. 69
mRecent experimental findings, aays Dr. Michael, 
show that chemical influences can also affect homosexual and 
bisexual behaviour. Ifith chemical injections, e.g., 
which are used to help prevent miscarriage or to treat 
a genetic malformation, "In both conditions the human 
foetus is exposed to excess androgen and external mas- 
oulinization results.
Evidence is thus available that in the human, as in infra-human primates and infra-primate mammals, the behavioural potential can be influenced by the chejaical composition of the environment of the embryo during critical periods in its development, All these experiments and observations have serious implications for o u approach to and understanding of, human sex­uality.
Behavioural comparisons reveal that bisexual be­
haviour occurs as a "normal biological variation in a 
wide range of mammalian forms including primates and
man*
Experimental evidence is now accumulating which points to the existence of bisexual potentialities, perhaps as distinct systems in the mammalian brain which can be influenced during critical periods in development in a male or jÇgtole direction, by chemical, hormonal means.
Üie ethical problem, in light of these possibilities, 
concludes Dr. Michael, "is not to account for it, but 
rather to account for its ferocious condemnation in al­
most all western cultures.
When we return later to this topic and discuss, 
e.g., Karl Barth's denunciation of homosexuality as "un­
natural for man," the avoidance of the type of study con­
ducted by Dr. Michael (and many others) is an inexcusable
Ibid., p. 71
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moral oversight* Whether our moral ooncluslons ooudemu 
or ooudone homoBexwal or bisexual practice* they must be 
based on the "natural" posaibllitiea and potential for 
man, if they are to be useful to the cause of contemporary 
Christian Ethics.
III. Transitional Chapter - Bridging the Gap
Ill, mwsiTXomii omPTER - m m w i m  the gap
We should mention here that our thesis involves 
"morals" as well as "ethics," Broadly speaking* we de­
fine ethics as the study of nature of man and his ethical 
life* and normally we would be referring to the kind of 
ideal goals and principles which men acknowledge as having 
some claim upon their life and thought, Ethics is con­
cerned with the theory of what the ethical life should 
be* a purely axlologlcal study, "Morals*" on the other 
hand* we use to refer to the kind of practical moral 
choices which men have to make day by day throughout 
their Ilf ess what kinds of decisions "ought" to be 
made in specific choices.
Sellers makes a similar distinction when he writes;
Morality is adapted to holding us to a given course of conduct* to going on with offering concrete guidelines . , , Ethics* on the other hand* is a more systematic and comprehensive study of human actions* their significance* and our changing situation. It is a careful* reflective effort at knowledge which asks the meaning of human conduct in its setting and measures our conduct by some fundamental criterion of excellence or of ultimate value,&
In "life Sciences and Ethics" we have dealt with
both. One can hardly speak about the historical origin 
of the nature of human sexuality* for example * without
1Sellers* Theological Ethics* p, 4
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investigating some of the situations in which particular 
men and women act sexually. Neither could one write about 
the evolutionary origin of the small family unit without 
also becoming interested in some of the concrete family 
situations which occur in our modern world. And surely 
the point of examining the origin of human aggression is 
to apply that information to the solutions of the moral 
problem of violence in our time* In the following sec­
tion* Christian Ethics and The Life Sciences* we will 
maintain inter-relatednesa between the two.
The writers we have chosen to use represent three 
different kinds of emphasis regarding ethics as well as 
moralss F, B# Tennant* e*g.* was almost entirely con­
cerned with the theoretical framework of ethics. Hi© 
investigations seldom led him to write on practical moral 
problems. Bishop F, B, Barry* on the other hand* has had 
a principal interest in the problems of practical Christian 
morality* Karl Barth*© "Special" and "General" ethics 
brings the two strains together.
In "The Life Science© and Ethics" we concluded that 
unless a scientist has a balanced view of the nature of 
man* including both his natural existence and his super­
natural significance* he would fall to offer a satisfactory 
ethical approach. We charged the evolutionary scientist 
with a special responsibility for maintaining a distinc­
tion between that subject matter of morality which Is 
verifiable by scientific investigation and that which is not.
Now as we turn to representatives of Ohristlan 
ethics in the next section* we will apply similar 
criteria* A balance is necessary for the Christian 
moralist as well. We will ask whether the theologian 
has understood the man who exists as a continuing part 
of the evolutionary process. We will judge the uses to 
which these men have put the findings of the life scien­
tist* both in their understanding of the nature of man 
and in the approach which they take to the moral problems 
which follow. We will be interested to see if these 
writers in ethics are alert to the special kind of 
ethical problems which arise out of this subject* There 
are some which have to do with personality itself* bas­
ically what man is and whether he is free to control 
himself in his environment.
One major point of this thesis is that there must 
be a relevant relationship between the facts and values 
that are involved in moral discourse. If either fact or 
value is denied* or relegated to a secondary position* a 
distortion will inevitably occur. In order to discuss 
the value* we have to have the facts at hand. In God and 
Reality* Professor Burk ill complained of the custom in 
axiologioal discussions where values are divorced from 
facts 2
♦ * « the world disclosed in common experience is eminently temporal^ it is historical through and through. The facts of which it is composed are lo­cated in a certain region of space and dated in a certain period of time.#
^Burkill*
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As we live* values are found among the facts of parti­
cular existential situations* "To think of a value 
apart from the concrete situation in which it arises is 
to entertain a conceptual abstraction*"*^ To our parti­
cular interest in evolution* Burkhill writes of the 
"certain continuity between man and the simple products 
of nature*"
The continuity is not merely temporal but also embraces striking relational and functional cor­respondences between natural organizations other­wise widely separated. Thus the distinctively human values* like truth* beauty* and goodness* have their animal anticipations in the biological world* The recognition of this fact does not* of course* derogate from the distinctive character of human values * * * Bman values are realized in history and have an historical ancestry#^
The facts of the origin of the attributes which we 
designate as having moral value are as interrelated with 
the values themselves as in the historical continuity 
itself# The facts of man*a needs as a social* ethical* 
and religious animal are integral parts of what has value 
in his good behaviour# As Peter Green wrote in the 
Problem
It would seem that a basis for ethics cannot resonably be sought otherwise than in the true na­ture of man. Right conduct for man must be that which is natural and suitable to such a being as man really and truly is,5
p. 103 
\-bld., p. 105
^Peter Green, The Problem of Right Coadnct (londons Longman'8, Green & Co., 1931), p. bb
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The point* repeated* is that in the matter of 
"morals* values derived outside of the facts of man and 
his situation cannot be suitably imposed. The descriptive 
knowledge of the ethos around us helps to define the man. 
The nature of the man who responds and the nature of the 
world in which the response is made* are open to investiga­
tion, Professor Sellers reminds us that "In the final 
analysis we are to visualize the input of wordly wisdom 
into the fund of Christian ethical insight not as an ad­
mixture of extraneous knowledge* but as a continuation of 
revelation itself*"^ Or as Dr, Long noted:
Two elements constitute the roots of the ethical enterprise. Ethics involves theory and practice* ends and means* standards and applications# It is not clear that a separation between these two aspects of the problem is as real in life as it can be made in theo­retical discourse. Men often reflect upon what they have done following their actions* or at least during their actions . , , Nevertheless* whether in sequence* in combination* or in seeming detachment from one another* the elements of standard-setting and decision implementing constitute twin foci of the ethical en- terprise,"7
* * * * * * *
We have proposed* too* an apologetic task for the 
Christian moralist. That task presupposes a familiarity 
with the information* but it also requires a tolerance and 
humility in accepting the inter-relatedness of the findings
6Sellers* Theological Ethics* p, 83
^Edward L, Long* A Survey of Ctoistian Ethics (New york: Oxford University TTSssT~l5G7yTlgTiO"
of other disciplines. It is a task that Principal J. B, 
Bahgood has defined successfully. He explains that;
, , . with this popular concern about ethical problems there seems to be a corresponding need to make theology relevant . ♦ . * One of the obviousways ofmdoing it would seem to be through Christian ethies.S
The moralist* after all* is the theologian who by the very 
nature of his subject matter is more directly involved in
the world than the other theological and Biblical disci­
plines* Dean Inge commented forty years ago that;
Our main difficulty is to get the fundamental principles of Christian Ethics accepted in a rather vulgar and materialistic society* and in the words of Dr* Jacks* "to recover the lost radiance of the Christian religion." Our subordinate* but still very important task is to apply these fundamental principles to the situation created by new knowl­edge and new conditions#-^
This thesis holds that our standards in Christian 
ethics have abiding validity* Our task is to see that 
validity in reference to the concurrent validity which 
is discovered in the world around us* "The ethiolst must 
constantly engage in reconnaissance of the ethos to deter­
mine if hi© theological stance is a genuine remedy for 
the huwn predicament.
Our method* then* is to begin positively with the Gospel* theologically understood as a promise of whole, ness to man* From there we move to the ethos* the conventional way of life* which is* according to the
8j. s. Habgood* "Ethics in the Church Today." The Church Quarterly Review; vol. 164* 1963* pp. 470-484/
oW. E. Inge* Christian Ethics and Modem Problems (London; Hoddar & 8toti@ht%TT38^
^^Sellers* Theological Ethics* p. 8l
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Gospel* ever In need of restoration to wholeness.At this point we attempt to "get the facts*" gain descriptive knowledge of the ethos with a view to concrete diagnosis^ of its form of frailty* its own rendering of sin.^^
"Host of us*" wrote Bahgood in the same article mentioned 
above* "are ill-equipped to deal with the ordinary claims 
of intelligent humanism* " and we have forfeited our moral 
leadership# To the challenges of our day* we respond with 
minds made up* determined not to yield one inch of Chris­
tian ground* and repeat the old authoritarianism anew#
A man like Brunner seems to take a delight in pre­senting the absolute demand of God as uncompromisingly as possible# His motive is so to stress the impos­sibility of the daaand* that man is fully revealed in all his sinfulness and helplessness* and ethics is superseded by the Gospel
It is in such an area that Bishop Ian Ramsey pro­
posed that the moralist should be involved in a mutual 
and exploratory task with and between Natural Law and 
Christian Ethics# In one way our study here can be seen 
as an adjunct of that proposal# Ramsey wrote;
, * , at least there is a possibility of moral principles having roots both in that moral obliga­tion and those key ideas which are called "Natural Law* " and in that Christian commitment and dis­course from which characteristic moral obligations and principles can be likewise derived.13
Bishop Ramsey wrote of the three possible approaches to
the relationship which Christian Ethics can have with
11Ibid#* p# 81
^%Iabgood* "Ethics in the Church Today" The Church Quarterly Review* vol. l64* I963* pp, 471-84. - —
13Ian Ramsey* Christian Ethics and Contemporary p. 393
204
natural law# No Christian would grant the firsts an 
absolute identity of the key ideas of natural law and 
Christian ethics# Some would argue* secondly* that they 
are entirely "other and conflicting*" But there is a 
third kind of relationship mentioned by Ramsey which is 
identical to the attitude of compatibility and inter­
communication which we propose in this thesis between 
life science and Ohristian ethics # He suggests that 
they should be "other and supplementary. "
The supplementation "is not going to be an easy 
matter#" Quoting H, L. A. Hart in The Ooncept of Law* 
Ramsey notes how Earths "minimum purpose of survival" 
can in part be aligned with the Christian principle 
which regards life as a gift of God and its preservation 
in the human* the touchstone of human worth and dignity. 
Difficulties arise in trying to accommodate the idea too 
completely* for the Christian idea of the doctrine of a 
future life raises the subject to an esohatological level 
and any parallel with "survival" as the minimum purpose 
of human ethical codes. Much additional study and inter­
communication is necessary* but
What is needed before any significant progress is made is (a) some elucidation of that basic obli-fation and associated key ideas which we would call atural Law; and (b) some formulation of "the most reliable Christian principles and the moral obli­gations they express #"14
Ibid., p. 393
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For now there Is;
a possibility of moral principles having roots both in that moral obligation and those key ideas which are called "natural law*" and in that Chris­tian commitment and discourse from which charac­teristic moral obligations and principles can be likewise derived,*5
Neither need be dissolved nor weakened* but a mutual effort
can work to the advantage of both* and in direct result to
the benefit of mankind at large# Ramsey closes the article:
It is plainly no easy matter to rehabilitateNatural Law or to supplement it reliably with Chris­tian principles. But to see what needs to be done and to be struggling to do it* meanwhile holding firm to positions we have already reached* seems to be no less positively wise and profitable for being the only possibility * Lb
If one substitutes "biological science" for Ramsey*a argu­
ment concerning "Natural Law*" there is a parallel to our 
purposes here,
The ultimate problem of this aspect of Christian 
ethics we take to be the relationship of how well the 
Christian moralist is able to perceive the interrelation­
ships in the formulation of his own approach to ethics* 
and then how ably he incorporates this information and 
mutual activity in his discourse on the moral choices con­
fronting modem man# Ohristian ethics must remain Ohris­
tian, It would otherwise be obvious that this is true* 
but in the methodology we have brought to this thesis* it
p. 393
p. 396
seems appropriate to emphasize it here* There is a 
distinctively Christian ethics* a particular attitude 
and approach to ethical subjects that is rooted in the
Christian faith*
The unique element in Christian character is a thing of the spirit# This does not mean it has a purely divine source as distinguished from natural morality* It is both divine and human in its meta­physical origin# But it has a distinct quality* a unique ethical flavor* ttot differentiates it from the non-Christian life **7
Barth is correct that we should not isolate ethics from 
its theological source* for that is the source out of 
which it lives* The proper ethic is related to the key 
ideas and the essential elements of the Christian faith* 
as well as to the ideas of the world in which it responds# 
What the essential elements are is a matter of 
controversy* But* in general* it means that Christian 
ethics will begin with some issues already settled# How­
ever apologetic it wishes to be In its task* however far 
it ranges in either the source or the application of its 
grounded ultimately in the God who acts with His people 
in Christ# It brings certain qualifications to any topic 
that has to do with that relationship and responsibility # 
It has a definite view of what Man is* hence Christian 
ethics must reject the reductionist view of man* where 
men would be reduced to the sum-total of his natural parts
1? Albert 0, Khudson* The Principles of Christian Ethics (NashvilleÎ Abingdon-Dokesbury* 1#^%# p. 162
*
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Han* s existence takes place in the Biblical context of 
the God-man relationship# From the start in Genesis* and 
through the Old and Hew Testaments* man is never seen as 
just man. It is the relationship which God seeks with 
him and which he in turn seeks with God, The Ohristian 
moralist cannot accept a natural morality.
We must seek to be taught as well as teach* to 
listen as well as to speak* We cannot isolate ourselves 
in the revelation which we receive about man* and the in­
sights which follow from the multi -revelation and in the 
descriptive knowledge received in the material facts of 
life and human nature# Neither Ohristian ethics* nor 
the church should make ethical demands on man which are 
counter to the "necessities" of his life# The catalogue 
of the sins of mankind throughout the moral history of 
Christianity has frequently violated that principle* in 
terms of sexual ethics* in terms of the passive behaviour 
we associate with good Christianity* and in terms of our 
categories of works righteousness we have required*
We seek an honest expression which is aligned with 
man* 8 origin and his destiny i an ethics which will pro­
vide a common ground where we can greet the behavioural 
scientist in humility and with gratitude for his assis­
tance; but where we also come in confidence* with the 
courage of our Christian faith* to offer our assistance 
in return#
DR. F.R. TENNANT
IV* GHRI8TIAN ETHIC8 AND THE LIFE 80im0E8
A* F* a* Tennant
1, Introduction and Objectives
Twentieth century British theology has* for the 
most part* maintained, a well-balanced approach to the 
study of the doctrine of man# Extremism in theology 
has been more a Continental or American diversion# There 
is no Karl Barth or Bultmann in Great Britain* but neither 
was there a Sohleiermacher or a HAmack# Usually we have 
found a succession of capable men whose steady enlarge­
ment of relevant and reverent theology holds the theo­
logical world-view and God-view in focus* Theologians 
such as John Oman* Tennant* Charles Gore* William Temple* 
John and Donald Baillie* H* E# Farmer* etc#* have con­
tributed greatly to a theological balance on the doctrine 
of man# Professor Alan Richardson recently reminded us 
in a different context* that these theologians "have 
not allowed us to grow up with childish and uncriticized 
assumptions about the "god-of-the-gaps* " the "need-ful- 
filler*" and the "problem-solver*
Richardson was writing specifically about the rich
1Alan Richardson* "The Death of God Theology*"
:* p. 16* January* 1968
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tradition of philosophical theology in Oman* Tennant* 
Temple* etc#* hut the same comment applies also to the 
nature of man* On the one hand* there has been the con­
tinued insistence that man is a created being* made in 
the image of God with special purposes and responsi­
bilities to that Creator* On the other* man is seen as 
part of the natural world where his humanity is compatible 
with his creation.
In this thesis we note the balance in the subject 
of the origin of human sin and nature of the ethical man. 
It has been a stormy century since the years just after 
the publication of Darwin's Origin* and excessive en­
thusiasm and extremist arguments have not been atypical 
of the passing decades. Yet Archbishop A. M. Ramsey 
could write recently that
On no subject more than that of Sin and the Fall did Anglican theology show through the years the ability to meet the shocks of criticism* to con­serve and reinterpret the essence of traditional belief* to be guided by the fundamental findings of Ohristian consciousness as well as by the data of science* and to avoid entanglement with passing and superficial syntheses*^
Even allovTing for the possible bias of an Anglican Arch­
bishop* the statement is accurate* It particularly 
applies to the early writings of Dr* F. E* Tennant on 
the doctrine of Original Sin and the Fall of Han,
Our objective in including Tennant in this thesis
Arthur Michael Ramsey* An Era in Anglican Theology i From Gora to Temple (New York;pTTBBTlSeHolBrWitlon* British Edition; From Gore to
l8 rooted in the relevance of hi# work to the Inter* 
rel&tiOBBhlp of acienee and theology,
(1) We will begin our dieoueeion of the writings of 
Dr# Tennant where he begin# hie own ethical enquiry «. in 
the common meeting ground of aoleatiflc study and Ohrietlan 
ethice# Our epeoial interest is in Tennant*e understanding 
of the evolutionary origin of man* and man's social growth 
as he develops hie ethical*moral life, Tennant held 
throughout hie wrltlnge that no theological ethioe could
be valid without the emplrioal data of evolutionary studies, 
He demands that we talte the scientist eerioualy when we 
discus# man and hie ethical limitatione andpoeeibilitiee*
(2) Secondly* we will etreee that Tennant freed 
the "natuAaL appetites* Inetincts* and impulses'* from 
any kind of negative moral judgment* and affirmed the 
natural humanity of man as being the lW,tlal source of all 
his moral behaviour* both that which we call good* and that 
which we call evil+
(5) Thirdly* it is important to understand the 
contribution which Tennant made at the beginning of this 
century* in the situaTiWal individuality of Christian 
moral judgments* One must 3mow the "Individual" natural 
endowment of individual persons before one can make objective 
ethical judgments on the* r behaviour at any stage of their 
moral development. The accusation has been made* as we
will note later on in this writing* that Tennant "atomizes
sin* and endangers the whole dootRiN8 of the universality 
of sin and the human predioament# Tennant is not final*
the strength of his argument has been reinforced in 
recent study»
Lastly^ and following from the firet three^ in 
addition to some other minor ccmaentary on his thought ^ 
we will note that Dr* Tennant provides a usable frame­
work in which mi open dlBouasion of human sinfulness 
in contemporary ethical situations can properly take 
place.
2; The Common Ground of Solenoe and Theology
Although Tennant continued to publish books up 
until the time of World War Il> when he wrote The Nature 
Of Belief in X94S> we will be dealing mainly with the 
books which were published in the first decade of this 
century* 3 These works are concerned more directly with 
what Tennant thought about man and his moral life* L, D, 
acudder has written a most useful volume which discusses 
some of Tennant's other works as "the best Intellectual 
defense of theism in our time"; in which he analyzed 
Tennant's two-volumed magnum opus, Ihilosophical The- 
ology*^^ and of lesser importance-* but highly relevant 
to Tennant's philosophical position^ Philosophy of the 
8ciences»5
Aside from Scudder;*^ and a few other references
which we will note» Tennant has been largely neglected
% *  E* Tennant (Cambridge: University Press) Origin and Propagation of Bin. 1902; The concept of 8in» l^ XÏÏT'W m  of^he #aDL aridgioal,"mn, ^4Tennant» philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Uni- varsity Press» vol* 1 » "The Soul and its Faculties," 1928, reprint 1956; vol* 2, "The World, the Soul, and God/ 1930, reprint 1956)
5Tennant, IMlosophy of the Sciences: Or the Rela- tions Between the"D#artmmts"15f^'']&6%e3ge^^lUS^ ersï%*''Klis'r’l^
^Lewis D* Soudder, Tennant's Philosophical New Haven: Yale University Tress, 1940
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In our day* It is an especially glaring oversight when
we realize how relevantly he Is connected to the plethora 
of books and articles and symposia which have appeared in 
these recent Post-Teilhardian years * There are a few 
casual references here and there in Norman Plttenger,^ 
as there are those few references already mentioned in 
A* M* Ramsey* There is a detailed discussion in Pro­
fessor N. H. G* Robinson's Faith and Duty which we will 
mention in other parts of this chapter# But in Thomas 
Langford's recent study of theology in England during 
1900 to 1920» e.g., Tennant's name is mentioned only 
once a ^ and that only as an incidental note regarding a 
brief comment which Tennant made about the work of John 
Oman*
In those early books, which were written prior
to the years when he was a Fellow of Trinity College, 
Cambridge, Dr* Tennant was attempting to re-state the 
Christian understanding of the nature and origin of man 
and his sin in light of the post-Darwinian evolutionary 
science. We will note some objections to Tennant's 
work, both in regard to his own misinterpretations of 
the evidence and in the limitations which were imposed 
by the information available in his time; but there is 
a positive acceptance to be noted at the start of our 
analysis.
^Pittenger, Christian Understanding * p* 104, p* 976 
8Thomas A. Langford, In Search of Foundations: English Theology*1900-1920 (Abingdon Press, 1969)  ^P* 175
We propose here that the attitude and approach 
which is followed by Tennant throughout hi© discourse on 
the subject of man and hi© sin, could serve as a working 
model for the way in which the student can approach his 
contemporary study of the nature of the ethical man# He 
sought a common meeting place with the science of his 
day. To go back to Philosophical Theology, which was 
reprinted in 1957» Tennant described the theory of his 
approach to any ^^trustworthy philosophy of human per­
sonality and human knowledge # "
There is but one way of inquiring into the na­ture of the self, whether as knower or as object known # . # It is to set out from the observable facts concerning mentality, as these are consti­tuted at the level of experience —  organization involved in the presumptive knowledge that we employ in the conduct of life; or rather, as they are analyzed and reduced to system in the science of psychology.^
After the data have been described fairly, and without 
preconceived notions regarding what the data can and can­
not include, Tennant said: . then, and only then,
can we reasonably proceed to consider what implications 
they contain, and what metaphysical interpretation they 
may suggest or require!!
Tennant likens the empirical data surrounding the nature 
of man in his existence, to the individual bricks with 
which the bricklayer builds a house* Bach item of
9Tennant, Philosophical Theology, vol. 1, p, l 
p. 3
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information is like a single brick, and although each 
brick can be "broken into fragments, ground to dust, or 
analyzed into chemical elements,"
We can now no more begin Inquiry otherwise than from fact-data, at the stage of elaboration and with degree of compositeness and turbidity with which, as experience units, they are actually received, than a bricklayer can start housebuilding with other units than bricks.
"The earliest, the simplest, the logically prior, the meta­
physically ultimate, may be goals: none of them can be
datum or a starting point*
To whatever definition and theory of knowledge in general; and to whatever doctrine of the self, we may be led, such theory must justify itself by its capacity to account for the prima facie facts being what they are#
. # *, , . There is no escape from what these prima facie facts dictate, translate them how we myT^Trith-m t  them, as foundation, all building is in the air*They are the sole external control
Tennant is consistent with that opiatemologieal approach
throughout his study of the nature of man and man's moral
imperfections* And, although we do not wish here to enter 
a tedious discussion concerning his phenomenology we do 
accept that the problem of sin and guilt, and the nature 
of the ethical man to which they are relevant, should be 
studied through the empirical data which is discovered 
in the historical study of evolutionary advance# In one
p# 1 
pp. 1-2
.» p. 4
of the Cambridge Theological Essays which was published in 
i, Tennant explained that:
. # # though it does not belong to physical science to dictate ready made ultimate and absolute truths to the theologian or the philosopher, or to presume that her methods can cover the whole ground of research, it is her part, her very important and inalienable privi-e— and
world*
Physical science itself mi^t not provide a cosmioal theory 
of the nature of man and God and the universe; yet when 
physical science is absorbed into the wider sphere of 
philosophy, and when its fundamental principles of knowl­
edge are accepted without denying the individuality of 
the science, then "A philosophical system, in interpréta- 
ins nature . * # must take into account the established 
facts of science, keep in touch with them, and abide by 
t h e m *  "^ 5 h q  claim is made for natural science above 
philosophy* Bather, in that Essay, Tennant carefully 
e:^lains the limitations which science has in the ulti­
mate questions of the origin and nature of the universe. 
But, he writes, "even if we allow, for the sake of argu­
ment, that the material world exists independently of 
our experience," physical science leads up to and assists 
in the answers of basic philosophical questions*
Tennant's own understanding of the biological
^^H* B* Swete, ed#. Essays on Some Theological Ques- tions of the Day (London: #i^c&llanr^^*^.
^%bid*, p. 74
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nature of the man was obviously limited in its dependence 
on the prevailing scholarship of those earlier years. 
Hendelian genetics, e.g., was only being rediscovered at 
the time Tennant delivered his Hulsean Lectures at 
Cambridge in 1900. He was also the debtor, though in 
some ways also a victim, of the post -Darwinian elevation 
of the evolutionary process as the panacea for most social, 
political, philosophical, and ethical problems. His 
psychological data were pre-Freudian then, for Freud had 
not yet published a major work, and Freud's important 
findings related to the origin of conscience and ethical 
ideals, incorporated into the studies of Professor 
Haddington and Julian Bucley, were not available at that 
time,
Tennant was directly Interested in the data that 
were germane to man and hie ethical reflection* He was 
not principally a moralist. It should be noted in pass­
ing, for example, that in all his investigations regarding 
the nature of natural man and his "appetites, " Tennant 
seldom applied his ethical thought to particular moral 
questions* He mentions only once, e.g., the subject of 
human sexuality, and ignores other important moral prob­
lems completely. Perhaps it was a Victorian reluctance 
to mention such controversial topics in public, or perhaps 
it was really that Tennant was so immersed in the examina­
tion of the theory of man and his "original sin and fall," 
that he never fully applied his study to the waiting moral
problem#* In either cage he euooeeded in bringing the 
Ineight# of the eolenoe of hie day into lile theologioal 
and ethical dieoueeion# of the eonoept of aln and morality.
Neutrality of the Natural life 
a* Original 8in
In the period we are considering - 1900 to 1912 ~ 
Tennaht was occupied mainly with the Doctrine of 8in, and 
more especially with the Fall and Original 8in, He argued 
extensively for the justification of his theodicy in The
Origin and Propagation of 8in#^^ "The basis of the view 
was the supposition that the complete theory of evolution 
applies toyman*" In that evolutionary origin, man in­
herits "all of the tendencies of the stock*" Such ten- 
dencies, however, are neutral and are not given moral 
value* In that way, Tennant held, the Creator is not 
charged with creating a man who is sinful at his origin. 
Neither is original man the perfect righteous being who 
is headed for destruction and sin as is the case in the 
interpretations of 8t. Faul and Augustine. At the start 
the attributes of man are:
• . * simply the conditions which render virtue and vice equally a possibility when will and con­science have been acquired*^7
^ _ # i l d  and 8in* Tennant dealt directly with 
Anglican and Presbyterian theology that taught the
*1 Tennant, Origin, pp. II6 ff,
17'ibid., p. IIT
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original sla of man. The former declares that "fault 
and corruption of the nature of man" inclines man to 
evil, "so that flesh lusteth always contrary to the 
spirit, and therefore, every person horn into the world, 
deserveth Ood*s wrath and damnation*" (Ninth Article)
The Westminster Confession goes further still: Adam
and Eve "became wholly defiled in all the faculties and 
parts of soul and body. They being the root of all man­
kind , * # the same # # # corrupted nature was conveyed 
to their posterity, descending from them by ordinary 
generation * * ♦ we are utterly indisposed, disabled, 
and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to 
all evil * , But, declares Tennant, since the doc­
trine of special creation has been abandoned "in light 
of modern scientific knowledge" the moral fall has been 
discredited*^®
The child *0 basic nature is neutral, Tennant con­
tinued* All Of his instincts are natural and necessary 
to life* The propensities of the infant will plunge him 
into an arduous and never-ending struggle when he re­
ceives his moral sense; but the natural attributes which 
have been associated with "the Ape and the Tiger" cannot 
be classified as things "which ought not to be# "^9 And,
l8Tennant, The _Ohild. and Religion (london; Williams and Horgate, 1 9 0 5 chapter 4, "The Child and Sin", p* 160
Ibld.j, p. 168
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unless we rob ethical terms of all significance, we cannot
20regard them as of the nature of sin#
As in both major books, Tennant notes in this
article, that "Our virtues and vices have common roots, 
and what shall grow from these roots depends on the action 
of the will alone. 80 "The ecclesiastical doctrine of 
original sin is to be repudiated entirely," and the argu­
ment should rest on the following three points:
(1) What we inherited from our ancestors cannot be classed as sin, but only non-moral ten­dencies ♦
(2) Sin is not due to a fall at all, but to the outcome of the nature of our development and social heredity#
(3) All of our "stock tendencies" are to be traced back to our non-human ancestry.
Prior to the first man, and certainly prior to our direct
lineage, there were present behavioural tendencies which
helped to form what now we call homo sapiens# This is
not to say that sin is simply an atavistic reminder of
what once we were; it is only to say that all of his
traits came along when man was formed;
Since we have come to believe in the animal origin of man^s physical nature, we are compelled to regard these appetites, with all their intensity, as a sur­vival whose presage is inevitable mid a part of the course of Nature.
According to Tennant, man begins morally neutral
20Ibid#, p. 170
p. 171
2?"Ibid., p. 167
222
and the "sin" with which he is later charged cannot be
said to be present at the time of man* a origin* The
question then arises as to when and where sin comes into
the experience of man# Tennant answered in general that
sin comes later within the lifetime of the species as
well as with each individual man* Moral codes place man
under a responsibility to obey, and each man elects to be
disobedient in the presence of an actual possibility to
obeys and thereby each individual is responsible for his
own sin* The objection is raised immediately that Tennant
thereby endangers the universality of man*s sinfulness,
and that an "atomic view of sin" results, instead of the
solidarity of the race. In answer Tennant appended an
extended footnote in the Origin and Propagation of Bin,
which argues for a modified version at least, of the
universality and solidarity of human sinfulness*
This inheritance, universally received by individual men, is sufficient to reconcile the universality of sinfulness with individual freedom of will; and it implies^that the human race is "one great organicwhole."23
The moral solidarity of the race, to Tennant, is not based 
on inborn sinfulness, or on some Original Bin of Adam that 
is transmitted to all future generations through some 
physical or spiritual inheritance* He refers to actual 
sin alone, "to environment and not to physical nature."
In fact, it becomes a universal* He attempts to avoid
23Tennant, Origin and Propagation of Bin, p. 223
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both the atomism of Pelagius and the Original Righteous­
ness and inherited guilt and sin of Augustine and the 
traditional doctrine# The natural inheritance is nau-
It is neither true that man is b o m  had, "with his whole essence shattered and unsound," in conse­quence of his organic connection with previous generations, nor, as Rousseau taught, that man is horn good and depraved by society# He is b o m  normal and neutral and, influenced more or less according to circumstances by society, makes him- self bad or good#&4
Even though it comes from a "natural” source the univer­
sality is not denied# In Concept of Sin, Tennant wrote 
that
The notion that human nature, as Cod made it, must have been originally characterised by unruffled haaSkmy' ' # one of those reverently but gratu­itously and misguidedly invented conceits with which theology has burdened itself and hampered with its progress in the past.
There is an alternative, Tennant believed, to both 
the Doctrine of the Fall and the solidarity involved there, 
and the atomistic conception of the race which is asso­
ciated with Falagius. It begins with the understanding 
of what man receives in his original state: the impulses,
instincts, etc* All men receive the same, "Universally 
received by individual men,” and that combination of 
inheritances which all men receive and through which all 
men will sin in time, "is sufficient to reconcile the
®\bid., p.
25Tennant, Concept of Sin^  p. 146
universality of sinfulness with individual freedom of 
the will." The argument is tedious hut important.
First, all men are one in their shared inheri­
tance; and second, moral solidarity is achieved in the 
"influence which the members of society have on one 
another#«26
Our free-will is conditioned not only by our common nature, but also by our nurture# The world is a moral order, and there is a sense in which "sin is in each the work of all and in all the work of each# " Though each of us has a unique individuality and inviolable responsibility, yet our being is not capable of being wholly sundered from that of our fellows,&7
"We are linked both to the process of nature and to the
chain of human sins and sorrows." . . , "this kind of
solidarity refers to actual sin alone, to environment 
and not to physical nature,"^® but it is still a uni­
versal trait of all men*
Tennant emphasiaes this "social nature of human 
life and the organic unity of the race" in his critique 
of Immanuel kant# Tennant finds kant*s views partly 
compatible with his own. Neither accepts the Doctrine 
of Original Bin, and both locate the origin of moral 
failure in the willful act of the individual. Neither
locates sin in the natural tendencies of mens
The ground of evil, he (Kiant) teaches, does not lie in any object or instinct; it is not to be re­garded as a natural characteristic of our species. We, and not our nature, are responsible for its
Tennant, Origin and Fropagation, p, 223 
7^'lbld., p. 824 
p. 224
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because we are conscious that it
To Kant, writes Tennant, "Evil is brought about when a 
man adopts the impulses of his sense-nature, rather than 
the dictates of his reason."®^ Later, Tennant observes 
that Kant has not emphasised the social nature of human 
life and there denies the organic unity of the race#
Kant, says Tennant, in the end, atomizes sin#
Kant of course abundantly recognizes the uni­versality of sin; but it is for him merely an empirical truth* an induction from observation, to which there is no reason to assert an excep­tion# His explanation of it is even more entirely individualistic than the ancient doctrine ofFelagius.Ji
"In all this Kant was the expression of the individualism 
of his day# Kant could not do justice to the social 
side of man and his integral unity with the race of man- 
kind* Tennant levels the identical criticism of the 
individuality or "atomization” of sin which has since 
been charged against Tennant himself by Williams, 
Robinson, and others*
In his Preface to the Second Edition of Origin 
and Propagation, written six years later, Tennant 
answers some earlier critics who charged that he en­
dangered the Doctrines of Grace and Atonemmit when he 
denied original sin,as in Augustine# Tennant responded:
^%T3ld., p. 50
30lMd*, p. 52
pp. 57-58 
p. 58
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With regard to the hearing of the evolutionary theory of sin on the Doctrines of Grace and Atone- ment, I can only repeat what I have said before; that these are not in the least endangered, because they have their sufficient basis in the fact of uni­versal actual sinfulness, and are independent of theories as to how sin takes its rise.^o
All men are in need of Christ's redemption because all 
men have sinned. "The fact of universal actual sinful­
ness" was believed throughout by Tennant# Bis argument 
was simply to deny that man was sinful in his evolu­
tionary origin# It was to make the origin of sin neutral 
and to assign moral value only to the actual, although 
universal, sinfulness of man#
Moral status, says Tennant, is acquired gradually, 
as the moral conscience and development of the Individual 
and the race occurs*
Moral sensibility emerges in the course of mental education, and the content of the ethical ideal is the later gift of social heredity, for which physical, heredity only supplies the empty and bare neoessity#-^^’
Tennant locates the origin, as well as the continuation
of sin, in "the individual infill as it is influenced by
its social environment.” Evil and moral imperfection
cannot be said to be the results of a transition from a man
originally good who fell into natural sin# "Good and
bad are alike the results of volitional reaction upon
what is ethically neutral*"®^ The individual discovers
33*^ Xbid», Preface, p# xii
34Ibid., p# 117
p. 118
that he la sinful; "He does not rightly find himself to 
have been sinful#"
The idea of a growing awareness of the origin of 
sin, and the emphasis on the social heredity Involved, 
is a combination of ideas that would be compatible with 
the kind of latter reasoning of scientific ethical 
thinkers such as Julian Huxley and Professor Waddington, 
both of whom emphasize the importance of the "cultural 
heredity" and the "sooio-genetio transmission" of charac­
ter traits in the formulation of "ethical" behaviour# 
According to his critics, Tennant missed the 
integral understanding of the objectivity Of sin in its 
universality# In spite of the careful reasoning behind 
his argument of a "universally experienced sin," some 
have objected that there is no theoretical or logical 
necessity that man would sin, or that sin exists indepen­
dently of the judgment which men make regarding it.
It was argued in Evolution and the Need of Atonement# 
that the inherent universality was a necessary item 
of doctrine before one could speak with meaning about 
the necessity of the reconciling work of Jesus Christ, 
in death as well as life# Bioknell wrote that Tennant 
made a false assumption when " # , , he (Tennant) 
treated sin primarily from the point of view of the 
moral philosopher, not the theologian. Sin is to him 
first and foremost moral evil."®^ Tennant, says Bioknell,
36' ,Stewart A. McDowall, Evolution and the Need for Atonement (Cambridges University *’'*—  ---- —
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does not understand the theological meaning of sin or 
Its necessity in the basic pattern of Christian theology* 
Bicîmell objects that Tennant sees sin as a kind of 
improper choice, or a wrong kind of decision# "Its re­
lation to God he treats as secondary. "37
Dr. Tennant has fallen into the error of Pelagias,an atomic view of humanity# St# Augustine, with all his exaggeration, held fast to a real truth* Sin stretches out farther than the individual will# The term cannot rightly be confined to actual sin* The individual is estranged from God by^Aomething wider than his own personal disobedience.
N* P* Williams joins Bioknell in his attack on the
theological support for Tennant's understanding of the 
origin of sin. But, unlike Bioknell, Williams concludes
that Tennant has made God the author of sin. He (Tennant) 
"does not logically exempt the Almighty from responsi­
bility for causing evil.”39
If man's nature is a "chaos not yet reduced to order, " and if the hypothesis of a "fall" of any kind can be ruled out, we can only suppose that man started his career as a "chaos" because God willed that he should so start * # # and earlier that the will of God immanent in organic evolu­tion has brought man into existence with a secret flaw in his soul which sooner or later betrays him into actual sin*'^ ^
The problem with Williams ' criticism is that he 
has overlooked the evolutionary origin of Tennant's man. 
The "flaw of chaos," referred to by Williams, does not
37
•j PP 36-37
P. WlUtams^ Iciea.8 of--the Fall ami Original Sin (tondons Longmans, Green & Co., 1927), P« 532
p. 532
acknowledge the neutrality of man's natural being in 
Tennant and the " social " creation of the universality of 
sin* Neither, of course, does it overcome the reverse 
objection that the first man Adam who in the Genesis was 
created pure and perfect by God, and then later fell from 
grace, was also created with a similar irreversible ability 
to choose the sin#
One main objection which Tennant had to the Doc­
trine of Original Bin is that the traditional doctrine 
was conceived before Darwin; but with evolution, "there 
has also emerged an alternative view of man's original 
condition*" What if he were flesh before he was spirit?^ 
What if he were "in what we call sin" before he supposedly 
"fell"? To Tennant, man was originally without laws to 
govern his moral action* He responded as an organism 
fulfilling his "natural" life, the life which presumably 
was willed for him by God at that time, When his moral 
consciousness was awakened, he became aware of good and 
evil# Tennant wrote;
The increased light which has been thrown upon the early history of manîdnd, not to speak of the continuity of the hiuaan species with those lower in the scale of animal life, compels us to enter­tain the conviction that what was once necessarily received as a genuine tradition is rather, trans­figured and spiritualized, the product of primitive speculation, on a matter beyond the reach of humanmemory*42
hpIbid., p. 865
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So, concludes Tennant, "The Doctrine of Original Sin, in­
sofar as it implies original guilt in the natural origin 
of man, stands self-.condemned#
If one accepts biological evolution as an explana­
tion for the way in which man arrived on the earth, then 
one must also accept the natural inclinations of man, 
which lead to what we call "sin" and "moral guilt," as a 
part of man's natural endowment# The origin of sin then, 
cannot be located in a fall from a state of human perfec­
tion where his natural endowments would have been sup­
pressed.
“îf *îf # •X' ^
A different kind of criticism is leveled against 
Tennant by Professor N, H. G. Robinson in his excellent 
and insightfidL treatment of the theological doctrine of 
sin in Faith and Duty, There are two related parts of 
Robinson's objection to Tennant which are relevant to 
our chapter. The second we discuss later,^  regarding 
Tennant's "atomic" view of sin, when we turn to the 
strength of Tennant in what we call "the individuality 
Of moral judgment." Robinson's prior criticism applies 
directly here.
In Faith and Duty, Professor Robinson is con­
cerned with the theological problem of sin, and more 
especially with the specific problmi of "holding together
p. 102
44 Cf. pages 263 ff# in this thesis
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the universality of sin and man's responsibility for it." 
Robinson's objection is that while Tennant saw the one 
side of the problem clearly (man's responsibility for his 
own sin), according to Robinson, Tennant ignored the 
otheri To Robinson, Tennant has tried to escape the dilemma 
by "surrendering the idea of strict universality" by Sub­
stituting for it an empirieal universality subject to all 
sorts of qualificationst" Writes Robinson;
%enever man's freedom not to sin is emphasized, as in Tennant's treatment of the subject, sin itself becomes an accidental and contingent feature of man's life, and then the affirmatim, that all men sin be­comes no more than a provisional and entirely em­pirical declaration# Its universality, in other words, is not a genuine universality and many theolo­gians feel that such a statuent fails to do justice to the grim reality of sin*
i" to Robinson, is a prior claim which theolo­
gians make independently from any natural setting or
empirical investigations so that even if Tennant had 
been successful in proving a universality of human sin 
and a moral solidarity of the race, the proof would still 
be inconclusive because the subject of human sin and man's 
need of redemption is not a proper matter for empirical 
evidence* To Robinson, Tennant endangers our moral soli­
darity —  the verified universality of sin and sinfulness -• 
because Tennant assumes that the strength (or lack of it) 
in the doctrine of "original sin" is subject to empirical 
evidence and not to a prior belief that all men have
H* G. Robinson, Faith and Duty (London; Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1950; New YorETlBJpiF'STBrothers, 1950), p* 127
simea. îo aoMnson, It is "by faith that we toow alll. ^men are sinful."
"The raison d'etre of the Incarnation and the
atonement cannot be a capricious, accidental and conti­
nent feature of man's life#^^ It is a genuinely Christian 
insight that all have sinned and fall short of the glory 
of God."^
Dr* Tennant's ea^lanation is a perfectly good ex­planation of the universality of sin, if that uni­versality is merely empirical; and th@T%ct that we feel that it is not a good explanation, that something essential has been sacrificed even by the general outline, is an indication that the ugv|^sality of sin is not just empirical after
The concern of Professor Robinson is not the 
specific concern of our thesis' topic. His objection 
to Tennarit raises other problems that must find solutions 
elsewhere. It is not an objection that would radically 
alter our approach to the contribution which Tennant 
makes to this thesis. The question under discussion is 
Tennant's rejection of the Doctrine of Original Bin* 
Tennant's main concern meanwhile is not the question of 
whether man is universally sinful or not —  although he 
is careful to deal with that problem. What he is arguing 
is that man's original defects, and his corresponding and
46Ibid., p. 130
■^^ Ibid., p. 131
^®Ibid,, p. 116
^%bid., p, 116
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universal sinfulness, cannot be associated with man's 
original nature. Man cannot be held accountable for 
his nature endowments, out of which the decisions of 
life are made, and some of which are judged "sinful.” 
Robinson notes correctly that;
Dr# Tennant finds serious difficulties covering the original state of innocence, the entry into this state of sin, and the radical dislocation of human nature wrought by this one sin =% finally the transmission of this acquired defect
and further that :
Sin is empirically universal, not because we have inherited a corrupt nature from our common ancestor, but because we are all confronted by the same uneasy task through our common descent
and finally, Tennant is quoted as holding that:
We must learn to talk not of man's fall, but of his slow and painful rise above the non-moral level of his animal ancestry* # # * Theology should speak in terms of the difficulties and dangers of man's rise instead of the miseries of his fall#
Professor Robinson has a bias .against the use of 
evolutionary theory in the problem of ethics# He writes 
of the importance of Tennant even though "with the pass­
ing of time it becomes increasingly difficult to suppose 
that the doctrine of evolution holds the clue to many 
of our most stubborn Intellectual problems."®^ The 
"passing of time" has indeed helped to eliminate the 
doctrine of evolutionary origin of man from being
p. 114
p. 112
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Offered as a panacea for all social, ethical and intel­
lectual problems, as we have already shown* But the 
passing of the years since the early part of this century 
has also shown the increasing importance of understanding 
man as an evolutionary being and of showing how critical 
the passage from non-human to human is in our discussions 
of man's ethical possibilities# At that point. Professor 
Robinson has dismissed man's natural progression as being 
irrelevant to the discussion» Tennant's problem is to 
justify his "empirioally universal" doctrine of sin»
But Professor Robinson's problem is how to include man's 
existence and the origin of his moral and ethical capa­
bilities#
But, to return to our argument regarding the moral 
solidarity of the race, X am indebted to Professor Robinson 
for his clarification of the changing emphasis regarding 
the inevitability of universal sinfulness between The 
Origin and Propagation (first edition 1902) and The Con­
cept^  of Bin (1912)* Robinson notes that;
Dr» Tennant has indeed described sin as "em­pirically inevitable" but in his later work he withdraws that misleading and perhaps self-con­tradictory expression and says instead, concern­ing sin, that it is stupendously difficult wholly to avoid it throughout a lifetime #53
Both Robinson and Tennant agree that each man is 
and must be accountable for individual responsibility in 
committing sins# The point of difference is in how we
p. 115
can judge that all men are sinful (or every man is 
sinful) and in need of redemption*
A further point should be made completing this 
aspect of Robinson's objection to Tennant* While 
Robinson has read Tennant correctly and has evaluated 
him fairly, we must emphasize that Tennant is not argu­
ing for a "sinless man." Tennant allows throughout for 
two different kinds of judgment regarding man's sinful­
ness* There is a "theological" judgment that all have 
sinned* The moral law to a theologian, as opposed to 
a moralist, is an ideal given by God*
Tennant writes that "The sinner's responsibility, 
again, is derived from God, and it is to God his judge 
that he holds himself accountable. Tennant dis­
tinguished between sins as morale and sin as a theo­
logical concept. His work is primarily ethical and for 
"ethical Bin" to be present, man must be a properly 
knowledgeable moral agent (or at the least be poten­
tially knowledgeable). Theological judgments on sin 
could be something else entirely# With all that said, 
each man in Tennant still falls short of the Biblical 
admonition to be perfect and fails against the highest 
ideals which we see in the life of Jesus Christ and his 
perfect obedience.
More specifically, one point of Robinson's objec­
tion has to do with Tennant's theoretical possibility
54Tennant, Concept of Bin, p* 20
that any given man, might on a thorough empirical 
examination, he judged to be without sin. From our 
point of view, one could wish that Tennant had been more 
specific and more careful* But our wish has nothing to 
do with what Tennant actually wrote. In Note 0, at­
tached to The Concept of Bin, he does partially vindi­
cate himself and eliminates some of the objection. He 
does write, as Robinson noted, only of "the stupendous 
difficulty of a sinless human life,"®^ and never actually 
reiterates the "empirical impossibility of avoiding sin" 
of the earlier book* later he affirms the theoretical 
possibility that since each life has not been examined 
in detail, "we can never be sure that in favorable cir­
cumstances, there have not been cases in which a shorter 
or longer life has wholly escaped being marred by sin. "5® 
Admittedly, Tennant does not enlarge upon the 
Issue, but the logical progression of his thought would 
indicate that however we decide that man is universally 
in need of redemption —  whether we know it by faith 
or by empirical evidence, in Eden or in the development 
of human moral codes, all men are equally in need of 
God's forgiveness and of Christ's redemption* Tennant 
never does in fact eliminate, except for the theoretical 
possibility of elimination, any active Individual from 
the onus of individual and universal need. However,
55, l.j p. 263
p. 268
each man hecomaa aware of hie sinfulness, all who are
aware know that all men have aimed and fall short of 
the glory of God.
In his detailed summary at the end of Note 0, 
he shows his purpose specifically when he writes that 
we can still hold that every other member of the human 
race has sinned.
To sum up; the doctrine of the universality of sin must he deprived of its borrowed semblance of absoluteness, must sharply be distinguished from the assertion of universal imperfection, and must be dissociated from exaggerated notions concerning sinfulness in its lower degrees, for the rest, the generality of sinfulness finds its sufficient ex­planation in the monû. psychology and solidarity of the race in respect of conative propensities* Self-knowledge is adequate to enable us to under­stand the sinfulness of every other member of the human family*57
In context Tennant is concerned with the subject 
of ethical condemnation in original man# One point he 
is presenting is that non-moral agents (for example, 
the original men, infants who die, etc. ) have committed 
sins simply by virtue of being alive* More than a belief 
in man's original sin is required to deal with sin and 
moral evil*
Unless ethics partakes of the abstractness of all deductive or pure sciences, it must concern it­self with and apply its norms to, data provided from the field of the actual# It must take human nature as it finds it. Before it can discuss the ideal life forces in men it must raise the previous question; What is man's nature and mental constitution?5o
%bid., p, 272
58^ Ibid., p* 125
and to sum up:
A concept of sin such as shall be of universal application must be framed in the light of the in­disputable facts that man is conscious before he is self-conscious, impulsively appetitive before he is volitional and volitional before he is moral.55
p. 155
b. The Propagation of Sin
The second item in the traditional doctrine of 
original sin which comes under Tennant's scrutiny is the 
propagation of sin from one generation to the next, ad 
infinitum. Beyond the origin of sin itself, Tennant 
argues further against "sin" being transmitted from one 
generation to the next in the biological heredity of the 
human race. He used a biological argument from genetics 
to support the argument that there can be no "spiritual" 
transmission from parent to offspring » a transmission 
which Tennant felt was essential to the traditional 
Christian doctrine. He did not deny that mental and/or 
dispositions towards certain character traits were passed 
from one generation to the next, for Galton and Hibot had 
already taught him that "talents, tastes, strength or 
weakness of emotions and passions"®^ were transmittable. 
Tennant insisted that these transmissions "take place 
only in the form of modified physical structure * . , 
mediated solely through the body.Professor Ladd in 
Biilosophy of Hind made the same point.
No previous mental activity, or conscious state, can really be connected with the following activities and states as their progenitor, so as to explain
p. 35
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genesis of the latter.®^
Tennant's evidence Is an adaptation of the old 
controversy over the inheritance of acquired charac­
teristics, which we noted in Lamarck, who taught that 
characteristics acquired during the lifetime of an indi­
vidual could he transmitted to the individual's off- 
spring.®® In the years just preceding the writing of 
The Origin and Propagation of Sin, Spender®^ and Haeckel 
and others had adopted the Lamarckian view to support a 
preferential social philosophy which favoured the estab­
lished power* The evidence at that time was not con­
clusive but Tennant sided with the opponents of Lamarck, 
and thus is in line with what we now know to be true*
He was cautious to point out that;
* * . the a priori proposition that acquired charac- ters cannoi*"be" iinherited is not^wholly justified in the present state of knowledge
But he goes on in the same paragraph to imply that be­
cause of "the ever-increasing skepticisms,” it one day 
would be justified.
♦ * * It is almost impossible to conceive the nature of a mechanism whereby a specific effect produced upon any organism could so modify its reproductive organs as to cause a corresponding modification inthe offspring.
62Ibid., pp. 32-33, quoted by Tennant63^Ibid., p. 37
Of. Spencer, p,l(8%f this thesis
^^Tennant, Concept of Sin, p. 3766"^Ibid., p. 37
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In The Fall and Original Sin, Tennant suggested
that to understand the meaning of Genesis III, we have
to begin in Genesis itself, and not in later Biblical
elaborations or interpretations ;
In the narrative, there is no hint that Adam's moral condition was fundamentally altered by disobedience. . . . Punishment is physical, not eternal. The idea that his sin is passed to all succeeding generations does not appear in the narrative.
It is to be concluded then, from exegetical grounds alone, that the lust contained in Genesis III was
This issue of the inheritance of sin was so impor­
tant to Tennant that in his appended Note D, he summarized 
the topic of the inheritance of acquired characteristic 
as it then stood:
"(1) A change in conditions cannot affect the next 
generation unless the reproductive organs are affected;
(2) from a consideration of the facts of the case it is 
almost inconceivable that the effect produced upon any 
organ of a given organism by a clmnge of conditions 
should so modify the reproductive organs of that organism 
as to lead to a corresponding modification in the off­
spring without the latter being exposed to the same con­
ditions; (3) the only effects which are certainly known 
of changed conditions upon the reproductive organs are 
the production of sterility and an increase in genetic 
variability* That was a competent summary in light
67Tennant, Fall and Original Sin, p. 11 
®^Tennant, Origin and Propagation of Bin, note D,pp* 176-180-------- --------- -------------
of what could have been known at the turn of the cen­
tury.
It was important to Tennant but not because it 
helped to solve a problem of biological evolution* It 
was the theological by-product which prompted him to 
enter the argument* To Tennant, as to others, the 
Ohristian doctrine of the fall and original sin depended 
on that sin and guilt being passed from Adam to each 
succeeding generation# He thought that if he could prove 
scientifically that "sin" could not be transmitted genet­
ically from one generation to another, he would have 
removed another support for the doctrine of original 
sin itself# It was Tennant's way of holding the indi­
vidual's responsibility for his own sin# Tennant thought 
that if sin cannot be transmitted genetically from parent 
to child, then original sin is not a tenable doctrine, 
either scientifically or theologically, and each indi­
vidual will remain responsible for his own sin#
In Evolution and the Need of Atonement, Professor 
Bicknell noted his difference with Tennant regarding 
original sin and inheritance of "acquired characteristics*” 
Bioknell said that while the majority of theologians 
have taught that each man inherits from his parents sinful 
tendencies, and that each man receives a nature that is 
basically disordered, Tennant has argued that this is 
"scientifically isq>ossible#" mcknell challenged Tennant:
Dr# Tennant states this with great confidence but his position is by no means so secure as his book suggests# An important school of biologists holds
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that satisfactory evidence has not been produced of the inheritance of acquired characteristics* The whole subject is very complicated and still under discussion*59
That "important school of biology,” as we have 
shown earlier,70 has not produced "satisfactory evidence" 
that acquired characteristics can be inherited* Quite 
the contrary* Bicknall, not Tennant, is incorrect#
^%cDowali, Evolution and Need for Atonement, p* 4o 
70 See pages circa 62
o. The Origin of Sin
To move back to the development of Tennant ' a 
thought^ he has argued In the first instance that man 
in his natural state cannot be considered sinful on the 
basis of his natural endowments. Neither can we hold to 
a transmission of Adames sin genetically to all future 
generations. Tennant then goes on to establish his own 
thought on the origin of sin itself from an evolutionary 
viewpoint. Tennant argued that if we accept that man 
arrived on earth as the culmination of a long process 
of natural evolutional then we must accept that more than 
his physical nature has evolved# We must look to the 
extra-physical attributes which arise in the pre-human 
evolution, with a view toward determining how they af­
fect man qua man. If one rejects the fall and original 
sin, what can be substituted for a theory of the origin 
and propagation of sin?
Tennant begins his answer with an acceptance of
the natural instincts and impulses of man as part of the
procedure by which man became man*
The instincts belong to man as God made him, and are to be controlled in proportion as the moral law be­comes the more exacting because the more elaborately developed and the more expressly associated with re­ligion embracing the whole of life#71
^^Tennant, Origin and Propagation of Sins p. 93
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Natural Instincts and Impulses are waiting to be moralised 
by the arising moral consciousness which comes after them. 
They may become good or evil. The conflict and the re­
sulting moral disorder come in the process of human develop* 
ment# As Galton wrote:
We, men of the present centuries, are like animals suddenly transplanted among new conditions of climate and food; our instincts fall us under the altered cir­cumstances*»^
Our nature and nurture are necessarily at cross -purposes, 
and sin arises, not of necessity alone, but “from their 
necessary conflict." "Evil is not the result of a transi­
tion from the good, but good and bad are alike voluntary 
developments from what is ethically neutral. g^n, or 
the original sin, from this point of view, does not con­
sist in any particular deed which man has never performed 
before, but is a result of the moralising influence of the 
social environment, even a "sanction of rank as low as that 
of a tribal custom." It begins at the first point when 
man - or men - declared that a morally neutral act was 
wrong. In his analysis of the ethical teaching of Jesus, 
Tennant concludes that:
So much, then, may be gathered from the Gospels as to our lord% conception of sin; and it would seem enough to enable us to infer that for him, "sin" only included, and only could include, activities contrary to the known law or will of God, for which the agent
^^Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius (London: Nacmillan & Co., 1869), p7^345T^9uotedr&nrbrigin and Propa- - Gin by Tennant, p. 112
^^Tennant, Origin and Propagaion of Bin, p. 115
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is, in the sight, of God, in some degree responsible or accountable # 74
His moral life begins in the consciousness that some 
things are "right" and some "wrong*" From that point 
forward his moral life begins and he is, of necessity. 
Involved in a lasting series of struggles as his natural 
propensities have to be measured and evaluated in ac­
cordance with the requirements of an ideal or a moral 
law,?5 which he discovers as his vision increases*
Instead of resorting to a hypothetical previous existence or extra-toBiporal self-decision ♦ * * can we assign the rise of evil itself simply to the difficulty of the task which has to be en­countered by every individual person alike, the task of enforcing his inherited organic nature to obey a moral law which he has only gradually been able to discern?"'»
Tennant * s answer is in the affirmative* "Social hered-
ity"^ is the phrase Tennant uses to describe origin of
sin* Moral guilt cornea in the expanding process of
evolution Itself; in what Teilhard de Chardin later
called the realm of "nobsphere*"
It is with difficulty that our natural, non- moral tendencies are moralised or brought under the dominion of the higher nature; and every failure in the attempt, or every congcious de- siatance from the struggle, is sin*?»
^^Tennant, Concept of Sin, pp. 28-29 
^^Tennant, Origin and Propagation of Sin, p* 99 
f^Ibid*, p* 81
^^The idea of "social heredity" is also developed in the article "The cmild and Bin," in The Child and Re- I, ed# Thomas Stephens.
^^Tennant, Origin and Propagation of Bin, p# 84
i
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To elaborate, Tennant defined the source of sin in the
preface to the second edition of Origin and Propagation;?^
First: Man inherits the natural and essential in­stincts and impulses of his animal ancestors. These are necessarily non-moral, and there is no reason to ascribe to them any kind of abnormality.
Second: Voluntary action in man appears before anyconsciousness of ri^t or wrong. There has been a period therefore in the history of both race and in­dividual in which even volitional conflict has been innocent, however far such conduct differs from that later prescribed by moral actions and the conscience*
(So far, sin has not emerged at all)
Thirds A period is reached during which moral senti­ment is gradually evoked and moral sanctions are gradually constructed. Acts once Imowing no law now begin to be regarded as wrong. The performance of them henceforth constitutes sin*
Fourth? The earliest sanctions known to the race were but crudely ethical, and their crudity was but gradually exchanged for the refinement characteristic of highly developed morality.
Fifth: Christianity has erected an absolute ethicalstandard and any falling short of that standard in any human being at any stage of his existence or development is therefore asserted to be necessarily sinful*
These ideas are more fully developed in 
Sin, published ten years later* The book itself has a 
three-part purpose which Tennant explains as the neces­
sary elements in the concept of sin:®^
(1) the fundamental element in a concept of sin is derived from Christian theology "in light of revealed truth concerning God's attitude to human sinfulness."
79^^Ibid*, xxii, ff.
^^Tennant, Concept of Bin, p* l4
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(2) We can proceed farther to enlarge and define its connotation by incorporating elements such as ethical science finds compatible*
(3) Finally, inasmuch as ethical judgment on the mental activities of a moral subject sometimes presupposes an accurate psychological knowledge and analysis of the conscious processes result­ing in these activities, we must also add the soiree of psychology to the number of those which control our freedom to fashion or re­fashion our conception of sin*
It is the last which is the special concern of this 
thesis and where Tennant becomes useful to it* We would 
not deny that in Christian ethics the light of revealed 
truth concerning God's attitude to human sinfulness is of 
first importance# Nor should we wish to pass over or 
treat lightly the contributions of ethical science, as 
Barth and others have tried to do# But these belong to 
another area of study* It is the "science of psychology" 
which was the principal interest of Dr* Tennant and which 
is the interest of this thesis*
By the "science of psychology" Tennant meant the 
whole study of the character, personality, and behaviour 
of man* Tennant proposed that this science belongs at 
the very center of our Christian ethical discussions*
In a chapter entitled "The Conflict of Impulse and Reason" 
Tennant notes that ethics must also presuppose a knowledge 
of the empirical facts* An ethics which is based either 
in the revealed word of God, or in man's reason is mis­
taken unless it is also grounded in the facts of existence. 
"Knowledge of what ought to be, when we come to the de­
tails of actual conduct, must very largely be derived
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from» or toased upon, knowledge of what For
ethics mist take human nature as it finds it, as it
actually is, not as a moralist postulates that it ought
to he* Tennant believed that before we can discuss the
ideal life we mist raise the previous question: "What
is man's nature and mental constitution?"^^ Unless ethics
is to consist of mere barren tautologies, it must be
based not alone on some general principles of metaphysics,
but also "upon the study of human nature in its concrete
empirical entirety, as it reveals itself to students of
psychology, sociology and anthropology. Psychological
facts and metaphysical principles are not alternatives
for the study of ethics* Both are essential* Theology
depends on both to complete its ethical approach* "Our
purpose," writes Tennant,
is to determine what elements are essential to a logically perfect concept of actual sin such as shall be based on the knowledge of human nature that is available to us at the present day, and shall at the same time satisfy the requirmentso,, of distinctively Christian theology and ethios**^
81*^Ibid,, p* 125
®^Ibld,» p. 125
%bld,» p. 126
p. 89
d. The Origin of the Moral Life
The origin of morality is a social creation# It 
can only begin to be a possibility when man becomes a 
social being and when evolution has moved into its psycho­
social phase* Man arose %d.th those same propensities 
"inherited from an animal ancestry, which are at once 
necessary and normal"; and upon the animal nature is 
superimposed the endowment which constitutes “the 'divine 
image* in man, namely volition and moral r e a s o n . T h e  
instincts and appetites were developed in the long pro­
cess of animal evolution to suit the animal whose be­
haviour la “largely automatic," said Tennant. They were 
not developed “with the ulterior end of making moral life 
easy for a posterity which was to be additionally endowed 
with will, reason, and conscience*" As we have noted;
The notion that human nature, as God made it, must have been originally characterized by unruffled har&% * * * is one of those reverently but gratui­tously and misguidedly invented conceits with which theology has burdened itself and hampered its pro­gress in the past,»»
The moral life represents a continuing process of
socialization and in consequence of the fact that "man
is the kind of being he is, it consists largely in the
inhibition of impulsive tendencies which are natural.
■^ Ibid., pp. 146-47p. 146
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normal and i n e v i t a b l e , ïhe conflict between impulse 
and reason, between desire and conscience, "is a condi­
tion requisite for the very possibility of human mo­
rality.
There ia some ambiguity in what Tennant seems to 
mean by "sins" which the individual actually commits* 
Bin, itself, arises in the process after human reason 
and moral awareness become part of the mental and emo­
tional equipment of man# That is clear# But Tennant 
is not concerned with practical morality and does not 
elaborate on acts which we call sinful# He does not 
use the normal categories, and ignores reference, e.g., 
to all those which have to do with sexual morality, save 
a few oblique references to "passion" or "natural ap­
petites" scattered throughout the text.
The ambiguity arises when we examine more closely 
the description he gives to the origin of the moral 
struggle in each individual as well as in the race. At 
one point, he posits "man's original brutishness," which 
must be matched against the more traditional view of the 
"unsullied goodness" of man#
Morality consists in the formation of the non- moral material of nature into character in subject­ing "the seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and desire" to the moulding influence of reflective purpose.
®®lbld., p. l46
G^ibld., p. 109
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The moral life, he says, will largely he the "inhibition 
of impulsive tendencies which are natural, normal and 
inevitable."
Me can credit Tennant with neutralizing the moral 
qualities of the impulses. But, when it seems to follow 
that morality is the cheek on this "brutishness of na­
ture"; and that our "lowly appetites" must be curbed, 
and when our "nature and our nuture are at cross-pur­
poses with each other," and when the "seething, tumult­
uous life of natural tendencies, appetites and passions" 
must be overcome; we note that Dr. Tennant allows for 
the belief that the "natural man" and his "natural 
desires" could actually be immoral. Again, in his 
article on "The Child and Sin," Tennant uses similar 
terminology I
Into the "seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and de­sire," is introduced the new-born moral purpose, which must struggle to win the ascendency* And this fact alone would seem to supply a sufficient explana­tion of the universality of human sinfulness.90
It is one thing to say that man and his impulses are
neutral. It is quite another to enumerate the graphic
kinds of beastliness which must be conquered* He does
admit that these same tendencies also make for what we
call goodness, yet many cited references are to what
must be subdued*
qoTennant, Ctilld and Religion, chapter 4, "The Child and Sin", ™  ----- —
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The alternative Is not of course to declare that 
natural appetites are entirely good In themselves* That 
he never does. But it might he to say specifically that 
our natural impulses and appetites - things such as 
human sexuality, aggression, altruism, tribal and family 
ties - are wholesome and are the source Of the beauty 
and goodness we find in life; and that their proper 
exercise, not their elimination, is the key to under­
standing human morality,
Tennant mentions the subject of sex specially 
only in "The Child and Sin, " where he wtltes; "The ap­
petite of sex, which is developed in early childhood, 
is not necessary, like those of hunger and thirst, to 
the life of the individual; but it is essential to the 
life of the s pe c i e s , T h e  statement itself is quite clear. 
But, it is really not clear just what Tennant intends 
in this reference# He could mean that the expression of 
sex is not part of the natural make-up of the individual, 
but only a procreative aspect of the species. But that 
would contradict his understanding of the impulsive na­
ture of human existence. The Victorian ethos is no 
doubt the source of the trouble. To pretend that there 
is something so critical to the whole personality as sex 
which could be removed from the discussions of sin, its 
origin, the nature of man, basic instincts, is a mislead­
ing "sign of his time,"
pp. 65-66
e. The "Will" as a Moral Agent
Tennant tied, his discussion of the origin of the 
moral life directly to his understanding of the "Will." 
It is not the natural attributes or the psychological 
possibilities which bring moral value, but the use 
which is made of them by the Will.
Ethics, in the strict sense, has no concern with the • talentsX'^ 'tEelF naïure b Æ  amount, cmmitted to an individual, nor with the total to which they con­tribute; its evaluation is applicable only to the volitional use made of them,92
It would not matter how the act itself appeared to one 
outside of the decision which prompted it, A person 
who is endowed with the natural disposition and an 
agreeable personality, which might be supportive of an 
acceptable moral life, should not be judged good on the 
basis of what he does, or because of any intrinsic good­
ness in the act itself. It would be evaluated only on 
the basis of what the person had freely willed himself. 
For, says Tennants
these propensities are neutral in respect of the moral value of what the will may shape out of them; or rather in their prophetic aspect, they are 'double meaning prophesies.* % e y  may be turned to good or to bad account; and to which they be turned depends solely upon the will. As organic fear is the basis both of cowardice and courage.
p. 71
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so is hunger the basis of both gluttony and one form of temperance#
"The will beoomea the only ultimate and real 'spring, ' 
or creative source of moral conduct*"93 wo theory of 
moral evil can trace the origin of Bin or Evil other 
than to the will of man to choose consciously that 
which he recognizes, or has the power to recognize, as 
moral imperfection#
The will, to Tennant, was that aspect of a human 
personality wherein the human was truly human# It is 
the place (or the time) when the person becomes the 
conscious mediator and controller of his "unconscious." 
*ïn its complete manifestation, it involves intention, 
activity or energizing, and, according to the view 
adopted here, freedom. %  Tennaot It actually means 
something like the ability to choose behaviour - a know­
ing and responsible action on the part of a knowing and 
responsible person* It is Tennant's way of defending 
the dignity and individuality of mankind against the 
opinion that man is only a part of the natural process, 
and “nothlng-but" an animal whose activity follows 
predicably from one need to the next; where good and 
evil are simply judgments made by an observer on the 
effects which a particular act has on the society in­
volved - in a particular time, and in a particular
p .  1 6 4
^^bia», p. l6l
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place# And, quoting Dr. Gore In Dux Mndl: "It is
characteristic . # . of the non-Ohristian view that it 
makes the body, the material, the seat of sin* It is 
essential to the Christian view to find its seat and 
only source in the Will.
The will itself is free from the many biases 
which affect the natural man - or more exactly, as 
Tennant described it - the Will is by definition, that 
aspect of humanity which is free from and in control of, 
the natural man* "The only bias the Will can have is 
that which it makes for itself, or for the personality 
to which it belongs, by its own activity*
With that we can agree. But there is a weakness 
in his use of the concept of the will* To preserve an 
extra-natural aspect of human behaviour, and in reliance 
on "The Will" to be that aspect, Tennant adopted the 
belief that the will, or some other which perf orms the 
same or similar functions, is an entirely independent 
"faculty" of man* "The will makes its own bias, " he 
wrote* In Tmnant, the will sems to have an existence 
other than in the life and body of the individual* Al­
though he does write that the will is not a separate 
entity, and that it is but "one aspect of the spontaneous 
or inherent activity of the conscious subject, he also
Ibid*, p* 205
p, 142
97 Ibia., circa p. l42
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writes about it as if it ware separate and autonomoua* 
What Tennant seems to miss is the unconscious 
and non-mtional origin of the will itself. As a child 
develops his individiml "will, or cwseienoe or super- 
ego," in actual fact he is having it 'developed for him" 
fey the various moral pressures of his immediate family 
and surrounding society. So the child to which Dr. 
Tennant was addressing his speculative thought, is one 
in which the "obedience required" and the "imitation of 
others, " developed a moral ideal where the natural im­
pulses were to be controlled and the brutishness of 
nature is subjected to and controlled by reason and 
the idea of fair play* In other settings, actual as 
well as hypothetical, the "will developed" could, and 
does, have quite different moral sensibilities* Or, 
in other words, if the will arises also within the 
process of nature and its growth is dependent upon 
the pressures it receives, it can hardly be thought 
independent and consequently be the judge and moral 
evaluator of the process itself.
John MacQuarrie has recently written of the pro­
blem involved in the use of "Will" and his ocmment can 
be applied to the meaning which Tennant intended: "It
savours too much of the old faculty psychology, as if 
the will were some definite organ or department of the 
mind or personality# "
Consequently, it is in little use today among
either psychologists and moralists *98
Xn the end Tennant becomes guilty of the same 
kind of criticism which he directed toward those who 
had refused to he realistic regarding the evolutionary 
origin of man* For those who had tried to separate 
those parts of man which they demaed holy, from those 
which were "physical" and which could safely be sur­
rendered to nature* Tennant's will is something which 
man receives independently from his natural endowments; 
as if his mind (or will) were deposited directly into 
his person, and unrelated to, and non-communicating 
with, the rest of his development* The careful point 
he had made previously that the evolutionary develop­
ment of man implies a natural origin of body and be­
haviour, is partly ignored when he comes to Will as 
the decision-making aspect of man, and the arbiter of 
moral choice*
* * * the id.ll has to withstand the clamorous soli­citation of sense and impulse for satisfaction * * * and it has also to contend with already^formed habits and to endeavor forcibly to break them# 99
Although Tennant protests that it is not, his "Will"
occasionally appears as a separate possession of an
otherwise natural man*
We can adopt Tennant's individual responsibility.
9%ohn MhoQuarrie, editor, Dictionary of Christian Ethics, article on The Will", p# 35$rT{%onaonr~Sc^^ Ltd., iggT
Tennant, Ooncept of Bin, pp* 139-140
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But we must also locate the ethical and moral capacity 
of man in the same biological and psychological con­
ditioning which affects man himself and his other areas 
of choice* Even what one thinks is the ultimate un­
selfish supreme good does not arise outside of the 
developing individual, with his basic natural needs, 
his past training, and his present situation. The "Will" 
is also subject to these same pressures and limitations, 
The will is the m n  making his ethical choice, and the 
man is the sum total of all that affects his will, 
person and decisions*
4* The Individuality of Moral Judgment
Tennant was led to a new understanding of the 
origin of sin and the moral life. The aeientific 
materials he used demanded that he make a new state­
ment on the judgments which are made regarding moral 
behaviours (1) much behaviour to which we attribute 
moral worth is out of the realm of the consideration 
of moral value at all, and (2) that since so much of 
"ethical" behaviour is out of the volitional area, it 
must be judged on a standard which varies from culture 
to culture, from time to time, from person to person, 
and from an individual now and to the same Individual 
in the future.
The degree to which any individual can approxi­
mate the absolute ideal of moral goodness is not de­
pendent "solely upon his volition and moral effort, but 
also upon conditions beyond his control, and which are 
different from those of any other individual,
Tennant noted that much of what we call good Christian 
behaviour, and that which is normally approved by the 
Christian moralists, often has more to do with innate 
disposition and with natural abilities, than with the
Tennant, Concept of Bin, p, 8l
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actual moral worth of the acts themselves or the indi­
vidual's choice. Ee writesî
# One necessary condition for virtue * * , is what we call a good disposition* I speak of an in­herited predisposition, as distinct from volitionally acquired character* This inherited tendency to act in certain ways and to adopt emotional attitudes of certain kinds, is an important factor in moulding the quality of "character" in the broader or more comprehensive sense of that term*^^^
We cannot deny that people are bo m  with different dis­
positions, and that those predispositions toward certain 
kinds of personality traits are important to the ethical 
conclusions a person will adopt. The disposition varies:
In seme it renders emotions warm and vivid; in others cold and dull. And inasmuch as it forms part of our psycho-physical constitution and is fixed at birth, it is obviously non-volitioml; no responsi­bility for its quality attaches to its possessor*It can no more be said that a person ought to start with a good or beautiful disposition tiSn'that he ought to have a handsome faoe#i02
We agree with Tennant at this point* He detailed 
some "essential elements" of what we call Christian good­
ness and acceptable behaviour in our western society, 
that are not within the power of the person to control, 
e#g,, an active imagination is required for a full 
exercise of sympathy and considerate action, an impulsive­
ness is necessary to lend a "unique grace" to kindness 
and courtesy; and a ready tact is needed to discover 
the right word or the right action at any given moment*
101Ibid., p. 59
102Ibid., p. 59
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We might. Indeed, add a sound physical constitution 
and good health; for physical infirmity is responsible 
for many mental states, such as melancholy or irrita- 
bility.^^3 And these are the states in which ethical 
choices and attitudes arise# Well-meaning people often 
act wrongly for they do not have the necessary abilities 
to prevent it. So concludes Tennant:
The content of perfection for man is neces­sarily circumscribed by man's nature, by what he is and what he is capable of becoming* Human per­fection, in the most general sense of the word, is inevitably scmietMng vary different from the per­fection of God#^^^
Our moral consciousness would be mocked if we had to be
ashamed, and were accounted guilty for that over which
we have no control and which we did not choose. "No
Christian can believe that God requires us to pass the
limit of our possibility.
Sixty years ago Tennant was reminding the Christian 
community of the individuality of the judgment of sin.
In alcholism, for example,
. . .  a man who inherits a physical or psycho­physical constitution such as renders him subject to a lifelong and importunate t^ptation to indulge in his alcohol, but who, throughout many years of intense effort, steadfast loyalty to principle, and self-conquest, succeeds in maintaining the habit of abstinence, is from the standpoint of merit to be regarded as morally heroic; while îrffiTthe standpoint of virtue or perfection hemust be judged a miserably marred and' stuntedspecimen of a man* 106
p. 62
p. 79 
p. 119
p. 55
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The only ethical perfection which is a possibility for 
man, and the only standard which should be used in 
judging his conduct is the “faultless use of such im­
perfect natural talents as he has." This is central 
in understanding Tennant and in understanding this 
aspect Of our thesis #
Unless a moral law or ideal applies to an in­dividual as he is conditioned by his particular endowments, capacities, opportunities, and by the particular position in human society which he oc­cupies, it cannot be relevant to him or binding upon him at all.107
In consequence, says Tennant, the moral law is 
largely accepted from a developing concept* Instead of 
a static eternal decree, instead of making the same de­
mand on every stage of human life, it applies to the 
given stage of moral growth or possibility which a 
given individual can attain* The moral code, as ap­
prehended by the subjects whom it concerns, differs of 
course in different societies, from age to age in the 
same society, and even in the same i n d i v i d u a l . W e  
must substitute an "indefinite number of graded ideals 
or standards, each one possessing absoluteness for a 
given individual at a given time*^^^
We referred earlier to a second relevant aspect 
of Professor H. H* G* Robinson's objection, and we will
°^'^ Ibld., p. 85
lOGibld., p. 109
p, 91
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turn to that now* This has to do with Robinson's 
criticism that the principal weakness in Tennant ' s 
view of sin is the “atomic" view of man sinfulness*
* # # the evolutionary theory, as Dr# Tennant expounded it, appears guilty in some measure of what we have called atomism, that is to say, the tendency to regard a whole as reducible without remainder to a number of discrete units and there­fore the tendency to treat these units as funda­mental
Robinson elaborates that Tennant breaks up the divine 
law into many laws; he breaks up the life of man into 
many different stages, each standing by Itself, and he 
breaks up the society of men into a mere accumulation 
of many units and many individuals
"Life," wrote Robinson, "is a continuous process, 
and it is both arbitrary and abstract to judge a single 
state in the light of its own s t a n d a r d * Mhile there 
is one side of the truth in acknowledging this conten­
tion that a man must be judged at the highest standard 
available for him at the moment, "It is the continuity 
which is fundamental and from which we must start; and 
the divisions, though useful for certain purposes, are 
relative, abstract, and arbitrary*
Robinson writes that:
In fact. Dr. Tennant's atomism appears at three different points, for (a) he breaks up the one di­vine law so that it becomes many laws and each is
110Robinson, Faith and Duty, p. 123
p. 120
p. 121
pp. 121-22
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apposite to some individual at some stag© of his moral career; (b) he breaks up the life of man into many different stages each standing by it­self and requiring to be judged by his own ap­propriate ideal possibility; and (o) he breaks up the society of men so that it becomes little more than a mere accumulation of many units and many individuals *^4.
r, Robinson writes; "It is wrong in principle 
to start with a number of situations, and to try from 
there to build up a human life; the task is beyond us, 
for here as elsewhere we have murdered to dissect# It 
is the continuity which is fundamental and from which 
we must start # . *"
If a man is to be judged, the subject of the judgment is his character, and character is a by­product Of growth, not the sum of certain actions performed by him in a series of different situa- tions»^ ^^
Yet if Tennant's position were taken seriously, it would mean that in trying to assess a person's character one would first of all consider how he had acted in all the situations with which he was confronted in the light of the varying standards applicable to these different situations, each situ­ation having its own standard * # # whereas in truth the verdict upon a man's character is not reached in any such artificial fashion but is arrived at intui- tively#^ »^
While it is based upon knowledge of what a man has done 
Robinson continues, it goes beyond a simple recitation of
each act* "The reason is that acts are indications or 
expressions of character, not by any means its component 
parts
p. ISO
116'^ "^ '^ Ibid#, p# 122 
llTlbld., p. 122
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It Is here that our most serious disagreement 
occurs in treating Robinson's objection# If in atomiz­
ing Bin Teimant allows for an individual and for the 
relative judgment upon the individual acts during the 
course of his life —  then we side with Tennant* The 
point we are making in this present thesis is that indi­
viduality of judgment is required in light of the total 
situation of the moral agent*
To the objection that Tennant atomizes the soli­
darity of human society, Robinson writes that Tennant 
denies the moral solidarity of the race* Tennant pleads 
innocent mays Professor Robinson, "for he does speak of 
the solidarity of the race in respect of conative pro­
pensities * * #"
Elsewhere he holds that the moral solidarity ofthe race is adequately acknowledged in his theory by the place it gives to the non-moral inheritance and to the influence of our evil social environment upon the growing individual
The former, Robinson says, provides not for soli­
darity but for atomism and the later "offers no more 
than an external relation between separate units whereby
the one can produce an effect within the other * # #" but119as sinners all men are "completely unanimous#"
The final issue of this examination of Tennant's position must be that in the last analysis it is un­tenable for two reasons I namely, its empiricism in
Ibid*, p* 123
'ibid., p. 123
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connection id-th the universality of sin and this other feature of atomism.i^»
Some further comment is required regarding the 
objection that Tennant has atomized sin# We can agree, 
of course, that the continuity of a whole life, with 
all of its moral acts, is fundamental; and that the 
long view of what it has meant or done, is the important 
consideration. But the first instance is compatible 
with Tennant's thought# He nowhere writes that we 
should ignore the totality of the moral life# He is 
concerned, as we are in this thesis writing - to use 
Robinson's words - with the “certain purposes" and how 
useful the divisions can be in approaching the under­
standing and judgment of human behaviour to which we 
attribute moral value#
There we are led to examine non-rational factors 
in ethical decisions# The individual's moral behaviour 
must be seen in terms of the facts which condition or 
determine what he should do and how he must do it - not 
for the purposes of evaluating his good or evil acts 
from the theological point of view; nor to determine 
his sinfulness and need of atoneaent with the righteous 
Ood - but to understand the act itself - in its indivi­
dual meaning and its social setting* For while we may 
want to believe that an individual is ultimately respon­
sible to God for the whole of his moral life - or even
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that without receiving the grace of God he cannot per­
form any truly moral act - we must also investigate the 
incidental behaviour - out of which the whole is made, 
and apply only those standards which are applicable at 
that time#
Tennant suggests that if we approach morality in 
this way, we will discover that no all encompassing at­
titude or standard of judgment can be used. No meta­
physical injunction, no declaration of the "ought" - 
can be made until we first understand the individual 
involved and the act itself in terms of the possibilities 
open at the particular moment for the particular indi­
vidual involved*
Tennant is not trying to eliminate responsibility 
or to excuse an individual for his Immoral behaviour.
His argument
insists ♦ # . upon the responsibility of the sinner for his sin . . , It refuses to shift one whit of the responsibility for real sin to the sub­ject's environment, the_ conditions of M s  life, orhis natural endowments
Sin, or moral imperfection, has to do with volition and 
with volition alone. It is "the fact of deliberate 
choosing of the worse when a better course is both 
known and possible." If "sin" is to be a moral-ethical 
term at all, it "must connote only transgression of 
moral law by a moral a g e n t . Tennant borrows
121Tennant, Ooncept of Bln, p. 246
^^^Ibid., p. 98
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81(igwlGk*8 "strict sense of ethics" - It refers only 
to "vjhat is right or what ought to be^ so far as this 
depends on the voluntary action of individuals. "^^3 (The 
act, to be ethical at all, must be capable of being un­
derstood by the individual* Sin must always possess 
four characteristics; it must be a violation of moral 
law; this law must be known or be capable of being known, 
as binding; there must be two lines of conduct open to 
the actor; and the activity must be the outcome of the 
intention*^^^ "These conditions may be summed up in 
one word - accountability*" Bather than set aside indi­
vidual responsibility, Tennant is attempting to establish 
it* Bather than deny the corporate setting of human re­
sponsibility, he is attempting to enlarge it.
Hobinson objects that Tennant has introduced a 
"somewhat elastic and indefinite e l e m e n t in intro­
ducing the idea that man*s ethical behaviour must be 
Judged in its individual setting. While "there is much 
to be said in favour of this theory * * . yet it may be 
doubted whether as it stands it provides an ultimately 
satisfactory account of the matter*
The strength of Tennant *s argument is clear and.
p. 64 
p. 209
^^^Robinson> Faith and Duty^ p. 119 
Ibid., p, 119
270
we conclude, justified* Man is a unity, but within
the corporate unity there are individual considerations 
vdxioh must be judged according to the exigencies of the 
particular amoral situation#
A man* a desires are determined . # * by the totality of his point of view « * * Each desire is said to belong to a certain universe or mental con­text, and loses its significance for its subject when he passes into another mood or frame of mind# Generally speaking a man holds several points of view together#127
A child cannot be held accountable for the moral 
act which in a responsible adult would be judged as 
ethically evil. All the multitude of individual cir­
cumstances which are present in each "ethical" situa­
tion for the adult as well are part of what Tennant is 
stressing throughout his argument*
^^^Tennant, Oonoept of Bin, p# 119
5# Conclusion
With that last criticism, our inquiry into the 
thought of F. R. Tennant has reached its objectives,
So much more could he added regarding Tennant himself 
and the related topics of this chapter, but that would 
lie beyond the scope of our thesis interest here. We 
are concerned with the question of the relevance of 
Dr. Tennant to the inter-relationship of physical sci­
ence and Christian ethics, and the result of that inter­
action. In conclusion, but with the qualifications 
herein registered. Dr. Tennant is useful to this thesis 
and to the contemporary study of ethics, for the follow- 
ing reasons:
a. In the first place Tennant Initiates the 
approach to ethical and moral questions in the common 
meeting-ground of scientific study and Christian ethical 
thought. Our objective here is in the rather specific 
interest of the evolutionary origin of man and the 
social growth of his ethical-moral world. Neither the 
presuppositions of Christian theology, nor the presup­
positions of scientific ethics stand independently from 
the other, although each maintains an essential inte­
grity in its own field. Each is a legitimate academic
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and ethical enterprise, and in separate ways, each is 
subordinate to the other* No theological ethics can be 
valid without the empirical data of evolutionary study, 
and no scientific ethic can violate the basic non-scien- 
tific questions* Both contribute significantly to a 
constructive ethic: the "is" and the "ought" arise to­
gether* Tennant is a Christian Modernist, in the defini­
tion which was set forth by A* M. Ramsey, one who makes;
The self-conscious effort to protect the rights of free inquiry, to use the findings of the modern sciences and to insist that there is development in the understanding of the Christian faith*
In 1905, Tennant described the age, as a scientific one 
that was " characterized by the zealous pursuits of 
physical science , • # and by an increasingly rich and 
impressive harvest of results acquired by means of sci­
entific investigation* "^^9 Tennant took both the modern 
world and his Christian faith seriously* We can ask the 
same of contemporary Christian moralists*
We concur here with a recent evaluation of Tennant 
by C* R, Kenowden;
* * * it is Tennant's approach to the subject, as governed by certain definite principles, which has a decisive relevance today* He remnds us that an adequate doctrine of sin requires expression in clear and precise language and, at the same time, it must take full account of modern knowledge and
128Ramsey, Era of Anglican Theology> p. 74 
^^%©nnant. Concept of Sin, p. I88
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the demands of the enlightened moral consciousness* Above all, it must not do violence to man's truestature as a moral personality*
b# In his evolutionazy viewpoint, Tennant has 
freed the natural appetites and impulses from any kind 
of moral judgment, thereby neutralizing the moral aspect 
of man's basic nature* Tenmmt argued that the natural
"instincts and impulses and tendencies" of man are not
evil* Man's basic humanity with its natural origin be­
comes then the source of a wholesome ethical life and 
existence* The question of what Tennant does to the 
Doctrine of Sin, or to the Fall and Original Sin, is not 
really our question in this thesis* Bather, we are con­
cerned to show that man, as he rises in the process, 
receives a moral awareness, and beccmes concerned to 
modify his "natural" behaviour in the light of accepted 
moral principles*
In that regard, we adopt the conclusion of Dr*
N* P. Williams who writes %
Dr* Tennant has laid theology at large under an immense obligation by the courage with which, follow- ing in the steps of Julian and Scotus, he has pro­claimed the moral neutrality of the appetites (the fomes pecoati) as such, thereby sweeping away at one blow the endless confusions which clustered round the word "concupiscence," and by insisting that the word "$in" means, not a psychological state nor yet a forensic status, but an act com­mitted with full and conscious deliberation in de­fiance of a known law.^^i
130Benowden, Church Quarterly Review, vol* 163
131McDowall, Evolution and the Need of Atonement,p* V#
c. Tennant is helpful in understanding the 
relativity, or better the individuality, of Christian 
moral judgments. The two ways in which he directs our 
thoughts here are (1) that the natural endowment of the 
individual moral agent must be considered before a 
judgment is made on his act; and(2) that we guard 
against associating good Christian moral behaviour with 
the kind of gentle and agreeable disposition where men 
are judged good in proportion to the way in which they 
perform on our scale of agreed and established value*
In all of this Tennant provides an acceptable 
working attitude to ethical questions and provides a 
theoretical framework in which an open discussion of 
contemporary moral problems can take place. And, al­
though he is principally concerned with ethics, moral 
problems and solutions can follow directly from his 
philosophical and scientific approach*
In all, we close with the words of another critic 
of Tennant's work and borrow their meaning for our own. 
E* J* Bicknell wrote:
May I take this opportunity of expressing my own great obligation to Dr* Tennant's books, though at times I am unable to accept his position* All Christian teachers owe him a debt of gratitude for his pioneer work and his reverent and fearless at­tempt to restate old truths in the light of modernknowledge.132
132Ibid., p. V

B, Dr. Karl Barth 
1* Introduction
From Tennant ' s philosophical introduction we turn to 
Dr. Karl Barth. At the start we have a problem. In 
Oommunism and the Theologians a Charles West began his study 
on the significance of Karl Barth with the words: "The
right of Karl Barth to take his place in this study at all 
must first be e s t a b l i s h e d , "^^3 those who hold the preju­
dicial notion that Dr, Barth has never been interested in 
man and the social, political and ethical problems of the 
times, a notion that is exposed by Robert McAffee Brown in 
his introduction to The Portrait of Karl Barth,^^^ some
133Charles West, Communism and the Theologians (Philadelphia: The WestmînsleF"W e i s " , I n "  actual fact Dr, West judges Barth to have a far greater place in the con­tinuing dialogue with Communism than all of the liberals com­bined, and of equal influence with a man like soclal-ethi- cist Reinhold Niebuhr, West's argument rests more clearly in the work of Barth than the social philosophers, or the syncretistic approach of Paul Tillich; mainly because Barth "has liberated European Protestant theology both from bondage to one political ideology • , . and from the sterile division of life into the two kingdoms of grace and law." —  "He has done more than any other theologian in the tradition of the reformation to open the way for a Christian dynamic in polit­ical life which has made a Christian encounter with Communism possible at all," —  It was Barth "who provided . * . the elements of Christological understanding of the state, a free direct approach to human beings and their wel&re, and knowl­edge of the crisis of Christian obedience in the political sphere." p, 304 and passim.
^^^Ceorges Casalis, Portrait of Karl Barth (Garden City, Hew York: Doubleday, I553T"% r ( r ^ ^  Barth,Labor et Fides, Geneva, i960), trahsla%eH"'%th'^Tint'foduc- tioh by Robert McAffee Brown,
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question could be raised regarding our use of Karl Barth 
in this thesis on science and Christian ethics.
As Professor Will Herberg noted a dozen years ago, it 
is true that:
the image of Barth that is still operative in important circles in the English speaking world is the image of an earlier Barth, a position which Barth himself aban­doned more than two decades ago.
That image holds Barth to be a good bell-ringer in the early 
years of this century, a kind of pendulum-to -the -right, who 
reacted against liberalism with a neo-orthodox cell to a 
God who is totaliter alter, with little or no direct ref­
erence or responsibility to man. But, West said, Barth 
belonged to his study because it was Barth more than any 
other who opened up the Christian imagination "to the bound*, 
less resources for practical living in the fact that the 
Christian's life is in the hands of a redeeming God."^^^
And, we should not forget that during the nineteen thirties 
and forties, "while he was turning out huge volumes of the 
dogmatics with his right hand," he was also "dashing off 
political tracts with his left - and in every case the left 
hand knew what the right was doing. "^37 in that combination, 
says Herberg,
135Will Herberg in his introduction to Community,State and Church, collected works of Karl BartbT (Garden City:\  PP# 13-14
■^^ W^est, Communism and Theologians, p. 15
137Brown, Portrait of Barth, p. 22
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A Baarfehian social philosophy has emerged, and this theologian, who abjures apologetics and desires nothing but to expound the Word of God, has been compelled by circumstances to propound views on society and the state that make him into one of the most influential social thinkers of our time. 138
Yet, even if we grant the social relevance of Barth, 
there could still be a question of why Barth belongs in a 
thesis which takes its starting point in the evolutionary 
origin of man, and searches out the biological contributions 
to contemporary Christian ethics# In answer we offer this 
three-pronged raison d'etre for including Barth:
(1) Largely due to the theological stature which 
Barth has attained during this century, there are many points 
where he is directly relevât to our topic. It will become 
clear that we do not adopt the Barthian position regarding 
man or his ethics, but Barth is not an "isolationist." Els 
Ohristo-centered understanding of man, and his ethics as 
solely the command of God, do not lend themselves to a 
compatible co-existence with other anthropological or 
ethical stances* Nonetheless, Barth does help to preserve 
a constant interplay with the forces around him, Cultural, 
political, and scientific. He insists first on the claim 
of the Christian to make his moral Judgments and develop 
his anthropology from within the scope of his distinctively 
Christian faith* But, while Barth always proceeds from the 
center of the Christian witness, he goes out to challenge 
the particular issue at hand. In an ultimate way, "the path
^^^Herberg, in introduction to Community, State and Church, p. 13
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from human knowledge to the knowledge of God Is a oui de
saos"
But this does not make conversation and understand­ing and mutual enrichment impossible between theology . and culture; it simply means that conversation and un­derstanding and mutual enrichment do not proceed solely on the premlfig of those who reject Christian revelation out of hand.i^^
To that point we will return shortly# But the first reason 
why Dr. Barth belongs to this writing is in the scope and 
depth of his ethical writings*
(B) There is a second reason, and that is a sense in 
which Barth brings himself to this study# However lofty is 
his original ethical position, Barth comes dome from his 
theological tower to address himself to most of the problems 
that are concomitant with a study of biology and ethics*
In "Special Ethics" Barth found the time, and had the in­
terest, in writing out long and relevant commentaries on a 
multitude of special topics. Gustafson explains further:
Barth is the only theologian of his generation who took Interest in a number of special ethical problems that have occupied the attention of Homan Oatholic moral theology* Examples of such are his discussions of abor­tion, suicide, tyrannicide, and is (sic) intensive dis- cussioo of war *140
Dr. Barth read widely in scientific literature and he in­
corporated it into his discussions. Others have taken up 
the interest since, notably men like Paul Hamsey and Joseph 
Fletcher, and are addressing themselves to most of the topics 
mentioned* But Barth was there throughout the early middle
Brown, in introduction to Portrait of Barth^
James M* Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (New York: Harper and How, 196877"P* 1 ^
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years of the twentieth century, applying his ethic found
in heaven, to the affairs of men on earth* Barth never
finished his ethical writings, as he never finished the
Dogmatics itself, but:
In spite of the incompleteness of Barth's ethics, as he planned to write them, the student is confronted with the most inclusive and systematic theological ethics to be developed in recent theology* Indeed it comes close to being one of the most impressive theo­logical ethics in Christian thought .141
Barth and his ethics do not exist in a vacuum. Our study of 
Barth begins in the assumption that when a theologian chooses 
to enter into the ethical and moral areas where knowledge of 
biological information is essential, he chooses to be judged 
by the criteria of this study*
(3) Finally, we take up the ethical writings of Dr. 
Barth for a third reason, one which might almost be taken 
as a tongue-in-cheek attitude, albeit quite serious in its 
intent* It is the reason which Barth himself used, also not 
without some lightheartedness when he accepted the invita­
tion of the University of Aberdeen in 1937 to give the 
Gifford Lectures. There he was, fulfilling the request of 
Lord Gifford that Natural Theology be defended and, as Barth 
confessed, he had always been "an avowed opponent of all 
natural theology*" He said there that he would throw 
natural theology "into relief by the dark background of a 
totally different theology."
l4lGustafson, Christ and Moral Life, p. 15
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The particular background he chose was "the Knowledge 
of God and the Service of God according to the teaching of 
the Reformation*" But said Barth, he would not be ungracious 
enough towards Lord Gifford's will that he would attack 
natural theology# He would only present his own case, as 
a backdrop against which to view it* Then he said;
However that may be, it can only be to the good of "Natural Theology" to be able once again to measure it­self as the truth - if it is the truth) - by that whichfrom its point of view is the greatest of errors. Op-portunity is to be given to do this here* And in this sense I propose to satisfy Lord Gifford's requirements# 142
Natural theology could fend for itself.
What we are borrowing is the idea that a few of the 
salient objectives of this study can be thrown into clearer 
focus as seen against the theology of Karl Barth. There is 
a kind of healthy negative contrast at some important points* 
Meynell once noted that all theologians who wish to engage 
in any kind of natural theology, will inevitably come into 
conflict with Barth. And, if they are to accomplish anything
in that pursuit, they must offer "reasons for denying either
Barth's premises, or the validity of his arguments, or 
both* "^^3
^^ ^^ Karl Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Servie© of God According to the'''Teaching' ' of' tbë''''ËeŸoi#&i^  ^
Lectur#''''l'S37.(London; Hodder and Stoughton, second impression, 1949), p.7
^^&Ugo A. Meynell, Grace Versus Nature (Studies in Karl Barth's Dogmatics), (lonBmT^eeT^STErE, 1965), p. 2
2. Two Problems Related to Ethios 
a# Btbic© and the Doctrine of God
In the Foreword to the first volume of the Church 
Dogmatics written in 1932, Karl Basf'th described the place 
Which ethics would have throughout his writings*
Ethics so-called X regard as the doctrine of God's command and do not consider it right to treat it otherwise than as an integral part of dogmatics, or to produce a dogmatics which does not include it*144
There Barth announced his intention to include a discus­
sion of ethics at the close of each of the major volumes 
of the Dogmatics* "The Oommand of God in General" would 
be discussed at the close of the Doctrine of God.^^5 
"The Commandment of God from the Viewpoint of Order" 
would come at the close of the Doctrine of Creation* 1^^
The "Viewpoint from tew" would come at the close of the 
Doctrine of Reconciliation; and from the "Viewpoint of 
Promise" at the close of the Doctrine of Redemption.
Only the first two were completed as Dr. Barth died in 
1968 before the other volumes were written. Yet, abbrevi­
ated though it was, Barth's ethic is clear and consistent 
and, from the viewpoint of meaning, is also complete.
^^^Barth, j^gwticG, vol. 1, part 1, p. xiv
l45Ibid., vol. 2, part 2, chapter 8 
vol, 3, part 4 
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Ethics is, for Barth, an exclusively theological 
task* In the four major sub-divisions of the chapter, "The 
Command of God," ethics exists as a "Task of the Doctrine 
of God"; comes as "A Claim of God"; is seen best as a 
"Decision of God"; and finally comes as the "Judgment of 
God*" "The God who claims man makes Himself originally 
responsible for man."^ '^^  ^ To speak fully about man, we 
speak also of the God who made him and made the command 
for his life# The "special way" of this theological ethic, 
is in "the Word and work of Gpd in Jesus Christ, in which 
the right action of man has already been performed and 
therefore waits only to be confirmed by our action* "1^^ 
Noting the "superior principle" of theological 
ethics, Barth wrote:
Its starting point is that all ethical truth is enclosed in the command of the grace of God - no matter whether this is understood as rational or historical, secular or religious, ecclesiastical or universal^ ethioo- social truth.Wg
Barth writes that;
We must refuse to follow all these attempts at theological ethics which start from the assxaaption that it is to be built on, or to proceed from, a general human ethics # * # In the relationship be­tween the command of God and the ethical problem, as we have defined it in its main features, there is not a universal moral element autonomously confronting the Christian. It is, therefore, quite out of the question methodically to subordinate the latter to the former, to build on it, or to derive from it.^^o
^^^Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol* 2, part 2, p. 543
'Ibid., p. 527
^^Oibid., p. 543
The subject matter of ethics is not concerned with the best 
way to make a good ethical decision, based on all the avail­
able information. It is not even "the Word of God as it is 
claimed by man." It is "the Word of God as it claims man*
It is not man as he is going to make something of the Word 
of God, but the Word of God as it is going to make something 
of man. wl51
The propositions of Ohriatian ethics are proposi­tions of Christian dogmatics. This means that as with all the other propositions of dogmatics the truth in them is contained and lies in the Word of God, that it can be known only in the Word of God, and must again and again be sought and caught in the Word of God and therefore in faith.152
Christian ethics, says Barth, is the process where 
man attempts to repeat what has been said to him in the di­
vine command of God# The command represents the sovereign 
claim which God has made on him in Christ. Man can do noth­
ing to change it; he can only learn to obey it. The Word 
of God is already there, it is for him to leam to listen. 
What is "good" for the man to do, is already made good by 
the Word of God. As Barth explained in his article on 
"Christian Ethics" in the volume God Here and Hows
What is good in the Christian sense of the word? Good, in the Christian sense, is that conduct and ac­tion of man's which corresponds to the conduct and ac­tion of God in history, . . .  To say it briefly: That action of man's is good in which man is thankful for God's grace « • » That human conduct and act of man's
'Ibid., p. 546
p. 603
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i8 therefore, which corresponds to the grace ofGod#:i53
An act is "good" only as it corresponds to the grace of God, 
Evil, to Barth, is that conduct or act which "contradicts 
the content and action of God's history, in which he hurries 
or sneaks past the suffering and the joy of Jesus C h r i s t * "^54 
There is no other way to say it# With Barth there is no 
overlap between this ethic and all other ethics. It stands 
alone, as alone as Barth himself x^jas when he wrote the Com- 
mentary on Romans in 1919#
Barth confesses that he would have preferred to "keep 
to the beaten tracks when considering the basis of ethics *
But I could not and cannot do so* "155 And why? Because 
to Barth, the ethical question does not arise in a vacuum*
We are not free to begin our deliberations of the subject 
as if the command had not been spoken* Neither can we 
begin our discussion of good and evil as if the Grace of 
God did not exist in Jesus Ohrist# Outside of theology there 
is no ethics*
Barthian supporters often advise that the extremism 
of Dr# Barth can be seen best in his historical setting# 
Douglas Horton wrote:
Only those of us who are old enough to remember theparticular kind of desiccated humanism, almost empty of
153Karl Barth, God Here and How, translated by Paul M# VanBuren (Londons BoutleSgFllSTEipErPaul, 1964), p# 89
154Barth, Ohurch Dogmatics, vol. 2, part 2, p. x 
repeated emphasis in Barth#
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otherworldly aontent, whloh prevailed in many Protestant areas in the early decades of this cen­tury, can understand the surprise, the joy, the re­freshment which would have been brought by the book (The Word of God and the Word of Man) to the ordi­nary and, like myself, somewhat desultora reader of the religious literature of that time#15o
Barth was of course, swinging the pendulum back from the 
humanistic theology of Bchleiermacher's "feeling"; and 
Ritschl's "moral value judgments"; and Troeltsch's "scien­
tific religious history." Historical insights are most help, 
ful, but there remains a basic eplstemological objection 
that in its historical setting or not, Barth excludes what 
Tillich calls "The Bituation"^^^ from his theological formu­
lations, and thereby suffers the consequence of an isolated 
ethical task* As James Gustafson noted, Barth misses the 
fact that as "the analyses and choices are human, made by 
creatures with various biases and perspectives
It is neither Christ nor love dbne that tells the conscientious youth what his vocation ought to be; it is also his aptitudes, his opportunities, his desire to achieve, his awareness of various purposes * * * Christ does not prescribe the options and dictate the choice of the Christian*^.^^
With Barth the ethical question is recaptured for 
the Christian theologian* He insists that man belongs to 
God and that man's ethical life is not unlike his other 
activities. Man belongs to God; but also, in one important
^^^Quoted by Arnold B* Come in An Introduction to Barth's Dogmatics for Preachers {Lonûmi
157Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, (University of Chicago Press, 1951), v<ÆÎ'"'T,“'p* 5'  .
Gustafson, Christ and Moral Life, p* 268, passim
286
sense, God belongs to man* God cannot fee considered apart 
from his overflowing love and Bis Will to create an exis­
tence independent from himself - in Man* Ethics is an 
integral part of the Doctrine of God* But it must also fee 
part of the Doctrine of Man* That, Dr. Barth cannot ulti­
mately concede* Therein lies the weakness, to which we 
will return#
b# Theological Ethic© in Relationship
We will discus© later what Barth has to say about 
non-theologieal sources of the study of man. Generally we 
conclude that he uses those sources more competently than 
his critics suggest. Here, in the Barthian Ethic itself, 
it is essential that we understand the manner in which he 
uses those studies.
In the Barthian ethic, as we have noted, theology 
is invariably in a superior relationship to all other 
ethics. But the relationship with Barth can never be 
apologetic* The theological ethic will annex the others 
for "annexation remains annexation, however legal it may 
foe, and there must foe no armistice with the peoples of 
Canaan and their culture and their Cultus#"^59 it is no 
coincidence that Barth chose "the annexation of the peoples 
of Canaan" - an annexation which was noted for its lack of co­
operation. They annihilated the lands
Grace which has from the start to share its power with a force of nature is no longer grace, i.e., it cannot be recognized as what the grace of God is in the consideration and conception of that divine act, as what it is in Jesus Christ# And therefore revela­tion which has from the very outset a partner in the reason of the creature, and which cannot foe revelation without its cooperation, is no longer revelation* 180
^^^Barth, Church Dogmatlesj vol, 2, part 2, p. 524
p. 531
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It 16 that obstinate attitude which prompts many com- 
mentatora to conclude that; as Hartwell writes; "There
iB no room for man's independent enquiry into the question 
of good and evil. Otherwise man would usurp God's place 
as the sole Judge of good and evil# And Meynell, in 
Grace, Versus Nature^ goes further; "Here the thesis of 
Barth, that all human aspirations are equally worthless 
when exposed to the grace of God revealed in Scripture, 
appears at its most implausible." Then follows immediately;
The paragraph in which Barth says that a man who acknowledges other lords than God is a murderer even if he never hurts a flea, an adulterer even if he never looks at a woman, is surely one of the worst in the whole Dogmatics *1^ ^
Meynell extends his criticism too far# For one thing he 
uses a quotation from the Dogmatics which does not wfer to 
the particular argument he is attempting to make# And for 
another, Barth never says that "human aspirations are worth­
less#" In the text which Meynell selected Barth is elab­
orating the theme of what the command has to say to man 
as the covenant-partner of God* It is worth pursuing, not 
to be picayune but to stress Barth's actual point#
The command requires, Barth writes,^^3 that man 
"should be wholly and genuinely free in relation to his 
neighbour; free by his absolute obligation to God; freed
^^^Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth i An Introduction (Gerald m c k w o r W %  boT," ' Ltd#, lohdonr"' ^ p*
619-80
1q8Meynell, graoe Versus Mature, p. 58 
^^^Barth, Ohuroh Dogmatics, vol. 2, part 2, pp.
28g
from all other divine or quasi-divine masters." Then he
will be able to keep the commandments. And,
He does what belongs to their fulfillment, but how can he fulfill them when he neglects what they really require of him, when he is captive and bound by a re­gard for other lords and powers besides God?
Then follows Meynell's quotations
The man who is a captive in this way is a murderer even if he does not harm a fly, an adulterer even if he never looks on a woman, a thief even if he never^ap-propriates a straw that does not belong to him*^ '^ ^
And finally^ Barth goes on to write of what happens to this
covenant-partner of God's when he continues to be under the
"grip of mammon# "
Barth is referring to the command and the act which
it requires. Ha is not in that paragraph talking about the
way in which we gather our ethical information, or the worth
of our human aspirations. He is referring to the command
for action towards one's neighbour. It is not unlike the
words of Jesus in Matthew 5 s27s "Everyone that looketh on
a woman to lust after her hath -committed adultery with her
already in his heart." We really cannot serve God and
Mammon) It is the failure to be freed from quasi-masters
so that he might do justice to his neighbour* It is in
following some other master than God, which makes that man
a "captive, and a murderer who does not commit murder."
But beyond the specific use of this quotation, Meynell
has overemphasized the position which Barth actually takes
pp. 619-20
*Ibicl., p. 524 166.
^Ibld., pp* 513-14* 1 am indebted to Professor N* H* a* Robinson for calling my attention to this quotation as well as elucidating its meaning*
iGGlbid., p. 515
' t,
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regarding outside sources of information* "Theological |
ethics," Barth writes, "can and must establish a con­
tinuous relationship of its thinking and speaking with 
the human ethical problem as a whole*
It will be absolutely open to all that it can leam from general human ethical enquiry and reply* It can be absolutely open because it has absolutely nothing to fear from this quarter*186
"Ethics" is separate from the "ethos." The former is 
where ethical valuations are made; the latter is the situa­
tion in which we act. Barth draws a clear distinction in 
his definition; "Ethics is the science or knowledge or 
doctrine of the modes of human behaviour, of the constants 
or laws of human behaviour*"187 But there are many other 
questions about the modes of human action (in the ethos)* 
Psychological, historico-morphologlcal, politico-juridiclal, 
and philosophico-historical questions are always involved*
These, however, "do not have anything to do with the ethical 
question itself*" The ethical question:
asks concerning the genuineness and rightness and value of the constants which are at issue in those other ques­tions* . * * It asks concerning the validity of the laws of human behaviour ascertained on the basis of these Other questions* It asks concerning the law of the good, and the connexion between this law and those other laws and the human behaviour which is in con­formity with them#18o
"Ethics" says Barth, "raises the fundamental question."
165.
’ibid.
There is admittedly some ambiguity at this point.
We cannot accept Barth entirely. The separation between 
"ethics" and "morals" we have already defined as mainly a 
working definition of separate functions# But Barth's 
separation is radical* It is based on an assumption that 
the "modes of human action" are separate from the knowledge 
or the doctrines which support them.
In fact they are not. As it is true that we do not 
know the ought without the is, so also we do not know the 
ethical without the moral. The command can make its claim, 
but until we determine the man and his "situation" - in 
Tillich's use of the word - we will not be able to make 
claims for the ethic# The "ethic" in this case has specific 
moral implications.
But to go back to our main argument# Professor H. D# 
Lewis made a similar oriticism^®'^ of Barth some years ago, 
as indeed many others have done, including Professor H. E. 0# 
Hobinson in Faith and Duty. ^7^ Lewis argued that Barth had 
excluded the moral philosopher from the ethical enterprise. 
Barth said that "God is known only by the Scriptures . # # 
and the Divine message must be known immediately and has 
no echo in ordinary thought and esqperience#Barth's
should not imply however that Lewis would be sympathetic to the over-all concern of this thesis. But we borrow the kind of point he made and substitute the Interest of the scientific moralist for the moral philosopher - and that would not be a cospatible thought with Lewis' philosophy.
^^^Hobinson, Faith and Duty, esp. pp. ix, 5> 12, 21,
171H. D# Lei#.s, Morals and Revelation (London: George Allen ^  Unwin, 1951), ---------------
inflexibility eliminates all cooperative investigations 
of ethics, and to Lewis, that meant it failed its respon­
sibility*. "A suooessful issue to the crises of Western 
civilization," wrote Lewis, "in its strictly ethical and 
political aspects, turns very largely on our ability to 
agree to differ in a spirit of mutual respect *"^7^ Lewis 
notes that:
A spirit Of Ohristian trust and forebearance is hardly likely to be engendered when men turn away from rational consideration of one another's problems; and wrap themselves up in a cloak of spiritual self- assurance *173
Lewis also notes that the Word of God comes to the 
individual in the crises of historical circumstances*
Surely thou#, "It presupposes some appraisement of his­
torical events * * * and depends on a fair appreciation 
of the facts in a particular situation*" Any ethics which 
maintains that it does not, "condemns itself at the start."174
"The worst of it all is yet to mention," writes 
Lewis* That is Barth's rejection of the natural capacities 
in man. Barth claims they are not only unreliable, but 
positively e v i l  #175 Natural human capacities must be 
examined as they in turn give us the ability to examine 
further.
Lewis is correct by and large in his eriticiem* We 
p. 7
p, 8 
p. 8
^^%bld., P» SO
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GtreGG one farther point î not only man»a ” reason” and 
ethical toola^ but also the natural investigations into 
the nature of man and his behaviours must be included in 
ethical discussions#
Barth is not of course unamra of this kind of con­
cern* ”1^ tooj have heard the news^” he writes, "that we 
can speak about God only by speaking about man."
I do not contest this claim. Bightly interpreted, it may be an esqpression of the true insight that God is not without man. * * * But this claim, correctlyWe can speak
The counterclaim comes first to Barth. And therein will 
remain a difference. In either case, Barth does leave 
room for some kind of subordinate interrelationship be­
tween the theological ethic and the ethics around it, even 
if it is a kind of Oanaanite annexation#
The "Batter Barth" has altered some of his views 
and has given a new breadth to the possibilities in the 
world around the Barthians#^^^^ Perhaps it is more that
176Khrl Barth, The B m anity of God (London: Collins, 1961), p. 69  ^-177Will Herberg once described four different Barths, which surely must have amused Karl# There was the "pre- Barthian Barth," i.e., the Barth of the liberal period which everyone forgets, but prior to the publication and prepara­tion of Bomans, that Barth was# Karl Barth was once a liberal I Then there is the "proto-Barthian Barth," that is, the Barth of the First Edition of Bomans, Barth the bell- ringer, who awakened himself and the world# Third is the "early-Barthian Barth" of the Second Edition of Romans and throu^out the twenties# And finally, there is the "late- Barthian Barth," the Barth of the Ghuroh Dogmatics and after Barthes of# Community, 0tate and byHerberg, pp#'‘'''lj5-K*"'' !me '""latilSarthiah Barth" is really the Barth we know and the one we have met in this thesis. The
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there is some hidden ambiguity in the point itself, or 
at least some basic ambidexterity in Barth#
In that regard, there is one other comment we must 
makes onewhich was also caught precisely by Edward Leroy 
Long in his Survey of Christian Ethics :
Barth postulates a sharp dichotomy between theo­logical discourse and general discourse about ethics and then seems to make a tentative place for general discourse for which there is really no theoretical slot in his scheme of things.!*^
He does find that "tentative place#" It is the definition
of the "place" which concerns us here. How is the Christian
ethic related to the world of human morals? How can Barth
use information which is theoretically unavailable?
In a more recent article Barth wrote on "Christian
Ethics,"^79 there is a prolegomena to an answer.
"What is the posture between Christian ethics and
the world of morals?" he asked.
The answer is this; Christian ethics runs through this whole world of morals, tests everything and pre­serves the best, only the best, and that means those
real question might be does the real Barth change. He probably did abandon "the lion^s roar," as he once called it himself; and he probably did come more to emphasise the Grace as opposed to the judgment of God, and he probably did move more towards the "humanity" of both God and man. But in ethics, in our concern with it anyway, the leopard never really did change his spots,(or was it a lion and his roar;/ Throughout the Dogmatics, and in later publications, Barth changed not one SBitl TEe strength and the weakness were there from the start of Volume 1 in 1932#
ITSEdward L# Long, A Survey of Christian Ethics (Hew York; Oxford U n i v e r s i t y  .
^^^Barth, God Here and How, chapter 6, "Christian Ethics," pp. 86 ff.
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things by which from time to time God^s grace is best praised.!^
X^hatever his theoretical reluctance to "wallow around" in
inferior human ethics, there is no reluctance whatever to
Invade these areas# Barth uses the best which the other
ethics can offer, but never is led by them#
The assertions of human understanding need not on that account be false# The old as well as the modem natural sciences# or rather natural philosophy# teach that man is a very sneclal and strange element in the cosmic-terrestrial. in the physico-chemical, in the organic-biotic processes of universal existence#
# « * All of this may be true according to the Christian view but only if included in it is the fact to which it is subordinated and in connection with which it is un­derstood, that man is from God and belongs wholly to God, that as His creature, man is hastening towards Him and towards eternal life with Him#!^i
The extreme of that position is untenable in this 
thesis* Yet, Barth did not always practice what he preached* 
He did make and use that "place" to great advantage, and 
that tentative place which had no place in his over-all 
theory# And, we must remember that it comes as part of 
his defense of the supremacy of the claim of God and His 
command. It is that claim which is ultimate, not the 
actual decision making process to which we normally refer 
in ethical choices. The Christian ethic can go out and 
look around and select whatever it chooses, which can then 
be annexed into its own arena.
p. 90
181Karl Barth, Against the Stream (London: SOM, 1954), p. 187 ---------------
No real dialogue is really possible, even in the 
"latest Barth." One of his last books relates the results 
of a conference^®^ he attended in Geneva on Bmanism. He 
was as out of place there philosophically, as he was at 
the Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen^®® He told the assembled 
crowd of humanists that there was only one humanism, the 
humanism of God, which was the basis in Christ for all 
other humanism). "If I was preaching, " Barth said, "I 
would tell you all to repent and we would pray the Lord*s 
Prayer and celebrate the Lord*s Supper together*" little 
wonder, as Barth later related, "All they would say to 
us again and again was that the * claim of absoluteness * of 
the •religion of revelation* was a horrible, dangerous, 
and unbearable thing* " Then, writes Barth,
that which is called the » exclusiveness* of the Christian proclamation and Christian theology, when looked at in its own terms, consists in this . * # that it summons men to decision and responsibility, to faith and obedience# From case to case, but also fundamentally and permanently, it calls men to a binding decision and responsibility, to a freedom which is the highest and truest freedom, since it is that of the free man who knows himself in all serenity tpobe a man who is called, ordered, and obligated
"The Christian Proclamation Here and Now", an address delivered before the Eecontres Internationales in », included in God Here anE''%w7'"
Of# page 279104Barth, God Here and Now, p* 106
Ibid., p. 107
3* Two Problems Belated to Man 
a. "The Anthropological Problem"
In Barth’s special ethics we will discuss the moral 
problems which are related to our thesis; but it will be 
helpful first to examine the approach which Dr. Barth 
takes to the nature of the "ethical man." In Part 2 of 
volume III of the Church Dogmatics - "The Doctrine of
Creation," Barth devoted a lengthy volume exclusively to
man, "The Creature." The editors noted that;
Publication of this part#volume in English should finally destroy the charge that Karl Barth has noth­ing to say about man* Here under the title "The Creature," he has in fact given us the most massive account of the doctrine of man in our time.i^^
"Doctrine of Man' applies only in the more formal sense 
of the words, for Barth's anthropology in the end is not 
an anthropology at all* It is a Christo-centered theology 
of the man who exists in Christ and is understood only in 
that reclamation which took place in the life and death 
and resurrection of the Lord Jesus. There is no Other man, 
and no "man," independent from that One. Barth is address­
ing himself not to the usual question of the nature of man. 
He is concerned with "Man as the Creature of God, as his 
dear child and covenant partner, wholly bound by his grace
106Church Dogmatics, vol. 3, part 2, p. vii
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and upheld by His Faithfulness."
We remember that we shall search the Old and Hew Testaments in vain for a true anthropology and there­fore for a theory of the relation of soul and body*The Biblical texts regard and describe man in the full exercise of his intercourse with God. Their authors have neither the time nor the interest to occupy themselves with man as such, nor to give them- selves or their readers a theoretical account of what is to be understood by the being of man.loT
What was good enough for the authors of the original word, 
should be good enough for Karl Barth I
Next, Barth refuses to allow man to be placed within 
any Weltanschauung which would unite him with the cosmos 
and extend his individuality into a continuity of life be­
yond man. There can be no category or frame of reference 
into which he "fits," or where he can be understood and 
explained* Ho kind of scientific anthropology can move 
in alongside this one which Barth proposes.
Irrespective of details, the attitude to this book will necessarily be determined by whether the reader finally agrees with me that the way of a theological doctrine of man proposed here ifoQOt only possible, but the only one possible , *
The Word of God might be said to have a "cosmic
character," but only
to the extent that its message of salvation relates to the man who is rooted in the cosmos, who is lost and ruined with the cosmos, and who is found^and renewed by his Creator at the heart of the cosmos.!o9
p. 433
p. ix
iG^ibld., p. 4
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Man la not polaed In some eosmologicaX void, into ifhioh 
men have to peek with their home-made tools of research 
and sundry world**views to see what he looks like or to 
find out who he really la#
we recognise to he human nature Is nothing other than the disgrace which covers his (man's) na­ture; his inhumanity, perversion and corruption. If we try to deny this or to tone it down, we have not yet understood the full import of the truth that for the reconciliation of man with God, nothing more nor less was needed than the death of the Son of God, and for the manifestation of this reconciliation nothing more nor lcss_;Wian the resurrection of the Son of Man, Jesus Christ*!^
To the initial question "Who and what is man within the
cosmos?", Barth replies:
If our decisive insights are right, the first and basic answer can only be that among all the creatures, man, i.e., this man, is the one in whose identity withhimself we mugt^ recognize at once the identity of Godwith Himself *!91
Our very selves, and our rebellion from God, is not some­
thing which we know as a result of our own insight# We
know it solely from the Word of God:
In virtue of the exoneration from sin validly ef­fected in Jesus, we may count on this nature of ours and its innocence as we could not otherwise do. This judicial pardon gives us the courage and shows us the way to think about man as God created him* It is the true ground of theological anthropology#!?^
Barth's anthropology is Ohristologioal throughout*
The theme was explored in depth in the small separate volume
^^^^bid,, p# 27 
^^^Xbid*, p* 68 
^^Ibid,, pp$ 48-49
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Christ and Adam; Man and Humanity In Romans 5#^^® Jesus
la really the man which God willed# He is the man that
God intended# We derive our real human nature from Him,
"The nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the
problem of human nature* This man is man, , , , He
alone is primarily and properly man,"^^^
, # , if we understand man in general from the hu­manity of Jesus Christ, it automatically follows that we have to understand him as God's creature, as the sinner pardoned by God, and as the heir-expectant of the coming Kingdom of God* In these relatlom we recognize ourselves, not as in the mirror of an idea of man, but as in the mirror of the Word of God which is the source of all truth* And it is obviously not in the framework of unguaranteed concepts arising from these relations, that our sanctification, and the significance ol the claim and decision and judg­ment of^the divine command, can and must be under­stood,!?^ •]){• •X" 'X' “X- % #
A question must now be asked regarding the extent 
to which Barth isoletea the theological ethic. He does 
deal with the "Phenomena of the Human," Man 18, and re­
mains, the creature of God, but other sources of general 
knowledge, says Barth, can offer "symptoms" of the real 
man*!?^ These symptoms are always relegated to a secon­
dary role, but nonetheless, natural science, idealistic 
ethics, existential philosophy, and theistic anthropology 
play their part in Barth's information about the phenomena
Translated by T# A. Small (Hew York: Harper's,1957) ^
Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol$ 3, part 2, p. 43195Ibid., vol* 2, part 2, pp, 549-50 
W d * ,  vol* 3, part 2, pp. 200 ff*
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of man* These sources do not draw their information from 
the Word or Revelation hut, says Barth, this does not 
mean that what they know about man is "false and worth­
less#" Theological anthropology - the Barthian anthro­
pology of the real man - "is prepared to welcome all 
such general knowledge, "1?7 as long as we understand 
that it cannot lead us to the knowledge of the real man, 
Jesus#
In that examination of the partial phenomena, sci­
ence can never be judged the enemy of the Christian con­
fession. It becomes the enemy "only when it dogmatizes 
on the basis of its formulae and hypothesis, becoming 
the exponent of philosophy and world view, and thus ceas­
ing to be an exact science* "Our differentiation
from it," says Barth, "need not imply opposition*
With Barth, one does not investigate man with the 
hope of understanding his basic nature. The theologian, 
and the man, who does not know himself already as the 
covenant partner of God in Christ, before he approaches 
his investigation of the phencmena of man, "will always 
look on the wrong side," Knowledge of "The real man" 
must precede it.
The intent of Barth's position here is compatible
p. 202
p. 23
p. 25
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with this thesis# When the scientist goes beyond the 
phenomena regarding man into the inner reality which 
distinguishes the real man from the partial man, then 
that scientist, says Barth, becomes a Word-of-God theolo­
gian# He is bound by the concerns regarding man as the 
Creature of GodI
It is never, for example, that the evolutionary 
origin of man would be contested by the Word-of-God theolo­
gian# Her is it that the Scriptures would be set against 
the findings of evolutionary science# It can be seen as 
we cite one of the longest footnotes in the Dogmatics. 
Barth gives an example of his own use of outside informa­
tion with reference to the evolutionary origin of man# 
During the latter years of the nineteenth century, some 
doubt arose of the position of man in the universe# Barth 
relates three separate "so-called" apologetic attempts to 
support the uniqueness of man in creation# Zockler, 
e#g,, emphasized "the psychological gulf which existe be­
tween man and the animals." Otto, in the early twentieth 
century, held that "while evolutionary theory can have no 
detrimental effect on a religious outlook, " man also has 
a "completely new and characteristic creation; the world
200Ibid., vol# 2, part 2, pp# 79-90# One wishes that Barth had chosen some other specific examples of apologetics, and more specially in the way of better known theologians# But the point we are making here re­garding Barth's use of science does not depend on his particular choices#
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and life of the spirit In his intellectual life and
in this other world of the spirit, man attains to per­
sonality; and "Personality constitutes the clear and secure 
distinctiveness from the whole world and all other being; 
it establishes a self-enclosed world of its own, free and 
superior to all other becoming and p e r i s h i n g , Titus, 
later in Hatur and Gott, 1926, goes further to admit that 
the "Human psyche camnot be excluded from the general 
process of evolution," but anticipating the kind of Christo- 
centered anthropology in Barth, Titus wrote that "the re­
ligious ideal of man results only from the supreme reli­
gious ideal and therefore from the person of Jesus Christ 
and His ideals*
Further, Barth adds to these apologetic summaries 
some observations of Adolf Portman,^^^ from Biologische 
Fragmente zu einer Lehre vom Manschen (1944), Evolution, 
Barth Interprets Portman as saying, is only "one interpre­
tation of life" which must be brought into the sphere of
Ibid., vol. 3, part 2, p. 82 
p. 83
^^\dolph Portman is a German biologist whose most recent book has been translated into English* Cf. New Paths in Biology, esp. pp. 145-148. (New York; Harper and'TRow^ 1964) iSrtman does note a cautionary attitude toward ac­cepting Darwin's Natural Selection as the total explanation of the origin and significance of man. He emphasizes rightly that life must be examined on two levels; in our subjective experience of living, as well as from the subject of matter itself. He is incidently the only biologist who is used by. Barth throughout his exploration of the subject of man.
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faith* There is a possibility in Barth that either 
Darwinism, or the Theory of Evolution itself, might not 
he an adequate explanation for the nature and origin of 
physical life as we know it, Portman implies no such 
thing, and certainly Barth does not deny an evolutionary 
origin, although it does appear at times that he might 
wish it were not sol Portman's aim is to emphasize human 
particularity by means of biological research* Man differs 
from the rest of nature in his prolonged period of infancy, 
and in his universal "one year premature birth" which in­
dicates an adjustment which is made on the pre-natal, or 
at least the pre-oonscious level* Man develops an in­
creased individuality and his body and soul appear in man 
as a unity.
His (man's ) biological singularity consists in the indissoluble connexion (peculiar to each indivi­dual) - sic - between his inherited tendencies and deveiopmSSI* on the one hand, and his experience of history on the other# "Life requires more from man than the modest certainty which the fragments of factual research can offer us
So said Bortman*
Barth wrote that man's distinctive nature cannot 
be rooted in the characteristics he has developed which 
are not present in the beasts There can be nothing 
in the phenomenon which distinguishes man from the rest of 
creation; however individual or praise-worthy or especially 
unique it might seem*
^^^Barth, Dogmatics# vol, 3, part 2, p, 87
206The point Barth is making here is one that wealso accept in this thesis*
If there la a secure human life, unshakeably sure and conscious of its humanity and therefore its dif­ferentiation from the Ohimpanzee, it will not be the life which cons#s in the phenomena which even at best can be gg^onstrated by science only with a modest oer-
In 80 many significant ways, there can be no doubt that we 
are different, very different, from our animal cousins*
"But what have we really seen when we have seen such 
phenomena? True man? Certainly
If we begin a long list of all the good things we 
have over the beasts, we are faced Immediately with the 
proposition that we are making the list, according to what 
we now know about ourselves and the beasts, We can brag 
about ourselves, but animals which are ranked much lower 
in the process are gifted with some especial kinds of 
talents which Barth says "put man in the shade#" Beyond 
that, for all we know, the animals may have possibilities - 
unknown to us - which are outside of the phenomena we in­
vestigate# In the end, it is possible that our listing 
could be reversed, or almost certainly modified,
Then, the question arises, would we have the right 
to "regard man as higher and better" Barth's answer is 
negative again, for "the value of the distinct phenomena is
207Barth, Dogmatics, vol, 3, part 2, p, 88 
&bid,, p, 89
^^%he amusing comment made by Professor Waddington, referred to on page 140 is immediately brought to mind. BaldWaddington, I will listen to the argument that a worm is superior only when the worm himself comes to present it,"
^^^Barth, Dogmatics, vol. 3, part a, p, 89
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not itself a phenomenon hut the subject of a judgment which 
has not the slightest connexion with the observation of the 
facts*" For, suggests Barth, what if we reversed the 
evaluations at that point? What if we regarded, with 
Schopenhauer, that man's striving is the cause of his suf­
fering, and that the "much boasted mind of man" was the 
source of his disease?
All that is really certain is that the circle of man's supposed self-knowledge is nowhere so visible as in the fact that our real advance upon the animal causes us to regard ourselves as really different from the latter^ü
Barth suggests in the end, with characteristic humour, that 
we are certain only that we are better; but the only proof 
of our advance is the courage and the nerve to make that 
claim*
There is a parallel here between the kind of In­
formation which Barth brings to the study of the nature of 
man and that which he allows for the man making his ethical 
choices* In the ethical situations, we can also investigate 
the various types of collateral information which we can 
discover* But ultimately we are not arriving at a legiti­
mate ethical decision* We make that only in the command 
which God issues, which may or may not be confirmed in the 
other ethical deliberations which we undertake.
We must know man, as we know ethics, says Barth, 
from the original source, and only there.
211Ibid., p. 89
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If m m  does not Imow himself already, long be­fore his attention is directed to these phenomena, he will be blind even though he sees* In face, and in spite of these phenomena he will always look on the wrong side* He will always think he should con­vince himself that his own reality consists in what he has in common with the animal and the rest of crea­tion generally* Thus even from this standpoint the knowledge and interpretation of phenomena of the hu­man is limited, conditional, and relative knowledge*The knowledge of man himself must precede it, and this has roots in a very different soil*^!^
# * * * * * *
The separation is clear* But paradoxically, at
least in his latter writings, Barth actually encourages
the use of collateral information from the natural sciences
and other sources, which help to describe the phenomena of
the tentative man* To understand fully, says Barth, or
rather to understand the one who is fully man, we must
first annex this knowledge and subdue it. Just as surely
as the knowledge of the Oommand of God must annex the
other fields of ethics as the Israelites annexed Canaan*
But it must come only in the second place, following the
real man*
Ibid., p# 90
h# The Gommand and its Intrusion on Man
The second concern in our criticism of Barth's 
ethic lies in his analysis of the divine command and the 
way that command is received by man. We argue that his 
analysis is based on a fundamental misconception of the 
capabilities of man to receive the divine instruction.
In God Here and How, Barth wrote that: Christian ethics
is the att##t to repeat in human words and with human 
concepts the divine commandment. Man's goodness is 
based upon his openness to receive the cmimnd. The 
Christian, says Barth, can reduce the urgent ethical 
questions to ones How may I be impartial to the truth 
of the C r e a t o r The believer can begin his ethical 
quest with the knowledge that God has already provided 
the answer - and the answer is specific* The Christian 
answer does not belong to the group of answers which man 
himself can give and is accustomed to receive* Nothing 
which comes on the "basis of |»is reason, his conscience, 
or on the basis of his knowledge and history, , , ♦ Chris­
tian ethics answers the call from God" , , * you have heard 
0 man, what is good*^^^ The Christian is able to receive.
^^®Barth, God Here and Now# p. 87
Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, translated by Douglas H5r^5nnrCw3BnrTB33er^1928), p. 148
SlSBarth, God Here and Now, p* 86
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hear, and act upon a speolfle command from God: What he
"ought" to do has already been spoken for him*
The difficulty we note here is that Barth provides < 
no way in which one can determine whether there is a specific 
command or not; or if there is, how one can be certain that 
what he decides at the moment is actually the command,
Barth declares that the ethic gives freedcoa; and that it 
is in correspondence with the Grace of God. But what ac­
tually occurs as it develops in Barth's writing, is not 
unlike the ethical process which occurs in many other 
ethical pursuits * Where the Christian is deciding what 
the command of God could be, he still is in the human predic­
ament, deciding within his culture, and within the limita­
tions of his individual person. Believing that the com­
mand has already been spoken, or that it is in the process 
of being spoken, is just one of the factors involved in 
making the choice.
We want to know from Barth how the man can know 
that he has heard the specific command of God. Barth anti­
cipates that question and attempts an. answers
The objection that the divine will is not known to to us, or not sufficiently known, in its definiteness, is not only futile but cunning and deceitful because it makes a virtue or an excuse out of our need, « • * so that we are acquitted in advance if in our arbitrary choice between the many possibilities open to us we may not coincide with the will of God.^!^
Later, he reiterates that "God intends and finds and reaches 
Wx'th, Dogmatics, vol. 2, part 2, p. 670
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man In the most detailed way when He gives His command, "^ 7^
He (God) does not give us a selection of possi­bilities between which we must decide according to this or that rule* He confronts us liith a concrete necessity in relation to which obedience puts us in the right and disobedience in the wrong#21o
And:
It cannot be said of any other commands in them­selves and as such that they are permissions, re­leases, liberations; that they give us freedom* On the contrary, their commanding is in every respect a holding fast, a binding, a fettering* * * . their bidding is a forbidding*"?
"The command of God sets men free* The command of God 
permits. It is only this way that it commands,^^^
The gift of freedom is one of the foundations of 
the Barthian ethic. We ask here concerning how this com­
mand which brings freedom can be shown to be the specific 
command of God* Man has freedom before God; he has free­
dom in fellowship; he has freedom for life; and he has 
freedoa in limitation itself, "The decisive significance 
attributed to the concept of freedom in Barth's ethics," 
writes Hartwell,
can be inferred from his characterization of the di­vine gift of freedom as the foundation of Christian ethics, and of Christian ethics as the reflection upon what gjn is required to do in and with the gift of free-
p. 710
p. 585
""°Ibid.
Hartwell, Theology of Karl Barth, p* I61
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The Command of God, to Barth, Is the renewed offer of grace 
which will make man free. The freedom, to man, is the 
God-given freedom to obey,^^^
A free man is one who chooses, decides and de­termines himself and who acts according to his thoughts, words, and deeds. The course of his ac­tions is a consequence of the nature of his God- given freedom. . . .  Man does the good when he acts according to the imperative inherent in the gift of freedom. He does the evil when he obeys a law that is contrary to his freedom.
We have no quarrel here with Barth's exposition of 
the divine command and its will for our good and our free­
dom. Neither do we object to the demand which Barth in­
sists that it makes upon us. In most of the details of 
this section of his argument we could readily agree* The 
question still concerns the man himself: Does the free­
dom which God confers in Barth's ethic, also free man 
from his manhood? Can we be certain that the freedom is 
not dependent on the Instinctive feelings or rational con­
clusions of the Individual involved?
In addition to this freedom, Barth suggests another 
way to determine if the command of God is present. "It 
will not appeal to his fear, but to his c o u r a g e , That 
has an authentic sound, but doors of compulsion can be 
opened in many other ways. Psychiatric counseling. Masonic
popBarth, Humanity of God, p. 82
^23Ibid., p. 84 
^^\arth. Dogmatics# vol, 2, part 2, p. 586
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meetings, new jobs, an inheritance, mystical meditation, 
pop art, and ecology rallies have all been credited re­
cently with opening the doors of compulsion and offering 
freedom to the individual* A Captain in the fields of 
World War II, Ian Smith in Rhodesia, Eldridge Cleaver at 
a Black Bower Bally, Mau-Mau warriors - each commanding 
something other and different, and often antithetical -
appeal to courage and not to fear. Unless Barth wishes.<■
to attribute some sort of equal merit, which is obviously 
nonsense, he would have to define the distinguishing 
characteristics of the command in some more convincing 
manner#
Barth counters the objection with the answer that 
"The problem of distinguishing the command of God from 
other commands narrows down accordingly to that of dis­
tinguishing Jesus Christ from all other lords#"^^5 The 
person of Christ, he says, is ultimately the fullness of 
the divine command. Again, Barth implies that the be­
liever in Christ receives an explicit directive that the 
Lord Jesus Christ is to be served in this specific way#,
Christ is part Of the ethical process # As James 
Gustafson has made clear in his recent Christ and the Moral ^  
Life: "The moral life is a life of disoipleship to Christ," 
writes Gustafson.
It is not to be determined by one's loyalty to the community of family, or university, or nation, or
p. 608
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ecclesiastical affiliation, but to find one's wayin and through these in loyalty to him."')
Christian finds Christ to be a norm that illuminates 
his options and, insofar as he is loyal to Christ, deeply 
conditions his c h o i c e . T h a t  is not to say, as Barth 
does, that the choices and the options are dictated by 
Christ. "The analyses and choices made are human, and 
are made by finite creatures with various biases and per­
spectives • "
♦ ♦ * as the effects of human agency they can never claim divine sanction unambiguously. Agency, the capacity to decide, to act, to initiate and respond, is not only our human condition, but it is Sdgh by creation, and X believe it necessarily is respected by the providential power of God."°
Ho statement could better epitomize our objection to the
way in which Barth teaches that the specific command of
God is revealed to the individual Christian. The "capacity
to decide, to act and initiate" exists in creation. We
believe the "providential power of God" respects that
capacity in ethical choices.
God is involved in the ethical decision and with 
the man who acts. "Who is the man who acts?" Barth answers;
is the creature of God, namely, the one whom God had in view when he created heaven and earth, de­termining him as His covenant-partner and finally for participation in His eternal life. He is the sinner to whom God in His wonderful freedom is gracious.That is, he is the being who has disobeyed God, broken the covenant, denied his own nature and missed his vo­cation, yet to whom God is faithful quite apart from
226Gustafson, Christ and Moral Life, p. 2 7 0
Ibid., p. 268
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and in defiance of his deserts, so that without being worthy of it he may hold fast to His promise in faith, live by His forgiveness and hope in Him# And he is the child of the father led by the Spirit, who as the time of contradiction, conflict and suffering moves to its end already lives in hope in the presence of God's future and final revelation which will fully reveal him as that which he is even now# The man who is in the ethical event acts in the light of the divine command is to be consistently understood as this being. ^
That would do for a beginning to a Christian understanding
of man. Man is all that. But he is also a being driven by
conflicting motives over which he has not managed conscious
control, and through which the revelation and the command
must come.
Another possible mediator for the command would be 
ethical discussions of the conscience of man. To Barth, 
conscience is "the totality of our self-consciousness in­
sofar as it can receive and proclaim the Word and there­
fore the command of God as it comes to us."^^^ Later he 
writes that, "the concept of conscience cannot be classed 
as an anthropological but only as an eschatological con­
cept"; and that "it is only in the light of the integral 
connexion of our existence with that of Jesus Christ, in 
the light of the future consummation which is our inheri­
tance and possession in Jesus Christ, that conscience or 
our self-consciousness can be understood and claimed as the 
organ of the divine will."^^! coixsoience knows the com­
mand of God, but "the command is not revealed and given
^^^Barth, Dogmatics, vol. 3, part 4, p. 25 
vol. 2, part 2, p. 66?
231Ibid.
by conaoiance but to consclanca
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If only athica could reveal to man from the very beginning that in wrestling vdth the problem of his good or evil actions he is not confronted with his con­science, with the kairps, with his own judgement, with any visible or invisible law of nature or history, with any individual or social ideals, and least of all, with his own arbitrary will. If only ethics could tell him that as a free man he is confronted with the will, word, and deed of the free God.^^^
Would that we could deal with a man who is in such full com­
munion with God that we could believe that his conscience 
is the voice of God. But the inner voice which speaks is 
as complex in voice as it is in origin* Barth writes as 
if no psychological studies had ever been conducted, and 
as if the origin of the super-ego, and the development of 
the moral idea in a child had never been investigated.
Barth, too, is obviously aware that the Will and 
Word of God will often be obscured from the individual.
But, he writes;
The obscurity of God's will in a particular case always arises on man's side, not on God's. And the question which requires clarification in each parti­cular case is not what the command ia^_but how it stands with the man confronted by it.^a^
But that is only partly true. If we grant that there is a 
specific command of God for each specific ethical event, 
we are still left with the problem of separating the "com­
mand" from other "commands," and must inquire both about 
the nature of the command and the nature of the man who is
Humanity of God, pp. 85-86 
^^^Barth, Dogmatics, vol. 3, part 4, p. 12
confronted by It. "How It etands with the man confronted 
by it" - to us - Is simply another way of saying that when 
the vrlll of God Is obscure, we must examine the cultural, 
psychologloal, biological and religious elements of the 
whole ethical event.
The "religious element," in this case the belief 
that a command from God is already issued, is one of the 
circumstances which surround the decision. Rather than 
begin by asking "What has God commanded?", we should ask 
both "What does God require in this situation?", and "How 
am I best able as a man to meet the requirement?" The 
first question is akin to Barth's, The second is not.
To understand how I can meet the requirement, I have first 
to understand the predicament of the human situation, and 
then evaluate what can become the Word of God* What I 
think is the will of God is also part of what I have re- 
oelved. With that knowledge, I am forced to inquire whether 
there is a command, how X can interpret it correctly, and 
how in the end, with the problems of human existence, I 
can act. la writes;
among us ever hears the Word of God so perfectly as to see this context in all its fullness? It is enough that it exists, and that God knows and rules it. This is the ease even when man is not conscious himself at all, when he is not yet or no longer a Ghrlstian.^35
But it is not enough I We must conclude that Barth has no
satisfactory answer to the question of how the individual
man can know the specific command of God.
p. 26
4. Special Ethics ; Some Problems and Possibilities 
a. Introduction
Our critiqua here is not aimed at the ethical con­
clusions which Dr* Barth suggests* Often we can endorse 
the way he approaches many of these topics* One can hardly 
read the Dogmatics and not be touched by the compassionata 
concern of this mighty theologian#^3® Some of the polemic 
which is leveled against his "irrelevant ethic" would be 
eliminated if the critics were to read his special ethics 
in detail*
We are concerned with the manner in which Barth 
arrives at his ethical spheres and frame of reference* 
Barth's instructions for the ethical event are received 
from the Word of God, but his moral opinions consistently 
reflect many of the cultural norms and sanctions which 
others receive from other sources* If it is alone the 
Word of God which determines Barth's ethical conclusions, 
then let us say that it is also the word of man* When
236One cannot miss the scope of his ethical concern, where, e#g#, Barth applies his ethic to "near and distant nei#bors"; or where, in the middle of his discussion of "The Holy Day," Barth soars into a remarkable paean of praise on what the joy of living is; or how in the section on "childless couples," he offers compassionate supportive counseling and encouragement to all those who have not been blessed with children*
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Barth oornes down to discuss the problems of the earthy he 
utilizes some of the ethical attitudes of human nature as 
an integral part of his ethical formulations3 Hot to over- 
simplify^ but what we really find are the well written 
opinions of a certain Bwiss professor of theology who is 
kindly disposed to certain fundamental ideas of historical 
Christian practice, and laments their passing in the twen­
tieth century; but who* at the same time, 1# moderately 
progressive on many socio-economic* and personal ethical 
problems which an enlightened bourgeois gentleman of our 
time must inevitably face# Ttm revelation of the special 
command of God the Creator is mediated by the particular 
culture and circumstances in which the problems and the 
projected solutions occur» Where his ethical analysis is 
most helpful* it is usually because he has indirectly 
noticed sources within the life process. Hhere he is 
incorrect* or irrelevant* in our judgment* is often at 
the point where he has ignored or misinterpreted the kind 
of scientific and cultural information regarding both the 
non~rational origin ofiM%%ü^, and the necessary background 
information on the event itself.
For example* the first ethical problem which Barth 
discusses* and the one which to him is first in importance * 
is the problem of '^Sabbath Observance." We have no cause 
to argue that Barth is right or wrong. Assume for the 
moment that Dr. Barth is correct. What we want to ask then* 
is on what authority can such an announcement be made? Some
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other might answer because the Bible teaches it; the fourth 
Commandment does after all say "Remember the Sabbath Day 
to keep it holy." But* Barth would not give that answer*
He says he will answer it in accordance with the divine 
command of the Living Christ* and the particular ethical 
event as it is described in the sphere* or the relation­
ship* of God the Creator and man the creature#
What can etMcs do in this matter? , # # its proper contribution to the problem of Sunday is neces­sarily the proclamation of the Gospel* of the history of salvation and the end* and this id.ll always become the proclamation of the Sabbath commandment # , ,^ 3*
It will take place in the context of holiness. Barth writes
that "His command says that man is to keep His day Holy*
as a day of worship*"
It is not just a general entreaty to be worshipful 
and to be devoted the whole day to heavenly thoughts. The 
day* says the command* will have certain characteristics 
which will specify the "holiness" i "We may well say that 
without rest from work and participation in divine service* 
there is no obedience to the Sabbath commandment.
Barth ties the solution of his "first ethical pro­
blem*’ to the belief that God must be first in our thoughts 
and acts. Sabbath observance shows that we put God first* 
The Sabbath commandment explains all other commandments #
"The holy day does not belong to man* but to God." And*
Barth* Dogmatics * vol. 2* part 4* pp. 66-67
p. 60
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"Be who h&8 a self-renounolo# faith on Sunday will have It 
also throughout the week. "
If B&rth were using the day as & symbol* there would 
be leas Objection. Man*8 relationahlp with God la of first 
importance. But* to Barth it is far more than a symbol* it 
is an actual ethical command* that Sunday* The Lord's Day* 
aontag itself* be celebrated and observed. Man is then 
to pause from his work* and to attend divine service; and 
then* but only then* is he offered refreshment for his 
spirit*
Barth notes that there could be other good reasons 
for selecting the one day of rest in seven: reasons from
the humanitarian side: in the necessities of physical
rest* psychological peace* or social hygiene.
Yet this humanitarian basis has the necessary forceand authority only when it derives its strength from the first and true basis of the commandment # , .Where it is simply asserted as a postulate of human nature and reason* many a counter-basis and sundry
Barth's ethical instruction now becomes pre-eminently clear, 
Man is not entitled to establish any ethical instruction 
from a source other than the Command* which is independent 
from all other sources. And* if Barth be accepted for 
what he says* all other "humanitarian" reasons* good as 
they might otherwise be* are of no use In Barth's special 
ethics.
239Ibid.* p. 61
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Barth's oommmd says that Sabbath observance will 
bring rest and refreshment to the soul# Could it not also 
be an egpol consideration* that rest and refreshment should 
be brought to the body; when after six days of work in the 
classroom* or in the church* or in the hospital surgical 
row* a day of exercise and hard work in the country* could 
be more beneficial to the Christian* than a seventh day of 
rest and worship and prayer? And could not the same Chris­
tian* who also desires to place God first* not miss divine 
service* work all day Sunday* and go to Men's Club at the 
First Presbyterian Church on Tuesday noon; or go out to 
serve God's people in the ghetto on Friday evening? The 
needs and the necessities of the human individual are in­
volved integrally in the process of decision Itself.
Barth writes of the peculiar work of going to church on 
Sunday; to which the "nature-lovor* the sportsmen* the 
spiritually minded lover of solitary contemplation* and 
even the ordinary man bent on a lie-in * . # now that he 
Is released from the labours of the week* and especially 
those of Saturday evening*" all object*
But "When the Gospel* the good news* breaks through and asserts itself in this commandment; when the history of salvation and the end is heard in all its glory; when man grasps it as an invitation to keep to God's grace and rejoice in it* then he will cleave to the congregation* and will definitely go
The "command" soon enou#L becomes a "commandment" I
p. 64
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Many lament the passing of the Sabbath observance 
in our modem world* And* while we would not transfer 
the range of ethical concern out into the lowlands of 
non-theological ethical reflection* and consider only the 
cultural* social* and psychological needs of the indivi­
duals involved* we would insist that these sources can 
influence the command (or the commandment) and help to 
shape an answer that would do justice to the demands and 
needs of the individual as well as worship and service to 
God.
b. The Problem in Special Ethics
Barth dl80U8888 "the problem of special ethics" at 
great length at the beginning of this volume (III* part 4). 
First he draws a distinction between "general ethics" and 
"special e t h i c s " G e n e r a l  Ethics*" which forms part of 
the Doctrine of Gods "is a question of understanding gen­
erally the fact and extent that human sanctification and 
therefore good human action are effected by the action of 
God in His c o m m a n d . General ethics has to show how 
the command is the claim made by God on the man and how he 
may accept it; it shows that the command "is always God's 
decision"; and it shows that the command is God's judgment 
on man* but also it shows his grace* "by which man is at 
once condemned and acquitted and thus becomes free for 
eternal life." The last is "the final goal and the original 
purpose of the command of God" - to make him free.
Good human action is action set free by the command of God* by His claim and decision and judgment. This is the general answer which theological ethics has to give to the ethical question.^^3
"special ethics" is a matter of following through on
241Barth* Dogmatics* vol. 3* part 4* pp. 3 ff. Allfollowing references to vol. 3* part 4.
242 , p. 45
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this original purpose and goal. We have to follow the com­
mand from God to man# The command of God "does not hang 
ineffectively in the air"; it becomes concrete and goes 
"into the distinctive lowlands of real human action and 
therefore into the sphere of concrete human volition* de­
cision* action and abstention* into the events of this 
particular
Special ethics is seen in other places* as a set 
of Biblical texts and concomitant sets of moral rules which 
are to be applied to the ethical event; "the ethic which 
in church history bears the name of casuistry*" Casuistry 
does have a particula veri» and there is a "practical 
casuistry*" says Barth, It is an enticing approach for it 
gives a security to the individual and removes the burden 
of decision; but "it is basically unacceptable* . , « how- 
ever convenient it would be both for spiritual advisors 
and above all for troubled souls,
(1) If special ethics become casuistry* this means that the moralist wishes to set himself on God's throne.# . . Casuistry is a violation of the divine mystery in the ethical event
(2) Casuistical ethics makes the objectively untenable assumption that the command of God is a universal rule * , # But it is always an individual com­mand for the conduct of.this man* at this moment and in this situation.
p, 6 , vol. 3, part 4 
2 % .  8
10
11
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It commands not only how man Is to think and act here and now* but also quite specifically* what is to take place Inwardly in his mind and thoughts* and outwardly in what he does or Refrains from doing.
Then Barth goes on significantly to write;
It ( the Command ) leaves nothing to human choice or preference. It thus requires no interpretation to come to force# To the last and smallest detail it is self- interpreted* and in this form it confronts man as a command already in force#
# # # 4.MÏ3 obscurity of God's will in a particular case always arises on man's side* not God's* and the question which requires clarification in each particu­lar case is not what the oommandqis* but how it stands with the man confronted by it#
also* says Barth* is the way the command came to those 
in the Holy Scriptures* "not as rules* and axioms* and general 
moral truths*" but in "unique and singular orders." "Their 
common import consists in the fact that it is always the 
same divine Overlord who in this way confronts various men*" 
(3) The tWrd argument against casuistry is that it 
"also involves an encroachment* * « » and a destruction of 
Christian freedom*" Man is expected to offer himself to God* 
not to follow the instruction of a particular moralist* 
"Casuistry destroys the freedom of this obedience* It 
openly Interposes something other and alien between the 
Comnmid of God and the man who is called to obey Him."^^^
Having argued that the casuistical approach to ethics 
is unacceptable* Barth faces the alternative* If moral rules 
are not to be applied to individual situations* then is man
p* 12, vol. 3, part 4 
'p. 14
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left to operate ethically on a moment-to-moment* catch-as- 
catch-can* do-what-you-llke ethic? Barth answers an em­
phatic ; "Ho* of course not I" This cannot be what we mean. 
Here Barth gets to the heart of "the problem in special 
ethics" ; How one can abandon casuistry in ethics* where 
rules* axioms* and principles can be systematized and im­
posed* and not adopt a situational or an anti-nomian ethic 
in which each individual forms his own answer to each in­
dividual ethical situation without reference or guidance 
from beyond the situation* %at should* or can* be sub­
stituted for dictates* rules and laws.
Others have attempted to answer this problem in 
modem ethical thought. Joseph Fletcher^^ and Bishop 
J. A. T. Eobinson^^i have offered a type of "situationalism" 
that emphasizes the ethical event itself and the require­
ments inherent in it* mainly the requirement of Christian 
love# J. H# Oldham^^^ and John 0* Bennett^^^ have offered 
a "middle axiom" ethical reflection that has the merit of , 
bringing the best from casuistical ethics into contact with
See Joseph Fletcher's Situation Ethics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press* 1966)1 and Moral Kespmsibillty (London:SOM Press* 1967) -------- ^ ^
251Bishop J. A* T. Robinson* Honest To God ( Philadelphia :Westminster Press* I963); and Ohristlah Moras Today (Hxila- delphias Westminster Press* 19W )
252Oldham originated the term "middle axims" back in 1937* following the Oxford Conference. Of. The Function of the Church in Booiety (1937)
253Cf. asp. The Achievement of John C. Bennett* by David H. Smith (Hew York; HèrdeiFâhË Be^ rder^  .pp. 133 ff. Or Bennett's Christian Ethics and Social Policy (Hew York: Charles Soribnei^ s^ 'BohsT'lgWy'''''"'''   ^ ~
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the best of our aoncern for the ethical event. Barth him­
self mention# the writings of D. Bonhoeff@r* with hi# 
concept of "mandates” that concern the "whole man and all 
men*” Brunner's concept of "orders*”^ 55 Barth rejects al­
most completely, Baul Althaus'^56 dependence on the environ­
ment in which the ethical event takes place is also rejected 
as "missing the event,” M* II# S^e receives criticism for 
going to the other extreme and offering "a piecemeal ethics* ” 
which is never more than a reference to the ethical event *^ 57
Barth's own constructive effort to solve the "problem 
of the horizontal” is one of the most important ethical 
statements in our day# Special ethics "always speak with 
reference to God's concrete command* and man's concrete 
obedience or disobedience,”^^® It is a concrete and spe­
cific command* but it is not only "in a series of innumerable 
revelations,” God's mercy is new every morning* but God
Barth* Dogmatics* vol. 3* part 4* p, 10* 14-15* esp, 21-22 and of, D* Mmoeîïir Ethics* translated by Eberhard Bethge (London: 80M* 1955)
B^arth* Dogmatiog* vol. 3* part 4* p. 20* etc,* andof, Brunner's The"mvlhe operative (London: The LutterworthPress* 1937* translamT wÿrn}-----
256Barth* Dommticg* vol. 3* part 4* pp, 20-21* and sea Paul M t h a u s Command* translated by Franklin   — — — 1* 1966)
Barth* Dogmatics* vol. 3* part 4* pp, 22-23
p, 16
'Sir.
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Is One and He la true to Himself* so that "in all the in- 
finite diveraity . . .  we have # . , a single and unitary 
command,”
Hot only ia God one* but all the individual ethical 
acts are the "action of the same subject* of man* this man." 
Man is one* too. As the vertical intersects the horizontal* 
as "One God" meets the one man* there is a constancy of the
command and the action of man, "The references to the
vertical . . * cannot remain a mere point but must become 
l i n e a r , The function of special ethics in that regard* 
to Barth* is a service in this "formed reference, " It does 
not pronounce judgment* but it gives "definite instructions" 
with regard to the event,
Special ethics can then become the investigationand representation of the character which this eventwill always take* of the standard by which the good­ness or evil of human action will be decided* not by ogi the moralist* and his ethic * but by God the Commander.
Everything* though* depends upon whether anything can 
be known about the " continuity and constancy of the divine 
command and human action."  ^ We receive our knowledge 
about this horizontal by God's word - or not at all, Man 
must be instructed by God Himself* and by His Word* "regard­
ing the connexion* the permanence* continuity* and in which
259Ibid,* pp. 17-18
p. 18
p6p“Ibid.* p. 18
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it takes p l a c e . The two factors which are present in 
every ethical event - God with Els claim upon man and man 
the active subject - are both "revealed in the Word of God* 
in Jesus Christ.
In that revelation we find the commanding God and 
Els command: "as the command of the One who is man's Creator*
Reconciler and Redeemer* surrounding and holding him fast. 
Corresponding to the three persons in the Trinity* Creator* 
Reoonoller and Redeemer* we find the God who is involved in 
the ethical event. We also find the man* a creature of God* 
who "is the sinner to whom God is gracious » . . he is the 
child of the Father led by the S p i r i t * T h a t  man is also 
one who is "certain of M s  eternal future."
If we accept the above information concerning God and 
man* we will see the basic clarity of Barth's special ethics. 
"Basic clarity" is probably an overstatements but* Barth 
says "A moment in history" takes place between God and this 
man* and that is the nature of the constancy. "Special 
ethics is in general terms a commentary upon this history* 
to be drawn up with particular regard to this encounter.
When The God meets This MOn "th#n definite spheres
I^bid.* p. 19 (all following are also vol. 3* part 4)
23
24265p. 25
26
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and relationships may be seen in which the encounter takes 
p l a c e , These "spheres and relationships" are never to 
be regarded as "universal ethical truths*" for they are 
only "the general form of the one and supremely particular 
truth of the ethical event," Yet* God uses these spheres* 
and the ethical event takes place in them* so that - "as 
with a mirror" - we can reflect into this or that sphere 
or relationship (say the historical outline of the encounter 
Of Crod and man)* and although we will not receive a defini­
tion or an exact summons as to what we do next: we will re­
ceive;
a reference to it by which it is generally de­scribed in a way which is generally discernible and attested in a form which is generally valid; an ethical lead in which there is a perceptible approximation to this event ; a directive * or rather* a series of direc­tives* which give guidance to the individual in the form of an approximation to the knowledge of the di­vine command and right human action, "Sog
The description of that reference* which is an approximation 
to the answer of what la good for man to do* then becomes 
as "intensive as possible* and the directives and direc­
tions as urgent and as binding as p o s s i b l e . And* if 
we can take the ideal possibility of "full knowledge of 
definite spheres and relationships in which the ethical 
event takes place*" then the definite directive takes on a 
sharpness which "almost acquires the character of an answer, '
p. 2 9 , Vol. 3, part If, CD
^^ 9p. 30-31
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Almost an answer* but not quite; for "ethics still will 
have to leave the final judgment to God," The question 
"gains in precision” as the knowledge becomes broader and 
deeper* And* if it adheres to the historical outlines of 
the spheres and relationships* "it certainly offers no less 
than g u i d a n c e . M o r e  than guidance will not be expected. 
"More than guidance” is either "arbitrary human assertion 
or the event of the revelation of which only God Himself 
can be the subject.” "True ethics" gives "well-founded and 
legitimate witness* and therefore training in Christianity* 
and in the particular case of ethics training in keeping 
the command."
In short* Barth believes that if we could describe 
any particular "sphere*" or "relationship" in which the 
particular ethical event takes place* the sphere* say* of 
the encounter of God the Creator with his creature; if we 
could understand that in this encounter God wills freedom 
for His creature; and if we could reflect on that descrip­
tion or reference* the ethical event itself; we could ap­
proximate a good ethical response* provided that we under­
stand that the description et al comes only from the command. 
In the end* man must take a leap of obedience to the Word of 
God; not a leap per se* but a leap in obedience to the com­
mand as it comes to man.
It is consistent with the Barthian system to single
P* 31, CD, vol» 5, part 4,
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out the command as the source of authentic information# 
Whatever objection we have to that belongs to his entire 
epistemologieai concept* and not to this specific reference# 
It is important only to note that Barth sets the concrete 
and specific command of God within that framework# The 
command is individual; but* roughly abbreviated* it Mil 
remain somewhat constant* as it corresponds to the relation­
ship which the One God has to the one sian* both being con­
stants* As Professor James Whyte once remarked* "The 
command soon enough becomes a commandment." That* it often 
does. Barth is dogmatic on most ethical subjects.
We will move to some of the spheres of ethical events 
which Barth covers in this volume* and follow the consistency 
with which he applies the working principle of the special 
ethic# The solution to this "problem" is operative through­
out# Barth "instructs" the concrete ethical event with a 
description of the sphere* imposing the information received 
from the command over and above other sources of knowledge. 
There are some qualifications to be made regarding his use 
of that concept* but they will arise individually in situ.
c# Man and Woman
The basic concept of man In Barth's theology Includes 
the idea of man in fellow humanity* and in the first instance 
man with woman: male and female created Ha them. Ho man 
exists in isolation; "there is no abstract human but only 
concretely masculine or feminine being* The details of 
this concept are worked out in three different sections of 
the Dogmatics Volume on Creation. We will deal briefly with 
each:
(1) Volume III* Bart 1* Paragraph 41
There* in a lengthy exegesis of Genesis 2:18-25*
Barth Introduces his thesis : "Everything aims at one fact*
to wit* that God did not create man alone* as a single human 
being* but in the unequal duality of male and f e m a l e . Man 
himself was created in such a way that "in the exercise of 
his genuine freedom he must will to confirm his humanity 
with this unequivocal Yes to the woman given to him*
Without woman* man would be without the glory which God in­
tended, And* further in the prototype "from which it cannot 
depart* " the relationship of man and woman has to be understood
P72Barth* Dogmatics* vol. 3* part 2* p, 286 
'■'ibid., vol. 3> part 1, p. 288 
^"^\bia,, p. 294
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as described in the account of oreatlon#^75 %t is "primal 
history.” Yet In fact* "man is no longer single hut a 
couple. He no longer lacks the good thing which he lacked 
according to the judgment of God In verse 2;l8 # , • The I 
has found its Thou and that means hoth.”^ ^®
Barth then briefly notes the ordering: "The striking
expression 'the man and his wife' points already to the 
definite order of this relationship."^77 Sexuality is con­
sidered in relation to procreation* and "for the sake of a . 
son a m m  must seek his wife."^^® "The Old Testament does 
know a proper meaning and seriousness of the sexual relation 
as such# It is tied to procreation alone# That is why it 
ventures* in the voice of the prophet* to describe the con­
nexion between fahweh and Israel in terms of the relationship 
between man and wife#"^^^
Volume III* Bart 2* Paragraph 45* Section 3 
Barth builds somewhat on this first description of 
male and female* when he comes to the subject "Humanity as 
Likeness and lope#"^ He affirms once more that "we cannot 
say man without having to say male or female and male and
#* p# 305 (all followixig are also vol. 3* part 1) 
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a8o 33.9#* vol. 3* part 2* pp# 28g-324
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female# It Is difficult to follow Barth completely* but 
he goes on to say that while there are other relationehipe 
with "feliw-hum&nity*” such as fathers and daughters* 
mothers and sons* etc#*
It is obvious that the encounter between man and woman is fully and properly achieved only where there is the special connexion of one mm  loving this woman and one woman loving this man in^free choice and M t h  a view to a full life-partnership *
Wien God created man and woman* writes Barth* "He also creates 
their relationship* and brings them together#"^®® They ful­
fill themselves in relationship with the other* in the order 
of subordination which is ordained by God# "This basic order 
of the human established by God's creation is not accidental 
or contingent# It cannot be overlooked # # # It is solidly 
and necessarily grounded in Christ* with a view to whom 
heaven and earth and finally man were created#”^®^
In the community this relationship cannot imperil either man or woman# , # « There is no cause to abolish it as though it were a mere convention# On the contrary* dishonour and h a m  are done both to mag and to woman if this clear relationship is aboliahed#^^*^
"Wives be subject to your husbands # . . for the husband is
head of the wife even as Christ is head of the Church*" is$
the exegetical norm for all the other t e x t s . T h e  M f e
^®^bid#* vol. 3* part 2* p# 286 (all following are also vol. 3* part 2)
p* 288
p # 291
Jp. 312 
’jP. 313
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is to be subordinate to the husband* as the whole community
of Christians - male and female - is to be to Christ. The
husband has hi# subordination in that he should love hie
wife aa himself* "Mlling for himself only as he wills her 
,,287
(3) volume HI* Bart 4* Paragraph g4
When he comes to the ethics of the Doctrine of Crea- 
tion* Barth gives an elaborate study of Man and Woman and 
the ethical problems which belong to that relationship# The 
ethical Goncems of sexual intercourse are discussed in de- 
tail# Barth issues first the warning that we should never 
allw the subject to be isolated* and to let it become one 
of physical nature or natural impulses# "One can properly 
be concerned about sexual ethics only when one has a clear 
head and a firm h e a r t I t  is* after all* still God's 
command which we are listening to* even in these lowlands 
of human experience#
All this sexual experience takes place only in totality and context of the life of each of the partners including the whole sphere of their encounter and co- exlstenggi man and his fellow* Thou and I* as man and woman#*=™
are not out to liberate ourselves from natural sex* Barth 
explained# It is an important part of the creation: "But
p. 3:288Ibid#* vol. 3* part 4* p# ll8
130-31 (all following are also vol. 3* part 4)
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it is only a single point In the line preceded and followed
by others and together with the latter determined by the
common origin and goal*”^ ^^ It is part of the goal regard-
ing human sexual intercourse that the two shall become one
flesh* In concern for the whole being of the other* Barth
throws out the challenge i
What are you* you man and woman* who are about to enter into sexual relations? What do you really want of each other? What is your business with each other? What have you in common? Is there any meaning in it?Is it demanded and sustained by your real life together? Is it justified and full of promise because at any rate you are honestly and resolutely on the way to achieving* * *
Barth addresses at length the question of the natural biolo* 
gical i#ulses towards sex: those who succwb to the biolo* 
gicai urges* he says* are poorly endowed* rather than rich* 
Outbursts of sexuality are but self-centered bondage which 
merely exploits the nature of man* Bm» in the human situa­
tion* Barth says must be seen entirely differently from 
that in the rest of creation:
In itself it is not a fundamental natural impulse which man has In common with animals and which has then to be morally controlled and directed* By nature it is a human sexuality# primarily m û  inwardly stamped and moulded by man's specific nature# and by the mental andg
Barth also discusses sexual restraint and discipline#
131
291PP* 133-34 
%. 13?
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Mth especial reference to Gharlot straeeer
wrote that "we do vloleWe to nature If we measure the 
nature of m n  by that of the anlml»"
HUmm mature has a phygleal but also a psychical structure. Hemoe It is erroneous to suppose that human mature is frustrated If In the time of p^sleal sexual maturity* It eamot be sexually active# bgt.^ lt must mit a suitable opportunity for this aetivlty#^^
Nobody# suggests Btraeser* "has yet been made ill or destroyed 
through sexual diaeipllne»"
80# o<mtlnuee Barth# everythiaig which deviates from 
the exclusive psydho-physical relationship between two 
partners in marriage is indiscipline# "The humbug of the 
absolute necessity of seamal satisfaction in some way or 
another must be finally defeated»" (Barth still quoting Strasser»): 
The command of God brings certain insights into this 
sphere of human relationships which have to do with the 
theological knowledge which is received by the obedient 
servant* Barth does show an awareness of some of the litera­
ture Which concerns human sexuality* and he often incorporates 
it into his text# At one time or another he deals ?d.th the 
writings of Simone de Beauvoir in Le peuxieme. Bexe (a flight 
from oner's own sex); Nicholas Berdyaev in The Destiny of Man 
(the ve*%r opposite view Of sexual polarity); Denis de aougemont 
in L'Aw u r  ot L'Occident (clever and informative but in it 
"we jm# out of the frying pan into the fire"); twice with
138-J9
n .  138
Theodor Boveti Brmmer mâ B00 are engaged frequently;T» von der Velde's marriage mamml is mentioned and com-mended to the reader; and brief mention is made of D# H*Lawrence# Freud# Adler# Jung* Btrasser# etc#
But a real description is not possible from thesesources or any other and most of them fail by trying to
describe mix from outside the existence of the command.Typically# Barth write# that "Although we recognize theirachievement we definitely reject every phenomenology ortypology of the sexes#
We can describe individual mm and woman . # # But we have to realize that when we say all this we merely point to something which cannot be expressed# to the myste%in which man stands revealed to God and to Him alone
But* however little we can actually describe* it is in that
relationship of male and female* where each can and should affirm their sexuality# They can be "honestly glad of it# 
thanking God that they are allowed to be members of their 
particular sex# and therefore soberly and with a good con- science going the way %mrked out for them in this distinc­tion#
# # # ^ * * *
IW then shall we evaluate this description of what 
Barth has to say about the male and female in creation? In
p# 152
e. 150
p. X50
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the first instance w  can affirm the wholesome appreciation 
which Barth has for the sexual relationship in man* Tlirough- 
out he elevates the study into the human sphere itself# and 
cautions againet allowing sexuality to become a matter alone 
of the sex act#
And yet# in this strength* there is also the danger 
that Barth has spiritualized human sexuality too completely# 
It is one thing to say that sex is more than a biological 
urge# It is quite another to say* in quoting Btrasser 
(whose book Barth described as a "parallelism to the Chris- 
tiam Truth"):
The sexual impulse is through and through spiritu­alized in man# Beyond the biological need there stands spiritual decision# Love means much more than bodilysatiety in sexual intercourse# Love is something be­yond m  organically conditioned disturbance of our ego below the mvel.S^
choose this reference to Btr&sser for a double 
reason# First* it is an example of the way Barth uses out­
side sources of information* which he offers to advance his 
own position# But* secondly beyond the source of the in­
formation* it is the best exawle in this whole chapter of 
what Barth seems to mean regarding the real nature of the 
sexual Impulse in creation* and the way it exists in man#
In actual fact* so far as experience and reflection 
can penetrate* the sexual impulse cannot be described as 
"through and through spiritualized in man*" Its use might 
be said to be spiritualized* or at least we can say its use
139
341
ought to be spiritualized In man* but we cannot eay that it 
is# The confusion in Barth* from the point of view of this 
thesis* is that the impulse itself* and the use to which 
rational and spiritual man puts it* have been made identical* 
To be sure our eexual need is more than "an organically con­
ditioned disturbance of our ego b^ow the navel" (an overly 
graphic phrase used by Barth which does not actually de- 
scribe the location of the sexual impulse)* but it is biolo- 
gically conditioned as well# To understand the nature of 
man and his sexuality* we must understand also the sources 
of biological sexuality Itself* The problem is not an un- 
usual one in discussing Barth's ethics* but it is a parti- 
cularly disturbing one when we come to the analysis of 
what man and his sexuality actually are* When Barth quotes 
strassar and writes: "nobody has yet been made ill or de­
stroyed through sexual discipline*” - we suspect the source 
of his Information and add a warning* We conclude with 
words that are directly the antithesis of what is written 
by Dr* Barth; rather than lOT* we would write that sex "IB 
a fundamental natural impulse which man has in common with 
animals and which then has to be morally controlled and di­
rected! ” If that is not clear at the start* then all further 
discussion of specific ethical problems which arise out of 
that relationship will inevitably be influenced by this 
initial understmding*
Another specific objection which must be noted* is 
that Barth's theoretical construct regarding male and female
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in creation makes it difficult for M m  to deal reliably 
with %nany of the ethical problems wbiob arise in that sphere »
Many of the ethical concerns which are controlled by this 
point are necessarily closed before discwclom cam be opened* 
Homocemality* e#s#* which we M i l  dicoucs in greater detail* 
is immediately classed as perverse* because it is unnatural 
to this relationship as created by God* Monogamy is com- 
mamded mot as a law or oustm of any particular society* but 
because it receives justification in the hi#er court of the 
GOmmamd* and the very nature of love and marriage call for a  ^
permanence of relationship with one man and one woman* Barth's 'J 
consistent response comes directly out of this theoretical 
concept of idiat creation has commanded.
Further to that point* Barth's insistence that mar­
riage is the ultimate end for man and woman* moves greatly 
in the direction of misunderstanding and denying the indi- 
viduallty of each person* male or female# Marriage is the 
standard by which the success of the relationship is judged*
In our previous discussion we have been able to con­vince ourselves of the validity of the rule that in this matter everything is good which is in the full mû strict sense is compatible with marriage* and everything is badwhich is not so compatlble*^^^
Barth does admit that every individual does not belong to 
marriage; some for good reasons remain outside of it* but 
it is the standard and light in which male-female is seen#
Marriage is without doubt the telos# goal* and centerOf this relationship# We may provlmBBally define it as
'p# l40
the tom of t w  of md tmmlo in wlAohthe ffOOj, hêmonimB ahoi.ee of love on the partof a partleuiar man an# woman, leada to a reeponBihly nndertaken^life-imion which ia lasting# ecmplete^ ande%elwive#3w
Finally we note that the near-literal rendition of the 
%blical mxderetanding of the anhordinate position of women^ 
does not allow for the enltnral and historioal conditioning 
which would give the momliat .freedom to judge the ethical 
situation today# Proof of the faet^ although incidental to 
the main theme in his writing^» Barth referred to the feminist 
movement ae a "more or lenm eaipress and definite desire on 
the part of women to ooc#y the position and to fulfill the 
function of men*"3#l And we have already noted that Barth 
opposed the vzriting of Simone de Beauvoir as trying to 
escape from her o m  sex#
Barth does not teaoh a distinet polarity of the sexesjk 
or the kind of typology where the oharaoterietios of male 
and female are dietlnot and even opposite* But "there is 
a distinction and it muet not be blurred#" $he dietinction 
does not necessarily relegate woman to an inferior place; 
it puts both sexes in "their proper place#" All that is 
true^ but it does lend itself to a workable subordination 
wherein scriptural and ethical support is given to man^s 
8%^r#«kcy in nature^ marriage# and in life#
I W
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d. Birth Control
From the imn-woman basis in the creation# we can move 
into a few of the related ethical spheres# and examine what 
Barth counsels in the specific. One of these is the problem 
of birth control# where Barth's discussion is Influenced by 
his general ethical understanding of the man-woman relation­
ship. Barth asks the question whether birth control is 
permissible# or even obligatory# from the Christian point 
of view. In answer he observes first that there Is no 
longer any fundamental difference© in the attitude of Chris­
tians; for "increasingly an essentially affirmative answer 
is being given# not only by Christian doctors . . . but also 
partially# yet with a fundamentally decisive break from the 
former consistent negative# by the supreme teaching office 
of the Roman Catholic Church* "3^^ His own starting point 
is# as was also the starting point in the discussion of the 
problem of childless couples# "again the fact that post 
Christum natum the propagation of the race ("Be fruitful# 
and multiply#" Genesis 1:28) has ceased to be an uncondi­
tional command." There may be a time and situation where 
a Christian community# "to awaken either a people or a
302p. 268 (continuing in vol. 3# part 4)
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section Of people which has grown tired of life# and 
despairs of the future # « . should seriously try to main­
tain the race* But a general necessity in this regard 
cannot be maintained on a Christian b a s i s  * " ^ 3  fact#
in drawing a quotation from Bmil Brunner# .Barth concludes 
that the problem of overpopulation could really be "the 
greatest danger" we face today. From that standpoint there 
can be no valid objection to the practice of birth control*
But birth control within the specific relationship 
of the life-fellowship in marriage# says Barth# is rather 
different* There# as always# sexual intercourse is viewed 
as part of the life fellowship# which can exist and has a 
dignity and a right whether or not it leads to parenthood*
But sexual intercourse has as "a first essential meaning# 
the fact that it is integral to the marital fellowship*"
Se-3cual Intercourse performed for its own sake#whether within marriage or without# whether with or without birth control# is a no%human practice for­bidden by the divine command**^^^
"Sexual intercourse should be performed in a way which implies
that its meaning is simply the love relationship of the two
partners#" and that "can always be# not merely human action#
but an offer of divine goodness made by the One who even in
this last time does not will that It should be all up with
us*"
368-69
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Hence every act of intercourse which is tech­nically obstructed or interrupted# or undertaken with no desire for children# or even refrained from on this ground# is- a refusal of this divine offer# a renuncia­tion of the widening and enriching of married fellow­ship which is divinely made possible by the fact that under the command of god this fellowship includes sexual intercourse
The use of birth control from that standpoint could be some­
thing "which the divine law strictly forbids," In their 
essential freedom# the couple# sharing a responsible act# 
will be faced with the fact that "it must and will be a 
choice and decision between Yes and Ho*" A choice is neces­
sary.
Some object that the matter of birth control and con­
ception should be left to the "oourse of nature" or to "the
rule of divine providence," Barth responds with a reasoned 
argument which he says shows the basic flaw in that objec­
tion# The providence of god and the course of nature are 
not identical# he says; they are not even on the same level,
Surely the former cannot be inferred from the later. Surely the providence and will Of God in the course of nature has in each case to be freshly discovered by the believer who hears and obeys His word# and apprehended and put into opération by him in pereonal responsibility#in the freedom of choice and decision*
The decision to have a child must be given a specific answer 
For the individual "is not allowed to dispense with rational 
reflectim or to renounce an intelligent attitude at this 
point. The very opposite is the case. At this point
pp, 269-70
p. a n
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especially Intelligent reflection may and must constantly 
and particularly prevail# and nothing must be done except 
in responsible decision*"307
That being written# Barth then warn© of the danger in 
such reflection which must be made* The actual danger is 
that "a divine gift may be refused and a child who might 
have been the light and joy of its parents is not generated*" 
The opposite is also true; a child could be generated by not 
using birth control# a child which was not offered and af­
firmed by God. In either case the marital fellowship could 
be imperiled* But
danger of thus failing to do the will and com­mand of God is no smaller# but also no greater# at this point than everywhere where responsible action and the venture of faith and obedience are required*
venture# however# Is required at this point too*Hence it would be false to say that in view of the risk an unthinking laisses faire is better in this matter^ m than action in'‘frSF 'SSS' ' responsibility and declslon*^^^
Whatever the couple decides# they should decide it 
together and individually# says Barth# "and what happens# 
even if they are mistaken# will at least happen in responsi­
bility and therefore in a right relation to the divine com­
mand. "3^9 The idea Of birth control should be a positive 
choice# one which belongs in the context of the confidence 
of life that is grounded throughout in faith* And when
p* 270
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either# or both of them dem% It impossible "for one reason 
or another really to desire a child in the name of God and 
therefore in faith#" they should choose to control concep- 
tion* If their reasons "etand the test# they ought not to 
desire a child (again at the risk of being mistaken)# and 
what happens will happen in responsibility and therefore in 
true relation to God's law*"310
If a responsible couple has made the decision not to 
have a child# Barth then discusses the four possibilities of 
conception controli (1) the practice of complete sexual re­
straint; (2) sexual intercourse at times when the woman 
m m o %  ootioelvej (3) efiJIsaJatgr^g^î s M  (4) oontmeep- 
tives. All four# says Barth have "the character of human 
arrangement and control* Hone is "natural" in any sense of 
the word# and all are painful and troublesome# Bach is 
"unnatural and artificial. "313^
Sexual restraint# which was once the only choice# 
often is described as the "highest path#" and the one which 
is heroic and virtuous. But it# too# is unnatural; for the 
sexual act is part of the fellowship of marriage; and also 
there are rather undesirable psychological repressions in­
volved "which might have fatal consequences for the marital 
fellowship*"
The second possibility# one which is called "the
p. 273
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rhythm method" (not by Barth) does lees violence and might 
be "the most feasible course of all#" But control Of birth 
by this proscribed method of abstaining when the woman is
able to conceive# brings out the real and deeper question 
which cannot be avoided in choosing between alternatives#
The real question is whether "we may exclude the possi­
bility of procreation on our own judgment#" That still is 
what is being done# unnatural as it is# Further the rhythm 
method removes the "spontaneity" from the marital act "with, 
painful statistics and calculations#"
What becomes Of its spontaneity if it necessarily involves a constant glancing at the calendar of con- ception? And wimt becomes of its character as the joyful consummation of marital fellowship if its spontaneity is threatened in this way.312
"Spontaneity" seems a particularly inappropriate selection 
of word with Barth who has throughout emphasised the aspect 
of decision making in this whole matter of birth control.
The couple is charged with a responsibility and choice 
based on a thoughtful decision made in seeking the command 
of God. It seems an argumentum interruptum not to complain 
that the "rhythm method# " because it requires some careful 
planning and decision making should be thought a threatening 
experience* Either a couple engages in "spontaneous inter­
course" throughout# or they engage in thoughtful# rational 
choices.
M S E J S S S S 3$$BE- Baith does not give the dignity
p. 274
350
of an argument. "We need not waste words however on the 
particularly unsatisfactory nature of this course * . . It 
constitutes ^a special threat'."
In the use of contraceptives Barth makes his defense 
against the "Inflexible veto of the Roman Ohuroh," We must 
not suppose that In this method# "where the artificiality 
is so apparent# we enter the sphere of w W t  is evil and 
illegitimate. "
The use of these mea%%s is not evil just because they are so manifestly artificial* It Is evil when it takes place for* reasons self-seeking# pleasure -seekingor expedianGe.313
Other methods are no less evil If they are adopted for those 
reasons; and the reverse is true as well - if they are all 
four not adopted for reasons of self-seeking then the inter­
course without birth control is also evil*
Ho absolute preference can be given to any of the 
four#314 Barth# and none can be flatly rejected. Ho
general rule can be set forth which would make the decision 
easier for the individual couple* "Does this mean that we 
can only conclude that in this matter each individual must 
choose and decide for himself in the freedom which faith 
confers?" "That is true enough#" says Barth. The individual 
in the freedom of his faith may decide.
^4. =75
Although a careful reading of the text makes it clear that Dr. Barth obviously prefers the contraceptive method. The other three* including, "rhythm" are shown in much darker contrast to what the correct choice might be.
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But yet "we must mention and eerlously Insist" upon 
"certain universal principles which must govern the choice 
made." Those certalii univ^real principles are three in
number $315
(1) The choice muet take the form it does. It must be made and executed in faith# not in fear# doubt or dismay . # , in reliance upon Ood'e forging grace.
(2) Both of the partners must make the choice* "both act in full freedom . . .  in such a way that they can be open with each other both before and after,*'
(3) The choice must be made with due regard to the fact that so far as possible the inevitable painfulness of each available course must be the burden of the hus­band and not of the %fito * * , it is the wife who is directly and primarily affected and concerned# #■ * # the fact that biologically she is always in greater danger than he is* and that she must therefore bear the li#ter burden# he the heavier#
There Barth closes his discussion of birth control and moves
back to the main concern of this chapter section# "B&rents
and Children."
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile all of what 
Barth writes here with what might be prescribed if he main­
tained an exact adherence to his general ethical approach*
For one thing* it appears that the human situation of the 
twentieth century* with "its strange increase of population* " 
has indeed influenced his ethical judgment. One gets the 
Impression that if the situation could be reversed; and/or 
the Western World should decide to rid itself of "tiredness 
in life" and "despair of the future*" they might justifiably 
re-institute the command to go on multiplying. As it is*
315pp. 275-76
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Barth's special ethlo here arises within the cultural milieu 
of the twentieth century# with its peculiar problems# and 
the command is mediated through the needs of the time.
For another# the command iimtructe us that sexual in­
tercourse must be understood always as a divine gift# never 
to be entered into lightly# for "a divine gift may be re­
fused and a child who might have been the light and joy of 
its parents is not genewted." It is literally true that 
a Ghild tdiieh might have been ooneW.ved will not be# but 
Barth has wrongly transferred the topic and its ethiGal 
meaning back into the "sex as praoreation" determination.
If the human sexual aet was "intended" only for procreation# 
and only incidentally for the ew3M>eeion of love# then Barth 
10 warning about the eeriousneee of overlooking the possi­
bility of Goneeption each time birth control is praotioed# 
might be in order. But sex ie for recreation too; and 
eapeoially in man# part Of the joy and enjoyment of life. 
Barthes emphaaie on the aeriousneee# the life-and-death- 
matter he makes out of it# the reasoning which must "stand 
the test#" removaa @j^ality from the human situation in 
which it occur0# and by which standards it muet be judged.
Barth reeogni»ee part of that point when he separates 
"the course of nature" from "the providence of God." It is 
an e#haeis on the Goneoloue decision of man in the process# 
and the events which influence him which would also 
separate "the course of the comznand" from "the course of 
man in nature and spirit,"
e. Abortion
Barth's treatment of "Abortion" Is another case in 
study. He introduces abortion under the section "The Pro­
tection of life." The introduction to the section is hidden 
in the middle of a paragraph# and for several pages it is 
unclear that Barth intends abortion to be considered under 
the heading:
Perhaps on the far frontier of all other possi­bilities* it may have to happen in obedience to the commandment that men must be killed by men*^ -^ ^
Barth's first contention is that in abortion we are "engaged
in the killing of a human life." The unborn child is still
a child; and Barth quotes from Charles Btrasser's Per Arzt
und das keimende leben (1948) which holds that the embryo
has its own brain# its own nervous system# its own blood
circulation# and consequently has every right to be called
an independent life# a child.3^7
Bo# says Barth,
He who destroys germination life kills a man and thus ventures the monstrous thing of decreeing concern­ing the life and death of a fellow man whose life is given by God and therefore# like his own# belongs to Him* 318
p. 415
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The child has done nothing to deserve death# and man has no 
right to take it. The "child" is one for whom Christ also 
died and "The true light of the world shines already in the 
darkness of the mother's womb."
And yet they want to kill him deliberately because certain reasons which have nothing to do with the child himself favour the view that he had better not be born.'^ -^ ^
Barth continues:
The fact that a definite Ho must be the presuppo­sition of all further discussion cannot be contested# least of all today# The question arises however# how this No is to be established and stated if it is a truly effective Ho*320
The only thing that can help to establish it# Barth writes# 
is "the power of a wholly new and radical feeling of awe 
at the mystery of all human life as this is commanded by 
God the Creator# Giver and lord* "3^ ^
Then# in an abrupt reversal# or at least a startling 
qualification# Barth writes that the absolute prohibition 
of abortion prescribed in the past# is too forbiding and 
sterile to give effective help. "However dangerous it might 
sound • • * there is a forgiveness # . . even for the great 
modem sin of abortion."3^^ And# so long as proper quali­
fications are enforced# certain abortions are justified,
Bman life# to Barth# is not the absolute# the will and
416
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and command of God Is; and "How can \m deny absolutely that 
He might have commissioned them (doctors# etc.) to serve 
Him in this way (abortions)?"323
Xiet us be quite frank and say that there are situa­tions in which the killing of germinating life does not constitute murder but is in fact commanded
It will be in the form of rare exceptions# but if all pos­
sibilities to avoid it have been considered# it is possible 
that we can find the command in aborting,
But# having opened the subject up to consideration 
and possible decision# Barth closes it again with the quali- 
fioation that life must be at stake against life;
These situations may always be known by the con­crete fact that in them a choice imst be made for the protection of life# one life being balanced against another# i.e.# the life of the unborn child against the life or health of the mother *3^5
Neither the life of the infant# nor the life of the mother 
is necessarily and always to be chosen# but the decision is 
to be made "not by the mother alone# nor the quacks" but by 
an experienced and trained physician.
Finally# he outlines four observations that will al­
ways have to be present when and if abortion is the command 
of God: (1) life must be at stake against life; (2) the
"most scrupulous calculation" is required and yet also a 
resolute venture is to be taken"; (3) the "calculation
420
421
pp. 422-23
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and venture" must take place before God and In responsi­
bility to mm; and (4) since it is always dangerous# even 
only restricted to the life against life qualification* it 
should be executed only "in the faith that God will for­
give the elements of human sin involved."
Barth's restriction of justifiable abortions to the 
"life against life" principle# outside of which it cannot 
be discussed because God commands against it# is another 
example of the way in which Barth shuts out all informa­
tion and/or possibilities which he does not wish to use# 
There is some question as to whether and how a two-day 
old foetus should and must be regarded as a human life 
and we could produce evidence and opinion to that effect. 
But that would not prove the point* What we want to ob­
serve is that Barth quite willingly uses a scientific 
source to support the claim that a life Is being taken 
(see Btrasser# etc*); but presumably he would not permit 
or accept contrary information to decide an issue which 
Is determined not outside of embryology but within it.
Also# Bai*th# even if he were correct there# has not 
satisfactorily examined the psychological and social fac­
tors which are involved within the decision* He does in­
clude the sociological and personal consideration of the 
mother's life or of the child's. But he does not enlarge 
his vision to include other considerations and alterna­
tives. He refers at one point to the possibility of 
abortion where "the life and health of the mother is at
357
r"; but It is uncertain whether Barth intends the 
statement to be expanded beyond physical life and death*
The German sentence at this point reads "das laben des 
tjpgeborenen und das Beben bzw* das gesunde Leben der 
Mutter."326 sheds no clearer light, "das gesunde" 
merely translates from the root gesund# which means "sound# 
healthy* well* wholesome." Is it not possible that Barth 
intended it to mean the good health* mental and emotional* 
as well as physical?
Barth, Pie Klrohllche Doranatik, Drltter Band. Die Lehre Von DeF"^ chSk>TOigj' Vierter $Sl. Ivan- gella'cher''Veiaag "(giirloh:"A, Q:." %olllkln, 1957), pp. 480-81
f. Homosexuality
It is significant that Barth deals with the subject. 
Moralists such as Brunner* Bffe* Trillhaus# etc,# do not.
He defines homosexuality as "a physical* psychological and 
social sickness," It is "a phenomenon of perversion* deca­
dence and decay which can emerge when man refuses to admit 
the validity of the divine eommand,"327 we can hope* con­
tinues Barth* that those attempting to help the homosexual 
will put forth their best efforts (as they would to any 
sinner) in awareness that the God who commands also is a 
God of forgiving grace. But the decisive word of Christian 
ethics* relying on the divine command which declares that 
homosexuality is a perversion* "must consist in a warning 
against entering upon the whole way of life which can only 
end in the tragedy of concrete homosexuality,"
"Belying on the divine command" is the most trouble- 
some phrase in Barth's approach* It is here that Barth's 
assumption that all homosexuality is perverse* becomes 
elevated to the status of God's direct Word, The command* 
says Barth* shows the homosexual "that as a man he can 
Only be genuinely human with woman," If he accepts this 
insight* "homosexuality can have no place in his life,"
Barth* Dogmatics* vol. 3* part 4* p, 166
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It seems to us that Barth is mistaken. But that is not 
the major objection* What has happened is that he has taken 
an opinion regarding the repugnance which the Christian tra­
dition has had towards the homosexual# a repugnance which 
could ultimately be traced to a misreading of the passage 
in scripture Genesis 19:4-11# and transferred that feeling 
to the command* Barth says that God says homosexuality is 
a "physical# psychological and social sickness# and a 
phenomenon of perversion# decadence and decay*" It is 
against the life for which man was created.
But is it? In order to answer that question# one 
needs to have the kind of data concerning what is normal 
for the man as he was created. The kind of helpful material: 
historical and speculative# which appears# e.g.# in D* 8, 
Bailey's Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition, 
Bailey maintains that the Christian abhorenee to homo­
sexuality begins with a false reading of the passage in 
Genesis 19# especially at verse 5: "Where are the men
that came into thee this night? Bring them out unto us# 
tiaat we may know them# " The assumption of early writers# 
and the assumption of the present day with many# is that 
the incident and the ensuing catastrophe of Sodom and 
Gommoreh for their sins# refers to homosexuality* later 
in the book Bailey dismisses the incident completely from 
any homosexual m e a n i n g # He exegetes the Hebrew verb 
(yadha) "to know#" and refers to its original non-coital 
meaning# which would "be equally consistent with the text
T. 8. Bailey^ Homosexuality and the Western Chris­tian Tradition (London: Longmans* Green & Go. * 195B7.j pT” 155
and spirit of the narrative." Bt* Paul denounces homo­
sexual practices in Romans 1;26-27* hut Bailey examines 
that denunciation hermeneutically and suggests that even 
Paul was not censuring "all homosexuality,Bailey is 
cautious# and concludes with the comment that "It cannot 
he fully explained until we understand more than we do 
at present about the psychological factors which help to 
determine our social attitudes# but the historical study 
of sexual ideas throws some light upon the problems,
Bailey's contribution at that point# whatever one must de­
cide regarding his conclusions# is essentials the historical 
study does shed some light without which our conclusions 
are not applicable. Bailey lists several points by way 
of summary# two of which concern us here; (1) the Chris­
tian tradition is "defective in that it is ignorant of in­
version as a condition due to biological# psychological or 
genetical causes; and consequently of the distinction be­
tween the invert and the pervert. (2) The tradition is
also defective because "it is by no means entirely a tradi- 
tion founded and built upon reason# for it has been 
strongly influenced by emotional and psychological factors 
into which enquiry needs to be made.»331
Ibid,# p, 157 
Ibid.# p. 161
331D, 8, Bailey# Homosexuality and Western Chris - tian Tradition# p, 173
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Thieliûke is more to the theological point in The Ethics 
of Sex. "Doctrinaire prejudices" he writes# "which dis­
tort the theological problem presented by homosexuality# 
manifest themselves also in the fact of the value judgment ; 
'homosexuality is s i n f u l T h e  theologian who chooses 
to make such judgments# says Thielioke* "mist look at 
anothei* side of the matter and dare not defame the humanum 
of the person so conditioned in order to make his negation 
easier,"333 And finally#
This inability to deal with the phenomenon which is conditioned by theological or psychic aversion so it can lead even such a prominent thinker as Karl Barth into such an astonishing confusion of terminology that he is capable of putting such heterogeneous value judgments as ^'sickness# " "perversion# " "decadence and decay#" on the same logical level . , * as a "refusal to recognise God and a failure to appreciate man# and this humanity without the fellow m e n ,  334
Barth gives the decisive word of Christian ethics as 
a warning against homosexuality * But what can the command 
against homosexuality mean to the Invert who is constitu­
tionally unable to enter into the fellow man relationship 
on the male-female encounter? What is that person to think 
of the command?
One needs first to investigate# from the vantage 
point of biology# and evolutionary biology in particular# 
what "natural inclinations" are involved; i.e*# if one
332Helmut Thielioke# The Ethics of Sex# translated by John W* Doberstein (New lfoïkT'Wip¥F'aS 1964)# p* 270
Ibid*# p* 271
Ibid., pp. 271-72
362
ohooses to speak of natural Inollnatlons a© all. And 
there Professor H. Thorpe write©:
First# one can say without any fear of oontradic- tion that there is not one iota of biological or psychological evidence to warrant the labelling of homosexuality as "unnatural" in the young. On the contrary# it seems to be natural right through primi- tive society. . . . Permanent adult homosexual partnerships are known in creatures as far apart as geese* porpoises# monkeys# elephants# and gi­raffes .
As they are in man. "1 may be wrong#" writes Thorpe further# 
"but I cannot conceive a situation - nature being what it 
is - in which the structure and stability of society would 
be shaken let alone gravely threatened by homosexuality* "336 
Barth would not have responded affirmatively to the 
suggestion that we must judge homosexuality in the light of 
the social# personal# and cultural settings of the indivi­
dual involved. The command says otherwise# and no reason- 
ing outside the command# can be influential. But however 
"unnatural" it might appear# and however must again the 
created order as Barth imagines it# however much it can 
be perverse and a sign of decay; it belongs to that order 
of things which can and must be viewed in their natural 
setting# and in that regard# Barth is surely wrong.
Others# of equal devotion to God and His Word# dis­
agree; "I cannot see that the fact that one loves a person 
of the same sex#" writes Dr# Norman flttenger# "and wishes
Thorpe# Science# M m  and Morals# p. 128 
Ibid.# p# 127
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to act upon that love# Is In and of itself sinful.”337
When RLttenger wrote that comment# homosexuality and 
its expression were against the law# and consequently 
"crimes#" But# if the laws were to be changed# would it 
still be a sin# as it would be with Barth? Bin# to 
Blttenger# is that fact which violates the mutuality of 
expression between two persons# is that relationship in 
which no concern is given# Consequently# homosexuality# 
in and of Itself# need not be sinful.
337Httenger* W.M. .New Christian^ March 9# 1967 ,p. 9.
5, Summary and Critique
How at the end. of this long and laborious enquiry into 
the ways in which our thesis is concerned with the ethics 
of Karl Barth# let us draw together a few conclusions that 
should reflect the usefulness of the study and justify the 
effort involved* We can be brief# for almost all of what 
needs to be written has already been set forth in the pre­
ceding pages* Some procedural type problems and basic 
theological differences have been given special considera­
tion in the early sections of this chapter* Our conclu­
sions regarding the basic approach to man and Barth's 
attitude to ethics are aiiply recorded in those pages. The 
way in which Barth often escapes from the matrix of those 
initial problems is also mentioned there# It remains for 
us to delineate the resulting strengths and weaknesses in 
his ethical thought and therein to determine the kind of 
assistance which Barth can offer to the contemporary stu­
dent of morals*
For our purposes here in this thesis : the strengths
of Barth's ethical position are as follows : The first is
Barth's pre-eminent contribution in demanding that we main­
tain a theological frame of reference throughout our ethical 
deliberations * "For us#" he once wrote# "the urgent ethical
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questions are reduced to one; how we may be impartial to 
the truth of the c r e a t o r ! "338 Barth comes plunging down 
into "the lowlands of human history" but he brings the 
command of God along* How empty of content and assistance 
is the ethics which ignores or is uncertain about the God 
who has created and who cares. Barth wrote almost 40 years 
ago that:
There was once a Schleiermacher# a Eothe# a Troeltsch who hardly knew what to do to take care of the profusion and variety of the facts of life# They felt they must be impartial at all costs to the whole of creation and to every creature; and they became so generously impartial# that Christianity# having no special privileges with them# found itself the unhappy victim of a housing shortage #339
He have enumerated some limitations in the "partiality" 
which Barth offers in return; but without entering the 
arguments between Barth and the nineteenth century liberals# 
this thesis accepts the principle that unless a Christian 
ethic is concerned to work out the implications of the 
Word of God for theological ethics# somehow framing the 
ethical event with the ways of God with men# it has sacri­
ficed its essential contribution to ethical deliberation# 
and it should become a victim of another kind of housing 
shortage in contemporary ethics. As Robert McAfee Brown 
has written regarding Barth and the American theologians;
Americans parroting a Barthlan line would only be parodying it# The most Barth can do is to force
338Barth# Word of God# Word of Man# p. 148 
p. 148
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Americans to do what he himself has always done - to listen afresh to Scripture in the life of the church# not to reinforce a Barthlan theology# hut to see how and in what ways the Word of God is speaking a fresh# ohallm^jig# upsetting and yet ultimately renewing word to the church# and thereby to the world *34u
That task# seen in conjunction with a cooperative ethic# we 
accept as belonging to the Christian moralist.
Secondly# from the positive point of view# we want to 
emphasize Barth's understanding of the need of man. Barth 
knows sin and error# but he teaches first the forgiveness 
and the love of God. After all# as Berkhouwer says# "Grace 
does triumph in the theology of Karl B a r t h . " 3 4 l  ^race does 
triumph over the radical view of man's sin which in every 
vmy is prone to evil* Man by himself is totally sinful and 
hopeless# but man# even the worst man# is never by himself 
in Barth's theology.
Real man# man himself# is the being reflected in the Grace of God addressed to man in Jesus Christ. This being is indeed a sinner# a pardonned sinner# and a child of God in hope. But this being does not start with the sinner. It is also a creature of God# participating as such in a definite structure# and knowable in this structure in the Word of God.34«
He is already forgiven before he knows it; already healed
before he is sick; already new before he seeks newness# In
one Of the most compassionate and reassuring passages of the
whole Boroa;fcics t Barth writes as the conclusion of the
^^Casalis# Portrait of Barth# translated by Brown#pp. 2-3
341Bee G# 0, Berkhouwer# Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Khrl Barth (Grand Bapîfel;'’lîK K' ierffiffi35i^
^^^Barth# Dogmatios. vol. 3# part 4# p. 44
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section on Man and Homans
Thus even where man does not keep the command# the command keeps man* And the fact that it does so# and does so more powerfully than man himself is willing to admit * * * He who here commands does not only judge and forgive; He also helps and heals*
This thesis reiterates all that is implied in the statement# 
counteracting gome of the traditional "preachments" of 
which Christian ethics is so frequently guilty*
Finally# from the affirmative# we note that Barth is 
concerned with the wide range of ethical problems and situa­
tions which face modem man# He does place a heavy emphasis 
on the ethics of Sabbath observance# and Prayers of Con­
fession# but he also comes directly into contact with the 
more earthy topics of abortion# birth control# suicide, 
war# poverty# sex relations in and out of marriage# etc* 
Throughout# he implies that the Oommand of the Doctrine of 
God# or better God Himself# is concerned with these ethical 
situations too* As Gustafson noted earlier# no modem 
theologian so completely adapts his theological interests 
to the ethical conditions of man. One could hold that 
Barth's answers are inadequate# or even wrong# but the 
charge that they are irrelevant is made only by those who 
have never met the Karl Barth of Dogmatics III# part 4, 
Barth in many cases is quite flexible and the range of his 
interest is extensive.
We noted already the curious paradox within Barth's
343Ibid.# p* 240
eplstemologjr and athicai where on the one hand he allows 
for no source of truth outside of the command^ in theory; 
and on the otherthat he introduces information gathered 
from the sources around him# First he writes ;
arace which has from the start to share its power with a force of nature is no longer graoe^ i.e., it cannot he recognised as what the grace of God is in the consideration and conception of that divine act, as what it is in Jesus Christ# And therefore revela­tion which has from the very outset a partner in the reason of the creature, and which cannot he revela- ^  tion without its cooperation, is no longer revelation.
Then juxtaposed against that, is;
Even the understanding of man from the Word of God will always he effected in practice in the language, categories and framework of the possi­bilities of human self-understanding* In it we shall always and inevitably have before us the phenomena of the human, and to that extent make use of the naturalistic, idealistic, existential, historical, psychological and similar thoughts and
According to Barth, the "Real Man” is never found in these 
"possibilities Of human self-understanding, " far less 
should the ethical situation be influenced by them* Either 
way, Barth does touch upon them throughout his ethics# And, 
while his theory does not allow them, he manages to bring 
their insights to bear on the topic#
It would not have concerned Barth if we should have 
noted a non-rational source to his ethical reflections.
The command itself is non-rational in the literal sense*
But take, for example, Barth’s treatment of the subject
3W.
345.
W d , ,  vol. a, part 2^  p, 531 
'Ibid., vol. 3» part 4, p. 44
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of euthanasia, or more speciflaaXly "the elimination of the 
incurably Infirmed, the insane, the deformed •" Throughout 
hlB section on The Respect for life, there is always an 
exception to the prohibition of the command against taking 
a life# It is always implied that the command can over­
rule whatever reasoning or reckoning the Individual can 
bring to the situation# But, when Barth comes to the topic 
of taking the life of those whom society declares to be 
"unfit," there is no exception whatever. The command can­
not, we suppose is what Barth meant, over-rule this ab­
solute negative: "The question whether human society has
the right to mctinguish the life of such people is to be 
answered by an unequivocal
We cannot possibly isolate this topic from the 
Europe Barth knew during the Third Reich and the atrocities 
under Hitler; where in fact the problem first arose for him. 
Hitler was exterminating the unfit to create his pure race# 
Barth responded that it was "murder"; and that both the 
taking of those lives, as well as the more usual euthanasia 
problem in the case of an incurably ill hospital patient, 
"cannot possibly be justified before the command of God*" 
"Tyrannicide" was earlier exempted from the negative list, 
and in a significant reference to the plot in which 
Bonhoeffer participated, Barth seems willing to justify it 
(although not so completely that one has to wonder about
346Ibid#, p# 4 %
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what he really means regarding Bonhoeffer), and writes that 
if those men who planned to murder Hitler had been more 
courageous and had been willing to offer their life in ex­
change for his, it might have succeeded*^^^ As it was, 
perhaps they lacked courage or perhaps there was no actual 
command*
The case in point is mentioned not because it is so 
remarkably insightful, or novel. Many ethicists would 
draw the same two conclusions in the two situatiors of as­
sassination and euthanasia. It is used to support the at­
tachment which Barth and the command have to the culture 
and ethos which he knew# The problems arose within the 
Europe he knew, and his suggested reflection and instruc­
tion of the event are surely the result of what he saw 
and felt about the atrocities of Hitler and the Third 
Reich. The alternative would be for Dr# Barth to say 
that the command is always communicated through the cul­
tural and personal and political and social millieu in 
which the recipient lives| and that he could never do*
Yet our larger point here is the affirmative men­
tion of Barth’s relevance to the actual, real society and 
ethical situations which men have to face# %atever the 
outcome of the how and i-diy of îiis ethical instruction, 
we can complete this reference with the point already 
made: Barth’s ethic seeks a relevance to the actual moral
problems of the time*
^^%ost references to III, 4, circa 425
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Professor W. H. G. Robinson once noted that “Barth 
Is a great teacher from whom every Christian thinker has 
much to learn," but, Robinson continued, “a man can stay 
too long at school*“3^® It will have been obvious through­
out that we have attempted to leave the schoolroom with the 
best that he can offer, without staying so long that we 
lose a perspective on the weaknesses in Dr, Barth’s ethics.
The difficulties which are inherent in the ethical 
approach of Barth have been mentioned directly and indi­
rectly throughout this chapter* They come together here 
in two significant categories;
(1) Ultimately, Barth fails the apologetic task with 
which we have charged the ethlcist in our time. We would 
set Tillich against Barth at this point and use the former 
as representative of the task* "Apologetics," Tillich ex­
plained, is “answering theology"; "It answers the ques­
tions implied in the ’situation’ in the power of the 
eternal message and with the means provided by the situa­
tion whose questions it answers. It presumes that 
there is something in common with these outside the theolo­
gical circle* If Barth was unwilling to risk that integral 
and primal contact with outside sources of knowledge, be­
cause others (notably of the liberal period) succumbed to 
the risk, then we conclude that it is a failure of Barth
348Robinson, Faith and
349Tillich, Bystematic
, p*. 6*1
, vol# 1, p # 6
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and not the risk itself*
Theology moves hack and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received*Lve been able to balance
(2) The second category of weakness in Barth’s ethic 
is that if we follovæd him in guarding the right to say the 
first and last words regarding man, we would exempt our­
selves from the inter-disciplinary investigations into 
ethical problems, and fail to understand the nature and 
necessities of the man in the ethical event # Intercommunica­
tion and apologetics, as ends in themselves, are only part 
of the obligation# The other part is to determine that we 
have found the man who actually "is," not the one we expect 
to see from criteria outside of the man who is discovered, 
and uncovered, in an enquiry into the natural history of 
man and the behavioural mechanisms which are adjuncts of 
that history, Barth’s command, admitted by Barth himself, 
does not have to coincide with that man whlbh is observed 
elsewhere in the natural process# Alternatively, if God 
is the author of truth, author of the truth of man and 
nature and ethics, then the man which we find in the natural 
world is part of the truth which God has given, as will be 
his nature and his ethics#
p. 3
BISHOf ft a*
G. Bishop F# R# Barry 
1* Introduction
One great theme has dominated the life and thought 
of Bishop F. R. Barry# It is a theme that has worked its 
way into most of his books and articles, from the first 
book he published early in World War I, until his most re­
cent publication in 1969, which reached the public just 
before his eightieth birthday# The theme is his indivi­
dual response to a theological crisis of our modern world; 
a crisis that in one way or another has to do with the iso­
lation and eventual alienation of the contemporary culture 
and the Christian faith, an isolation and alienation for 
which both interests suffer debilitating consequences# 
Barry’s response to that problem is the attempt to restore 
Christianity to its former prominent place, originator and 
protector of the best in Western civilisation# Throughout 
that half-century Barry has lamented the decline and fall­
ing of Western life, and with it the near-collapse of 
Christian morality# "The crises of Christianity today," 
he recently wrote, "and the moral confusion of the West 
may both be said to result from the isolation of the Chris­
tian faith from the contemporary culture "33^
351F* H# Barry, Christian Ethics and Secular Society (London: Hodder & StougEtbnT,’^1966‘)7.
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There la a radical rift in the modem mind# The deep unconscious hungers of the psyche are starved or suppressed and find no satisfaction in a rational, intelleetualised culture - that is what men mean when they talk about "alienation” from the life of the twentieth century society# # « . It could yet lead to # # , the breakdown of Western civilisation.
Walter lippmann’s A Preface to. Morals, a book which 
must be seen in a special relationship to Barry’s The Rele­
vance of Christianity, 353 also written for those who 
no longer believed in the religion of their fathers, and 
for "those who feel that there is a vacancy in their l i v e s # " 3 5 4  
lippmann’s concern for moralistic humanism is not enough 
for Barry, but there is a kinship in aim as well as solu­
tion# Barry’s theme is rather the rediscovery of the 
truth and relevance of the Christian message about God and 
man#
Some corollaries to this central concern arise out 
of his overwhelming belief that it is in Christian ethics 
first of all that this restoration can begin# The real 
test of the relevance of Christianity "will be in what it 
has to say about ethics #" The key to renewing the Christian 
witness is to renew the importance and the application of 
the Christian ethic# Barry’s contemporary Charles Gore 
once defined the greatest need of Christian theology as
p. 28
353Early in Barry’s book we find references to lippxaann’s, even in the choice of a borrowed chapter sub­heading, "The Acids of Modernity"; but also see pp# 15, 17, 113, 121, 127^ 129, 213, etc#
334(,;^ Q,%ter Mppman, A Preface to Morals (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd p #''“3
being “a comprehensive work on Christian ethics"; one which
would lay its basis:
in a Just historical estimate of what the ethical teaching of Jesus really meant and of its development in the Hew Testament, and in the M s  tory of the church; it must Justify itself pMlosophically, scientifically, psychologically: finally it must give an elaborate ac­count of human life.ci® It should be according to the standard of Christ#355
In a most unpretentious and readable way. Bishop Barry has 
undertaken to answer that need#
A large part of the problem with the failure of 
Christian ethics, and consequently of the failure of Chris­
tianity itself, has been the irrelevant posture of the 
etMcal thought and counsel of the Christian moralists *
As we will note, Barry makes reference several times to 
the way in which "old men" usually unmarried, lay down the 
rules and responsibilities for young people, men and women; 
old men who do not necessarily know what is going on in the 
world, and who have made no attempt to apply the continuing 
principles of the Christian etMc to the changing situations 
of modem life, or at best have done it reluctantly, follow­
ing the many other leaders of our time# As another con­
temporary Dean W. R# Inge once said, the problem with Chris­
tian morals is that they are devised by persons "who fancy
themselves attracted to God when they are really only re­
pelled by man#"356
335Charles Gore, Christ and Society fHew York: Charles Scribner, 1928), p. 194------------— '
356Quoted by Walter Lippmann, Preface to Morals, p* 3l4
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Bat the irrelevance goes deeper than that* Barry is 
also concerned about the inability or the unwillingness of 
those who conduct the ethical enterprise, to seek a related­
ness to the accumulating scientific information regarding 
man and his behaviour,which concerns the Christian ethic*
The Christian must recognize that all attempts to find 
ethical truth and guidance for our world are valid and al­
lied with the Christian effort, "even though they may seem 
to give anti-religious answers*" "All along the line we 
jBust reach new understandings of what Christian morality 
means now, in a setting so radically different from anything 
forseen by our Christian ancestors*"357 The first variation 
on his theme is irrelevance*
The second variation of the theme is Barry’s caution 
that while the Christian ethic seeks to be relevant, it is 
yet an ethic which remains Christian# It must be true to 
the basic principles which arise out of Biblical, ecclesi­
astical, and theological study# If it is to be effective 
in providing moral leadership to modern man, it must re­
flect upon the Christian theology from which it comes, and 
by which strength it continues to live*
The Christian ethic derives from the Christian world* view, from those beliefs about God and man which con­stitute the Christian religion; and if the ultimate Christian beliefs are false - or to put it bluntly, if Jesus Christ was wrong - then clearly the whole case for Christian ethics , . * falls to the ground* In this sense it is hardly disputable that Christian ethics de­pends on Christian theology* 350
357Barry, Christian Ethics, p# 27 
*, P* 34
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There is no apology intended when we explain that 
F. R* Barry was included in this thesis for the practical 
application which he makes of the information of this re­
search, rather than for his over-all theological importance 
in this century# Barry is an interpreter and communicator 
of the scholarly information, a role which is compatible 
with the intent of this thesis. Barry’s concern is for 
the person who takes Christianity seriously, students of 
the faith rather than formulators of its theology. Bishop 
Barry offers direct assistance in a way that is both helpful 
and understandable. One of his recent books, e.g., was 
written "to help the ordinary Christian to find his bear­
ings in all the confusion of our w o r l d .  "359
This is not to imply that Barry lacks the depth of 
scholarship. It is only to say that his function has been 
one of conveying the information to those inside and out­
side the Christian faith of what we are about. That is an 
essential function in the church, and one which Barry fills 
with success#
The early nineteen-thirties were productive years 
indeed for books about Christian ethics# It was a period 
when Barry himself published his most notable book. The
359Barry, Secular and Supernatural (London: SGM Press, 1969), p. 10------------ ----------
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Relevance of Ohrlstlanity.^GO already mentioned
lippmann’a Preface to Morals. Add to those the early 
work of Reinhold Hiebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral society 
(1932), and Interpretation of Christian Rthics (1935) I 
add Barth’s word of God and Word of Man, Brunner’a The 
Divine Imperative, and Hartmann’s Ethics; as wall as 
Bergson’s Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion - 
all within a few years. In Great Britain itself Dean 
Inge’s Christian Ethics and Modern Problems; Kenneth 
Kirk’s Vision of God and The Threshold of Ethics; Gore’s 
Gifford Lectures (The Philosophy of the Good Life), and 
Christian Moral Principles; Professor Taylor’s Gifford 
Series The Faith of a Moralist; Temple’s Christianity and 
the Present Moral Unrest; Streeter’s Moral Adventure; 
Dewer’s Han And God, Henson’s OhristiTO
Morality (also Gifford Lectures); as well as M* D’arcy’s 
Ohristian Morals and H* Davis’ classic Moral and Pastoral 
Theology» Tack on the continued efforts of Freud and Jung, 
Whitehead and Lord Russell; Rartshome and Dewey, Baverloek 
Bills and Edward Westermarok; and it was a prolific time 
indeed for information related to the Ohristian ethio.
It will be the general contention of this chapter 
that Barry has fulfilled the obligations of the Christian
Barry, Relevance of Christianity (London; Nisbetand Co*, 1931); puBlllHed^'in' the 'Unitad"'Btates as Chris- tianity and the Hew World (with slight alterationsTTHew York; Iferper ^  1932)
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moralist, both in the world of the 1930’s and in the years 
s i n c e . H e  has maintained an honest interest and appli­
cation of the type of material which we deem essential for 
Christian ethics. He has emphasized the fact of human 
existence, but has not violated the uniquely Christian 
conception of man# In fact, we will later note that one 
of his greatest contributions is the balance he achieves 
in that area#
Through Barry we can trace some of the development 
of ethical positions on matters related to our topic* For 
the most part he has, as Dean Inga noted, a certain kind 
of "courage, open-mindedness, and ability*” Barry
recognizes the "realism and sincerity" with which the young approach all moral problems, as well as the danger of "secularizing" Christian ethics so as to
361Barry has been a prodigious writer indeed* He has written two dozen books from the first? The War and Christian Ethics (London: Blackwell) in 1914, to Secular and Supernatural (London? SCM Press) in I969* He has con­tributed to other books as a significant author, e*g#,F# Dearmer’s Christianity and the Crisis (London: Victor Oollanz, 1933yri&fïy*B'aRi^^ "The Church inthe World - Failures and Opportunities"; and W* R* Matthews’ The Christian Faith: Essays in Explamtion and Defense 'NSï Soîk: ISïpe^ article"The Christian Way of Life* " Barry was at the first a New Testament scholar (lecturer at Oriel 1913 to 1919) and he published a still fascinating study of Ephesians, St* Paul and Social Fsychology (Oxford Frees, 1923) and A RElosop^^^frw^ ) * But it was the relevanceW  'bhmstiim ' etEGs''' which dominated his scholarly and ec­clesiastical interests for the most part from One Clear Call (London? W* Heffer and Co#, 1922) to Secular and Supgrmtural (1969)* His two major books on ethics and Christian morals are The Relevance of Christianity (1931) and Christian Ethics and Secular Society Hodderand Stm#iton, 1966)* !B"MsF~cmtri5uted regularly to the Spectator, and occasionally to others such as the Church Quarterly Review* The listing of Barry’s books
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make them chime with the rhythm of the w o r l d . 362 
"On most subjects," Inge continued, "I am glad to find this 
book Relevance of Christianity in close agreement with my 
own," and especially on the subjects of "the need of dis­
cipline, the significance and supreme importance of the 
Galilean ministry for the foundation of Christian morality, 
and for a drastic simplification of life."
In introducing Barry’s importance for this thesis 
we will use the following four subjects: (1) the first is
the Eelev^qe of his Ethics. (2) The second will detail 
his understanding of the Christian theology which underlies 
the moral counsel* (3) Thirdly, we will discuss Barry’s 
understanding of the nature of man, and maintain that his 
ethic is responsive to the needs of men; and last (4) we 
will note the way in which he handles certain moral topics 
or "special ethics."
The approach which Barry takes to ethics could 
serve the church well in its moral deliberations. What 
he wrote in 1930 is true today:
What is required is less demonstration that this or that behaviour is "wrong," than a constructive philosophy of life which candidly faces all the new factors which have entered into the moral situation to make it both more delicate and more^complex, and offers genuinely positive leadership.^oj
It is the genuine positive leadership which Barry offers 
throughout the past half-century.
and articles which we have used in this section appear in the Bibliography at the end of this thesis.
362^^ R. Inge, Christian Ethics and Mod e m  Problems (London: Hodder and Stougbtbh, iggCj, pp. o-t ^
S^^Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p. 1
2# An Ethic that is Relevant:
The ethical concern of Bishop Barry, expressed 
over a span of forty years, is clearly set out in The 
Relevance of Christianity. It is: "To explore the pre­
suppositions and the adequacy of the Christian way of life 
in the changed conditions of a changing w o r l d * "364 
balance which is so characteristic of his writing is 
noted at the start* The task of the Christian moralist 
is "to explore the presuppositions and the adequacy of 
the Christian way of life"; but it is always explored in 
"the changing conditions of a changing world* " What must 
be shown is that the ideal of the Christian ethic is not 
only valid in theory, but also that it is actual and 
realistic in practice, "like the straight lines of our 
steel and concrete architecture. " No ethic can survive 
and be helpful unless it is aware of, and responds to the 
conditions of the world in which it exists *365
The changed condition which Barry noticed In the 
1920’s and 1930’s was one which appears to belong to our 
day too* "The most imperious challenge which today con­
fronts Christianity," he write in the opening words of
^ Ibid., p. 10
^^^Barry, apgc-fcator» January 19» 1934» vol. 152» p. 75
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The Relevanoe of Chrlstlanlty, "is the moral ohaos of our 
generatlon#”^ ^^ While the Victorians had religious doubts 
and enjoyed their agnosticism, they had "no manner of doubt 
whatever" about morality. They were sure that they knew 
the moral answers, and the answers were rooted in the 
ethic of Christianity.
But, by the 1930’s, that had radically changed.
Barry wrote of the great areas of civilization, "such as 
economies and sexual relationships," for example, "which 
seem to have broken away from any reference to Christian 
or even to moral standards *"3^7 por the greater number 
of modern men and women it was no longer possible to refer 
to a single principle of Christian behaviour, and matters 
of ethics had been set free from the control and advice 
of the church. "The common attitude of our contemporaries 
is not so much that Christianity is untrue as that it is 
irrelevant. "368 sometimes seems as though material
interests are the only allegiance to which the world of 
our time can offer itself in whole-hearted c o n s e c r a t i o n . "^69
That was the changed condition* There was no doubt 
some hypeibole in Barry’s estimate of the decline of 
Ohristian influence; but his question then, as now, was
366Barry, Relevance of Ohrlstianity, p# 1 
p, 14
Barry, Spectator, April 6, 1929, "The Christian Ethio," vol* 1%, pTSSiT"
^^^Barry, Eelavance of Christianity, p. 18
383
relevants
Is the Christian reading of man’s life the true one? Are the moral standards of Christianity such that the modem conacienoe can endorse, or are they merely ethical traditions hound up with ways of thou^t and life which the lapse of time is fast making obsolete?370
In the change, however, Barry saw elements of the 
changing character of God’s presence with men. And it 
was time for a change# The good old days had left resi­
dual errors in the attitude and approach to ethical pro­
blems*
The predatory, exploiting type of character which carried the world to 1914 has now become a dangerous anachronism* It organized the social order (if order is a word that can be used of it) for the risks and adventures of competition* The new age needs something quite different * It needs to be organized for the risks and adventures of coopera­tion* 371
The world had changed, and so must the Christian morals* 
The task Of Christianity, wrote Barry, is to vindicate the 
moral validity and creativeness of the faith "when drawn 
to the scale of new maps, on the twentieth century projec­
tion of a ceaseless evolutionary process unfolding Itself 
through the cosmic system* "
The failure in part had been a failure of the 
Christian Church to adapt itself, "The one really for­
midable argument against the truth of the Christian reli­
gion is the record of the Christian Church . * * again
p, 5
371Barry» Spectator» Jamary 26» 1934» vol. 152»P * 112
Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p* 2
and again it has taken the wrong Rather than
acknowledge the creative aspects of historical change, 
the church continued to view the movements of science and 
history as revolts against its authority and position; 
and the church called men to renewed obedience on stan­
dards of conduct which were no longer relevant or justi­
fied, The church had not only missed the fine qualities 
of realism and sincerity, which were also characteristic 
of the generation, but also had simply identified the 
Christian way of life with the social conventions of its 
predecessors. Therein said Barry, lay its modem predica­
ment and its irrelevance# It had tried to meet the 
challenge of a changing world with a repetition of venerable 
formulas of a previous generation*
There is a contemporary extension of that concern 
in Christian Ethics and Secular Societys
Ethics is sometimes called the cement of society.But a fluid society does not need cement, which must either restrict it or be cracked. What it needs is a permament center of moral reference, not so much a map as a true compass - bearing as mankind moves out over uncMrted seas to a still unpredictable destination,3T4
All moral decisions have to be made in an experimental 
manner. They are related to the particular situation and 
the materials actually at hand. They are Informed by the 
knowledge of the principles;
373Barry, The Relevance of the Church (London;Nisbet & Go. Ltd,, New York; Scribners, 1936), p. 46
374Barry, Christian Ethics and Secular Society, p. l4
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The basic Christian facts do not change; but Christian theological formulations have changed and are now changing rapidly in response to social and economic changes* Bo the Christian moral principles do not change, but new social and economic facts in­tervene to change the situation and thus require fresh interpretations of them.375
The Gospel of Christian Love bids us to care for the poor; 
but it does not give us the social techniques or the 
machinery or the institutions through which it will cur­
rently be best to express it* These depend on our knowl­
edge of the economic and social facts available at the 
time.
In the end the real test of the relevance of 
Christianity will be what it has to say about ethics. It 
is in the sphere of morals that religious questions pre­
sent themselves most acutely to men today# "And it is 
here that the churches and what they stand for are felt 
by many sincere minds to be failing them, "376 ques­
tion now is the same as it was then:
Can Christianity still be the moral guide of our fast-changing Western society, in its moral confusion and spiritual bankruptcy? What, more precisely, is Christian morality and how far is it valid apart from Christian belief? What has it to offer to twentieth century man? . , *3(7
The one thing it can offer is a relevant Christian ethic.
Professor Waddlngton once wrote that the primary demand of
an ethical theory is that "It should be relevant and
375Ibid., p, 32
376Ibid., p, 15
377ibid., p. 13
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applicable to the world around it."3?8
In the early nineteen-twenties, the case at hand 
was the "new" social psychology, Barry immersed himself
in the psychological writing of the day, including notably;McDougall and F, W* H. ^ers, and wrote Christianity and 
Psychology, as well as an introduction to the book of 
Ephesians? St. Paul and Social Psychology,^80 arguing in 
the latter that St. Paul was an apposite precursor of the 
best Insights of the modem psychology, "If Christianity 
claims to be a faith and a life for man in society, it 
must come to terms with social p s y c h o l o g y ,  "^81
The economic condition of the nineteen-thirties 
also prompted his interest and response in e,g*. The 
Relevance of Christianity, So deeply did he get to 
the root of the problems of the affluent society, that 
Dean Inge accused him of being overly socialistic for an 
Anglican a u t h o r , Barry’s continuing relationship 
vîith humanism we will note later. And, his most recent 
works incorporated the watchwords of the new theology,
378Waddlngton, The Ethical Animal, p. 20
379Barry, Christianity and Psychology (London: SCM Press, 1923)
300Barry, St, Paul and Social Psychology (London: Oxford UniversitynPress, 1923%"^
381Ibid., p. 44
'See Relevance of Christianity, pp* 284-99, etc,
383Inge, Christian Ethics^ Modern Problems, p, 7
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"rellglonless Christianity and man come of age" from 
Bonhoefferj the death of God theology from the United 
States; the process theology of Whitehead and Hartshome; 
and not least, for our purposes, the philosophical biology 
of Fr# Teilhard de C h a r d i n , H e  once wrote in the 
>r:
The first condition of Christian revival is a brave and radical rethinking of the theology for which the church stands, in terms not of formula and definition, but of truth for twentieth-century life and action
Relevance itself is important, and with Barry it 
takes on a deeper significance. lot only does he keep in 
touch with the world around him, he is also willing to 
listen to and be led by others.
There are technical factors involved in moral choices and if we are trying to find out what is God’s will and verify our Christian obedience we must have recourse, on such matters, to the experts whether or not they believe in Christianity.
Twentieth-century morality should learn from twentieth- 
century man, utilizing whatever information is available; 
"if God in Christ has entered history, then men must be 
able to find him in our history, not only in the first 
century or the thirteenth# Underlying principles do 
not change,
Secular and Supernatural, pp. 121, 126, etc.
Barry, Spectator, "The Churches and the Commonlife," vol# 160, p.nagg. Ik y  is , 1938
386Barry, Christian Ethics, Secular Society, p. 31 
^^^Barry, Secular and Supernatural, p. 33
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but new social and economic facta intervene to change the situation and thus require fresh interpre­tations of them. New social techniques bectme avail­able; society comes to be organized in new patterns; new medical or psychological knowledge may affect the Christian judgement on various points. Christian moral principles do not change. . . . (But) when new facts change the moral context, they will change the actualcontent of o b e d i e n c e
Christian morality exists in a far larger world than 
its own theology and churches. It cannot be understood in 
isolation from the culture and the social situation around 
it; God did after all, love the world so much that he iden­
tified himself with it. Barry’s relationship with the 
educated humanism of his day is a good case in point. In 
a most perceptive and Illuminating paragraph, Barry wrote:
That is the tragedy of the last three centuries. When the new knowledge flooded in, new desires were strug­gling for expression and a new power was put into man’s hands to mould the order of nature to his will, the official church was found on the wrong side. It of­fered the modem world a false choice - between belief in God, as it understood Him, and what seemed to be belief in pmgress and the hopefulness and wonder of man’s life*8^9
The relationship of Christian ethics with the world around 
it must be one of cooperation and mutual assistance*
All of us, Christian and Humanists alike, are in the same predicament together. We are all alike being carried along by forces which nobody yet fully under­stands# . . # Christian faith in the Lordship of Christ does not imply that we know the Christian an­swer to the complex ethical issues of our time. There is no ready-made Christian ethic which can just be
Barry, cairistian Ethics, Secular Society, p. 32
389Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p. 131
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"applied" - as though it were paint or wall-paper.
But, Instead of being "allies and collaborators," Barry 
wrote, the Christian moralist and the humanist have shouted 
at one another from entrenched positions; and Christians 
have been especially distrustful of any ethical or moral 
insights found outside the faith. While they should have 
been engaged in mutual conversation - in common defense 
of those human values which are in danger - each has re­
fused to take the other seriously*
Barry seeks a cooperative approach with Humanism, 
but seeks also to transform the secular humanist* Barry ' 
is entirely open to learn and to listen; but he is also 
prepared to teach and to preach* For:
Moral standards are not self-sustaining : theyare vitalized and sustained by convictions that reach out beyond themselves, as the tree draws strength from the soil that nurtures it. 891
To believe in man, we must believe in something more than
man# To be relevant to the actual moral needs of the
human situation, we must be related through the singular
contributions of the Christian faith*
In The Recovery of Man, Barry made the point clear:
The quarrel of Christianity with Bmanism . . # is not that its claims for the spirit of man are too high, but that they are not high enough, because it leaves
Barry, Christian Ethics* Secular Society, p# 31 
301Ibid., p. 26392. . Barry, The Recovery of Man (London: Nisbet & Go.. Ltd, 1948; New I p. 18
3. The Eelevanoe of Christianity
Daring the nineteen-thirties, Barry taught that 
the reconstruction of the Christian ethic will arise out 
of a reconsideration and rei&ppllcatlon of the Christian 
faith. "Christian ethics depends on Christian theology." 
That situation of the thirties must be realized before 
we can grasp the significance of Barry’s contribution.
The question then, expressed specifically by Lord Bussell, 
Sir Julian Huxley, Professor Irving Babbitt, etc., was 
whether modern civilization had to retain the tenets of 
Christian theology in order to retain Christian morality. 
The answer of that day was largely negative. Christian 
theology was part of an anachronistic way of looking at 
things, and the moral ideals which it developed did not 
depend on its other-worldliness* Barry responded with 
his book of The Relevance of Christianity, the purpose 
of which was "an attempt to state a conviction about the 
significance of Christ and the presentation of Christianity 
in its relevance to the claim and values of life."^^^
"The prime consideration of entering the Kingdom is to 
share the standpoint of the King. What Christianity
393Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p. xi-xii
p. 8
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, has to say about ethics arises out of that world-view.
If Christianity is Ineffective in the moral leader­ship of this generation, the failure lies not in its lack of zeal but in the confusion of our thinking and the poverty of our vision of God* Christ is central in our moral universe only so far as we refuse to isolate Him from the context of our experience.393
In The Relevance of the Church Barry argued not only for rele­
vance of the faith, but also for a relevance of the churches 
and the Church. The essential offering of the Church to the 
world is a regeneration of character. life is not only a 
series of individual acts which take on significance in the 
immediate situation; life is a continuing effort to gain 
mastery over the enviroment in which it lives ;
An ethic which is merely conformed to the outward conditions of a culture, and those thought forms and behaviour-pattems which they impose on the bodies and _ souls of men is but an echo of life, not a guide to it.89b
If Jesus was wrong at the centre of His thinking, then the Christian ethic is a false ethic. But if He was right, . . . our civilization must "repent" before it can talk of "applying" Christianity* To be saved without being converted * . a^Is in the nature of Christian things impossible*897
The emphasis later shifted into the more contempo­
rary issue over whether the church should be involved in 
society* Barry wrote;
We must not assume that what "modern man" thinks is the final criterion of religious truth. The Church must take care that in trying to build a bridge across to the secu­larized modern world, it does not abandon the bridgehead
395
Barry, Relevance of the Church, pp. 159-60 
397Ibid., p. 160
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on the Christian side and find Itself with nothing to communicate and nothing distinctively Christian to con-tribute
But> whether it is a thirty year old argument with Huxley^ or 
with the radical critics of the nineteen-sixtiesBarry ap­
plies the identical principles in order to have a Christian 
ethic that is relevant to the human situation^ you must first 
have an ethic which is related to Christian theology#
Our efforts to train people in the problems of 
moral perplexity are impeded and weakened by the sense that 
we do not understand with sufficient clarity what it is we 
are supposed to do#
We cannot be effective in action, whether in pastoral work or in politics. *til we know what it is we are try­ing to do# To clarify our vision of our objectives should not be without its help in attaining them#39^
What Christianity is "trying to do," is a question of first
importance.
From his background in the New Testament studies, 
Barry elaborates an answer in terms of the Hew Testament 
contribution and the Ethic of Jesus Together with his 
strong interest in the needs of contemporary society, Barry 
also insists that we must build our contemporary ethic on 
the Biblical foundation of the New Testament*^^
398Barry, Secular and Supernatural, p# 33
Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p# 21
401
^^^Ibid#, see chapters 3 and 4
Because of his special interests and preference, Barry chooses to ignore the Old Testament, a regrettable pro­cedure criticized by Robert Davidson*s "Borne Aspects of the Old Testament Contribution to the Pattern of Christian Ethics" Scottish Journal of Theology 12t 373-387* 1959
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His treatment of the New Testament background is an 
important variation in the study of Biblical approaches to 
ethical theory and practice#
The moment Christianity loses touch with the in­spiration of the New Testament, it tends to sink to a sub-Christian level, and its moral witness is weakened or obscured
But it is the inspiration of the New Testament which is the 
primary concern, and not the ethics of Jesus* If one goes 
to the Gospels to find material for a particular ethical 
system, one ends with a set of sermons and rules which 
Jesus applied to the first century situation in Palestine#
like the Christian religion itself, the New Testa­ment is ethical through and through# Yet it is not a manual of Christian ethics# It may truly be said that its primary concern is not with ethics at all but with religion# The ethics flow out of the religion, as the religion expresses itself in ethics - the two are in­dissoluble and correlative* Yet without the religion there would be nothing#^^^
What Barry is proposing as the proper way to look at 
New Testament ethics is consistent with the continuing plea 
for relevance in other ages# The "inspiration" of the New 
Testament to Barry, is a matter of realizing that Jesus put 
God first, and then He spoke about ethical matters as it 
happened to occur to Him in the situation#
The Biblical record shows us the moral and spiritual 
achievement which Christ had in the lives of the men and 
women whom He met, and therein lies its strength# "It is 
not for deliberate or conscious argument for our guidance
Barry, Relevance of Christianity  ^p# 40 
403Barry, Christian Ethics, Beoular Bociety# p# ?7
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or conviction of posterity* It is written for men of its 
own time, in the forms of their thoughts and language, in 
terms of the immediate tasks and p r o b l e m s , "^@4
The Spirit would create a new ethic, which would be spontaneous rather than traditional, proving its moral and spiritual mastery over circumstances, as they arose. There is only one law, the law of loves its applications are infinite in number, as they are many faceted invariety,40p
New Testament Christianity was involved with the 
world about it as it moved to the large centers of popula­
tion in the ancient world, but in itself it was not a social 
movement, "About the great constructive tasks of citizen­
ship and the gifts of faith to the so-called cultural values^
it seems to have almost nothing to say,"^^^ And, though we 
can partially explain its indifference at this point by the 
belief in an imminent Parousia, and by the knowledge that 
most of its converts were not in influential positions in 
society, "none of these Is satisfying," says Barry, and the 
reason must be sought at a far deeper level*
This is the paradox of the whole New Testament*Never has there been a stronger emphasis on the ethical implication of religion* Yet its actual ethical* di­rections appear to us to be almost obscurantist,^^*
The ethical teaching of the New Testament seldom goes beyond
the field of personal and domestic conduct, "and it seems to
^^^arry. Relevance of Christianitys p* 4?
405^Ibid*, p, 50
406Ibid#, p. 51
407Ibid., p.
have little concern with the larger questions of* civic and 
social responsibility*"
But, says Barry, the source of this weakness is also 
the source of its strength and the contribution to our 
modem ethical attitudes. It is not really interested in 
these problems.
It is not a book about ethics but a book about the Christian religion* The Hew Testament ^  an other- wordly book; its primary concern is not with social duty: it is with sin, forgiveness and atonement, and the source of spiritual, regeneration in the redemptive love of God the Father.^Oo
The primary mission of the faith was not to elaborate a
social gospel, but to proclaim the vision of God in Jesus
Christ. "The other-worldliness of the early church is
rather a massive concentration on the one thing which the
world needed most#"^9 xt was the relevant expression of
the Christian faith to ethics which was called for by the
Hew Testament world.
That, says Barry, is its lasting contribution to
ethical reflection. It calls us first to Ohristianity,
then sends us away with the conviction that if we are
grounded in the Christian faith, our ethics will bring the
depth of insight to the problems# The church is not another
group of interested people who are trying to solve ethical
problems. It is a group of Christians who apply the faith
of God in ethical situations. It calls first for a renewal
pp. 55-56
Ibid., p. 56
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of life in the God who is revealed in Christ, and then
ethical advice and action follows from there*
It is not because it tells us how to behave in this or that particular situation that we invest it with eternal value; it is rather as the victorious expressionfe intself, stripped of all
Other ethical approaches fail because of the narrow reading 
of human life which is circumscribed by temporal horizons. 
"How it was seen against eternal backgrounds."
The moral creativeness of Christ Himself is this in­
sight which He brought to bear on the existing materials.
He (Christ) was not concerned with advice about conduct, but with the exposure of motive, penetrating the inner heart *s secrets with the two-edged sword of inescapable insight * * . What matters is the integrity and the insi^jt which inspire the jud^ent brought to bear on them,^**
Hence the concern of Christian ethics is not so much 
to show that this or that behaviour is right or wrong, but 
to refer to a constructive philosophy of life which candidly 
faces all the new factors which have entered into the moral 
situation. Its essential offering to the moralisation of 
the new age is the regeneration of character and the Chris­
tian understanding of man.
The real question about Christian ethics is there­fore to show how the Christian world view, centered upon faith in a living God and accordingly supernatural in its emphasis, can offer itself as the interpretation of our rich and manifold experience in an ever-widening and bewildering Universe.
p. 57 
p. 75
412Ibid., p. 10
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In a certain sense, says Barry, there is no Chris­
tian ethic at all. There are hut Christian attitudes to 
experience. The Christian moral standard is, after all, 
not a code of conduct which has to he defended against the 
attacks of a forward generation* "It is an insight to he 
achieved* It changes because it is intended to change. 
Its permanence rests on a faith in "the divine purpose which 
is operative in the history of the world and in the sharing 
of which man’s life is f u l f i l l e d . I n  this way it is 
related to the social problems and movements of the world 
about it.
If the Spirit of Christ is the constructive spirit, in face of all that is decadent and destructive, then the business of the Christian ethic is to bring under social and moral control those yet unmoralized forces which are defeating the ends of civilization * 415
For that in essence is what is meant by the church; 
to be the Body of Christ in the world - the society through 
which God is revealed in the social order* Its whole life 
will be organized by God’s will for the human race, as 
declared and mediated by Christ Jesus * (airistianity has 
a revolutionary dynamic power of social reconstruction and 
renewal. But, if it goes into the social and ethical situa­
tions without that essential strength, it becomes but another 
of the many inadequate attempts to redeem society and man*
p. 8
f"88 Christianity and Crisis (P* Daarmer, ed* ),
4X5Barry, Spectator, January 26, 1934, p. 113
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Barry’s constructive work on the ethical foundations 
of Christianity was important in the 1920’s and 1930’© in 
light of the rapidly expanding "social gospel" movements 
which were in danger Of losing the distinctively Christian 
aspects of its life, it is relevant in our day as well.
Just insofar as the Church knows its business, its centre of gravity cannot be in this world, though it is in this world that its task is to be performed. Its mission is to bring the order of this world - with all its social and economic,,systems - into conformity with the divine ideal of it,^^^
^^^Barry, "The Church in the World - Failures and Opportunities," in Christianity and Crisis* p, 591
4. Ethle Related to the Essential Heeds of Man
Barry call© for an Investigation of what Christian 
ethics should he in our time* An ethic that claims fi- 
nality in the life of men must be Integrally wove into the 
true patterns of human life; and must be responsive to the 
deepest needs of manlcind* If it frustrates, ignores, or 
impoverishes any essential need of the human personality, 
it will be misleading to the moralist# The Christian 
ethic can never be safeguarded by rending the true tex- 
ture of man’s experience, as has been attempted in the 
many forms of a dualism between faith and knowledge; be- 
tween reason and revelation; between existence and ex­
perience*
The difficulty with the BartMan ethic is that the 
will of God is known to us only in and through revelation* 
"But if religion is thus drawn apart from life it becomes 
itself impoverished and anaemic Barth, says Barry,
desires to establish a distinction "between the faith by 
which God is apprehended and all the other activities of 
our spirits*"
The difficulty, says Barry, is more than a matter 
of method; it concerns the being and nature of God* "The
417Barryj Relevance of ('hurch, p. Ill
400
power of God," writes Barth, "can be detected neither in
the world of nature nor in the souls of men. But "if 
God is in no sense revealed in the glory and majesty of the 
world and the plain goodness of commen men and women * * # 
then Christianity is a mistake and God is not at work in 
the world in any sense as the Gospel claims.
Xt is not just a theological squabble with Dr. Barth, 
It is more a reflection of two different ways of looking 
at the world of nature and the Christian ethic itself.
It cannot hope to redeem the surrounding world so long as other-worldliness is interpreted as aloofness from the world’s affairs. If religion stands, as it stands at present, self-contained in its own preoccu­pations over against the values and interests of the world which it is commissioned to save, it will lose both the world and its own soul.420
Christian morality must be able to grow as human experience 
and human knowledge grow. It must respond to man’s funda­
mental selfhood.
This means that it must be set forth in the con­text of a satisfying and coherent world-view. For the question: what is the right kind of conduct plainly presupposes another: How can we interpret the universeand Man’s place and destiny within it?^^^
Barry’s interpretation is one which we will again note is
characterized by the balanced view he maintains regarding
the natural and supernatural elements in the existence of
man.
Ibid., p. 112 ^^ %bid.
^^Barry, Relevance of can-istiaalty, p. 19 
Ibid., p. 3
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main points in his argument were formulated in 
Christianity and psychologys^^^ published in 1923. Already 
Barry had understood the essential task which the scientist 
has in assisting the Christian moralist. Some of the de­
tails of the analysis must be altered in the light of knowl­
edge we now have, but the principles laid down in that book 
still apply* Barry’s own summary of the concern of the book 
is useful:
Psychology must supply us with the facts about the human mind and its experiences, of which the religious experience is one* It is then the task of theology to explain what kind of ugiverse it is in which such ex­periences occur # * ,423
Psychology supplies us with the facts* Before we
can decide what to do with them or how they bear on a
theological understanding of the nature of man, we must
first know what the discoveries are. The facts themselves
do not give us a system of value, nor a detailed list of
good ethical practice, but neither can we do without them*
This is an important point in Barry’s scientific
investigations, as well as our own# Later he referred to
the long-held dogma of moral philosophy "that there is no
passage from jU to ought Indicative statements cannot
be transferred directly into imperative ones. Barry’s own
Barry is using psychology in its broadest sense, which is a social psychology that deals with the study of man* It actually belongs to our general use of the cate­gories of The Life Sciences, rather than to psychoanalysis or psycho-therapy#
423Barry, Christianity and Psychology, p* 172
424Barry, Christian Ethics, Secular Society^ p* 48
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discussion of evolutionary ethics, which we will discuss 
later, makes that point quite clearly# While it is true 
that there is no passage from is to ought, Barry implies 
that this is not the emphasis which the Christian moralist 
is likely to need# The letter’s preoccupation with the 
theological source of value demands that he be concerned 
with the ought# It is the "is" which is likely to he over­
looked, or to be relegated to a secondary position* Barry’s 
concern is rather to show that "any theory of what ought to 
be, and therefore any moral judgments, must in the long run 
be firmly grounded in the way man is made, and the way the 
world is made. "^5
Early in his writing Barry was emphasizing that "the 
starting point of our whole enquiry must be the whole­
hearted recognition of the l^othesia of ’evolution’ in 
the sphere of mental and spiritual lifa."^^^ "lot our 
bodies only, but our minds as well are continuous with 
those of our animal ancestors, and we forget or deny them 
to our peril# "^^7 There is no activity of human life which 
can be examined independently from its origin in the evolu­
tionary process. Everything that man is or does, wrote 
Barry, is affected by his natural origin,
Man’s self-conscious reason rests on a biological foundation. It is built over animal appetites, and
425^Xbid.
Barry, Christianity and Psychology, p. 9
p. 9
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surroundad with non-rational processes# It carries with it traces of its ancestry.42o
The general conclusion, we think, is correct; and the 
intention is aligned with Barry’s relevance elsewhere. He 
tries to understand ethical and spiritual behaviour as they 
are related to their natural setting* He also emphasizes 
that the natural inclinations of man cannot be called "sin- 
ful, " for then it would have to be assumed that "self- de­
struction must be the Will of God."
Barry never did face directly the question of the 
origin of those attributes which we label sinful, the ques­
tion which domiimted the ethical concern of F. H. Tennant; 
i.e., how sin originates in the natural process. With 
Barry, as with Tennant, the native impulses and instincts 
are morally neutral. He is determined however, only to 
conclude that sin is "man’s melancholy privilege, not a 
hangover from sub-human ancestry*"^9 He dismisses the 
Genesis narrative from serious consideration as "having 
played little part in later Biblical thought, and it is 
never referred to in the G o s p e l s  *"^80 core of the
Gospel is the goodness of God and grace abounding to the 
chief Of sinners." The myth of Adam and Eve is useful only 
that it lays stress on the disobedience of man himself.
"Only a child of God can commit sin"; for while an animal
p. 10
^^Barry, Recoyery of Nan, p. 6?
p. 68
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can perform an act that is an incorrect choice, from our 
point of view, only a human spirit can perform an act with 
ethical significance*
Thus it is, by a resounding moral paradox, that the very fact of man’s fallen state - his shame, his treachery, and his humiliation, is evidence of his divine origin and therefore contains the pledge of his restoration * 431
Barry does believe that "morality" comes naturally 
to man, in a process similar to the "social heredity" we 
mentioned earlier %d,th Tennant* The "natural" is admittedly 
an ambiguous word, but Barry means only to say that morality 
comes naturally to man in his social setting* He asserts 
that all societies have moral codes which demand to be fol­
lowed by the constituency of the group, or retribution is 
required* More recently, in Secular and Supernatural5 he 
states that; "All cultures of which we have any knowledge 
have been based on a faith in God, or gods, and sustained 
by community myths and common w o r s h i p . At other points 
he includes a common ethic. Natural law and its conclu­
sions can lead to complex discussions, but
The permanent value of the concept is not so much in yielding a moral code as in its insistence that morality is natural to man. . . . It. is primarily an account of the naturalness of morals *433
Barry’s argument is really from a natural law, or from a
social anthropological point of view, yet it is similar to
432Barry, Secular and Supernatural, p* 9
433Barry, Ohriatian Ethics* Secular Societya p. 46
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that of Tennant, as well a© having a similarity with 
0. H* Haddington’s "socio-genetic transmission" of the 
ethical inclination# If there is something absolutely uni­
versal about the moral sense in all men everywhere, then it 
mist in the end be attributed to more than an accident of 
history and cultural development.
There are times when Barry oversimplifies the specific 
ways in which the natural instincts of man operate in human 
behaviour. He was dependent on MoDougall and the faculty 
psychology of the early decades of this century. With 
MoDougall, he assumes a far too simple list of primary in­
stincts, which operate directly in man. He writes, for 
example, of the "gregarious impulse, which after all is 
said and done, may be the dominant force in the lives of 
all of us." The "acquisitive instinct" is the root of our 
business interests. "A balked parental instinct transfers 
itself into acquisitiveness2 the childless man becomes a 
miser." The "hunting instinct finds its outlet in collect­
ing postage stamps. The fighting instinct of ’pugnacity’ 
is transferred into the formation of ’martyrs and pioneers* 
in all branches of the Master’s army#"^^^
Barry’s interest in these matters is to show" that 
the self-conscious man is able to redirect his natural im­
pulses into higher types of human activity; "They can be 
converted or sublimated; and their energy can be transferred
434Barry, Ohristianity and Psychology, pp. 16 ff, etc.
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along other instinctive channels #"^^5 with that we can 
also agree. But Barry’s difficulty (and our disagreement) 
is that he has assumed a simple and direct relationship be­
tween instinct and human behaviour, and has missed the com­
plexity of interaction in the genetically determined activity 
of man* And also, unintentionally, has overemphasized the 
purely biological nature of human ethical problems*
If we trace things back to the start, we shall probably find that practically all the moral problems which we have to face, in ourselves or in other people, have one of the primary Instincts at their root *436
That statement can only be true if we alter its emphasis to 
read; If we trace things back to the start we shall probably
find that practically all moral problems we have to face
* * * are in some way affected by the natural biological
origin of man* Barry had gone too far; but the point of
that early book was essentially praiseworthy# It put him 
directly into touch i^ ith the issues involved in a scien­
tific investigation of human behaviour.
In later writings Barry himself has altered the 
specific emphasis. In Ohriatian Ethics and Secular Society, 
written more than forty years later, he continues to stress 
that the Christian moralist must examine the scientific 
sources of human behaviour* The emphasis here, however, 
is on the more general aspects of the non-rational influences 
working in man* Using Niebuhr’s words, he writes of the
*, p. 21
436^ Ibid,, p* 19
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"limits of creaturelinass which man cannot defy#" "Every 
social decision is modified and circumscribed by natural 
circumstances and historical tendencies beyond the control  ^
of human decision#
As a product of biological evolution, man carries within him, physically and mentally, the indelible legacy of his pre-human origin* The oceanic tides of his earliest home still affect the rhythms of human physiology* Els mental and emotional constitution has a long history behind it and never ignores or cuts itself loose from its "natural" and innate en­dowment *436
Moralists, says Barry, have been prone to underesti­
mate "the extent to which life has to be lived and moral 
decisions made in a framework of events and processes which 
are beyond human c o n t r o l * T h e  first lesson we have to 
learn is that we do not enjoy a freehold - we must live by 
nature’s conditions*
# # * these apparently impersonal forces which appear to control and bedevil the situation, are but the ac­cumulated consequences of incalculably many acts of oho|^g by uncounted millions of hwmn wills before
Bman character is largely constituted by what we know 
are non-rational factors in our ethical decisions from our 
study of biology and genetics If we emphasize reason 
or revelation in that which makes us men, we tend to ignore
4*R7Barry, Christian Ethics, Secular Society, p# 61 
^^^Xbid#
439^,^^^ p# 60
^^Barry, Questioning Faith (London; SCM Press, 1965),p* 124
Barry, Ohristian Ethics, Becular Society, p# 60
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or to minimize the non-ratloml factors in our make-up: 
amotions, instincts, and desires# Ohriatian ethics must 
be realistic in its understanding of the limits within 
which our freedom of choice is p o s s i b l e  *442 must wel­
come the findings of the sciences and everything they may 
have to tell us about human behaviour,443
Barry’s interest in incorporating the scientific 
facts of human behaviour has continued throughout his later 
writings. But the structure of his ethical attitudes is 
completed only when we examine the process by which he 
applies the information to the developing Christian ethic. 
We must welcome the findings of science, he says, "but we 
cannot rightly understand what they mean until we place 
them all into the larger context of man’s existence in 
the universe."
As Canon Raven had noted earlier, we get further 
when we approach evolution from its end product rather 
than its beginning. The former is the procedure of Chris­
tian thinking, while the latter is that of contemporary 
Naturalism. Barry writes;
For modem thinking, as for Aristotle, ethics is a branch of natural science: for the great Ohristian tradition it is a province of Theology, That at once defines its essential character,444
442Barry, Questioning Faith, p. 124
44bBarry, Ohristian Ethics, Secular Bociety, p. 63
444Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p, 138
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Man la a part of nature, but he also transcend© the nat­
ural process and Is subject to the considerations of that 
realm as well* Central to the case for the Christian 
world-view is the awareness that "human rights * . . rest 
fundamentally on the faith that man is heir of a more than 
earthly destiny. " The most certain fact in human exper­
ience is that man is aware of, and able to reflect upon 
himself and his own thoughts and purposes* "Not only does 
man transcend nature, still more importantly, he transcends 
himself."445
The belief in man’s transcendence is essential. But 
there is a sense in which Bishop Barry implies that the 
awareness of this transcendence, and some specific descrip­
tions of its presence in man; e.g., "the cause of human 
behaviour," are things which are outside the natural exis­
tence of man - as if they represent a wholly extra-natural 
endowment from the Creator. While formerly he had in­
sisted that no aspect of human life, even its spiritual 
and moral action, is unaffected by the evolutionary origin 
and the biological nature of man, in this instance he ap­
pears to fall back on another kind of dualism*
He writes, for example:
Human action steps forth out of nature into an order of self-determination, an order of personality or spirit, in which man lives not by compulsion from behind him, but by value and purpose summoning him to realize what he has it in him to become.446
445Barry, Ohristian Ethics, Secular Society, p. 64
^Ibid., p. 63
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We will not argue that human action Is hound to It© evolu­
tionary origin; but on Barry’s own criteria of human nature, 
it is impossible that human action can step forth out of 
nature into an order in which man lives not by compulsion 
from behind but alone by value and purpose summoning him 
ahead# It is a difficult task to clarify the point without 
seeming to deny the transcendence of man# But the objec­
tion which we want to make is that Barry has been too timid 
in carrying his understanding of human nature to its logical 
conclusions; i.e., that while our understanding of the 
ethical value of man’s behaviour may exist outside of na­
ture, and that summons him on, human action itself does 
not# It seems rather that Barry should be saying that man 
can step out of a purely biologically determined behaviour 
into a uniquely human existence where he is able to reflect 
upon the meaning of his actions; but that human existence 
itself, and the ability to transcend it, are also affected 
by "natural" origins and expressions* Otherwise we are 
left with a belief in a partial natural origin of man, but 
with arbitrary exceptions which do not seem to be available 
to Barry unless he denies his previous point# Man is able 
to transcend his natural behavioural patterns and their 
limitations # It does seem correct to say that he does so 
by the values and purposes which summon him ahead* But 
even at these "highest levels" of human activity, he is 
still not "out of nature" nor freed from "natural compul­
sions*"
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More to the point of our criticiam is another quo­
tation from his hook:
Human action is caused by the human will and that is something altogether distinct from anything that exists in the natural order# Man’s brain, his nervous system, his muscles, are the secondary causes of what is done. But the real cause or the first mover is not any of these, it is the Man himself, giving effect to a freely chosen purpose#44?
Barry’s confusion is all the more evident here. To write 
that human action is caused by a human will which is "some- 
thing altogether distinct from anything that exists in the 
natural order," is to confuse the issue entirely and to 
reverse what Barry otherwise seems to believe. His use 
of "the human will" is part of the difficulty. The "will" 
to Barry, as in a similar way with Tennant, seems to mean that 
something exists in itself. But the will must certainly 
consist of all that the man is, and the man is all that 
he has become in the process of life. To separate it off 
as a separate endowment inevitably leads to the misunder­
standing* Man’s decision-making capacity (which pre­
sumably is what Barry means by the will) is available to 
him precisely because he has these natural endowments.
It is subject to the requirements (or compulsions) which 
exist in its origin and expression. When Barry writes 
that "the first cause . * * is the Man himself," it seems 
to us that he is simply providing another way of saying 
"the human will." The will is the man, and the man is all 
these things which make him a man.
447'ibid#, p# 63
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Barry has applied to the act itself a frame of 
reference which refers to the ethical value of the act.
In Questioning Faith, he is referring to the subject of 
"evil" or "sin." Sin, he writes, "is a concept.which con­
cerns man’s relationship to God and can only be formed in 
a religious context, not simply another word for doing 
w r o n g  ."448 source of evil is in the human will - in
its deliberate choice against the will of God.
The source of evil is not in "matter," in which case to be born would be damnation - nor in the ulti­mate rift or flaw in the universe, in which case it would be inherent in the nature of things and there could be no hope of overcoming it. The source of moral evil is in the will.449
There is an important difference between this and 
the previous passage* Here Barry’s argument is directed 
to the understanding of a theological-ethical interpreta­
tion of the value of human behaviour. It is not, as be­
fore, "human action" itself which is involved. It is the 
value judgment which a Christian, moralist is making on 
human action, and that is based on the criteria of that 
which transcends nature. Hhile previously "the will" was 
interpreted to mean the decision-making capacity of man, 
now it is restricted to the origin of the religious concept 
of sin. We must conclude that in the latter instance Barry 
has made an important point regarding the source of evil 
from a theological point of view. That can only rightly
■^^ B^arry, Questioning Faith, p. 138 
449Ibid., p. 120
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be done when we can establish that man made a conscious 
decision for which he is himself responsible* Then, if 
"will" can be taken to mean a conscious responsible choice 
of evil when a good was available, the point would apply.
But we cannot support the separate independent existence 
of "a will, " which then becomes the source of human be­
haviour*
We could not pretend to propose a complete and final 
counter-explanation* What does seem essential is that the 
existence of the total man in the process of life be under­
stood* And, at the same time, the existence of ethical 
value of human behaviour be included*
To that and Barry’s early discussion of evolutionary 
ethics is appropriate* "Faith in evolution," he wrote in 
1930, "must be recognized as dominant In the whole out­
look of the present age*"^^^ But it is a faith which 
leads to "gigantic disillusionment." Julian Huxley’s 
evolutionary humanism, e.g., Barry wrote, rests on the 
assumption "that there are within the sources of civiliza­
tion creative and regenerative forces adequate to respond 
to its own d e m a n d s # . . With Huxley says Barry, "What­
ever emerges must be accepted . . . whatever is, is best."^^ 
But, writes Barry,
4*60Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p. 123
"Ibid., p. 125
p. 145
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It is important to realize from the start that ♦ # • it is the minds of men which evolve; not the goodness or truth which they realize* Valuations may evolve; hut values are the measure of evolution#
If value, and what life is supposed to mean, is itself in 
the process of evolution (or in the findings of any sci­
ence), it ends with no value and no meaning*
the world "means" cannot change or evolve# But we who come out of its evolving process may ad­vance to a less inadequate recognition of its worth, its meaning and its purpose# * . * The race may find value tomorrow where yesterday it was unaware of it# If so, it will he we who have, changed, not the mean­ing or value which we find#4p4
No ethic that rests on evolution can justify its own obli­
gations « Value, and what is valuable, exist outside of 
the process* It is only our increasing self-conscious 
awareness of this value which can be said to evolve#
There Barry’s point is clear and consistent with 
his understanding of the differences between human be­
haviours and the value we attach to them#
The uniqueness of man is conferred upon him. It 
is not an assemblage of good and superior attributes from 
nature which he garnered on his evolutionary rise#If Man is merely a product of natural processes,whether biological or evonomic, then he can claim no value in his own right, and the processes that make him can break him* # # # But if Man is a spiritual personality - in religious language, a,,ghild of God - then the whole situation is different#455
453"^ I^bid#, p# 153p. 178
455Barry, m a t  Has Ohristianity To Bay? (London and New York; Harper ^  Wothers, 1938), p T W ;  this little known book of Barry’s, written in 1937, deserves a better hearing#
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Christian theology has not "the least interest in drawing 
a vail over human origins." Man shares instincts and pro­
pensities with the other mammals, and with all of life.
If we deny these facts, it is "merely silly." "We do not 
establish man’s spirituality by attempting to dematerialize 
the physical On the other hand,
Christianity reads the whole story. Man is not (as he once hoped) a god, nor as he now begins to fear an animal. He is soul, still making. The child Of natural and organic process, a creature, dependent at every stage of development on powers not his own, he is claimed and called by spiritual reality to ac­cept the responsibility of self-hood and to become a "person" in response to it.457
Ho knowledge about where man has been will ever tell us
the most important things about him now - "what he is and
whither he is going."
The Ohristian interpretation of man’s state is that it is explicable only in its relation to that spiritual environment on which it depends and by which it is transcended, and that man will never be complete or satisfied or freed from his own in­terior oontradiotions^’til his true relationship to it is achieved , . .458
The relationship of Grace to nature is always one where
"Grace fulfills the nature of man, it does not destroy it."
The Giver of Grace is the Author of Creation* But it is through grace, through God’s work in man, that we best understand what "creation" means. Man is the key to the structure of the universe.459
^^Ihid., p. 126
Ibid., p. 130
Barry, Christian Ethics, Secular Society a p. 67
^^^Ibid., pp. 53-54
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It was a point that has been made clearer in 
Teilhard and the philosophical biology of our time. It 
was also made by Bishop H* H. Henson, whom Barry once 
called "one of the greatest Bishops of his generation*"460 
Henson, in his Gifford Lectures at St* Andrews in 1935-1936, 
argued skillfully for a theme that is present in the title 
of the published lectures: Ohristian Morality: Natural,
Developing, Final. The Bishop of Durham wrote:
It is based on the assumption that, since man is developing from the lowest phase of human life to the highest, the truth about his nature will be most i^ly disclosed in the latest phase of his development#4ol
A* E. Taylor also noted it in his Gifford Lectures; "To
think of the moral life adequately, we rmst think of it
as an adventure which begins at one end with nature, and
ends at the other with supornature*"^^^
* * * * *
Tliere is a troubling aspect of the way in which 
Barry himself understands the uniqueness of man in nature, 
and it comes when he neglects the passage where that 
which was "not-man" becomes "man* He never incorporates 
the implications of the origin of man, whom he says is a 
human spirit. On the one hand he speaks as if (over)
460Barry, Secular and Supernatural, p. 32
H. Henson, Christian Morality: Natural, Develop.(Oxford! The ôlarendon Kress, i§3B7i p. ' S'OB'
462A* E. Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist (London: Macmillan & Go. Ltd., 1937), P. 124
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all that is essentially human is a special gift^ , conferred 
by virtue of the Creator. The dignity of man comes in 
that God loves him and has gifted him with "human attri­
butes . " On the otherj; Barry occasionally refers to "those 
capacities which we regard as specifically human - love 
and loyalty and constructive thought^ our thirst for truth 
and our delight in beauty, as coming out of and along 
with those other primitive endowments* Barry is not clear 
as to hoif they become humanized*
The choices are either that the specifically human 
attributes are developed out of the natural characteristics 
as they appear and are modified in nature; or there is a 
special endowment of what is spirit or soul, from the 
Creator^ at the time when what is pre-human becomes human. 
While Barry affirms the former, there is a vray in which he 
also tries to work in the latter. For example; the pro­
blem recurs in Barry* a interpretation of the evolution of 
man* In preserving the Christian uniqueness of man, Barry 
borroifs the philosophy of Emergent Evolution. "Biologists 
are almost all agreed in principle," he Wfrites, "that at 
any stage of the evolution of life there is something 
•there* which was not there before.
Life emerges within the inorganic, and begins to climb the spiral; within life emerges rudimentary con­sciousness, which to turn gives birth to intelligence.• . • Within intelligence, at the end of the story
463Barry, What Has Christianity To Bay? p. 127
464Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p. 154
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(though perhaps it is still more like^he heginning),emerges Man as self-conscious spirit.
The problem is still present* "%#at is man?" Is he "the . 
self conscious spirit," as a result of a progressive 
development which culminates in him, or did he have the 
self-conscious spirit conferred upon him by the Creator?
If it is, as vfith Teilhard de Chardin, that pre-existent 
in all of life from the very beginning, were the poten­
tialities for all that would later come - in the basic 
stuff of the universe existed the potential for the mind 
of man - then the sharp distinction in what the human spirit 
is as a unique being, cannot be drawn as clearly as Barry 
does in other places. The distinction is then one of 
development $
Biologists would almost all agree that: "There is
something there which was not there before" in every evolu­
tionary development. But it is not the same kind of "some­
thing" which Barry might be referring to* That agreed 
nevmess is there as a natural development advance, an 
adjunct of what is becoming (whether it can be understood 
in detail or not). "The human spirit," as Barry uses the 
phrase, would not be that something "there" almost all 
biologists would agree . H* Graham Cannon would, as we 
have earlier n o t e d , m a k e  that point, as would some 
others. Barry's dependence on Sir Mister Bardy*s Gifford
^Ibid., p. 164
^^^See page 64
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Lectures is an extension of that same ambiguity in 
Secular and S u p e r n a t u r a l We agree v?lth Hardy*s ambi­
tion - to discuss evolution in relation to the "spirit 
of man"; but when Barry writes of "that something within 
life itself, reaching out to new adventures and experi­
ments,"^^®® he comes close to a Lamarckian dilemma. While 
he wrote earlier that Darwin imd annihilated the earlier 
typology of natural development where the Will of God 
was transferred to the mutations and evolutionary changes, 
a neo-vitalism of the years after Darvxin, Barry here seems 
to substitute an equally indefensible Will of God to di­
rect the development and the nevmess in man.
467Barry, Secular and Supernatural, pp. 127 ff, etc
4684**Ibid., p, 128
5* Enquiry and. Method on Moral Problems
How Barry applies his theoretical ethical founda­
tion to the specific moral problems of our time is of 
enormous interest. In The Recovery of Man Barry applies 
his view of the nature of man in specific ethical situa­
tions, It is not simply a theoretical point of doctrine, 
for
If we start by believing, as Christians, that "what it is to be man" essentially is to be a crea­ture made in the image of God, it follows that the account which will be given of his biological origin and behaviour will not indeed tamper with the facts in order to point to an edifying moral, but it will be different from the account given by anyone who assumes that man is simply and solely a biologicalspecies,409
We begin with Barry *s discussion of the ethical 
problems related to the fa^ mlly in modern society, In 
1931 he called the rehabilitation of family life "the 
primary moral issue of our time,"^*^^ It is an area which 
interests more than the Christian moralist. Others may 
study the family from the standpoint of biology or soci­
ology or economics;
But none of these views will be realistic unless it also includes all the others, and unless it be
^^ 9 , .Barry, The Recovery of Man, pp. 40-41
470Barry, Helovance of Christianity, p, 202
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remembered that man Is not merely a civilized, animal nor a moralized social being, but that he is also an Immortal, spirit with a soul to save and a destiny to realize.471
The family is an area of ethical discussion "in which the 
natural good is fully realized only by partaking in the 
supernatural."^72
The Christian moralist will not "tm#er with the 
facts" of the situation, nor will he supply the facts 
from other than the scientific source* But he will give 
them value in a wider context. He will take account of 
the historical and sociological studies of the human 
family:
# . . but to these general considerations Christi­anity adds its own sovereign principles. No thought about the family can be true which thinks merely in terms of this world. Man is made for life eternal; and all social groupings and relationships must therefore fall short of their real significance if they are not so constituted and ordered as to school men for that eternal destiny. The family, in its Christian conception is an incarnation of life eternal.473
Barry is unyielding at this point throughout his ethical 
writings. The contribution which Christian ethics can 
make to the ethical discussions of our time is a dis­
tinctively religious one. It joins in the efforts to 
unravel the complexity of information relating to man and 
his behaviour; but it joins that same quest at its own
p. 204472Ibid., p. 201
473Ibid., p. 206
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level and on its own terms* It is willing to listen, but 
also prepared to speak*
Following Barry in this way, the Christian moralist 
first makes himself aware of the facts of the ethical si­
tuation. Christianity oarmot attempt to escape the twen­
tieth century, and in this instance, as always, we have 
to deal with the facts as they are* "How far is it pos­
sible in the changed conditions of the twentieth century 
for the Christian ethic to offer convincing guidance for 
the rebuilding of the family?"^^^
"Family life," he later wrote, "is changing ra­
pidly, whether for better or worse" ♦ * * "If we are to 
assess the changes realistically, we need theological 
interpretation and not merely attitudes that we have 
inherited" ;
Unless we expect that Christian family life can remain static and as it were insulated in the midst of a rapidly changing society « and that means, in the end, to put it in a museum. We must not try to equate the Christian family with the social patterns of earlier generations.4fD
Absent in the earlier work is Barry*6 historical 
and scientific analysis of the contexnporary understanding 
of the family group.^7® Here he notes that the historical 
and biological origin of the family, "is in the helpless­
ness Of the human infant." "But it is not simply a
474^ Ibid., p. 203
475Barry, Christian Ethics, Beoular Booiety. p. 185
pp. 187 f f .
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biological fact," and "Christian spokesmen need be rather 
careful not to claim more than is warranted by the facts." 
Our idea of the family pattern is a contemporary and cul­
tural expression of the biological or "natural" fact.
The idea that a man and a woman should be married as a matter of private arrangement between themselves, ' of their free choice and because they wanted to, be­cause they were in love with one another, without reference to their tribe or kin, would have seemed immoral to early society and would probably have shocked Queen Victoria.477
Even more the idea that a man and wife should live 
together in one place, and that both should care for the 
offspring in a systematic and continuing way, is also a 
recent phenomenon. Marriage and family, as we now accept 
them, are the result of a long historical development*
It has been closely related to the economic needs and 
social ideas of the particular group in question. When 
economic and social conditions changed, so did the concept 
of the family. What we would want to call the "Will of 
God" for the Christian family, says Barry, must be medi­
ated through our understanding of the other factors in­
volved. Our advice on its future pattern must begin with 
the awareness that it is "now once again in a changing 
social environment • ♦ . Its shape and pattern are bound 
to be readjusted,
The exact meaning which Barry intends when he writes
p. 188
478Ibid., p. 190
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that the "shape and pattern are bound to be readjusted" 
is not entirely clear# When he earlier wrote that the 
rehabilitation of the Christian family is the most impor­
tant ethical task of the modern world, he probably meant 
more a rehabilitation of the idea of the family which 
existed in the early years of this century, although he 
did stress that new factors would demand new approaches #
In the latter book, he seems to be writing about an actual 
change in the shape and pattern, and does not simply call 
for rehabilitation#
Christians must be careful not to suggest that the family is an end in itself. It is part of a larger social and moral structure and only fulfills itself in that larger whole. We must not forget that our Lord Himself was "difficult" when hia family circle made inordinate claims upon Him#4f9
He applies the general statement to several specific 
factors affecting marriage and the family such as economic 
and social value of women working, and the use of con­
traceptives. But he does not really mean that our idea 
of the family as the basic unit of society, and the source 
of Christian values, should be radically changed. He 
wrote; "The family seems to be In transition tomrds a 
changed pattern of relationship"; and "anything that may 
tend to weaken the family . # . Christians must regard as 
a menace to social welfare.
p. 196
480Ibid,, p. 194
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This was of course also the general conclusion 
and concern of the Relevance of Ghristiwity, written al­
most forty years earlier. The difference is that in the 
latter work Barry has expanded his analysis and has en­
larged the setting in which the Christian view of mar­
riage and the family is placed* In neither case does 
he point to the sentimental family of The Cotter*a 
Saturday Night, or and with a lament that things have 
changed* Both hooks are characterized by Barry's emphasis 
that:
Christian ethics are always in the making* What we call contemporary social movements are in fact his­tory unfolding; hut here as always new situations bring with thmi not only new moral problems but also the need for critical reassessment of traditional or inherited moral judgments *4oi
"The Christian home," wrote Barry, "is not a mere synonym 
for a commonplace, virtuous domesticity." It is, as the 
Christian Church claims, "a sacrament of human relation­
ships in their ideal « at once the symbol and instrument 
of redemption through the Love hi vine#
But to accept the ideal, or to make it workable in 
modem society, Barry goes on to delineate five areas in 
which "new data" must be given "searching and courageous 
attention."
(1) The circumstances of industrialized society 
and- the disturbing economic factors involved in it* Here
Ibid., p. 185
Barry, Relevance of Ohristianity, p* 218
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moral judgments and social standards are affected in 
ways beyond the control of the Individual and his deci­
sion* One arises out of the consideration that biological 
maturity comes prior to economic capability* "Early mar­
riage is becoming increasingly difficult and, as things 
are, probably undesirable*"^®® The biological impulse 
calling for sexual expression is present prior to the 
time that society presently permitted marriage*
This prompts Barry to discuss seriously the sug­
gestions for "trial" or "companionate" marriages, made 
back then by people such as Judge Lindsey, Lord Bussell, 
and Mrs* Sanger* The suggestion is;
that young people whose means do not permit of setting up home together should yet be rescued both from pro­miscuity and from social and psychological disaster, by being.,united in lawful wedlock on a "companionate" basis.
It is a serious proposal, says Barry, and "should not be 
answered by mere abuse*" "It is arguable that it might 
be a good thing for human welfare if the 'companionate* 
were given a trial . * *"
The objection, to Barry, is that it is not really 
a trial "marriage*" "It isolates *love * as sexual desire, 
frmi the responsibilities and sacrifices involved in the 
sharing of a permanent home*"^®5
^^^Ibid., p* 218* Incidentally in the latter book Barry noted that early marriage was becoming easier*
^Ibid., p. 219
^^^Ibid,, p. 220
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It is good to satisfy sexual desire: to suggest that it is unholy is not Christian* But this good­ness is hut one element in the goodness realizable by man; if it is so attained as to exclude other and higher elements in goodness, then its realizatim is positively evil*4oo
A man attains his full stature only so far as biological impulses are woven as one strand into the pattern of his whole psycho-physical constitution * . # Love is a self-giving of the whole man; and therefore it must involve some inhibitions upon the crude im­pulses of some parts of him.^o?
Such isolation results when one moves the subject of sexual
desire from its proper place in the Christian conception
of human nature*
Thus the gratification of one instinct is iso­lated from the whole rich complex of bodily, mental, and spiritual experience within which it plays a rightful part. This is what Christianity repudiates* This is not a matter of arbitrary conventions imposed upon the young by the middle-aged. It depends upon our conception of human nature* Christianity takes account of the facts*.,ûlt certainly does justice to the life of instinct#4^°
The changed economic status of women is another 
factor which must guide us, says Barry, in our ethical de­
liberation regarding family and marriage* "A man will no 
longer 'keep* his wife. She will not be dependent upon 
him either intellectually or economically. The ideal of 
love and indeed the whole conception of family life is 
bound to pass through far reaching changes * " ^ 9
p. 212
487Ibid*
488Ibid., pp. 211-12
489^Ibid,, p. 222
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(2) The second of "the new data" is "the thought 
of this generation that parenthood is not the primary 
aim of marriage." The desire to limit family should come 
not only from selfishness, but from "the idea that a woman 
in the modem world ought not to be asked to submerge her­
self entirely in the duties and demands of maternity. "^90 
On all grounds, sociological and Christian, "the smaller 
family of the modem fashion is preferable to that of our 
predecessors." The Christian ethic must be prepared to 
incorporate such knowledge into its formulation of an 
ethic of birth control, and not just continue to insist 
that the Bible says "be fruitful and multiply" - a com­
mand which was intended for a day when an increase of 
population was mandatory for successful survival* But:
From the Christian standpoint a human baby is of more value than a Baby Austin . . .  No serious thinker, least of all the Christian, can blind himself to the grave moral symptoms involved in undue restriction of the family. But families cannot be reared on a sense of duty. It is no good saying that people ought to have them. The procreation of childr^ is Bearable only as the crown of delight and joy.491
(3) This brings Barry to a third consideration: 
that of our attitude to the question of population. "An 
absolute increase in population is not necessarily a 
Christian ideal." "There are no Christian values involved 
in a quantitative increase of homo sapiens. Our
p. 224
p. 223
492Ibid., p. 225
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attitude should depend "on what population is needed to 
produce the best way of* life under the conditions of a 
given area." It is a matter which belongs to the experts - 
"the material for a moral decision must be supplied very 
largely by economics."^93 Futile sentimentalism or ir­
relevancy results if we proceed with an ethic of popula­
tion control which ignores the economic facts of existence.
So too with biological efficiency. Christianity ought to set itself decisively against the multipli­cation of the unfit, and to work for a far more sen­sitive public in all that concerns hygiene and eu­genics.494
Eugenics need not become a "new religion," but the Chris­
tian ethic will emphasize the responsibilities involved.
The traditionalists were meanwhile increasing the 
tempo of their preachment to "Be fruitful and multiply 
and replenish the earth. " H* C. Mortimer was worried 
then that the population decrease due to the use of con­
traceptives would deplete the human population from the 
face of the earth.
Bean Inge, meanwliile, like Barry, had caught the 
most important aspect of the topic. Inge had investigated 
from all available sources of information around him the
494^ Ibid., p. 226
C. Mortimer, The Elements of Moral Theology (London: Adam and Charles Black',' 1947), p. 181. It is after all, rather difficult to reconcile Mortimer's fear regarding contraceptives and the decline of population, with his earlier belief in the same book that celibacy and chastity are great Christian virtues which should be con­sidered by all.
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relevant information, and had concluded;
One of the most ominous and discreditable symp­toms of the want of candour in present-day society is the deliberate neglect of the population ques­tion* 496
The growing birth rate and declining death rate were al­
ready showing signs that the coming problem of over-popu­
lation would be critical indeed. It was a problem that 
Malthus and Darwin foresaw as well, and Inge makes ref­
erence to Darwin's predictions regarding it* "The op­
timum population of the British Isles," write Inge (al­
though he also said that a decline in the numbers of 
Englishmen and Scotsmen would not be a good thing) "is 
probably several million less than the forty-eight mil­
lion now*"497
The main fact of the matter is that we will have 
to reduce our population and, if we conclude that a re­
striction of the numbers of births is a part of the 
Christian responsibility, "the question" said Barry, 
"becomes simply the choice of the right method for secur- 
ing this.”^9®
The "new data" which must be considered is the 
increasing use and effectiveness of contraceptives.
There are problems involved here. For one, Barry warns 
of an accusation which is often used in the United States,
^^^Inge, Christian Ethics, Modern Problems, p. 257
497Ibid., p, 271
498Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p. 227
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and its current racial troubles - that contraceptive in­
formation can be used to shirk the responsibilities of the 
society to "deal faithfully with slum properties and pro­
vide working-class dwellings # " Teaching the poor to limit 
families can be a way of reducing the social problem#^^9 
There is also the problem that an increased use of con­
traceptive devices leads to widespread prcmoiscuity* But, 
answers Barry, "such knowledge is already the common pro­
perty of the young," and "the moral judgment must choose 
between driving it furtively behind a hedge and employing 
it in a frank, scientific way to enrich the values of mar­
ried life # " For
If we compel sincere men and women to import shame, evasion, and subterfuge into their most intimate rela­tionships, how can we hope to Christianize home life, or to construct a Christian social order from its foun­dations in the home upwards ?P01
The objection that the use of contraceptives is 
"unnatural," says nothing to modem man* "Everything in 
civilized life depends on conscious control of the natural 
processes," and it can be "a most important step towards 
the deliberate direction of instinct What will be
the most important interest for the Christian ethic is 
not that the new discovery makes it easier to be inmoral.
499See F* Wertman, A Sim for Cain, passim, where the accusation is directed"^ih fa%r of the American negro*500Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p* 230501Barry, Relevance of the Church, p* l6?502Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p* 231
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as was taught by Mortimer, but that:
It is that these new facts and changed circum­stances involve results still to be fully appreciated on the content of men's moral judgments and the per­sonal conduct of good men and women. 503
"All new discoveries bring new moral problems, insofar as
they widen the area of choice.
Contrast that approach with another Anglican moralist, 
H* G. Mortimer* Mortimer Included a chapter on "Sex and 
Marriage" in his book, Christian Ethics. The human body, 
he wrote, is to be used only for the purpose for which it 
was created. "It seems self-evident that the human race 
is divided into two sexes for the purpose of propagation.
The right use of the sexual instinct will take place in re­
gard only to parenthood and a life-long partnership* Even 
there the sex act will be mistrusted for while ''Christian 
ethics does not condemn pleasure in sex, it mistrusts it 
because of its Intensity."Modesty and delicacy," 
Mortimer says, "are an instinctive natural protection 
against the degradation of the self which inevitably fol­
lows from a misuse of its vehicle of expression."^07
Also in his text-book. The Elements of Moral The­
ology, Mortimer discussed sexual relations and contracep­
tives. Els natural law casuistry there declared that
p. 231
504•^ ^^ Xbid., p. 197
^®^ortlmer> Christian Ethics> (London: Hutchinson & Co.^  195Ph P* 106 --------------^®°lbid., p. Ill
5°7xbid., p. 105
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"reliance on contraceptives has been a major factor in the
increase of promieeuity,508 an(% contraception leads to an
unnatural use of the human sexuality#
The real question on contraceptives is that it turns into a form of unnatural vice# It is unnatural because it is directly opposed to the end for which the sexual act is intended#509
He does acknowledge the "growing tendency to admit the
quasi***sacramental nature of sex," and tîiat today we are 
trying to understand sexual relations as an expression of 
love and a sharing of parsonhood# But even there, it 
should accompany the original purpose for which sex was 
created.
Our cause is not to discredit those who happen to 
thinii (wrongly we would say) that contraceptives are un­
natural and immoral, Neither is it to ridicule those who 
think differently about ethics. It is a matter of pro­
cedure and a matter of how a moralist receives his infor­
mation, however he uses it in the end# In this case 
Mortimer has attempted to read out of a theory of natural 
history, a created purpose for human sexuality. We con­
clude that his methodology is wrong, as well as the moral 
counsel he gives in the end,
Lippmann seems more to the point of the argument in 
the thirties, and in some isolated areas today.
With contraception established as a more or less
508Mortimer, Elements of Moral Theology, p, 178
509Ibid#, p. 178
434
legitimate idea in modern society, a vast discussion has ensued as to how the practice of it can be ra­tionalized.
We would substitute for "rationalized" something more in 
the order of how the practice can be understood to belong 
in the changing climate of Christian ethics; but the end 
result is the same.
(4) Barry begins his discussion of the "new data" 
regarding divorce with the words;
The battle tactics of the Church Militant, as it sets itself to hold or reconquer the ideal of marriage for the Christian standards, do not suggest very bril­liant generalship. It has always been prone to defend the wrong line. Thus we wasted our strength and energy in resisting the Deceased Wife's Sister's Bill, which involved no vital Christian principle, and meanwhile we marry first cousins, and gaily confer the blessing of the Church on countless marriages which are really wrong and should not be pexmitted by any legislation.We are now in danger of making the same mistake in our attitude to the question of divorce.
We "drag our ideal through the mud" when we insist that a 
marriage with no real meaning must be continued because 
the Christian conception of marriage is that it should be 
lifelong and indissoluble. "No healthy moral opinion can 
be formed in the general mind of society by holding compul­
sorily together two people who belong to one another in 
nothing except a tie imposed by the l a w . T h e  Church 
must become aware "that there are bound to be cases where 
a marriage proves to be morally unworkable."
510Idppmann, Preface to Morals, p. 293
®^^Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p. 233 
512Ibid., p. 235
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For Christianity, marriage is indissoluble - but 
only on Christian presuppositions. 5^3 it is only those 
"whom God has truly joined together" which man may not put 
asunder, Barry suggests that the continental system of 
two marriage services - one state and legally binding, 
one Church "and not confused with the legal contract," is 
worth serious consideration. In that way the Christian 
Church would be rescued from "the hypocrisy of blessing 
marriages which it ought not to recognize,"
But Barry's objection to the double-marriage propo­
sition is that the practice would endanger the central 
part which the church now plays, or can play, in its 
ministry to the young married couples, "Where the parties 
involved have not reached the level of fully developed 
Christian thinking," they would neither qualify nor apply. 
The possible help which the Christian Church could offer, 
would then be lost.
But as an alternative, the church should make its 
rules "more realistic and more adaptable to changing con­
ditions," VJhat the church really means by Indissoluble 
is not that it is sacramental but that the "married state 
is capable of becoming something sacramental,"
The defense of the Church's law as it stands is, obviously, that there is no hope of any marriage be­coming sacramental unless it is entered upon by the parties with a firm and honest intent of life-long fidelity and companionship,514
p. 236
514•^^ I^bid,, p. 239
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( 5 ) Women ' b Vocations ;
We can hope for no adequate Christian ethic 'til we have given more thorough consideration to the whole standing of women in the modem world and the poise and rhythm of feminine life,^^^
This is a concern of Bishop Barry's which follovrs di­
rectly out of the Women's Rights Movements which were charac­
teristic of the time when he was writing the Relevance of 
Christianity, It is a clear defense of the right of women 
(wife and mother) to be individuals on their own#
It is urgently necessary for the Christian ethic that we should attempt to lay open fresh avenues of useful and worthwhile service which will offer women a richer and wider scope for their contribution to community life #516
In the earlier writing Barry discussed the problems 
of sexual ethics under the chapter heading "The Family#" 
Those specifics which he mentioned were always related to 
the effect which they had on marriage and family life# It 
is significant that in Christian Ethics and Secular Bociety, 
he enlarges the setting in which the discussion takes place. 
A wide range of the problems of sexual ethics is seen in 
the relationship of the individual to himself and to the 
whole society# Ethical problems regarding homosexuality, 
abortion or sterilization, which were not mentioned in the 
previous volume at all, receive careful and often lengthy 
consideration here. "Charity and Chastity" becomes a full 
chapter on its own#
515"^ Ibid., p# 24a516Ibid., p. 246
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The structure of his ethical approach alters 
slightly over the years, hut some emphases are different* 
One reflects Barry's Increasing awareness of the ever-in­
creasing volume of animal behaviour studies* Evolutionary 
Ethics, and in particular Julian Huxley's attempt, are re­
jected in favour of a more balanced view of the origin of 
man and his behaviour*
We must first disavow the fallacy of origins as expressed in the popular phrase 'it is human nature to be' pugnacious, acquisitive or sensual* It is fatally easy to think that because man is a product of biological evolution, biology can determine our moral Judgements *517
Directly to the point of our thesis, Barry acknowl­
edges that man inherits the "pre-human instinct." "We 
have our roots in pre-human nature and it is at our peril 
that we forget it*"®^® We may inherit the range of in­
stinct Î
But in man the inherited instincts are no longer simply biological facts* He is able to reflect upon them, work upon them in thought and imagination, to bring them under rational control, to choose the ob­jects of their satisfaction, to direct them as means to his own ends and purposes, and in all these ways they are profoundly modified.519
Instincts (or vitalities or drives) are "neither 
moral nor Immoral; they are Just the conditions of our 
existence." If we use the word "natural" in its usual 
sense, then "Nothing that man does is ever simply natural, "
517Barry, Christian Ethics, Secular Bociety, p. 157
 ^ Ibid,, p. 153
^^^Ibid., p. 158
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All Of hie activity must be seen in his manhood* But, 
especially on the subject of human sexuality, we should 
be aware that "instinctive drives" are "the potential stuff 
of character." But a Christian theology of sex "will be 
a theology of personality and the rightful place of bio­
logical impulses in man's psycho-physical constitution.
. * * %at we ought to be thinking and talking about, if we are to be thinking as Christians or indeed as rational beings at all, is not about something called sex, but about people, moral personalities, about the Christian understanding and interpretation of human life and the place of biological instincts in it. And it is only within that frame of reference that we can be talking in Christian or ethical terms.
The isolation of the subject of sex, even if it be 
by well meaning educators who teach the "facts of life 
honestly and openly to the young people in our society, 
can be positively harmful."
For a Christian child the first and most important thing is to learn that though he is cousin to the apes - which he knows in experience pretty well already - what he is essentially is a child of God and heir of ever­lasting life . . .322
It is precisely because man is man that we cannot 
view his biological impulses other than in their potentially 
moral situation.
If a man "sins in his sex," or becomes a glutton or a drunkard, that is not because sex or hunger or thirst are sinful but because he is sinful and per­verts them. Human beings alone, because they are
520Ibid., p. 159
^^^Ibid., p. 157 
522Ibid., p. 159
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human beings, are capable of "inordinate desire.
The most important fact for young children to know is 
"what is meant by moral personality." We do not teach 
children not to be greedy by showing them pictures of the 
digestive organs." Bather we supply them with the moral 
principles "in the light of which they can leam to control 
and harmonize their still uncoordinated impulses and to 
grow up, to become mature and adult#"
The question of pre-marital intercourse, writes 
Barry, "is the most live question in this field today#"324 
Our thinking must be realistic* And although Christianity 
"quite clearly cannot approve of It," we should see it in 
the context of its social setting and biological impulses 
in a society which "offers them little help and certainly 
sets no standard they can respect#"
Barry's argument against pre-marital intercourse is 
one which avoids the actual question for he transfers our 
attention to the Christian concept of sex and marriage#
Its "end" and its fulfillment is the "one-flesh" union, 
"that is to say the union of two persons totally committed 
to one another, living and sharing the whole of life to­
gether. If that be so, concludes Barry, sexual ex­
perience outside of marriage is wrong#
W d . ,  p. 16,3
p.
p. 176
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But later, discussing contraceptive information 
and its availability to the unmarried, he asks:
Bhould it be denied to unmarried young people?The instinctive Christian reaction to that is Of course" ♦ # * But is this quite certainly the right answer?
It is arguable that this is one of the points at which Christian citizens in a sinful world have no choice but to opt for the leaser of two evils*In any case you cannot compel people to avoid ^  fornication by withholding information from t h e m #  3 ^ 0
Homosexuality "is another case whore new knowl­
edge requires a new approach to the whole problem, and 
a reexamination of certain inherited Christian moral 
judgements * ^'327 ”3ex may be always to some extent ambiva­
lent, as it certainly seems to be in some of the animals." 
There are infinite variations and degrees of interpreta­
tion, and "far too little is known even now#"
Barry draws a clear distinction between "the homo­
sexual" and "the homosexual act"; the former a clinical 
probleia, the later a moral one. The homosexual is a 
"deprived person, cut off from a full share in the coa- 
mon life," handicapped, as are the blind, and not subject 
to a moral judgment. The act of homosexuality, in all of 
its various forms, is "something morally evil, which no 
Christian is likely, or ought, to minimize*"3^®
'iMd., p. 203
p. 178
*528Ibid., p. 180
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The intent of the distinction is in itself com­
mendable* Barry is using it to plead for an acceptance of 
the homosexual as a person* But in the process, his argu­
ment becomes confusing. On the one hand, he acknowledges 
that some homosexuality is constitutional, for although 
some perverts choose homosexuality, there are others vdio 
cannot help it; they are made that way#
At the end of the scale, however, there are notoriously a considerable number of both men and women who are constitutionally incapable of any at­traction towards the opposite sex and whose whole sexual development is fixated etnd inverted within their own.3^9
That is his handicap, his deprivation and, as with any other disability, he has to learn to accept it and live with it and make the best that he can of life in spite of it*330
Barry does not go into great detail as to why a person may 
be "constitutionally" homosexual; but we can assume from 
his association of the ambivalence of sex in the same para­
graph (and from Barry's other use of biological information), 
that he means that it is part of the natural endowment, over 
which the individual has no rational control#3®^
On the other hand, he insists that homosexual acts, 
or the expression of a natural endowment, are "greviously 
sinful in the sight of God - If we love righteousness, we 
must hate iniquity."
pp. 178.-79530Ibid., p. 179
531Although he later writes (p. 184): "at the moment there appears to be no agreement whether this condition has any physiological or biological or genetic basis." It could be (in Barry's thought) a purely environmental condition.
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One gets the impression that Barry is arguing that 
while it may be natural and acceptable to be a homosexual 
in thought and desire, it is unacceptable and "unnatural" 
to act as one. Our objection is not so much a defense of 
the right of the homosexual to practice homosexuality, as 
it is an objection that Barry seems to be inconsistent in 
his use of what is (or may be) natural*
If homosexuality Is "constitutional," it seems dan­
gerous for a Christian moralist to conclude, as Barry does:
Provided that both sexes are included, Christians will of course judge that perversion, deflecting the laws of creation from their course and submitting hu­man beings to degradation, is greviously sinful in the sight of God.532
The source of the inconsistency and the subsequent confusion, 
as was also true with Dr. Barth, lies in the concept of crea­
tion regarding man and woman, which arises not from biolo­
gical study but from Biblical vocabulary alone:
Man and woman are correlative terms. Man and woman are made for one another, they need one another, reach out for one another* • . . Human life needs for its fulfillment this mutuality between man and woman, complementary to one another, and each supplying what the other lacks : neither man nor woman alone is self sufficient.533
Whatever the conclusion on homosexuality - whether it 
be the moral rejection here, or the moral acceptance else­
where, when one begins with so clear and final a description 
of the man-woman relation in nature, one’s viewpoint of
5^2Christian Ethics, Secular Society, p. 183
533ibld., p. 167
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of homosexuality is necessarily limited* Neither Barry 
nor Barth is prepared to discuss the possibility that homo­
sexuality may be an expression of a biological and genetic 
requirement. Barry is certainly closer to the open inves­
tigation that seems warranted by the facts of scientific 
discovery. But he is not freed from the beginning assump­
tion that homosexuality must in the end be a grevious 
sln.534
There are other aspects in the development of Barry’s 
ethical writings on these m a t t e r s . B u t  with a few minor 
exceptions, he has approached the problems from the scien­
tific information available, and has applied it to his 
workable Christian ethic. Suicide, euthanasia, abortion, 
and sterilization are discussed under "The Sanctity of 
&ife."^3& B&oh belongs to a contemporary understanding of 
what is meant by the commandment "Thou shalt not kill."
Barry suggests that in each of these areas, there is a 
necessary exception to the traditional condemnations. Sui­
cide "must be seen in its wider social reference," and "the 
Christian Judgement will surely be very merciful." Un­
compromising laws on euthanasia are unfair to the doctor
634Bee W* N. Btttenger: Christian View of Sexual Be- Seabury Press7'1554)    _ _
For example p. 197, Christian Ethics, Secular So­ciety, when he writes that cohtracèptives "witnih marriage can be used for selfish ends . . .  to avoid having a family at all . . . and that, as defeating the primary end of mar­riage, is unnatural and a sin' againsl"he" explained that the reproductive process was not the pri­mary end of marriage.
pp. 246 ff.
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who must make the decision day by day. We should exer­
cise care in reforming the laws on abortion "lest public 
opinion should come to regard the practice of abortion, as 
pre-Christian society regarded it, as just a simple and 
obvious way out."537 Bu,t abortion in some instances is 
morally necessary. Compulsory sterilization is "an in­
fringement of human rights . . . which a Christian ethic 
is bound to condemn and resist".; but therapeutic or eugenic 
abortions can be justified#
The two governing principles" close this section 
of Barry’s writing, and also apply to the whole of his 
ethical approach:
First, that the new discoveries of the sciences, insofar as they tend to liberate human life from the sheer determinism of nature, may serve to enhance the sanctity of life in the Will of God, and so call for Christian welcome. But secondly, that obedience to the Will of God means bringing science under moral control. Because science knows how to do things, it does not follow that it is right to do them. 530
p. 261
p. 263
6. Conclusion
We say then. In conclusion of this section, that 
F* R. Barry combines the best of both worlds, in his ethical 
approach as well as in his moral solutions. Barry can 
serve the church as a good model in the way the Christian 
moralist should do his work in the last part of the twen­
tieth century. One must always keep the tension between 
man, as he appears in nature, in his biological origin, 
in his sociological setting, in his psychological develop­
ment, and in his theological significance. The authentic 
genius of the Christian faith is that while being other­
worldly and relentlessly religious.
Yet it reveals itself from the first not only as a redemptive antiseptic, the salt that saves the world from decay, but as a vital and transforming force within the movements of this-world history.535^
The relationship with the world about him Barry 
teaches, is one that is genuinely apologetic. Exhortations 
about how bad the world is have no place in the creative 
work of Christian ethics. The day has come when new sides 
have formed: all who honour the dignity of man and who 
seek for him a better, larger place, are aligned together 
in the search for solutions. Anyway, it is not man but
539Barry, Relevance of Christianity, p. 66
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God who "pronounces the last Judgment* The Church is not 
here to condemn the world, but to save the world, and it 
will not be saved by censorious attitudes*"540
Barry is useful to our research because he puts the 
whole idea into practice* He is conversant with the sci­
entific materials regarding the nature of man, and he ap­
plies it to the essential contribution which is made by 
the Christian faith. He is flexible and willing to fol­
low wherever truth leads. His ethical counsel is in the 
end rather simple in general: "Test all things, but hold
fast to what is good." In the specific, it is rigorous
and demanding in searcliing out the facts in each situa­
tion, then to apply them with the principles of Chris­
tianity.
Throughout his ethics Barry is concerned for the 
church and its relationship to and in the world* That is 
the purpose of the church, to redeem the world. What we
mean by the church is that "It is to be the Body of Christ
in the world* Tiiat is to say, it is to be the society 
through which God is revealed in the social order* It
is to live the faith in each generation*
The expression of the Christian ethic is rooted in 
an ultimate change* The principles which underlie it are 
not, Barry teaches that moral decisions are "experimental*"
54oBarry, Christian Ethics, Secular Society, p. 24
^^^Barry, "Christianity and Crisis," p* 588
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They have to be made in particular situations with the 
materials of the situation at h a n d . 542 gjhey are informed 
constantly by the constancy of the principles; but there 
is a newness about each new decision. Twenty-five years 
ago he wrote:
If the "new" morality is un-Christian - and some of its experiments and suggestions do cut across Christian principle - that is not merely because it is new, Christianity is in itself a new morality.It was thus that it first appeared in the world, transvaluing the accepted values, undermining many established traditions,543
Every generation thinks of itself as being the start­
ing point for all good theology and ethics; "Things that 
we were trying to say thirty years ago have been dis­
covered by the younger men and are being proclaimed as 
new revelations. But the life and thought of the Church 
are in fact continuous and each generation offers its 
little gift."544 Barry’s "little gift" has been an enor­
mous contribution indeed to the development and under­
standing of Christian morality and responsibility in this 
century.
Finally, Barry is optimistic, in a way that many 
others are not. Through all the years of this century, 
with wars, and economic collapse, with all the upheaval 
and re - evaluation of the fall of the British Empire, with
542Barry, Christian Ethics, Secular Society, p. 97
543Barry, Relevance of the Church, p.r  •frrn'ilT‘rfrii'i*r'1i~"r TTTi- « I*— -rurVri— f  fnri~ f  i--nnnn.ir ri<«m..—-nfm«(riuf i in 11 . 'i ii ir ii i
544Barry, Mervyn Halgh (London: SPCK, 1964), p. 10
all of the moral and aoolal revolution, Barry wrltea hie 
optimistic plea, "before the night cometh when no man 
can work. " Earlier he said:
Nearly all our cherished hopes have failed us,and everything In the world today conspires to drive us back on a disillusioned skepticism# One after another good men are succumbing to It, and sadly re­sign themselves to the admission that In the world of 1.937 Christian idealism is a proved failure.545
But It has not failed, not really» A study of the 
natural world and the biological origin of man does not 
lead back to the dust from which he came# It leads 
ahead to the end of history, and to its ultimate destina- 
tion# "Mbn Is neither an animal nor a god# He is a 
spirit yet an embodied spirit# He is part of nature yet 
he is not confined by it#"546
If our hopes and Ideals are but wlsh-fulflll-ments in a world that is built upon some alien pat­tern, nothing but disillusionment awaits us* If the religion of Jesus Christ is true, the forces of hope, renewal and good will are stronger than those of re­action and deoay#54f
With Charles Darwin, "There Is a grandeur in this view
of life*"
p;Barry, tihat Bas Christianity To Bay? p. 43 
546Barry, Christian Ethics, Secular Society# p. 6? 
Barry, Wmt Bas Christianity To Bay?, p# 62
Neither the scientist nor church man of today can follow his dogmatic forbears to claim that any present form of scientific interpretation is final or absolute; nor that all can be revealed to man in religion.We can travel hopefully; it does not seem to be our earthly destiny to arrive,^
“^Habgood, Religion and Boience, p. vili
# 9
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The strength of our conclusion is contained 
within the pages of this thesis. Throughout, we have 
returned to the salient point and purpose of the writing.
It remains only to recapitulate the major emphases and 
to express a continuing concern about the future of our 
research. In that regard we can look briefly into two 
specific questions regarding the ground we have covered 
in the thesis and a look forward to where the research 
leads next.
To the first : Unfortunately ,we have been forced f
to limit our presentation of the relevant material by 
the demands of space and the concern for a manageable 
thesis argument. Ooncoiaitant with this study are several 
questions which are obviously not answered in this writ­
ing# The caution of Sir Bryan Matthews, as he intro­
duced J. S. Habgood’a Religion and Science, seems 
appropriates
.-1«.Sÿ'r
450
We have "traveled hopefully" In the writing of 
this thesis, to the conclusion that an accurate under­
standing of evolutionary man is essential to the ground- 
work of Christian ethics in our day* Without it ive 
fail our central task, and our ethical reflection and 
moral guidance becomes irrelevant to the needs of modem 
man.
The point is not that man is essentially good, 
neither that he is essentially evil, but that as he 
develops he is essentially responsible to make the best 
use of both* Man is essentially human, and in that 
humanity he lives by the grace of God in Jesus Christ, 
but he also lives in that human condition which is 
largely Influenced by factors over which he has no 
conscious control. A concluding re-emphasis of that 
point performs some essential tasks for the Christian 
moralist. It reminds him of the fact of man’s existence 
and helps to correct an Improper rendering of man and 
his ethical possibilities, It forces him to withhold 
his conclusions on moral topics until he has included 
the relevant studies of the nature of the natural man.
It leads him directly to the proper work of apologetics 
and the inter-communication with other disciplines which 
are also engaged, rightly, in the study of man. It opens 
a wide range of possibility to give depth and relevance 
to his ethical reflection* It teaches him an ultimate 
humility in his ethical conclusions and enhances the
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possibility that him ethical advice will be helpful 
in the solution of many ethical problems of our time*
In the thesis we have made these general com­
ments more specific. The material in "The life Bolences 
and Ethics" speaks for itself. There we surveyed some 
examples of the kind of research and reflection from 
the life sciences which fortify the above conclusions.
In "Christian Ethics and The life Seiencas," with 
Tennant, Barth and Barry, we investigated, how applicable 
should be the concerns of the scientists. Tennant led 
our understanding of a committed Christian who was 
openly guided by these kinds of concerns, Barth was 
useful in maintaining a positively Christian oonmit- 
ment and also, at times, arrived at useful conclusions, 
Barry was the practical Christian moralist who applied 
the information to the plethora of moral problems which 
are involved. All three are useful to our thesis,
The question remains of where we go from here. 
Those who are familiar with the subject matter of this 
thesis will notice that we did not include many of the 
obvious ethical-moral situations which are directly re­
lated to the topic. Arising out of our concern are 
related discussions involving such Immediate problems 
e, g,> as the possibilities of genetic engineering; the 
whole topic of eugenics and micro-surgery on the genes; 
artificial manipulation of personality^ mood and mind
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control by chemical and/or surgical meansj artificial
creation of life; as well as the purposeful direction 
of the continuing evolutionary process. These are real 
problems with which Christian morality is only beginning 
to deal. One immediate answer to our questions is that 
the present reseraoh must continue to follow in these 
directions as well^ applying the same balanced under­
standing of man and his creation as we have attempted 
here.
Beyond that kind of specific problem there is 
need to enlarge the present investigation^ and develop 
further the ethical implications of how the Christian 
doctrine of man is affected by such a study. Our prin­
cipal interest has been in ethics itself. But the 
theological problem of man and his sin^ the fall and 
Christian atonement^ which were discussed but briefly 
in the chapter on Tennant* are still opened to a new 
reflection* and the possible results are far reaching 
and critical,
Still further* there is need now to incorporate 
the results of this investigation into the larger con­
cern of how man’s ethical and moral activity is pre­
conditioned not only by the biological situation but 
in the psychological* anthropological* and sociological 
settings as well. This thesis is a partial report on how 
moral decisions are and can be made* It is an initial 
effort in handling the cooperative ethical enterprise
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with all of the solence that attempts to understand man 
and hla morality - our attenqpt to become a knowledgeable 
amateur in a related field,
Christianity has always known that man is a creature ♦ ♦ , It ascribes to man neither meta­physical nor moral glories* and it sees the es­sence of man neither in what he is* nor in what he has been* but in the wholly surprising and un­merited attitude of God towards him* and in what he may therefore hope to become, , ♦ » It is my belief that this Christian dodtrine of man can serve at the same time the presupposition and in­tellectual basis of both the naturalistic anthro­pology of our social sciences and the humanism of our civilization,^
This approach to the study of ethics can serve not 
only the Christian faith* the naturalistic anthropology* 
and the humanism of our civilization* but can also serve 
to assist us in some Immediate conclusions to the ethical 
dilemmas of modern civilization. To that end we offer 
both this thesis and the continuing concern for its topic,
proper study of mankind should therefore not be only man himself* as Alexander Fop© would have put it* but should be the universe - its contents* its mechanics* the atoms in time and space* and the molecules in organisms* it should be the electrochemical operators that we call nerves* brain* and mind* and the socializing impulse that puts simple atoms into molecular complexes* that puts bees and ants into colonies* and men into civilizations, These paths to under­standing should all be followed for the proper study of mankind,3
p. 17
2Casserly* Morals and Man in the Social Sciences#
3Harlow Ghapley* Science Ponders Religion (New York: Appleton-0entury-CroF6s/"Ihc, * TgEOlTpT v
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